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This thesis presents a theory of structural irony gleaned from the irony theorised 
and performed in the texts of thinkers whose works operate on the border of the 
(non)propositional: Plato, Friedrich Schlegel, Maurice Blanchot, Paul de Man, 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. While focusing on the irony performed 
in the texts of Jacques Derrida, and using his engagements with these thinkers as 
a frame, this is not a theory of “Derridean” irony, but an irony (primarily) 
elaborated through a deconstructive approach and vocabulary. Structural irony is 
seen to take the form of the transgressive step/counter-step of parabasis and the 
non-hierarchical disorder of parataxis. It is an anacoluthic force/weakness, and 
exhibits the conjunctive/disjunctive trait of hyphenation. It is neither of cynical, 
aesthetic distance nor humorous, parodic engagement, but is a productive 
movement of (impossible) negotiation between terms. Irony is an expression of 
the beyond, within, and this reworking of borders and limits is performed in the 
fragment/aphorism. The (ir)responsible step taken in Derrida‟s texts is 
understood as a mode of structural irony, and it is proposed that the stylistic 
changes that occurred in Derrida‟s “later” texts were in part due to the 
autoimmunity caused by an overexposure to the “laws of the interview”. 
Throughout the thesis styles that manipulate the unmasterable excesses of irony 
are investigated, and each chapter ends with a reading of one of Derrida‟s more 
“literary” or “performative” texts, while recognising and playing with the falsity 
of such generic makers or divisions. Inscribing Derrida within a tradition of 
thinkers of the non-thetic both extends readings of that tradition and of irony 
itself, while affording a valuable way of approaching the “structures” within 
Derrida‟s texts. Irony is not presented as the transcendental signifier of 
deconstruction, but as a profitable way of understanding deconstruction and its 
relation to other writers.  
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Introduction  
 
Over the course of its history, the signifier irony has designated an almost 
bewildering array of contradictory signifieds, often in the works of the same 
writer. When we use the term we are thus drawn into a complex web of 
paradoxical implications, as irony is vile, self-congratulatory superiority and 
humble or urbane self-deprecation. It is a technique of sly trickery and harsh but 
caring pedagogy. It is a simple figure of speech and an entire way of life, a mild 
form of dissimulation and the cause of an execution. It is a trope, the trope of 
tropes, and not a trope at all. It is a plain inversion and a complex mode of 
consciousness, immersed engagement and superior distance, an inevitable 
function of language and a cruel and unusual use. It is purely rhetorical and deeply 
structural, (auto)poiesis and (auto)annihilation, a duty and an indulgence. It is a 
dialectic, an entrapped oscillation, an endless interruption, a permanent becoming, 
political and private, transcendent and nihilistic, ethical, unethical and a-ethical. It 
is sarcasm, wit, scepticism and enthusiasm, evokes sympathy and hostility, 
empathy and incomprehension, and is a divine and wholly human mode of 
creation. It is inclusive and exclusive, a display of poetic skill, indicative of the 
complete absence of literary ability, historically grounded and ahistorical, 
productive and interruptive of communication. It is simple irony, complex irony, 
conditional irony, reverse irony, rhetorical irony, dramatic irony, tragic irony, 
satirical irony, situational irony, Socratic irony, Romantic irony and the irony of 
irony. 
 Despite the myriad uses and theories of irony, common ground is typically 
found in the sense of disjunction that irony produces, a gap expressible as the 
difference between what is said and what is meant, what was expected and what 
occurred, or the expressed and the excess. The majority of approaches to irony 
address it as a figurative or tropological flourish that masks an attainable literal 
meaning or authorial intention; like a metaphor, irony can be traced backwards to 
an original source and “diffused” through the discovery of the true, intended 
meaning. Against an irony grounded in semantic richness and centred on an 
original, “authentic” meaning, this thesis proffers a theory of structural irony that 
functions in language irrespective of authorial manipulation or reader perception. 
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The positing of a structural irony is not new – Gary Peters describes irony as a 
“complex and dissonant structural principle”,1 and Marian Hobson argues for a 
structural irony whereby “language itself seems to be being ironic, rather than 
there being an author, a source behind it controlling what is going on”.2 This 
thesis, however, takes “les pas de plus et les plus de pas” (the additional steps and 
the one more/no more steps) of irony, offering a specific formulation of structural 
irony that both describes and performs its (counter)movements. Structural irony 
will be shown to operate through the transgressive, interrupted step/counter-step 
of parabasis, and through the non-hierarchical order/disorder that is parataxis. 
Irony is anacoluthic, the interruption of codes and grammatical expectations, and 
shows the trait of hyphenation, a stroke of (dis)connection that unites and 
separates. The structural irony of parabasis and parataxis steps away from the 
seeming inevitability of a presented order or system, and performs the possibility 
of reworking that is radically manifested in the fragment or aphorism. The 
fragment/aphorism is presented as the “perfect” ironic form, with all cognisance 
of the oxymoronic hyphenation between the closure or inevitability associated 
with a “perfect form” and the openness and aleatory reworkings of irony. Irony is 
thus a force of weakness that can be manipulated but not controlled, a 
(counter)force of the autoimmune that turns an entity in on itself in protection and 
exposure. 
Irony is a source of possibility and potentiality, an inventive or productive 
complication that one negotiates. As Miller writes, “The difficulty in analysing the 
narrative line is the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of mastering the 
unmasterable, the trope that is no trope … the trope-no-trope of irony”.3 Irony is 
not simply the sense of discrepancy within a particular context but a pervasive 
inconsistency or incongruity that stems from the divided mark and the resultant 
permanent impossibility of closure. It is a force/weakness that operates deep 
within the logical structure of the split mark which renders clear categories, 
particularly of intention, wholly unstable. Irony is the expression of the beyond, 
within; the beyond of language within language, the beyond of grammar within 
                                                 
1
 Gary Peters, Irony and Singularity: Aesthetic Education from Kant to Levinas (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005) 103. 
2
 Marian Hobson, “Derrida‟s Irony? Or, in order that Homeland security does not come too early 
to the case”, Derrida‟s Legacies: Literature and Philosophy, ed. Simon Glendinning and Robert 
Eaglestone (London: Routledge, 2008) 103. 
3
 J. Hillis Miller, Reading Narrative (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998) 177. 
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grammar, the beyond of ethics within ethics. It is, in other words, the excess 
generated by the divided mark and the connections of the textual web that the 
non-thetic and the non-propositional do not attempt to mask or suppress.  
The theory of structural irony proposed in this thesis is not specifically a 
theory of “Derridean irony”, as the structures it outlines are not restricted to texts 
by Derrida. The common threads are, however, joined together through Derrida, 
and through a vocabulary and approach that is undeniably grounded in 
deconstruction. As such it is a (deconstructive) theory of (deconstructive) irony; a 
theory which is interrupted by that which it theorises; by the unsystematisable and 
non-propositional excesses that irony “names” and which deconstruction 
“recognises”.4 An ironic reading is not an arch, satirical engagement – or at least 
not specifically – but a reading that describes and/or performs the force of 
weakness that is irony. A deconstructive reading can then be described as a 
singular engagement with a text that recognises the “happening” of irony – the 
structural conjunctions and disjunctions within and between marks and structures 
– and which shows, through interruptions, translations and associations, that 
systematic and structural institutions are predicated on grounds neither absolute 
nor inevitable.
5
 A deconstructive reading is a reading of irony that works not to 
suppress or diffuse irony; that is, it does not presume it to be grounded in authorial 
intention, but traces and investigates its irrepressible movement(s). In short, 
deconstruction happens because irony happens.  
The theory of structural irony of this thesis is gleaned from an analysis of 
the theories and uses of irony by writers who recognise the importance of the 
figurative or non-thetic – Plato, Friedrich Schlegel, Maurice Blanchot, Paul de 
Man, Emmanuel Levinas and, above all, Jacques Derrida. Each thinker envisaged 
irony according to different philosophical or theoretical perspectives, and each 
employed irony for vastly different functions. This thesis does not conflate their 
uses of irony, but presents a theory of irony formulated from the common 
operative structures. Thus Nicholas Royle speaks of “Derrida‟s humour, his sense 
of irony, of structural irony, his extraordinary thinking of the serious and the non-
                                                 
4
 Names while knowing the conjunction/disjunction between title and object, and recognises while 
not making an unconditional object of knowledge. 
5
 Bennington describes, or “schematise[s] a little brutally” (Interrupting Derrida (London: 
Routledge, 2000) 96) Derrida‟s mode of reading as double, divided between “what is declared and 
what is said” (96) – between the anti-metaphysical intentions and the metaphysical allegiances, 
and vice versa. His description bears a striking resemblance to descriptions of irony. 
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serious”,6 while Alexander Nehamas sees in Plato‟s (structural) irony one of the 
“most scornful displays of the weakness of readers who assume they are morally 
superior to various characters”.7 Schlegel‟s irony was a project of Bildung, de 
Man‟s was an implacable text machine, Levinas‟s was instrumental in the 
approach to the other. Plato used irony to mask irony, while Derrida uses irony to 
(re)reveal it; despite radically different uses of the “structure”, it remains. 
This should not suggest that the thinkers addressed were all theorists of 
irony, nor that they would have been comfortable with the ironist label. Levinas 
would no doubt be somewhat surprised, and perhaps appalled, to be labelled an 
ironic author, but the conjunctions and interruptions with which his approach to 
the other is expressed/made render his work a performance of structural irony. 
Similarly, Derrida did not leave behind – at least to my knowledge – a definite 
theory of irony, nor did he appear to be wholly comfortable with the term. In 
“This Strange Institution” Derrida says: 
 
Paul de Man was not wrong in suggesting that ultimately all literary 
rhetoric in general is of itself deconstructive, practising what you might 
call a sort of irony, an irony of detachment with regard to metaphysical 
belief or thesis, even when it apparently puts it forward. No doubt this 
should be made more complex, “irony” is perhaps not the best category to 
designate this “suspension”, this epochē, but there is here, certainly, 
something irreducible in poetic or literary experience. (SI 50) 
 
In Memoires for Paul de Man one senses that Derrida feels obliged to stress or 
invent a positive dimension to the term: “Underlying and beyond the most 
rigorous, critical, and relentless irony, within that „Ironie der Ironie‟ evoked by 
Schlegel, whom he would often quote, Paul de Man was a thinker of affirmation” 
(MF 21). However, despite Derrida‟s reservations, and his often traditional, 
rhetorical use of the word, this thesis argues that there is operative and performed 
in Derrida‟s works a force of (dis)connection and non-belonging that is structural 
irony. While the lexeme may not take a dominant role in Derrida‟s texts, nor 
operate as one of Derrida‟s quasi-transcendental signifiers, Derrida‟s work is a 
serious, extended engagement with structural irony. As he said, “I take irony 
seriously; I take the problem of irony very seriously. And we need some irony, 
                                                 
6
 Nicholas Royle, In Memory of Jacques Derrida (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) 
105. 
7
 Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998) 32. 
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that is, something which challenges the commonsensical concepts, and you can‟t 
do this without some irony”. 8  However, while reading Derrida‟s work as a 
performance of and engagement with structural irony, this thesis does not argue 
that irony is the mot juste or transcendental signifier for deconstruction. It does 
not propose that irony is the proper, eidetic term either for deconstruction or the 
effects of the divided mark. Irony cannot be eidetic as, like pharmakon, it is not a 
substance in and of itself – nor, in fact, strictly a structure, but a force of weakness 
that results from the divided mark. It is a good way of approaching deconstruction 
and the mark, but not the only way. 
Readings associating Derrida and irony too often exhibit a marked 
tendency to absorb both into a vague amalgamation of German romanticism and 
postmodernism, whereby the ironic, Derridean text parodies philosophical and 
literary traditions while reflecting with cynical distance on an undifferentiated 
mess of discourses. Deconstruction is reduced to a self-indulgent, self-fulfilling 
project of scepticism, nihilism and indeterminacy. Thus Arnold Krupat describes 
Derrida as one of those “poststructuralist, postmodernist, or neopragmatic ironic 
anti-philosophers” whose “rhetorical success” means that “any who wish to offer 
their own discourse … as more than a „persuasive fiction‟ has an uphill battle to 
fight”.9 Habermas argues that Derrida‟s mixing of genres produces nothing more 
than an “all-devouring context” where the rhetorical is privileged over the logical, 
and sophistic tricks of style are used to undercut philosophical arguments.
10
 Even 
the likes of Ernst Behler and Claire Colebrook show an inclination to reduce 
Derrida to a satirical, genre-crossing, context-transgressing postmodernist.  Hence 
Behler writes that  
 
the style of postmodern writing and the reflexive, ironic mode of 
postmodern thinking is performed at its best in the texts of Jacques Derrida. 
Here, the end of modernity, or better, the infinite transgression of 
                                                 
8
 Jacques Derrida, “Derrida: Screenplay”, Derrida: Screenplay and Essays on the Film, Kirby 
Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman et al (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 91. Spoken 
at the question and answer session following a lecture at the University of the Western Cape, 
South Africa, 1998. 
9
 Arnold Krupat, “An Apollonian Response”, Irony in Action: Anthropology, Practice, and the 
Moral Imagination, ed. James W. Fernandez and Mary Taylor Huber (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001) 135. 
10
 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Fredrick Lawrence 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1995) 190. 
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modernity, is not declared by a statement but enacted through performative 
writing and communicated indirectly.
11
 
 
And Colebrook: 
 
One of the great achievements of Jacques Derrida‟s post-structuralism was 
its capacity to forge a path between … two styles of irony: a satirical irony 
that attacks the conventions of a specific context, and a broader Romantic 
or transcendent irony that aims to think beyond context.
12
  
 
Placing Derrida within a tradition of thinkers of irony provides a radical extension 
to that tradition of irony and non-thetic modes of thought and writing, while also 
affording a new and important way of understanding the structures within 
Derrida‟s oeuvre. It does not propose that Derrida‟s texts and modes of 
engagement are reducible or equivalent to those of the thinkers addressed in this 
work. It argues instead that tracing the descriptions and performances of structural 
irony through these writers affords a profitable way of understanding both 
deconstruction and irony.  
 Writing so as to acknowledge the structural reworking(s) of irony involves 
a certain style, an engagement with a work that recognises within its singularity a 
force of reworking that explodes the text beyond its author, form, language, event. 
That is, each singular event is both produced and undone by the potential of the 
mark to be hyphenated to itself and other marks through infinite, aleatory 
(dis)connections. This “style”, which is also form or structure, performs a certain 
contamination of genres and discourses; the philosophical and the literary, the 
public and the private, the fictional and the autobiographical, etc. Structural irony 
is therefore neither specifically humorous nor specifically bleak, although it can 
be manipulated to produce laughter and tears.  
Irony as (simply) the jocular or facetious is usually read as a form of 
(deliberate) ambiguity whose semantic opposition is such that its disjunctions give 
rise to laughter. As one theorist of humour notes,  
   
One problem with irony is that the intention of the ironist must be made 
clear, that is, people must realise that someone means the opposite of what 
he or she says. Sometimes people don‟t “get” the irony, and take what was 
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 Ernst Behler, Irony and the Discourse of Modernity (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1990) 30.  
12
 Claire Colebrook, Irony (London: Routledge, 2004) 95. 
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said ironically in a literal way. So it is a dangerous method of generating 
humour.
13
 
 
Irony in this reading is simply a deliberate, wry commentary on the difference 
between expectation and outcome – an anacoluthic interruption of syntax or 
situation. Irony understood as scepticism or nihilism – which is addressed through 
Kierkegaard in the first chapter and (misreadings of) Schlegel in the fourth – is a 
deliberate, black commentary on the impossibility of any congruence between 
expectation and outcome – an inescapable anacoluthic interruption of syntax or 
situation. However, as this thesis argues, irony is neither laughter nor tears but a 
force of weakness potentially productive of both. It shares the effect of “everyday 
anamnesis”14 that Simon Critchley sees in the humorous, but is neither essentially 
frivolous nor essentially bleak. Irony is the hyphenation of extremes, the 
movement of conjunction and disjunction between marks, and as such cannot be 
thought of as a single pole or point. Thus when Derrida says that “I have this 
attitude that some people must have perceived as double, of emancipation, revolt, 
irony, and at the same time of scrupulous fidelity” (TS 43), the irony is not the 
single position he posits but the double attitude/movement itself. The 
countermovements of irony name the unmasterable excess that the mark produces. 
Thus, as Royle writes, “No doubt there remains the irony of Derrida as a 
grandmaster of non-mastery. Perhaps an especially helpful way of exploring this 
irony would be in reckoning with the singularity of his work as an affirmation of 
non-belonging”.15 
In “The Concept of Irony” de Man lists three commonly practised modes 
of defusing irony. The first reduces irony to an aesthetic practice or artistic device 
that enables the ironist to achieve an aesthetic distance from the material. The 
second rewrites irony as the dialectic of self-reflection; the self reflecting on itself. 
The third absorbs irony into a dialectic of history, so that it becomes a series of 
ironic moments within a dialectical pattern of historical progression. To answer 
the first, structural irony can, and usually does, manifest itself as a certain style of 
the non-propositional and non-thetic, but it is not simply of the aesthetic, as the 
aesthetic is not separated from the functional or theoretical or philosophical. Nor 
                                                 
13
 Arthur Asa Berger, An Anatomy of Humor (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993) 40-
41. 
14
 Simon Critchley, On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002) 86. 
15
 Nicholas Royle, Jacques Derrida (London: Routledge, 2003) 146. 
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is an ironic style of distance, but an engagement with the potentialities of 
language. In response to the last, structural irony, most noticeably in Derrida, 
steps away from linear, dialectical progression and sees the lines of influence and 
inheritance as crossed and multi-directional.  
In response to the second, irony has no part in immediate or direct 
reflection; in mirroring it does not (simply) alter or distort reality, but destabilises 
the notion of a separate and uncontaminated category of origin or authenticity 
which is then represented or reflected. Irony is the condition of possibility and 
impossibility of self-reflection – the face it reflects is never the face of the proper 
or the same. The positing of ironic language is always catachrestic, always a 
mispositing, or a positing of alterity. The skewed reflection of the self turns 
subject to subjectile, turning the text to alterity while turning every theoretical 
work into an autobiography. 
While irony is often accused of being unethical or immoral in its opacity 
and lack of a stable, definite stance, Derrida‟s irony occasions an engagement 
with the world that is responsible, but a responsibility that recognises its own 
“impossibilities”, and is therefore (ir)responsible. (Ir)responsibility does not 
provide explicit prescriptions for ethical behaviour, nor rules for a moral life, but 
is an openness to alterity, a step towards the other. The responsible step is always 
an ironic step, as not only can the subject never predict with absolute certainty 
where her foot will land, her responsible step of hospitality towards one is an 
irresponsible step of hostility away from another. Which does not condone or 
promote stasis or inaction, but cautions that each step taken should never be 
glorified as the best and only step.  
With the exception of the first, which gives a brief history of irony, each 
chapter presents a (re)reading of a thinker who theorises and/or performs a 
specific mode of structural irony, and whose work is then related to Derrida‟s 
engagement/performance of related structures and concerns. While the focus 
remains throughout on non-propositional modes of argument and communication, 
this non-thetic “style” or “tone” is highlighted at the end of each chapter, which 
concludes with a reading of one of Derrida‟s more “written”, “performative” or 
“literary” texts. These texts are chosen as they perform or explicate the modes of 
structural irony outlined in each chapter, and for an engagement with the writers 
addressed.  
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The first chapter of this thesis gives a brief outline of the history of irony 
from uses in Attic Greece to postmodern irony. It gives an overview of the 
philosophical, rhetorical and critical theories of irony, with a concentration on 
distinguishing the structural irony of Derrida‟s texts from postmodern irony.  
Chapter two establishes the structures through which irony will be 
addressed, beginning by differentiating Derrida‟s irony from that of the (other) 
great deconstructive theorist of irony – Paul de Man. While clearly influenced by 
de Man‟s “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, Derrida not only prefigures de Man‟s 
corrected version in “The Concept of Irony”, but steps beyond it to an irony of the  
perverformative, a contaminated constative/performative force/weakness which 
exceeds propositional exegesis, overstepping boundaries between literature and 
philosophy. The origins of the terms “parabasis” and “permanent parabasis” are 
outlined, and a new mode of transgressive, interruptive parabasis proposed. 
Against Marian Hobson‟s syntactical irony an irony of parataxis is proposed, and 
the structures of hyphenation and the anacoluthon outlined. The chapter ends with 
an exploration of the irony performed in Derrida‟s reading of Francis Ponge‟s 
“Fable”. 
Chapter three traces the lines of connection and inheritance between the 
irony of Plato/Socrates and the ironic functioning of deconstruction. Socratic 
questioning – elenchus – is understood as a structural mode of interruption and 
catachrestic reflection, while the falsely separated Platonic irony that of an 
author‟s attempt to suppress irony through irony. The chapter closes with a 
reading of the ironic, catastrophic turns of “Envois”. A performance of parataxis, 
the cards always say more than was intended, always express more than their 
content directly signifies, always sign to non-thetic excess. Reading “Envois” is 
an ironic, paratactic exercise of interruption and conjunction that disrupts identity, 
legacy, the author and the system.  
Against Wayne Booth‟s grim warning – “fellow romantics, do not push 
the irony too far, or you will pass from the joyful laughter of Tristram Shandy into 
Teutonic gloom. Read Schlegel” 16  – chapter four relates Derrida‟s texts to 
Friedrich Schlegel‟s fragmented irony and the parabatic interruption of Blanchot. 
Traditionally Romantic irony is understood as self-limitation or self-destruction; 
this chapter argues that the movement of Schlegel‟s irony prevents it from ever 
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being simply or only a negative force, and is rather an infinite and shifting 
movement between a range of the positive and negative. The persistent 
fracturation of the work – “Interrupted, it goes on” (ED 59) – found in Blanchot is 
the ironic functioning of permanent parabasis, and the ironic fragmentation – 
paratactic hyphenation – of Schlegel and Blanchot is found in the reworking of 
Derrida‟s fragments and aphorisms. Irony is seen to pertain to a certain 
syncopated or contrapuntal time and contradictory citationality. Derrida‟s essay 
“Che cos‟è la poesia” is read as a performance of “poematic” singularity that 
interrupts and engages with fragmentary, romantic irony. 
Chapter five presents an “ethical interruption” (OB 44) which argues that 
Levinas‟s ethics and Derrida‟s (ir)responsibility function through irony. A non-
programmatic engagement with the other is performed through a language and 
style resting heavily on interruption, disjunction, repetition, a certain scepticism 
and fragmentary seriality – irony. The chapter concludes with a reading of the 
fragmentary ending to “At This Very Moment”.  
Chapter six specifically engages with the changes that arose in what is 
referred to as Derrida‟s “later” style, proposing that an unfortunate overexposure 
to the laws of the interview contributed to this change. As his career progressed 
Derrida was obliged to succumb more frequently to the laws of the interview – to 
present his work orally, reductively, anecdotally and quickly, concentrating on 
accessibility, transparency, and pedagogy. As Derrida increasingly read himself 
he developed a style that is best referred to as autoimmune, a contradictory 
movement of protection/exposure that is ironic. The interview is revisited in the 
autobiographical inter-view, which is seen to be an ironic, parabatic, paratactic, 
fragmentary work, and Circumfession is hence read as exemplary of the ironic text. 
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The History of Irony 
 
Irony and Origins 
 
The terms now usually translated as irony – ειπωνεία (eirōneia), είπων (eirōn) and 
their derivatives – first appeared in the corpus of Attic texts, where they denoted 
thoroughly negative qualities, often of low, sly cunning. In Wasps, Birds and 
Clouds Aristophanes used them in reference to falsity and deceit, and in 
Demosthenes‟ texts they referred to citizens who prevaricate to avoid civic duty.1 
In Laws Plato goes so far as to prescribe death for ironists, while in the Sophist 
eirōnes denotes those imposters, hypocrites and sophists who use language as an 
art in itself, with no involvement in a greater truth. Despite this, throughout 
Plato‟s dialogues it is Socrates who is most commonly associated with irony, an 
irony of dissimulation or self-deprecation.
2
 Socratic irony is typically connected to 
pedagogy, as Socrates‟ form of questioning – elenchus – involved a feigned 
ignorance which caused his interlocutors to stumble over the inconsistencies of 
their own arguments, and therefore, ideally, to recognise their lack of knowledge. 
Despite the intricacies of Socrates‟ arguments, Socratic irony is most often read as 
a basic inversion of meaning that was neither malicious nor intended to deceive, 
but deployed to confuse the interlocutor in order to awaken him. Socrates‟ irony is 
also thought of, however, as the first instance of an ironic life. As G. G. 
Sedgewick writes: “Imagine understatement expanded into the principle of a 
whole life and you have grasped, in the large, a notion of the most famous and 
noble of all the ironies – the irony of Socrates”.3 
Influenced by Plato‟s depiction of Socrates, the ironist in Aristotle 
occupies a somewhat ambiguous position. In Rhetoric Aristotle describes how the 
use of equivocal or incongruous terms can be seen as derisive, and inspire anger in 
interlocutors “at those mocking them when they are being serious; for mockery 
[eirōneia] is contemptuous”.4 However, the ironic form of mockery was also a 
witty and urbane mode: “Mockery [eirōneia] is more gentlemanly than 
                                                 
1
 For more on the origins of the term see Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral 
Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 23. 
2
 Socratic and Schlegelian irony are discussed in detail in chapters three and four respectively; 
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3
 G. G. Sedgewick, Of Irony: Especially in Drama (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948) 9. 
4
 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford 
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buffoonery [bōmolokhia]; for the mocker makes a joke for his own amusement, 
the buffoon for the amusement of others”. 5  In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
distinguishes between the alazon – boaster – and the eirōn – ironist, although 
eirōn is often now translated as self-deprecator. Aristotle‟s eirōn has a moral 
superiority over the alazon, as the eiron self-deprecatingly presents her worth as 
less than it is, while the alazon attempts to increase it. Directly describing 
Socrates‟ disclaimer of his knowledge and virtues as ironic, Aristotle consolidated 
the movement to redeem irony.
6
  
By the 1
st
 Century BC irony had become a clever and engaging mode of 
exposition; Cicero describes Socrates as “fascinating and witty, a genial 
conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call είπων [eirōn] – in every 
conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the 
wisdom of his companion”.7 In De Oratore Socrates‟ “assumed simplicity” is a 
“choice variety of humour … blended with austerity, and suited to public speaking 
as well as to the conversation of gentlemen”.8 The “ironical inversion of verbal 
meanings”9 is described as a pleasurable form of humour: 
 
Irony too gives pleasure, when your words differ from your thoughts, 
not … when you assert exactly the contradictory … but when the whole 
tenor of your speech shows you to be solemnly jesting, what you think 
differing continuously from what you say.
10
 
 
For Cicero, irony is not simply the direct inversion of meaning, but the act of 
“saying one thing and meaning another”.11 Thus while it can be used, for example, 
to condemn via overblown tributes,
12
 the intended meaning is not merely the 
opposite of what was expressed. 
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The identification of irony with humour is continued in Quintilian, where 
even “the most severe form of irony [is] a kind of jest”.13 Irony can be used “to 
blame with a pretence of praise and to praise with a pretence of blame”,14 it is 
feigned ignorance
15
 or misrepresentation
16
 that is employed to “enhance the 
elegance of … style”.17 However, the subtlety of Cicero‟s disjunction between 
words and meaning is lost in Quintilian; irony is antiphrasis, a mode in which 
“the meaning is contrary to that suggested by the words” [emphasis added],18 
although Quintilian does reject the translation of είπων as simply 
“dissimulation”. 19  While the potential for excess is reduced in Quintilian‟s 
formulation of irony, irony proves nonetheless impossible to restrict to a single 
category, belonging “to figures of thought just as much as to tropes”.20  
 
Irony involving a figure does not differ from the irony which is a trope, as 
far as its genus is concerned, since in both cases we understand something 
which is the opposite of what is actually said; on the other hand, a careful 
consideration of the species of irony will soon reveal the fact that they 
differ. In the first place, the trope is franker in its meaning, and, despite the 
fact that it implies something other than it says, makes no pretence about it. 
For the context as a rule is perfectly clear. … But in the figurative form of 
irony the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise being apparent 
rather than confessed. For in the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while 
in the figure the meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case, 
conflicts with the language and the tone of voice adopted; nay, a man‟s 
whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who 
was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost 
in wonder at the wisdom of others.
21
 
 
Thus Quintilian‟s irony has a relatively simple tropological form – one or two 
words whose meaning doesn‟t seem quite right: “Brutus is an honourable man” – 
a slightly less direct figurative form: an entire book or essay like Swift‟s “A 
Modest Proposal” – and the pervasive figure of irony as espoused by Socrates, 
that of an entire life. Hence Quintilian‟s definition of irony as a movement of 
direct and simple inversion becomes immediately problematised by his own 
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example; Socrates‟ life involved masks and subterfuge, indirect communication 
and feigned ignorance, and neither his actions nor his dialogues can be resolved 
through direct inversion.  
In Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas on Irony Dilwyn Knox 
proposes that irony was a relatively common stylistic feature of Medieval and 
Renaissance texts, although it continued to be defined as saying the opposite of 
what is meant or, as he paraphrases, “Yronia denies what it says”.22 Delivery and 
intonation continued to be clues to irony and use and, as he claims, its 
dissimulation was never intended to deceive, though it could certainly mock. 
According to Norman Knox, the first record of irony in English – yronye – 
appeared in Thordynary of Crysten men in 1502,
23
 which stated that self-
deprecatory dissimulation “may be mortall synne and such synne is named 
yronye”.24 In the Restoration and Augustinian periods irony was a verbal device 
used to express praise-by-blame, and it was not until the 1720s, “after the clear-
cut ironies of Defoe and Swift and the constant, obtrusive ironies of controversial 
pamphlets and periodicals, that irony became common in the literary and general 
discourse of the day”.25 However, it was the group of young scholars in Germany 
who became known as the Jena Romantics who gave irony a complex and overtly 
philosophical form. 
 
Irony and Philosophy 
 
German Romantic irony, discussed fully in chapter four, was primarily theorised 
and performed by Friedrich Schlegel in a number of dialogues, essays and 
fragments published in the journal Athenäum (1798-1801). Schlegelian irony is 
most often described as an appreciation of the incomprehensible, incommunicable 
chaos of the world, and an oscillation between self-creation and self-destruction. 
An ironic artist is portrayed as one labouring under an awareness of the limitations 
of the self, one who creates, pouring herself into her work, while at the same time 
reflecting on the insignificance and insufficiency of the work. The ironic work 
should be self-reflexive – work and theory on that work – fragmentary and full of 
contradictory themes which cannot be synthesised or harmonised, while the 
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ironist espouses a mood of superior, mocking alienation and sceptical 
awareness.
26
 Schlegel‟s irony was misread by many of his peers, and continues to 
be misinterpreted, though perhaps without the violence and personal animosity of 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 
Hegel was extremely strongly opposed to the irony posited by Schlegel 
and the Jena Romantics, and was sufficiently roused to condemn irony and “the 
father of irony” – Schlegel – in passionate terms: “This irony was invented by 
Friedrich von Schlegel, and many others have babbled about it or are now 
babbling about it again”.27 As he wrote in Aesthetics: 
 
irony implies the absolute negativity in which the subject is related to 
himself in the annihilation of everything specific and one-sided; but since 
this annihilation … affects not only, as in comedy, what is inherently null 
which manifests itself in its hollowness, but equally everything excellent 
and solid, it follows that irony as this art of annihilating everything 
everywhere, like that heart-felt longing, acquires, at the same time, in 
comparison with the true Ideal, the aspect of inner inartistic lack of 
restraint.
28
 
 
Hegel was deeply troubled by the absolute, independent instrumentality and 
power of the ego as posited by Fichte and used by Schlegel: if all is created by the 
subjectivity of the ego, then all can be destroyed by it, and nothing has any reality 
beyond the ego. Hegel read Fichte‟s theory of living artistically to presuppose that 
all action and expression is mere show, that there is no earnestness and nothing is 
genuine. Since all is of the subject‟s creation, all is false and fake. Irony and the 
ironist become god-like, creating and destroying at whim, causing “the vanity of 
everything factual, moral, and of intrinsic worth, the nullity of everything 
objective and absolutely valid”.29 The supposedly superior position of the ironist 
is revealed as a false and empty pre-eminence, as her artificial elevation leads to 
isolation, to a craving for the solid and substantial and to a longing to escape the 
vanity and impotence of irony. Thus, if as an ironist I attempt to relate to 
something objective, 
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it vanishes at the same moment before my eyes, and so I hover over a pit 
of nothingness, summoning shapes from the depths and annihilating them. 
This supreme type of subjectivism can emerge only in a period of 
advanced culture when faith has lost its seriousness, and its essence is 
simply “all is vanity”.30 
 
Hegel presented Schlegelian irony as an oscillation that eventually causes the 
character to destroy itself: “if an individual comes forth in a determinate way, this 
determinacy is at once to pass over into its opposite, and his character is therefore 
to display nothing but the nullity of its determinacy and itself”.31 Even the use of 
irony as a means of expressing the excess or the inexpressible is dismissed by 
Hegel as inept and inartistic. The ironic mode of writing simply disguises a lack 
of skill: “in F. von Schlegel‟s poems at the time when he imagined himself a poet, 
what is unsaid is given out as the best thing of all; yet this „poetry of poetry‟ 
proved itself to be precisely the flattest prose”.32 In condemning Schlegel Hegel 
does not outright denounce all irony, as this would censure Plato and Socrates. 
Instead he argued that Plato used the term simply  
 
to describe a way of speaking which Socrates employed in conversation 
when defending the Idea of truth and justice against the conceit of the 
Sophists and the uneducated. What he treated ironically, however, was 
only their type of mind, not the Idea itself. Irony is only a manner of 
talking against people.
33
  
 
Hegel‟s polemic against Schlegelian irony inspired Kierkegaard‟s master‟s 
thesis The Concept of Irony: with Constant Reference to Socrates. For him irony 
“is not this or that phenomenon but the totality of existence [Tilværelse] which it 
considers sub specie ironiæ. To this extent one sees the propriety of the Hegelian 
characterisation of irony as infinite absolute negativity”.34 Irony 
 
is negativity because it only negates; it is infinite because it negates not 
this or that phenomenon; and it is absolute because it negates by virtue of a 
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higher which is not. Irony establishes nothing, for that which is to be 
established lies behind it.
35
  
 
The negation that occurs in irony is not a process that leads to something; irony 
has as its goal only irony. For Kierkegaard irony was a negative concept that 
resists positive positing; it lies outside our understanding, and definitions are 
impossible. Irony cannot be reduced, however, to a form of philosophical doubt, 
as when one doubts one seeks to understand an object, whereas when one ironises 
one seeks “to get outside the object … by becoming conscious at every moment 
that the object has no reality”.36 As we shall see below, even though he is rarely 
referred to by postmodernists, Kierkegaard‟s irony bears many similarities to 
postmodern irony.  
For Kierkegaard irony and subjectivity were strongly linked: he deemed 
Socrates‟ injunction to “know thyself” to be the introduction of subjectivity, and 
through that of irony: “when subjectivity asserts itself, irony appears”.37 Unlike 
the Hegelian dialectic, however, the Socratic dialectic begins and ends with 
ignorance, replacing supposed knowledge with “negative infinity”. 38  Socrates‟ 
ignorance, and his knowledge of this ignorance, never becomes a positive content, 
and in this lack of a positive thesis is ironic. It goes nowhere but turns in on itself 
and on the subject: “Socrates appears as one who stands poised ready to leap into 
something, yet at every moment instead of leaping into this „other‟, he leaps aside 
and back into himself”.39 The Socratic identity is thus ironic in its self-reflexivity, 
without its revolution leading to a positive whole.   
For Kierkegaard Socratic irony and German Romantic irony were 
essentially the same thing; their differences were simply historical. Socratic irony 
had the positive effect of introducing subjectivity, but the German Romantics 
reintroduced irony to a world already familiar with the power of the self, and so 
subjective freedom became “an eccentric subjectivity, a subjectivity raised to the 
second power”. 40  Thus while irony, for Kierkegaard, is the negation of all 
historical actuality, in the case of Socrates “it was not actuality altogether that he 
negated, but the given actuality of a certain age, of substantiality as embodied in 
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Hellas”.41 Romantic irony is the subjectivity of subjectivity, a version of Socratic 
irony that is completely adrift, free from every historical actuality. Thus “the 
subject is negatively free. The actuality which shall give him content is not, hence 
he is free from the restraint in which the given actuality binds him, yet negatively 
free and as such hovering, because there nothing is which binds him”.42 Freed 
from historical actuality, irony and the ironic subject become temporally unbound, 
as the past becomes fictional or mythical.  
Irony is the play with nothingness; as reality ceases to become real for the 
ironist everything becomes invalid, a vain fabrication. Kierkegaard‟s (German 
Romantic) ironist dons mask after mask; in the multiplicity of possible 
personalities the ironist loses all stability and continuity of identity. Kierkegaard 
understood the German Romantic ironic life to be a life without essence, whose 
poiesis or production produces nothing at all. As Kierkegaard writes: “the ironist 
does not have the new within his power, it might be asked how he destroys the old, 
and to this it must be answered: he destroys the given actuality by the given 
actuality itself”.43 A parodic quality that is strongly present in postmodern irony, 
the ironist turns life against itself, and finds that it ends in the void of aporia. In 
poetically producing herself, the ironist produces nothing, and makes her life a 
bare emptiness.  
 And yet for Kierkegaard irony is not to be wholly disregarded as 
dangerously immoral. When mastered, irony “limits, renders finite, defines, and 
thereby yields truth, actuality, and content; it chastens and punishes and thereby 
imparts stability, character and consistency”.44 Mastered, irony becomes an ethical 
category, so much so that “He who does not understand irony and has no ear for 
its whisperings lacks eo ipso what might be called the absolute beginning of the 
personal life”.45 A poet has mastered irony when the poetic work becomes a part 
of her own development, when her existence as a poet becomes part of her 
actuality, of the reality of her life. Kierkegaard uses the examples of Goethe and a 
Professor Heiberg, and regarding the latter he writes: 
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while almost every line he has written affords an example of irony‟s inner 
economy at work, there is also present throughout all his works a self-
conscious endeavour to order and assign each particular its place in the 
whole. Thus irony is mastered, reduced to a moment: the essence is none 
other than the phenomenon.
46
 
 
Balance is restored in the case of responsible, productive, mastered irony; the 
external and the internal, meaning and appearance (re)align, and the moment 
relates to a greater whole. The subject becomes resituated within her historical 
actuality, and recognises that irony, rather than an end in itself, is “the negative 
way, not the truth but the way”.47  
 
Irony and Criticism 
 
While ostensibly different in philosophical emphasis and approach, the next four 
critics are unified by their common reading of irony as a vital literary force. 
György Lukács‟ work on irony in The Theory of the Novel sees it as the 
disjunction between real and ideal, and the novel the site of the ironic connection 
between the disordered world and the desire for knowledge and totality. G. G. 
Sedgewick‟s dramatic irony is the tool of the human or godly creator, while 
Northrop Frye‟s irony is firmly of the “real” and human world. For Sedgewick 
ironic distance generates sympathy, while for Frye it instils superiority. For 
Brooks irony is the contradictions that arise from the poem‟s content, and 
therefore a vital productive force. Irony for Frye is a mode of Romantic un-
romanticising, as it shows the world to be disorderly and chaotic, with none of the 
order or sense of the myth or romance. Interestingly, Frye and Lukács are in this 
sense more similar than might be thought – both see irony as a movement between 
romance and reality, though Frye‟s sense of the inherent disorder is far less 
Romantic than Lukács. 
In The Theory of the Novel Lukács investigates an art form that has 
become problematic because reality has become problematic; while the Hellenic 
age existed in glorious organic unity, the early twentieth century subsists in a 
reality that is essentially incomplete, non-organic and abandoned by God, that is, 
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any authority or reality that is complete. Lukács‟ novel is an expression of 
“transcendental homelessness”,48 and the novel‟s hero is lost in a fragmentary, 
inorganic world that has no coherence in meaning or causality. The novelist will 
always be an ironic novelist, as she is split between a dogmatic self that strives to 
create a work that is an ordered totality, and an empirical self that recognises the 
general absence of ordered totality. She will always be alienated from her creation, 
the ironic hero will always be alienated from meaning, and any attempt to 
understand the world will be belied by the world itself. 
As the “self-correction of the world‟s fragility”,49 irony creates an artistic 
or aesthetic web of fragments, altering reality‟s acausality and irresolvable 
movements into a form connected and yet isolated, meaningless and meaningful. 
Irony thus enables a perspective that sees the fragmentary (in)dependence of the 
parts on the whole, although their relationship to the totality is not an organic one, 
“but a conceptual one which is abolished again and again”.50 Nonetheless, through 
what Lukács describes as “skilfully ironic compositional tact”,51 the contingent 
and discreet fragments that comprise the novel – characters and actions – are 
inserted into the whole in such a way that their compositional significance 
transcends their simple presence, and so the illusion of organic qualities is given. 
Hence Lukács writes that “The composition of the novel is the paradoxical fusion 
of heterogeneous and discrete components into an organic whole which is then 
abolished over and over again”.52  
The ironic novelist has realised that the wish for a mimetic form of art, 
where the empirical and the ideal, or the real and its internalisations are 
intertwined, is a fantasy. A double irony lies in both the hopelessness of the 
attempt, and the hopelessness of its abandonment. Thus while irony shows reality 
as victorious, it also reveals that reality is nothing without the unreal world of 
ideas.  
 
Irony, with intuitive double vision, can see where God is to be found in a 
world abandoned by God; irony sees the lost utopian home of the idea that 
has become an ideal, and yet at the same time it understands that the ideal 
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is subjectively and psychologically conditioned, because that is its only 
possible form of existence; irony, itself demonic, apprehends the demon 
that is within the subject as a metasubjective essentiality, and therefore, 
when it speaks of the adventures of errant souls in an inessential, empty 
reality, it intuitively speaks of past gods and gods that are to come; irony 
has to seek the only world that is adequate to it along the via dolorosa of 
interiority, but is doomed never to find it there. … Irony, the self-
surmounting of a subjectivity that has gone as far as it was possible to go, 
is the highest freedom that can be achieved in a world without God.
53
 
 
Irony for Lukács is that which enables representation of the self-contradictory 
state of reality. The subject is caught between the real and the ideal, and irony 
invests both the empirical and conceptual with fragmentary and paradoxical 
connections that bind without eradicating their discreet nature and unify without 
creating a totality. Irony is the awareness of the distance between art and reality, 
of the disjunction between understanding and the object understood, and of their 
simultaneous inseparability.  
According to G. G. Sedgewick‟s Of Irony: Especially in Drama the theatre 
is always ironic, as the audience oversee the spectacle of a life over which they 
have no control. This instils in the audience a “sort of paradoxical sympathy; for, 
though it is sympathy, it is likewise detached”.54 General dramatic irony is thus  
 
the fusion in a spectator‟s mind of superior knowledge and detached 
sympathy … The whole attitude of the interested spectator is ironic; by the 
very fact that he is such a spectator, he is an ironist. And “general irony” is 
a name for the proper pleasure of the theatre.
55
  
 
Dramatic irony is also tragic irony, and specific dramatic irony differs only from 
general dramatic irony in that it is overt. While Sedgewick agrees that ambiguity 
is a common and important form of irony, he concentrates on the irony of 
ignorance, the tragedy that occurs when a character is wholly unaware of her fate: 
“The irony of the scene [in Electra] is rooted, not in the double meaning of the 
queen‟s words, but in her ignorance of the conflict in which she is a principal and 
of which the spectator is tensely aware”.56 Thus, dramatic irony “is the sense of 
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contradiction felt by spectators of a drama who see a character acting in 
ignorance of his condition”.57  
 Iago is Sedgewick‟s perfect example of an ironic villain – his language is 
rarely directly overdetermined, but all too often literally and unambiguously true. 
His is the irony of apparent understatement, as he tells a version of the truth 
whose mildness appears to shelter another, and thereby makes the truth appear to 
be far graver. As Sedgewick writes regarding Sophocles: “the ironic language of 
Sophocles is not so much ambiguous as entirely neutral; it has of itself a deadly 
colourlessness that takes on any shade which the hearer may reflect into it”.58 
Irony‟s force comes thus from the blank potentiality of language itself, the 
characters‟ differing states of ignorance, and the audience‟s sense of reminiscence 
and anticipation – irony‟s temporal disjunction – so that irony becomes “the sense 
of power brought to ruin and of divine relentlessness, the feeling of spectators 
who from their place of vantage may look back over the hideous myth”.59 
In The Well Wrought Urn Cleanth Brooks writes: 
 
irony is the most general term that we have for the kind of qualification 
which the various elements in a context receive from the context. … 
Moreover, irony is our most general term for indicating that recognition of 
incongruities – which, again, pervades all poetry to a degree far beyond 
what our conventional criticism has been heretofore willing to allow.
60
  
 
For the New Critics irony described the pressure of the internal context or 
structure on the poem, and the co-existence of multiple and contradictory 
meanings. Irony was a structural element of incompatibilities and incongruities 
that brought richness and complexity – each part of the poem interacts with the 
general “internal” context or construct of the poem, resulting in the production of 
greater and varied meanings. Poetry is always ironic, but irony can also be overtly 
employed. According to Brooks modern poetry used irony because  
 
there is the breakdown of a common symbolism; there is the general 
scepticism as to universals; not least important, there is the depletion and 
corruption of the very language itself. … The modern poet has the task of 
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rehabilitating a tired and drained language so that it can convey meanings 
once more with force and with exactitude.
61
 
 
Irony was therefore a productive structure within the poem that pushed the poem 
in numerous antithetical directions, thereby instilling within the poem an 
economic semantic excess. This excess, however, should not be thought to push 
the poem “beyond” itself – each work was very much a totality.  
Like Sedgewick and Brooks, Northrop Frye‟s Anatomy of Criticism sees 
irony as inherently literary or poetic: 
 
The critics who tell us that the basis of poetic expression is irony, or a 
pattern of words that turns away from obvious (i.e., descriptive) meaning, 
are much closer to the facts of literary experience, at least on the literal 
level. The literary structure is ironic because “what it says” is always 
different in kind or degree from “what it means”. In discursive writing 
what is said tends to approximate, ideally to become identified with, what 
is meant.
62
  
 
While ironic modes present a world comprising absurd and incomprehensible 
coincidences, unintelligible motivations and improbable and inconclusive 
resolutions, this alien world is in fact “a vision of what in theology is called the 
fallen world, of simple humanity, man as natural man and in conflict with both 
human and non-human nature”.63 Frye gives the example of a Chekov play, which 
presents a scene of aburdist realism, so that the “ironic play passes through a dead 
centre of complete realism, a pure mime representing human life without 
comment and without imposing any sort of dramatic form beyond what is required 
for simple exposition”.64 Irony is the arbitrary nature of fate that makes the world 
unfathomable and unpredictable, and the ironic myth presents a realist parody of 
romance, as it is essentially “the application of romantic mythical forms to a more 
realistic content which fits them in unexpected ways. No one in a romance, Don 
Quixote protests, ever asks who pays for the hero‟s accommodation”.65 Thus we 
move from the heroic to the ironic, from the castle to the tavern, from the courts to 
the marketplace.
66
 Interestingly, for Frye irony is marked by the absence of a 
                                                 
61
 Brooks, “Irony as a Principle of Structure”, Critical Theory Since Plato 1046. 
62
 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (London: Penguin, 1990) 81. 
63
 Frye 285. 
64
 Frye 285. 
65
 Frye 223. 
66
 He does however also note that the realism of ironic literature tends towards myth (140). 
P a g e  | 34 
 
guiding, moralistic author: “the ironist fables without moralising, and has no 
object but his subject … [as] sophisticated irony merely states, and lets the reader 
add the ironic tone himself”.67 As he succinctly puts it: “Irony is consistent both 
with complete realism of content and with the suppression of attitude on the part 
of the author”.68  
Tragic irony for Frye is the study of tragic isolation from society, as one is 
dependent on chance and the arbitrary nature of life. Life takes on an inevitable 
irony – as the aleatory will occur – and an incongruous irony – the guilty will 
possess a certain innocence, and the innocent will have elements of guilt. 
Interestingly, given Derrida‟s later use of the pharmakon and pharmakos in Plato, 
Frye describes the random victim of tragic irony as a scapegoat, or pharmakos. 
Thus, while watching, the audience feels ironically superior to the tragic anti-hero, 
and looks down onto a scene of entrapment and frustration. 
 
The pharmakos is neither innocent nor guilty. He is innocent in the sense 
that what happens to him is far greater than anything he has done provokes, 
like the mountaineer whose shout brings down an avalanche. He is guilty 
in the sense that he is a member of a guilty society, or living in a world 
where such injustices are an inescapable part of existence. These two facts 
do not come together; they remain ironically apart.
69
 
 
Frye gives the example of Christ as the perfect innocent victim who bears 
society‟s guilt, though Socrates also comes to mind, particularly given 
Kierkegaard‟s subtle linking of the two.  
 In terms of the relation between irony and comedy, the most ironic phase 
of comedy is, according to Frye, when a “humorous society triumphs or remains 
undefeated,
70
 for example in The Alchemist or The Beggar‟s Opera. An intense 
irony is one where the play ends with the dissolution of society following a form 
of inaction, as one might find in Beckett. In the paradox and incongruity of irony 
we find social norms overturned, expected plot progression and character 
development skewed, and anacoluthic upheavals. What Frye calls the “tragic 
irony of the fallen world”71 is a temporality turning in on itself, a world adrift 
even from linear time.  
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Irony and Reconstruction 
 
In the Institutio Oratoria Quintilian presents a method for recognising irony, 
which will be 
 
made evident to the understanding either by the delivery, the character of 
the speaker or the nature of the subject. For if any one of these three is out 
of keeping with the words, it at once becomes clear that the intention of 
the speaker is other than what he actually says.
72
 
 
The works of D. C. Muecke and Wayne C. Booth are based on a similar approach, 
wherein they attempt to formalise the sub-species of irony, present ways of 
recognising these sub-categories, and therefore enable the reader to reduce irony‟s 
excessive possibilities to the meaning intended by the author. For Muecke, and 
indeed for Booth, “a work can be ironical only by intention: being ironical means 
deliberately being ironical”. 73  Of course, events and situations can be 
unintentionally ironic, and an ironic authorial intention does not necessarily make 
the work ironic for the reader, but beyond these conceded points, Muecke‟s irony 
is always bound up with intentionality and the existence of a “real” meaning – that 
of the author. With an impressive if unhelpful drive to categorise Muecke divides 
irony into 3 grades – Overt Irony, Covert Irony, and Private Irony – and 4 modes 
– Impersonal Irony, Self-disparaging Irony, Ingénu Irony, and Dramatised Irony – 
where the grades depend on the degree to which real meaning is concealed, and 
the modes on the relationship between the ironist and irony. While Muecke 
concentrates on the resolution of ironies of concealed intention and “real” 
meaning, he also poses a philosophical, “noncorrective irony”,74 which does not 
have a definite position to which to return. This is associated with the general 
irony of an ironic life, although he stresses that “the ironist is not a philosopher. 
As, or like an artist, he sees the world „aesthetically‟, that is, from the proper 
aesthetic distance but not outside the human context”.75 The ironies of art and the 
aesthetic are both a general and a Romantic irony, whereby one recognises, 
transcends and yet preserves incompatible elements, living, through art, inside and 
outside the world. Art will always fail to represent life, and exist split between 
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conscious planning and unconscious spontaneous invention, as a communication 
and thing communicated, as meaningful in its relation to the ordinary thing and as 
pure meaningless existence in itself. 
 Booth opens his text A Rhetoric of Irony with the telling line “Every good 
reader must be, among other things, sensitive in detecting and reconstructing 
ironic meanings”.76 Irony is normative, and the “correct” response to irony in a 
text is to solve the puzzle it presents, thereby arriving at the stable, knowable, 
intended meaning. Booth‟s irony has “an on-off switch”77  which, following a 
correct “reconstruction” flips back to the “original”, pre-ironic setting. The irony 
in the text is wholly of the author and depends “not on the ingenuity of the reader 
but on the intentions that constitute the creative act”. 78  Irony “is essentially 
„subtractive‟”79 as one works backwards, retracing (the author‟s) steps, removing 
and discounting incompatible meanings until the correct one is reached. Hence 
Booth‟s analogy of “reconstructing”:  
 
I turn to the building trades, to “reconstruction”, implying the tearing 
down of one habitation and the building of another one on a different spot. 
In playing with the notion of reconstructed buildings and relocated 
inhabitants, we can see more clearly the almost incredible intricacy of the 
pas de deux that I reduced to “marks” and “steps” above.80  
 
In an interesting inversion of deconstruction and a possible allusion to parabasis in 
the use of different forms of “steps”, Booth‟s reconstruction is the tearing down of 
an unstable structure to move towards a more secure edifice. The steps that one 
takes in irony‟s “intricate intellectual dance” 81  are steps through a range of 
markers that reveal truth: one finds hints in warnings from the author‟s own voice 
in titles, epigraphs, disclaimers; in errors such as incorrect uses of popular 
expressions, inaccurate historical facts, skewed conventional judgements; in 
conflicting facts and information within the work; in clashes of style; and in 
conflicts of belief between those expressed and those believed to be held.
82
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 Under Booth‟s classifications ironies themselves range from the 
comprehensible “Stable-Covert-Local” to the indecipherable “Unstable-Overt-
Infinite”, which, however, still depends “on a silent act of reconstruction of the 
author‟s superior edifice, and on our ascent to dwell with him in silent 
communion while the „meaningless‟ drama enacts itself down below, on the 
surface of things”. 83  It is indicative of Booth‟s approach to irony that when 
discussing Socratic irony he speaks of “a platform on which Socrates, Phaedrus, 
Plato, and the reader can stand as they meditate on the rich ironies of the 
dialogue”.84 For Booth Socratic irony is self-correction, where the “inadequacies 
of one attempt lead inevitably to another one, and then to yet another”.85 Literal 
statements mislead, so the ironist simply uses mythological statements that 
attempt to come closer to truth. 
Linda Hutcheon‟s 1995 work on irony – Irony‟s Edge: The Theory and 
Politics of Irony – is, like Booth‟s and Muecke‟s, founded on the “how and why” 
of irony. However, her analysis of irony does not treat it in terms of poetics, 
criticism or philosophy, nor as a way of life, personal characteristic or mode of 
consciousness, but as a discursive political strategy that opens power relations in 
communication. Hutcheon‟s irony of Irony‟s Edge is very much grounded in 
intention, although she does allow the reader to produce irony: “all irony happens 
intentionally, whether the attribution be made by the encoder or decoder”.86 While 
Hutcheon‟s irony therefore has a certain egalitarianism, she is emphatic about the 
hierarchical nature of irony, as it creates a class of target or victim. Thus “irony 
explicitly sets up (and exists within) a relationship between ironist and 
audiences … that is political in nature”87 and dependent on power, authority and 
subordination. The communities involved in irony are inevitably, even when 
viewed positively, founded on exclusion, and the relationship between ironist and 
interpreter is dependent on mastery rather than mutual comprehension: “In the 
economy of exchange that we call irony, there is always a power imbalance that 
does not seem to come into play in the same way in a trope like metaphor, in part 
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because irony is simultaneously disguise and communication”. 88  While some 
suggest that irony creates divided communities, Hutcheon argues that irony occurs 
because of pre-existent discursive communities in which power and control are 
always unequally distributed.  
Hutcheon stresses that as a mode of discursive politics, “the one thing 
irony would not seem to be is what it is usually claimed to be: a simple 
antiphrastic substitution of the unsaid (called the „ironic‟ meaning) for its opposite, 
the said (called the literal meaning)”.89 Irony occurs in the space between the said 
and unsaid, other and more than both. Thus at the end of an analysis of Branagh‟s 
and Olivier‟s versions of Henry V, Hutcheon writes that “the resulting edgy 
oscillation between the two [films] created a new meaning – the one I think is the 
real „ironic‟ meaning”90 – irony for Hutcheon is a palimpsestic excess resulting 
from intertextual interactions and contradictions. Reading the political effects and 
affects of irony, we see that it has, for Hutcheon, a protean polymorphism, or as 
her recurring metaphor underscores, an “edge” that enables it to be 
transideological, used by all against all, including an unexpected attack on the self. 
Hence irony is conservative and subversive, involving the emotive, necessitating a 
judgemental attitude, provoking reactions. Hutcheon‟s irony does not free us from 
dogma and fixed destinations, as it never works in one direction, even the 
direction against a single direction. Taking every possible step, irony can only be 
approached by a knowledge of its context: “irony is one discursive strategy that 
both cannot be understood apart from its embodiment in context and also has 
trouble escaping the power relations evoked by its evaluative edge”.91  
 
Derrida and Postmodern Irony 
 
In keeping with the majority of theorists Linda Hutcheon describes 
postmodernism as intertextual, parodic, contradictory, provisional, heterogeneous, 
transgressive of generic divisions, ex-centric and marginal. Postmodernism is a 
pastiche, it forwards a fragmented subject, questions totalising systems and lacks 
historical or narrative continuity. Essentially, Hutcheon‟s postmodernism is, as 
she writes, “fundamentally contradictory, resolutely historical, and inescapably 
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political”.92 As she also acknowledges, very few of these attributes are only to be 
found in postmodernism, and so she posits that “What is newer is the constant 
attendant irony”93 found in the postmodern era‟s relation to history and the past. 
Postmodernism is ironic, and what Hutcheon calls the “postmodernist ironic 
rethinking of history”94 is the way in which irony marks “the difference from the 
past, but [whereby] the intertextual echoing simultaneously works to affirm – 
textually and hermeneutically – the connection with the past”.95 The postmodern 
engagement with history is “always a critical reworking, never a nostalgic „return‟. 
Herein lies the governing role of irony in postmodernism”.96 Postmodern irony 
gives rise to “historiographic metafiction”, a form of the postmodern novel which 
is self-reflexive and historically grounded, and which subverts conventions from 
within. The historiographic and the metafictional aspects of the text  
 
ironise both metafictional (modernist) trust in the imaginative power and 
the closed, reflexive structures of art and also its opposite, history‟s 
assumed correspondence between narration and event, between word and 
thing. This mutual critical irony functions as a mode of internalised self-
conscious theorisation that is as paradoxical as any postmodern theory 
today: it inscribes and then undercuts both the autonomy of art and the 
referentiality of history in such a way that a new mode of 
questioning/compromise comes into being. And this contradictory mode, 
in both theory and practice (or in theory as practice and practice as theory), 
is what I want to call postmodernist.
97
 
 
Postmodernism is then the irony of the interaction of an (ironic) engagement with 
history with an (ironic) interaction with reflexivity. When Hutcheon refers to 
irony she refers repeatedly to the “ironic reworking of history”,98 but also to the 
“Ironic inversion of biographical conventions”,99 “ironic discontinuity … at the 
heart of continuity,”100 “ironic contact” and “ironic contamination”,101 the “irony 
that allows critical distancing”102and the “ironically undercut”.103 In A Poetics of 
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Postmodernism irony is the point of difference at the heart of similarity that 
allows for parodic and critical reworkings, so that the use of irony to implicate and 
yet critique is seen by Hutcheon as “distinctly paradoxical and postmodern”.104 
Hutcheon‟s postmodern irony is a switch that once thrown illumines a scene in a 
different, wry, paradoxical light.
105
  
Derrida‟s work is all too often read within the parameters of a postmodern 
irony in keeping with Hutcheon‟s. The calculated transgression of the law of 
genres both analysed and performed within his texts is viewed as a playful and 
chaotic dissolution of divisions between “high” and “low” art forms, while the 
structural difficulties and necessities of undoing metaphysics from within is 
reduced to a form of philosophical parody. Derrida‟s style becomes self-conscious, 
self-reflexive, and paradoxical as it fights auto-entrapment, and his work 
synonymous with the cultural-relativist principle of reducing truth to a form of 
language game which can only be judged in relation to specific, localised criteria. 
Relativism, or as Fredric Jameson coins it, “monadic relativism” is discussed 
specifically in relation to irony in Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, and his definition all too clearly encapsulates the postmodern irony to 
which Derrida is sometimes relegated. Ironic relativism is 
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to one of two conclusions:  
 
either (1) there is a message darkly concealed under these layers of ironies – a message 
that usually turns out to be a cry of despair over the human condition, or (2) there isn‟t 
any message, just gratuitous wordplay; hence the work is meaningless and therefore 
worthless … (2) is finally the same as (1). (5-6) 
 
While Lang‟s humorist has much in common with irony as posited in this thesis, and her criticisms 
of “irony” are accurate assessments of impoverished conceptualisations thereof, insisting on the 
disjunction and renaming seems a dangerous exercise, a drive to place irony firmly in a single pole.  
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the sense that each consciousness is a closed world, so that a 
representation of the social totality now must take the (impossible) form of 
a coexistence of those sealed subjective worlds and their peculiar 
interaction, which is in reality a passage of ships in the night, a centrifugal 
movement of lines and planes that can never intersect. The literary value 
that emerges from this new formal practice is called “irony”; and its 
philosophical ideology often takes the form of a vulgar appropriation of 
Einstein‟s theory of relativity.106 
 
In this definition postmodern irony is the relativity of discrete units that drift, 
unconnected, each observing the disorder somewhat differently. The result is a 
chaotic mess of conflicting, oppositional differences that lack a universal point of 
agreement. What appears to be differs depending on the point of observation; 
hence the ironic disjunction between what is expressed and what it potentially 
means. Postmodern irony for Jameson is thus a weak expression of relativism, and 
in the case of the theorists discussed in this section – Linda Hutcheon, Ernst 
Behler and Richard Rorty – the definition unfortunately holds true. In their works 
irony, postmodernism and deconstruction are conflated into a mode of parodic, 
historical contextualising through a paradoxical system of relativistic differences, 
and Derrida crowned first among ironic postmoderists.  
 Derrida‟s texts are seen by Hutcheon as simply postmodernist, which 
means that they partake of the same indefinite, paradoxical irony outlined above. 
Derrida‟s texts, she writes, “belong solely to neither philosophical nor literary 
discourse, though they partake of both in a deliberately self-reflexive and 
contradictory (postmodern) manner”.107 His texts are “postmodern-contradictory, 
plural, self-defeating”,108  as “Poststructuralist discourse paradoxically contests, 
yet unavoidably inscribes, the very preconceptions it seeks to challenge. … Along 
with postmodernist art, such theory is energised by the need to rethink and 
problematise everything, even its own identity”. 109  In other words, “the 
paradoxical reliance of deconstruction (like realism, of course) upon a historically 
determined concept of metaphysics that it wants to deny [… is a] contradiction … 
typical of postmodern theory”.110 Derrida‟s texts are thus reduced to Hutcheon‟s 
concept of an “ironic”, postmodern engagement with history. As she puts it: “the 
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Derridean strategy of writing sous rature … makes you want to have your 
historical referent and erase it too”. 111  Derrida‟s texts are postmodernly self-
conscious
112
 and his work on the trace simply a renaming of postmodern 
metafiction: postmodern novels are “metafiction[s which …] incarnate the 
Derridean network of traces in their own self-reflexive textuality.
113
 Importantly, 
while Hutcheon‟s later work Irony‟s Edge offers a slightly more sophisticated 
analysis of irony, in this text Derrida barely receives a mention, as Hutcheon‟s 
reading of Derrida is grounded in self-reflexive, parodic historicity, and she seems 
unable to reinscribe Derrida into a theory of irony based on political power. She 
thereby succumbs to the all too frequent mistake of deeming Derrida‟s texts 
devoid of political engagement, a mistake that Rorty enthusiastically duplicates. 
While Ernst Behler‟s Irony and the Discourse of Modernity presents a 
reading of irony, ironic writers and postmodernism that exceeds Hutcheon‟s in 
subtlety and philosophical engagement, he nonetheless also succumbs to the trap 
of reducing the irony in Derrida‟s work to a form of loose postmodernism. 
Despite seeing Derrida‟s critique of reason as a “genuine philosophical task”,114 
and despite – or perhaps because of – understanding deconstruction as the 
performance of Schlegel‟s system/nonsystem, deconstruction becomes an 
asystematic style that transgresses genre divisions and espouses parodic 
techniques of undermining (metaphysics) from within. The similarities between 
German Romanticism and Postmodernism are numerous, and Behler vastly 
reduces the structural subtleties of Derrida‟s texts by reading Derrida as a 
conflation of the two.  
Like Hutcheon, Behler understands postmodernism as a retrospectively 
orientated “critical continuation of modernism which is itself both critique and 
criticism”.115 Postmodernism lacks the positive qualities that an era requires, and 
as such is a not-quite period, no more than the critique of a critique, a relation to 
the past of “self-criticism and self-doubt”.116 Postmodernism makes a movement 
towards the past a gesture of self-reflexive self-involvement that rejects global 
truths, all-encompassing systems of meaning and general, assessable foundations 
                                                 
111
 Hutcheon, Poetics 145. 
112
 Hutcheon, Poetics 13. 
113
 Hutcheon, Poetics 81. 
114
 Behler 30. 
115
 Behler 5. 
116
 Behler 5. 
P a g e  | 43 
 
of knowledge. It is “an ironic notion communicating indirectly, by way of 
circumlocution, configuration, and bafflement, the necessity and impossibility of 
discussing the status of modernity in a straightforward and meaningful 
manner”.117 For Behler irony and postmodernity are virtually indistinguishable: 
irony is a parodic, sceptical engagement with the past and a self-reflexive, self-
critical mode of writing and being: “the ironic discourse itself, because of its 
highly self-reflexive character, practices critical, deprecating observations of a 
self-referential nature as a constantly recurring technique”.118  
Like Hutcheon, Behler believes that the “double-edged” 119  nature of 
postmodern, ironic discourse means that it cannot even be reappropriated as a 
(non)system for those outside the system – women, postcolonial identities, queer 
theories, etc – it works against those who attempt to use its openness. Behler‟s 
irony is, however, somewhat more refined than general theories, in that it is not a 
form of communication in which the speaker “says one thing and means another” 
but communication that undoes communication, a discourse that says something 
and at the same time undoes the content, logic, structure and stability of what it 
says. While both Hutcheon‟s and Behler‟s formulations of irony can be described 
as the meaning of the space between, for Hutcheon this is the space between 
possible meanings. For Behler, grounded in Schlegelian irony, irony is the 
movement of and the space between self-creation and self-destruction, a saying 
that destroys itself as it posits itself. In the oscillation between production and 
annihilation irony transgresses genre divisions and the limits of language:  
 
The ironic manner of expression can be described as attempting to 
transcend the restrictions of normal discourse and straightforward speech 
by making the ineffable articulate, at least indirectly, through a great 
number of verbal strategies, and accomplishing what lies beyond the reach 
of direct communication.
120
 
 
The writer who best performs postmodern irony, a self-reflexive, double-edged, 
performative style and content is, according to Behler, Derrida. Derrida‟s 
“paradoxical”, “contradictory” approach espouses a “type of irony … best 
conveyed in action, through performance, a kind of writing which in the mood of 
                                                 
117
 Behler 4-5. 
118
 Behler 112. 
119
 Behler 32. 
120
 Behler 111. 
P a g e  | 44 
 
a joyful wisdom employs the logic of play and the rules of a game. This is best 
accomplished in the writings of Jacques Derrida”.121  
Discussing Derrida‟s “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy” 
as an ironic text,
122
 Behler writes that Derrida  
 
mimes Kant‟s text, but he also parodies it and thereby transforms, deforms 
it. ... On the one hand, he seems to assume the attitude of one who warns 
us in the name of rational enlightenment against the death of all true 
philosophy, but on the other, he casts grave doubts on the credibility of 
such an endeavour.
123
  
 
Derrida‟s “discontinuous, fragmentary, and ironic mode of writing” 124  has the 
parodic element of postmodern irony; the use of a past style or historical stance 
against itself. It is self-creating and self-defeating as it warns while ironically 
problematising that warning, showing it to undo itself. The undecidable “come” 
repeated in Derrida‟s text is read as a movement of language outside itself that 
Behler understands as postmodern: “It is precisely here, at the breaching of the 
limits of communication, that postmodern thinking and writing begin to operate 
through circumlocution, indirectness, configuration, and ironic 
communication”.125 
For Behler “différance” exhibits a structure “similar to that of universal 
irony”.126 Universal irony, a term taken from Hegel but also used by Kierkegaard, 
is a dialectical movement whereby each historical period displaces the last, and 
carries within it the seeds of its own displacement. Universal irony is therefore the 
global, tragic irony of progressive, sequential undoing, and doubly ironic in that 
the irony comes from “the eye, the observation, the consciousness of the one who 
views this destruction as a necessary concomitant and precondition of world 
historical development and of life in general”.127 For Behler it is the fact that 
différance posits difference functioning from within, as the actual structure of the 
mark, which makes it like the principle of negativity in Hegel‟s dialectics, or a 
universal or Schlegelian irony. The differing and deferring of différance 
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transgresses metaphysics, and moves language to an impossible zone where it 
attempts to articulate notions other than those grounded in presence and identity. 
According to Behler this “appears to be the most stringent example of the 
„impossibility and necessity of complete communication‟ which Schlegel listed 
among the characteristics of irony”. 128  Derrida‟s undermining of metaphysics 
from within is seen by Behler as ironic, in that it is a self-critical, self-reflexive 
creating and undoing, a parody. Hence, while Behler‟s account of irony and the 
irony of Derrida‟s texts focuses on the limits of communication and self-
positing/self-undoing, the structural irony of the mark is reduced to a form of 
parody, a critical use of a structure from within the structure. Derrida‟s critique or 
destabilising of metaphysics becomes a postmodern, reflexive, parodic pushing of 
limits from within, and différance an oscillation between meanings that undo 
themselves.  
Richard Rorty‟s Contingency, Irony and Solidarity presents an irony that 
is postmodern in its jaded, parodic attitude to the past and sense of the power of 
redescription, while simultaneously subscribing to an old-fashioned picture of 
irony as an intellectual exercise for the disillusioned and degenerate rich. Rorty‟s 
private, self-involved ironist is lost in the contingency of her beliefs and adrift in 
the “final vocabulary” that she never truly possesses, a phrase Rorty uses to 
describe the vocabulary, somewhat idiosyncratic, somewhat of a specific time and 
place, which controls or (de)limits a subject‟s communication. An ironist for 
Rorty is someone who doubts her own final vocabulary while realising that she 
cannot use it to adequately express those doubts, nor sufficiently substantiate or 
dissolve them. She also opines that her vocabulary is not in touch with the “real” 
but is just a system of differences. An ironist is someone who realises that what is 
considered the essence of something can be changed by a redefinition, and as such 
she is never able to take herself seriously, recognising that her own construction is 
shifting and transient. Tellingly, Rorty opposes irony to “common sense”,129 a 
state in which the subject doesn‟t question her final vocabulary as she knows it is 
wholly sufficient for description and communication. For Rorty, a metaphysician 
subscribes to common sense, while an ironist is a nominalist and a historicist who 
thinks that nothing has an intrinsic essence. 
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Rorty‟s ironist is essentially a morally dubious literary theorist who adds 
lurking political bankruptcy to literary studies. Ironists and ironist theorists – like 
Derrida – are “invaluable in our attempt to form a private self-image, but pretty 
much useless when it comes to politics”.130 Irony instils a necessary tendency for 
questioning and self-doubt while demanding freedom and openness, but this is 
only suitable for the private intellectual, as Rorty suspects that ironist notions 
weaken and dissolve liberal societies. 
 
I cannot imagine a culture which socialised its youth in such a way as to 
make them continually dubious about their own process of socialisation. 
Irony seems inherently a private matter. … Irony is, if not intrinsically 
resentful, at least reactive. Ironists have to have something to have doubts 
about, something from which to be alienated.
131
 
 
Liberal societies are bound together by common vocabularies and common hopes; 
if individuals see themselves as comprising no more than vocabularies, then 
human nature and solidarity breaks down. “A universalistic ethics seems 
incompatible with ironism, simply because it is hard to imagine stating such an 
ethics without some doctrine about the nature of man. Such an appeal to real 
essence is the antithesis of ironism”. 132  Irony is a wholly private affair, 133 
contrasted by Rorty with public, liberal hope, and the ironic position is one which 
employs a personally involved, socially distanced, “ironic theoretical metalanguge 
which makes no sense to the man in the street”.134 Rorty‟s ironist is one who can 
spend her time in abstract contemplation, as the concerns of the poor, the 
malnourished and the workers are not hers. Irony does not even have the salvation 
of having once benefited humanity; for all the wrongs done by Marxism, 
Christianity, or utilitarianism, Rorty argues, “there was a time when each served 
human liberty. It is not obvious that ironism ever has”.135  
 Ironists are cruel but clever bullies, who make the world and its contents 
(seem) futile, obsolete, and powerless by telling people that their final vocabulary 
is contingent and open to parody. The critics of deconstruction – “one of the 
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ironists‟ current catchwords”136 – who see Derrida‟s style as devious and morally 
corrupt in its opacity have a defensible argument: “there is something right about 
the suspicion which ironism arouses. Ironism, as I have defined it, results from 
awareness of the power of redescription”. 137  Derrida, as private ironist 
extraordinaire, is sensitive to vocabularies, aware of their contingency and socio-
cultural historical grounding, careful to avoid entrapment in a single vocabulary, 
and capable of powerful yet opaque redescriptions. In his earlier “more 
professorial period” Derrida tries “to find words which get us „beyond‟ 
metaphysics”,138 while in his later “more eccentric, personal, and original” period 
he turned “such systematic projects of undercutting [metaphysics] into private 
jokes”.139 Rorty‟s later Derrida privatises his philosophy, and  
 
simply drops theory – the attempt to see his predecessors steadily and 
whole – in favour of fantasising about those predecessors, playing with 
them, giving free rein to the trains of association they produce. There is no 
moral to these fantasies, nor any public (pedagogic or political) use to be 
made of them.
140
 
 
Derrida‟s texts like Glas and “Envois” are exemplary of nothing more 
substantial than fantasy, which Rorty deems the end product of ironist theorising. 
Derrida is said to make no attempt to unite the public and the private, but devotes 
himself to the “reduction of public to private productions, of books to babies, 
writing to sex, thinking to love”.141 Fearful of being trapped in someone‟s final 
vocabulary, Rorty‟s Derrida uses playful, uncategorisable language in a way that 
reduces the importance of his quasi-transcendentals to a form of defamiliarising 
defence against habitualisation. This Derrida is a caricature of Schlegel, wilfully 
writing lurid, postcard versions of Lucinde in his bedroom, at night and under the 
covers. Rorty dismisses these postcards as private idiosyncrasies, which they are, 
but he completely misses the public dimension to the postcard, how it is open and 
visible to all, dismissed as innocuous and yet wholly subverting the logocentric 
system of the letter. For Rorty Derrida‟s “Envois” falls under Hutcheon‟s category 
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of historiographic metafiction; a clever, chaotic undermining of conventions 
written for private pleasure. While his ironist may be close to Demosthenes‟ 
shirker of public duty, his refusal to see the political engagement of both Derrida 
and irony blinds him to their ethically engaged qualities. 
 It should be clear to any reader of Derrida that his work does not fall under 
the descriptions of postmodernism presented here. While the thesis as a whole 
operates to present a more satisfactory reading of irony, it is worthwhile to briefly 
present Derrida‟s answer to notions of relativism and Rorty‟s false distinction 
between public and private. In an interview Derrida lists the “countless 
misunderstandings and … host of prejudices as tenacious as they are crudely 
polemical” (N 366) that deconstruction has undergone: “deconstruction as 
„relativist,‟ „sceptical,‟ „nihilist,‟ „irrationalist,‟ „the enemy of the Enlightenment,‟ 
„the prisoner of verbal language and rhetoric,‟ „ignorant of the difference between 
logic and rhetoric, philosophy and literature,‟ etc” (N 366). While not all of these 
misreading are simply due to associations made between Derrida and 
postmodernism, many of them can be found in the works of theorists presented 
above, and are linked to the approximating of his work to a vague version of 
postmodernism. The use of the word “negotiation” provides a useful example of 
the way in which Derrida‟s work has certain similarities with postmodernism and 
German Romanticism, but surpasses them in philosophical and structural subtlety 
and general purpose.  
Derrida describes a negotiation as a movement between “two incompatible 
imperatives that appear to be incompatible but are equally imperative” (N 13). A 
negotiation is impure; it requires involvement, and compromise. Etymologically 
its “un-leisure” implies fatigue, movement and the impossibility of stopping, 
which for Derrida means “no thesis, no position, no theme, no station, no 
substance, no stability, a perpetual suspension, a suspension without rest” (N 13). 
For Derrida “negotiation is a to-and-fro between impatience and patience” (N 29) 
that is not simply an oscillation, an infinite, paradoxical play between opposites, 
but a structural contamination that reveals the contamination of opposites. 
Patience and impatience do and do not contradict each other in a way that is not 
indicative of a postmodern (or indeed German Romantic) paradoxical chaos, but 
of a structural contamination that operates according to its own, transgressed, laws.  
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Because there is no general rule or law for negotiation, just the need to 
immediately respond to the context, it “must be adjusted to each case, to each 
moment without, however, the conclusion being a relativism or empiricism” (N 
17). As Derrida writes elsewhere:  
 
In spite of appearances, and the hasty philosophers who often rush to them, 
nothing is less empiricist or relativist than a certain attention to the 
multiplicity of contexts and discursive strategies that they govern: a certain 
insistence on the fact that a context is always open and cannot be saturated; 
a taking into account of the “perhaps” and the “quasi” in a thinking of the 
event. (N 363) 
 
Taking account of differences and particulars is neither fatalistic, empiricist nor 
relativistic. It acknowledges differences, retains them, stresses singularity, without 
making them “equal” and therefore abandoning them to the sea of the same 
described by Jameson. Derrida‟s work is precisely not relativistic; relativism 
undoes difference, while Derrida works to allow alterity to remain. As Derrida 
asks, “Is it empiricist or relativist to seriously take into account what arrives – 
differences of every order, beginning with the difference of contexts?” (N 367) 
 A negotiation is a compromise, and it is compromising. It is an ethical 
movement, a constant, restless stepping up to the other. Thus  
 
Negotiation is constantly in a state of micro-transformation. Every day: 
this means it does not stop. This also means that, between politics – that is, 
public life – and private life (interests, desires, etc.), the communication is 
never broken. I do not believe in the conceptual value of a rigorous 
distinction between the private and the public. There can be the singular 
and the secret, but these resist the “private” as much as they do the 
“public”. (N 17-18)  
 
Derrida‟s work is a negotiation, an ethical movement that is not a thetic, 
methodical approach but a permanent, (im)patient step towards alterity. It makes 
no rigorous distinctions between the spheres of the public and the private but 
engages with the mutually contaminated states of both. While it absolutely makes 
room for differences, and treats each difference as an individual singularity, it 
never succumbs to the denial of difference that is relativism. Its movement of 
différance is not simply constrained oscillation, but a term that expresses the 
structural intricacies of a temporal disjunction within the mark. It is these 
complexities that give rise to a wholly different form of irony.  
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Structures of Irony: Parabasis, Parataxis and Anacoluthon 
Introduction  
 
This chapter argues that the structural functioning of irony is best exemplified by 
the step/not of parabasis, the conjunctive and disjunctive spaces of parataxis, and 
the interruption of the anacoluthon. Irony is that which steps between supposedly 
closed categories, crossing and mixing codes, singularly and mechanically 
producing, describing and undoing. It is a force and a weakness, the structure of 
the divided mark that promises and commits perjury, anacoluthically interrupting 
the subject. It is the contaminated perverformative, a productive force/weakness 
which exceeds propositional exegesis, overstepping boundaries between literature 
and philosophy. It is an excess, the insertion of a gap or the beyond into the mark 
itself, which splits and doubles, performing and describing what it performs. 
Hence the performativity in the texts that interest Derrida partake of a 
“performativity in crisis” (SI 42), catachrestic malapropisms that in their skewed, 
improper use of reflexivity and the productive power of the iterable mark fabricate 
an excess beyond traditional uses of the constative or the performative.  
It is de Man, rather than Derrida, who is most often thought to combine 
irony and deconstruction. In his eulogy for de Man Derrida describes him as 
“irony itself”, and one who – here we see again caution in Derrida‟s use of the 
term “irony” –“never gave in to that negative assurance with which the ironic 
consciousness is sometimes too easily satisfied” (MF xvi-xvii). De Man‟s two 
major texts on irony –“The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1971) and “The Concept of 
Irony” (1976/77) – see a pronounced change in his approach to irony; the latter, 
writes de Man, was written as an “autocritique” (AI 170) of the first. This chapter 
argues that while Derrida appears not to have read “The Concept of Irony” while 
writing Memoires for Paul de Man,
1
 not only does he prefigure de Man‟s eventual, 
corrected definition of irony, but surpasses it in subtlety and complexity.  
                                                 
1
 The text that is published in Aesthetic Ideology under the title “The Concept of Irony” is taken 
from the notes de Man compiled for lectures given in Yale in 1976-77. However, Aesthetic 
Ideology was not published until 1996, while Memoires for Paul de Man was first published in 
1986, and so Derrida could not have read the text as published. It is of course possible, given 
Derrida and de Man‟s friendship, that elements of de Man‟s lectures were discussed, but as 
Derrida neither mentions them nor de Man‟s repudiation of much of the irony posited in “The 
Rhetoric of Temporality”, it seems unlikely that he was aware of them.  
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To step towards a theory of pervasive, structural irony it is necessary to 
step with and through de Man‟s text machine to Derrida‟s impossible event. Thus, 
while this chapter plays paratactic irony against Marian Hobson‟s syntactic irony, 
and brings parabasis a step closer to Blanchot‟s step/not of pas, the underlying 
engagement lies with de Man. 
    
Irony and de Man 
  
In “The Rhetoric of Temporality” de Man conceptualises allegory and irony as the 
distinct yet inseparable components of a temporal exigency, indicative of 
language‟s remove from the empirical, and resultant in a divided subject. 
Baudelaire, de Man explains, referred to irony as “le comique absolu”, whereby 
the self is doubled between an empirical self immersed in the world, and a self as 
linguistic structure that observes the empirical self. The reflexive process – 
watching, for example, the empirical self fall and reflecting on the fall – does not 
just occur through language, but transfers the empirical self into a world of 
language, whereby language is both an object in the world and the means through 
which the world is understood. As de Man writes, “Language thus conceived 
divides the subject into an empirical self, immersed in the world, and a self that 
becomes like a sign in its attempt at differentiation and self-definition” (BI 213). 
The ironic, doubled self thus contains “an empirical self that exists in a state of 
inauthenticity and a self that exists only in the form of a language that asserts the 
knowledge of this inauthenticity” (BI 214).  
While one must laugh at the fall, this process is by no means a comforting 
process; for Baudelaire it was a process of unravelling that reveals a being on the 
verge of madness. As de Man writes:  
 
absolute irony is a consciousness of madness, itself the end of all 
consciousness; it is a consciousness of a non-consciousness, a reflection 
on madness from the inside of madness itself. But this reflection is made 
possible only by the double structure of ironic language: the ironist invents 
a form of himself that is “mad” but that does not know its own madness; 
he then proceeds to reflect on his madness objectified. (BI 216) 
 
The ironic, reflexive self must think to the very borders of what can be thought, 
and reflect on madness, on the limits of what the linguistic self can express. 
Formed through language, the reflective self is a fiction that cannot be confused 
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with the “real” empirical self, and should not see itself as a stable point of 
knowledge and order. Should the ironic self see itself as a ground then it becomes 
empirical, and reality and fiction become confused. The ironic relation of the 
ironic self to itself – irony to the second power or Schlegel‟s irony of irony – 
stems, according to de Man, from the continued separation of fact and fiction. De 
Man sees parabasis as “what is called in English criticism the „self-conscious 
narrator,‟ the author‟s intrusion that disrupts the fictional illusion” (BI 218-19). 
This disruption does not serve to produce a greater realism, but a heightened self 
of fictionality that reveals that the ironic, fictional self can never be a “real”, 
empirical self. 
 For de Man irony is an endless process that never leads to synthesis, as 
“irony engenders a temporal sequence of acts of consciousness which is endless” 
(BI 220). Irony does not move towards unity, but instead is the endlessly 
repetitive “recurrence of a self-escalating act of consciousness” (BI 220). It is an 
infinite movement of lucid madness: a consciousness of non-consciousness. It has 
no origin and relates to what it means or refers to – the empirical self/object – 
only in terms of difference: “Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a 
past that is pure mystification and a future that remains harassed forever by a 
relapse within the [inescapable] inauthentic” (BI 222). De Man‟s ironist is very 
much trapped by her own irony; all she can do is “restate and repeat it on an 
increasingly conscious level, but [she] remains endlessly caught in the 
impossibility of making this knowledge applicable to the empirical world” (BI 
222). Irony and the ironic self drift from empirical reality, moving further and 
further from the sign they designate.  
 While the symbol operates through synecdoche or metonymy, allegory, 
the second component of the temporal exigency, is always of a different time and 
space to what it represents. Like a metaphor it refers to another sign which 
precedes it, a sign with which it can never coincide. Like irony, allegory is 
removed from its origin, temporally adrift. Unlike irony it operates diachronically; 
the structure of allegory is found “in the tendency of the language toward 
narrative, the spreading out along the axis of imaginary time in order to give 
duration to what is, in fact, simultaneous within the subject” (BI 225). While 
allegory gives the appearance of development and progress over time, existing 
“within an ideal time that is never here and now but always a past or an endless 
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future” (BI 226), “irony appears as an instantaneous process that takes place 
rapidly, suddenly, in one single movement” (BI 225). There is a climax or point, 
“the instant at which the two selves, the empirical as well as the ironic, are 
simultaneously present, juxtaposed within the same moment but as two 
irreconcilable and disjointed beings” (BI 226). The difference resides in the 
subject and time is reduced to a single moment. “Essentially the mode of the 
present, it [irony] knows neither memory nor prefigurative duration. … Irony is a 
synchronic structure” (BI 226).  
In “The Concept of Irony” de Man argues that irony functions at the level 
of the signifier and interrupts all that is posited by language. Irony is no longer a 
trope, but the trope of tropes, as the turn contained in irony is a shaper turn, a 
“more radical negation” (AI 165) than that contained in metaphor, synecdoche or 
metonymy. What is at stake in irony, he claims, “is the possibility of 
understanding, the possibility of reading, the very readability of texts, the 
possibility of deciding on a meaning or on a multiple set of meanings or on a 
controlled polysemy of meanings” (AI 167). Irony is therefore not simply a turn 
within language from direct or literal meaning that nonetheless presupposes its 
existence, but a double turn that moves away from any presumption of a knowable 
single meaning or “authentic” language.  
De Man proposes that the very foundation of the self is based on a 
tropological system of catachrestic turns. For Fichte, de Man argues, the self is a 
property of language, as the self simultaneously posits itself, and the/its nonself, 
through language. It is only because the self and the opposite of the self are 
concurrently posited that the properties of the self can be discussed; when the 
poles interact they delimit each other and enable comparisons and judgements to 
be made. Hence the (de)limiting and defining that Schlegel speaks of in relation to 
the self: Selbstbeschränkung. This structure, the isolation and circulation of 
properties, “the way in which properties can be exchanged between entities when 
they are being compared with each other in an act of judgement” (AI 174), is 
likened by de Man to the structure of tropes, and Fichte‟s system is therefore a 
theory of tropes: 
 
the circulation of the property (Merkmal) described in the act of judgement 
here is structured like a metaphor or a trope, is based on the substitution of 
properties. It‟s structured like a synecdoche, a relationship between part 
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and whole, or structured like a metaphor, a substitution on the basis of 
resemblance and of differentiation between two entities. (AI 176)  
 
For de Man Fichte‟s theory is a negative allegorical narrative of the self and 
knowledge, as the self can never know what it is, can never be positively 
identified, and all judgements about the self are reflexive and therefore unstable. 
This system is a system of tropes, a tropological system “to which the 
corresponding experience is that of the self standing above its own experiences” 
(AI 177). Hence, de Man argues, Schlegel‟s detached subject; the lofty urbanity of 
the ironist is the Fichtean self‟s radical detachment, although as we will address in 
chapter four, de Man specifically and inaccurately relates this distance to the 
writer‟s own work. 
De Man understands the “transcendental buffoonery” of Schlegel‟s 
Lyceum fragment 42 to refer to the buffo of the commedia dell‟arte, “the 
disruption of narrative illusion, the aparté, the aside to the audience, by means of 
which the illusion of the fiction is broken (what we call in German aus der Rolle 
fallen, to drop out of your role)” (AI 178). The technical term for this is, 
according to de Man, parabasis: “the interruption of a discourse by a shift in the 
rhetorical register” (AI 178), also known as anacoluthon. The latter refers more 
commonly to syntactical patterns of tropes, and is used to designate an 
interruption in the syntactical expectations of a phrase or sentence.
2
 But 
Schlegel‟s famous definition of irony likens it to a permanent parabasis, and so 
the interruption must place repeatedly, paradoxically disrupting the narrative line 
at all times. Since the narrative is the very structure of the tropological system, 
this enables de Man to give a definition of irony as “the permanent parabasis of 
the allegory of tropes” (AI 179). Thus the coherence of representational narrative 
forms is permanently interrupted, and it is irony which makes it impossible to 
achieve a consistent theory of narrative. As the allegory of tropes is (also) Fichte‟s 
system of the ego and of knowledge, then irony, as de Man understands it, is the 
anacoluthic interruption of “reality”, the calling attention to the fiction of a stable, 
solid world and self. Irony is that which causes dialectical and reflexive systems 
to interrupt themselves. That language can (catachrestically) posit at all is because 
of irony, but irony will also fundamentally disrupt this very positing.  
                                                 
2
 For example:  “I will have such revenges on you both,  
That all the world shall – I will do such things, 
What they are, yet I know not.” William Shakespeare, King Lear, II. iv. 
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 De Man proposes that the shocked reception that Schlegel‟s novel Lucinde 
received was due to its bipartite structure – what is ostensibly a philosophical 
discourse is also a reflection on sex. Thus two different codes inhabit the same 
space, and parabatically interrupt “each other in such a fundamental way that this 
very possibility of disruption represents a threat to all assumptions about what a 
text should be” (AI 169). It is the “free play” of irony which makes a treatise on 
philosophical matters a lurid description of sex. As the now famous passage on 
the ironic text machine reads:  
 
There is a machine out there, a text machine, an implacable determination 
and a total arbitrariness, unbedingter Willkür, he says, (Lyceum Fragment 
42), which inhabits words on the level of the signifier, which undoes any 
narrative consistency of lines, and which undoes the reflexive and the 
dialectical model, both of which are, as you know, the basis of any 
narration. There is no narration without reflection, no narrative without 
dialectic, and what irony disrupts (according to Friedrich Schlegel) is 
precisely that dialectic and that reflexivity, the tropes. The reflexive and 
the dialectical are the tropological system, the Fichtean system, and that is 
what irony undoes. (AI 181)
3
  
 
Irony disrupts while enabling reflexivity, and is the catachrestic movement, the 
turn that missteps, that undoes narrative while enabling meaning to be. 
Despite his repudiation of irony as formulated in “The Rhetoric of 
Temporality”, there are certain consistencies and similarities between de Man‟s 
two essays. While the definition of parabasis in “The Rhetoric of Temporality” 
unsatisfactorily understands it as the intrusion of the author into her work, this is 
not historically inaccurate. The error that de Man makes is ignoring the fact that 
this intrusion was scripted and as such as much a part of the play as the action 
proper. Although parabasis is presented in the second essay more convincingly as 
a shift in syntax, style and form, the concept of the disruption of artistic illusion is 
not abandoned but transferred to the figure of the transcendental buffoon. De Man 
thereby continues to retain the notion of the demonstration of the fiction and 
unreality of the play, which is, as the fourth chapter will show, a misreading of 
Schlegel‟s reality/fiction dichotomy. The emphasis on tropes remains in “The 
Concept of Irony”, although it is refined: in the later essay irony is no longer 
                                                 
3
 In Stupidity (Urbana: University of Illinos Press, 2002) Avital Ronell relates the impossibility of 
reading that stems from the text machine to stupidity, and the inevitability of always remaining a 
slow and witless reader (97-161).  
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simply a trope, but a trope of tropes or trope to the second power, turning away 
from the dependence on a “natural” language of literal meaning. The ironic 
subject in both is a fictive, tropological subject formed through language, and 
irony as self-reflexive consciousness in the first becomes the very (im)possibility 
of reflexivity, reading and understanding in the second. Irony for de Man is the 
trope of tropes through which the self is self-positing and self-destroying, that 
which causes dialectical and reflexive systems to interrupt themselves, the force 
through which the text machine operates to undo narrative flow, duration and 
consistency. Irony, as de Man‟s definition posits it, is “the permanent parabasis of 
the allegory of tropes”.  
 
Derrida and de Man 
 
In Memoires for Paul de Man Derrida remembers de Man‟s work and his 
friendship through a study of memory, specifically linked to the dual movements 
of irony and allegory. Irony and allegory, as Derrida reads them through “The 
Rhetoric of Temporality”, are figures of diremption, repetition and replication, 
whereby the empirical self is replaced or split by the ironic, autobiographical, 
linguistic self. Together the diachronic narrative of allegory and the synchronic 
moment of irony form “the rhetoric of memory which recalls, recounts, forgets, 
recounts and recalls forgetting, referring to the past only to efface what is essential 
to it: anteriority” (MF 81-82). In summarising the conjunction and disjunction – 
what will be referred to as ironic hyphenation – between irony and allegory in de 
Man‟s essay, Derrida explains that 
 
Paul de Man is bent on demonstrating “the implicit and rather enigmatic 
link” (p. 208) for allegory and irony; we have already glimpsed it for 
synecdoche, prosopopeia, or parabasis. Irony too is a figure of disjunction, 
duplication, and doubling (pp. 212, 217, etc.). It often produces a 
disjunction by which “a purely linguistic subject replaces the original self” 
(p. 217), according to the scheme of amnesic memory of which we have 
spoken. And yet, precisely because of the disjunctive structure that they 
share, allegory and irony draw up between them this singular contract, and 
each recalls the other. Of course, the former is essentially narrative, the 
latter momentary and pointed (instantanéiste), but together they form, in 
fact, the rhetoric of memory. (MF 81-82) 
 
The “scheme of amnesic memory” is memory understood as comprising the 
contaminated terms Erinnerung – “good-living-memory” (MF 67) – and 
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Gedächtnis – memory which remembers through the tekhnē of language and the 
sign, and which therefore leads to forgetting. Memory is thereby composed of 
what Derrida calls the allegorical Mnemosyne (memory) and the ironic Lēthē 
(forgetting) (MF 84). Derrida argues that not only does one remember events that 
occurred and events that did not, but that the remembered event is always a 
double structure of occurrence and non-occurrence, as what is remembered is the 
linguistic form of the event, which is not the event which occurred. Thus memory 
is an amnesic memory which comprises the narrative memory of allegory with 
bursts of ironic forgetfulness. Memory is both the retention and effacement of the 
past, and as such, like irony and allegory, lacks anteriority: there is only memory 
without the past (event). In remembering the empirical event is replaced by a 
linguistic event, and the self that remembers is a linguistic, tropological, fictional 
self. Hence memory as irony/allegory replaces the “original” self with the 
linguistic subject.  
A novel of novels, an allegory of irony, is, according to de Man, a 
narrative that prefigures itself, that is tied to a fictive past and future – allegorical 
duration – and yet contains within itself characters or moments which are isolated, 
whose past and future events do not exist for them – ironic moments. However, 
Derrida (ironically) interrupts de Man‟s text by stressing the contamination of 
irony and allegory:  
 
Is not that [the moving towards a memory which prefigures the 
ironic/allegoric split] his [de Man‟s] practice, his style, his signature, the 
stamp of his deconstruction? I speak of the signature because this entire 
series of questions thrusts itself upon me at the moment where there 
appears a kind of hybrid of two memories or of a memory and an amnesia 
which divide the same act. As if the ironic moment were signed, were 
sealed in the body of an allegorical writing. (MF 84)  
 
Irony and allegory operate in a non-dialectical contamination or hybridity, so that 
the (ironic) moment of the signature is always found within the (allegorical) 
duration of the narrative or autobiography. The body of de Man‟s texts – his 
allegorical autobiography – comprises ironic moments of signing, where life is 
figured and disfigured. In Memoires Derrida refers to the act of turning a text on 
an other into a text on the self as the irony of the signature. Thus, as we will see, 
Derrida moves towards a reading of irony as the interruption of genre or code that 
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takes place in a text that changes it from a thetic exposition to a personal account: 
anacoluthic – or parabatic – irony. As he writes: 
 
where de Man says of Baudelaire that he says of Guys what in truth he 
says of himself, how can one avoid reading in this passage something Paul 
de Man is having said by these two others about himself, for himself, in 
his name, through the effects of an irony of the signature? Irony or 
allegory of the trademark (stamp estampille), perhaps? (MF 62-63) 
 
Irony and allegory are the interruption of codes, a spectral haunting of the text by 
its possible interpretations. Texts become phantom-texts, haunted by ghostly turns 
and signatures, by “the phantoms of all the prosopopeias or parabases which, in de 
Man‟s later writing, have been brought in simply to take up the idea of allegory, 
even irony” (MF 80). 
Derrida asks if we should “disjoin this ghostly disjunction called allegory 
from that other ghostly disjunction called irony” (MF 81); his answer is unclear. 
While Derrida directly voices de Man‟s opinion on the immiscibility of irony and 
allegory – “two figures that Paul de Man judges at once inseparable and 
irreducible” (MF 23) – he also deliberately confuses and combines them. There is 
a point of undecidability, he writes, in which you cannot and must not dwell, and 
this is the point of the mutual interruption of irony and allegory. However, insofar 
as a concentration or emphasis can imply hierarchy or privileging, Derrida seems, 
like de Man, to afford allegory a position of primacy, although, unlike de Man, 
through a deliberate contamination of the two. That which is ironic is also 
allegorical – in the above quotation the stamp is both ironic and allegorical – 
while at times when the term irony is expected allegory is (anacoluthically) used: 
on explaining how memory comprises two tropes, Derrida doubles the term 
“allegory”: “the one [which] pretends to know how to tell stories – this is 
diachronic allegory – and the other [which] feigns amnesia – this is synchronic 
allegory” (my emphasis) (MF 82). A little earlier Derrida states that “It is the 
power of allegory, and its ironic force as well, to say something quite different 
from and even contrary to what seems to be intended through it” (MF 74). Irony 
thus becomes a force within the allegorical. 
  Based, perhaps, on de Man‟s foregrounding of allegory over the course of 
his career, and reading from “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, Derrida understands 
allegory as a trope whose narrative structure plays out the tale of the tropes, and is 
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therefore a trope to the second power, the allegory of allegory: “since the concept 
of allegory (as a metonymy) means something other than what it says through a 
figure about the system, it constitutes a kind of allegorical trope in the most 
general sense of the term” (MF 74). The allegory of allegory, the allegory of 
tropes, is the allegory, or disjunction, of a disjunction, and “will always remain a 
disjoined reflexivity, an allegory of allegory that can never, in its specular self-
reflection, rejoin itself, fit itself to itself. Its memory will promise but never 
provide a chance for re-collecting itself” (MF 76). 4  Derrida has therefore 
prefigured de Man‟s later essay while also anacoluthically interrupting it: for de 
Man the trope of tropes, the interruptive, extra turn is irony, here Derrida names 
the same interruptive, disjunctive force allegory. Even more importantly, Derrida 
describes allegory as the allegory of tropes, the phrase de Man used in his 
definition of irony: irony is the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes. The 
allegory of tropes is the diachronic narrative of tropological turns, the disjunctive 
turning (around, away from) of the system of disjunctive turns. In Memoires for 
Paul de Man life is the (allegorical) narrative of (tropological) turning, where the 
past becomes a work of narrative fiction, a memory that is other to the event it has 
remembered/fictionalised. De Man‟s “allegory of tropes” also describes 
fictionalised life and knowledge, and so, without Fichte or de Man‟s second essay, 
Derrida has arrived at de Man‟s definition, anacoluthically naming the same 
structure or force “allegory”. Derrida‟s essay performs the permanent parabasis, 
performs the anacoluthic interruption of the definition in its conflation and 
deliberate confusion of irony and allegory. In Memoires for Paul de Man we see 
performed the “permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes”, performed 
ironically or catachrestically, with the necessary parabatic turn or transgressive 
step. The deliberate confusion of irony and allegory, the temporal disorder 
between the instant and duration, the complication and contamination between 
memory and amnesia, is both faithful to de Man‟s essay and an interruption of its 
codes. Derrida thus makes the point of undecidability between poles even more 
effectively undecidable, and performs on de Man‟s text what he performs on 
                                                 
4
 In the final lecture of the series – “Acts” – Derrida speaks of memory and performativity. To 
speak of memory is also to speak of the future, to speak of what is to come – we remember to 
protect, to move towards, to anticipate the future. To speak of memory is therefore to speak of the 
promise, and of the performative. A promise is always excessive, it always promises too much and 
is haunted by the possibility of its own failure, but without this excess it would be a simple 
description of the future, and therefore a constative. Hence the excess undoes the performative as 
promise and is the possibility of its failure, while also being the very structure that enables it to be. 
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Levinas‟s in “At This Very Moment”. A text on irony demands interruption, and 
so Derrida anacoluthically disrupts de Man‟s in a way that turns the text in a 
different direction and produces an excess. 
Derrida plays with the contamination of the terms throughout his essay, 
deliberately confusing and replacing them, setting up narrative expectations that 
are anacoluthically undone by ironic substitutions. The opposition between irony 
and allegory is never stable as the opposition between memory and forgetfulness 
is never secure – allegory is memory, but memory itself contains or is a form of 
forgetfulness. Irony is forgetfulness, but associated with writing, which is a form 
of memory, it is also a mode of retention. Irony, of the moment, still promises, 
which is of the future, and is thus a performative which writes for the future. The 
association of irony with writing is important – irony is a force of inscription, and 
while of the moment, lacking narrative duration, it outlasts, it remains, potentially 
inhabiting every new context. Allegory‟s memory is the memory of anamnesis, 
living memory, which is often associated with orality. Orality has the duration of 
cultural memory, epic narratives told and retold. Which last, but without the 
(supposed) durability of the immediacy of irony. What becomes “clear” is that 
Derrida‟s essay (irony) is the anacoluthic interruption (permanent parabasis) of 
memory, life, representation, allegory (allegory of tropes). 
Not only does Derrida anticipate de Man‟s definition of irony, he also 
presages a subtler reading of parabasis and of the self-reflexive qualities of irony. 
Derrida refers to “parabasis” twice in Memoires for Paul de Man, each time 
associating it with prosopopeia. As discussed further in chapter six, for de Man 
prosopopeia denotes the spectral presence of the author within her own work, and 
so the juxtaposition of the terms parabasis and prosopopeia implies that Derrida 
uses the former term as de Man does in “The Rhetoric of Temporality”: to denote 
the interruption of the work by the presence of the author. As quoted above, 
Derrida refers to “the phantoms of all the prosopopeias or parabases which, in de 
Man‟s later writing, have been brought in simply to take up the idea of allegory, 
even irony” (MF 80). But while in “The Rhetoric of Temporality” the interruption 
by the author is the work of a “self-conscious narrator” who breaks the artistic 
illusion, Derrida directly conflates parabasis and the irony of the signature, 
making it the interruptive, catachrestic force that turns thetic text into 
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autobiography. As we shall see, this conflation places Derrida far closer to 
parabasis as used by Schlegel and in Greek Attic drama. 
De Man writes that the mistake he made in his first essay was to reduce 
irony to a mode of self-reflexivity. And while Derrida makes self-reflection an 
important part of his text, the fictionalisation of the self in the work is not simply 
self-reflexivity, but auto-interpretation. Writing the self into the text, using an 
ironic, anacoluthic signature to make a text about an other also a text on the self 
means that the text includes “an invaluable periodising auto-interpretation, to be 
read also as memoirs or a theoretical autobiography, with the fictive, ironic, or 
allegorical dimension that de Man‟s signature imprints on all his texts” (MF 122). 
Parabasis interrupts the text, turning each text into an autobiography. The 
autobiography is not merely a mode of self-reflection, but the structural insertion 
of the self into the text, where it is presented, represented and interpreted. The 
irony of this autobiographical insertion is not one of a dialectic of the self, but an 
active structuring of the self within the work, an insertion of alterity into the self 
as the self is inserted into the text. Reflection occurs, but the face is not the face of 
the proper or the same.  
 Thus we can see that although Derrida‟s text is firmly grounded in an 
analysis of de Man‟s earlier works on irony and allegory, the irony posited is far 
closer to de Man‟s second essay. In fact, in complexity and subtlety it surpasses 
both, but can nonetheless be written in terms of de Man‟s definition of irony as 
the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes. For Derrida – in this text – the 
moment of irony, inseparable as it is from the narrative duration of allegory, is the 
moment of disjunction, difference and interruption of the self-reflexive system of 
turning and disjunction in general. Thus irony is of the moment but also of 
duration, a moment inseparable from the greater length. This contamination 
allows us to now focus on the patterns of irony‟s step: parataxis, parabasis, the 
anacoluthon, and the contaminated performative/constative.  
 
 
Syntactic Irony 
 
Hobson‟s Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines presents a masterful reading of 
Derrida and the functioning of syntax. A semantic understanding of language 
focuses on signifiers in isolation, understanding the richness of language to come 
from the ability of each signifier to designate an infinity of signifieds. Against this 
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Hobson proposes a syntactic approach to the text, where syntax describes the 
structure that arises from the joining of lexemes and phrases in unstable ways, so 
that terms “stop functioning as foci, centres, and begin functioning as junction 
points. The phrases are poised on the page, swinging in relation to the sentences 
adjacent to them, hijacking other grammatical functions”. 5  The patterns and 
connections made by units are used, mentioned, quoted, embedded and 
interwoven between other lexemes and phrases in a way that always “allows for 
more than, or other than, what we can say, or write”.6 Hobson‟s understanding of 
syntax extends to include a “performative” dimension; it is a way of articulating 
questions “which is not thematised as a conclusion in the work, [which] acts more 
like a load bearing formation, a way of thinking the questions”.7 Thus meaning “is 
built structurally, out of slippages and losses, out of graftings and cuttings.
 8
 
Derrida‟s neologisms and paleonyms should not be understood in isolation, but in 
terms of “strange attractors” or “singularities”; circuits of argument which are put 
into place by series of terms, so that it is not the lexeme that controls or guides 
meaning, but the sequence. From these arises an “argument which is not always 
explicitly signalled”,9 and a syntactical pattern which is very much of the rhythm 
and mode of Derrida‟s writing. 
Hobson directly, if briefly, associates the syntactical functioning of 
Derrida‟s texts with “a radically original form of irony”.10 Derrida‟s syntactical 
irony is one which “acts like a perturbing force field round certain words or 
phrases … a sudden change of frequency in emission, which can momentarily be 
received in a different way and at a different place”.11 There is no transcendence 
in Derrida‟s irony, no “human or more-than-human mind with an ironic 
overview”.12 It does not progress towards totality or infinity, its “ironic movement 
is not a change of level, but of current, as it were, like an electronic switching 
                                                 
5
 Marion Hobson Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (London: Routledge, 1998) 228. 
6
 Hobson, Derrida189. 
7
 Hobson, Derrida 8. 
8
 Hobson, Derrida 77. 
9
 Hobson, Derrida 121. 
10
 Hobson, Derrida 228. 
11
 Hobson, Derrida 228. 
12
 Hobson, Derrida 228. In making this point Hobson wishes to distinguish the irony she sees in 
Derrida‟s texts from the irony proposed by Kierkegaard or Schlegel. And while neither syntactic 
nor paratactic irony are the irony of the (falsely) elevated vantage point, this should by no means 
imply that irony cannot be manipulated as a tool. It is both that which happens, and that which can 
be made happen, though never wholly controlled. 
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mechanism”.13 Hobson‟s work on ironic syntax in relation to Derrida is to my 
knowledge the first work that moved away from an investigation of Derrida‟s 
lexemes as semantic units, and there can be little doubt as to its importance. 
However, as undeniably valuable as her work is, this chapter proposes that 
Hobson‟s formulation contains a number of serious flaws, and that the movement 
that is occurring would be better named a paratactic irony. 
Interestingly, Hobson does come rather close to parabatic, and paratactic, 
irony – her fourth chapter is subtitled “pas sans pas” (step/not without not/step) – 
and she relates what we recognise as the interruptive movement of anacoluthic 
syntax to the negative: “Derrida, punning on „pas‟ as both „step‟ and „not‟, relates 
to the negative the havering, halting, self-differential movement built out of 
infinitesimal frequency alterations”. 14  When describing syntax and irony her 
language revolves around images of anacoluthic, interruptive alterity: as quoted 
above she uses phrases like “hijacking other grammatical functions”, “an 
electronic switching mechanism” and “a sudden change of frequency in emission”. 
In a later essay she writes that irony “pull[s] the thought down into the seas of 
language, reaching out to the barely anticipated but not-already-formulated. In this 
writing, the absent is the future of what he will say”.15 As we will see, this writing 
of absence steps very close to the irony of parataxis.  
Hobson describes “strange attractors” as patterns which “induce a pattern 
of negotiation, while imposing a relation of interruption – they attract but they are 
out of reach”.16 Bennington opines that Hobson mistakenly segregates negotiation 
and interruption, wanting to make them “two forms of relation to singularities …, 
whereas I would want to say that they are the same, and that Derrida says this”.17 
Hobson thus falls into the trap of detailing pure, uncontaminated oppositions, a 
trap which the anacoluthic involvement and interruption of parabatic irony avoids. 
The movement of the strange attractors is also, for Bennington, a somewhat 
inferior or eidetic version of différance. As Bennington writes, in the case of 
différance,  
 
                                                 
13
 Hobson, Derrida 86. 
14
 Hobson, Derrida 169. 
15
 Hobson, “Derrida‟s Irony” 103. 
16
 Hobson, Derrida147. 
17
 Bennington, Interrupting 193. 
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just as singularity is both given and lost in one and the same moment, so 
the “identity” of each lexeme is given and lost only by its relative 
dispersion in the syntax of its occurrences and its relation to the other 
lexemes. What Hobson is inclined to present as a “strange attractor” 
always out of reach looks as though it would have to be either pure syntax 
(pure relationality without terms) or pure lexematicity (pure term without 
relation); but différance and the rest are just bespeaking the becoming 
syntax of all terms, their dissolution as terms into a syntax which also 
regularly secretes (or vomits out) such quasi-terms, in a rhythm which is 
that of Derrida‟s writing.18 
 
Bennington argues that Hobson‟s formulation of a “strange attractor” moves 
towards the purity of the eidetic, and away from the contamination that should be 
posited by syntax. He also argues that she has replaced the emphasis on process 
expressed by Derrida‟s multiple quasi-transcendentals with a single term that 
becomes both eidetic and semantically overloaded: “„syntax‟ might be doing too 
much work”.19  
The contradiction within Hobson‟s argument – a move towards syntax 
produces a reading centred on semantics, that is, on the term “syntax” – 
demonstrates the difficulty of presenting a theory/name of the fundamental 
structure of the mark that resists being elevated to the position of transcendental 
signifier. As Benningon writes:  
 
how do we understand the proliferation of Derridean lexemes on the one 
hand as producing a dispersion of singular terms in singular contexts, and 
on the other as having among themselves a connection which is not of the 
order of an essence or a common eidos (p.67)? How can we grasp the 
relations between these terms without committing ourselves to the idea 
that they must all somehow name the same thing, which would then have 
to have a proper name – so that différance, for example (or any of the 
others) would become subordinate with respect to all the other terms, the 
real name for whatever Derrida is on about? In other words, can we think a 
dispersion without gathering it around a centre or a single origin point?
20
 
 
How can this thesis present a theory of the basic or innate ironic functioning of the 
mark without subscribing to a notion of a pure irony, a thetic or eidetic concept 
with a proper name and place? Bennington describes Hobson‟s project as “both 
powerfully reductive (in that it proposes a quite specific syntactic motif as 
organising a wide range of texts) and endlessly open (in that syntax thus 
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 Bennington, Interrupting 190. 
19
 Bennington, Interrupting 187. 
20
 Bennington, Interrupting 188. 
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understood just is a principle of multiplication and dispersion)”.21 The challenge is 
therefore to find a thinking of dispersion that does not suppress alterity, that 
emphasises the contamination of terms like negotiation and interruption, that does 
not posit an eidetic ideal outside the system of differences, and that is neither pure 
syntax nor pure semantics but the style or rhythm of “the becoming syntax of all 
terms”. Which brings us to paratactic irony.  
 
Syntactic Irony to Paratactic Irony 
 
In “The Double Session”, describing the hymen, which in French means both 
marriage and separating membrane (hymen in English), Derrida writes: 
 
What counts here is not the lexical richness, the semantic infiniteness of a 
word or concept, its depth or breadth, the sedimentation that has produced 
inside it two contradictory layers of signification (continuity and 
discontinuity, inside and outside, identity and difference, etc.). What 
counts is the formal or syntactical praxis that composes and decomposes it. 
(DS 220)  
 
Meaning, be it direct or ambiguous, is not produced by a lexeme in isolation, but 
is generated through juxtaposition, by being beside or between other lexemes. 
Meaning is constructed 
 
first and foremost through the syntax, which disposes the “entre” in such a 
way that the suspense is due only to the placement and not to the content 
of words. … It is the “between”, whether it names fusion or separation, 
that thus carries all the force of the operation. (DS 220)  
 
As J. L. Austin writes, “properly speaking, what alone has meaning is a 
sentence”22; it is juxtaposition that produces meaning. The semantic range of the 
lexeme does not produce excess; it is only when the term is concatenated with 
other terms that meaning proliferates. The “between” – entre – is in French 
aurally indistinguishable from antre – “cave” – and so Derrida inserts great spaces 
into his conjunctions, as that which joins does so across the mouth of a deep 
recess. The links between words are spaces of excessive depth, passages that step 
up to labyrinths of textual chains. Joining becomes interruption, a parabatic, 
anacoluthic interruption, as the code or context is ironically disrupted by the 
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 Bennington, Interrupting 184. 
22
 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 56. 
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different paths each term can take. Hence we are confronted with the 
“impossibility of identifying the path proper to the letter of the text, of assigning a 
unique place to the subject, of locating a simple origin” (DS 224). 
 A concentration on syntax should not be thought to present a single, self-
present mark that produces meaning through its position in a particular, unstable 
sequence. The mark itself is unstable, and its instability can be read not as 
semantic overloading, but in terms of syntactical compounds. As Derrida writes, 
signs like pharmakon, hymen, différance,  
 
have a double, contradictory, undecidable value that always derives from 
their syntax, whether the latter is in a sense “internal”, articulating and 
combining under the same yoke, huph‟hen, two incompatible meanings, or 
“external”, dependent on the code in which the word is made to function. 
(DS 221) 
  
Huph‟hen, which was borrowed by English to create the term hyphen, meant “in 
one” in Ancient Greek, and evolved to form huphen, a term indicating a 
compound or portmanteaux term, wherein two (or more) words are to be read as 
one. Each mark is a hyphen, a word that contains its own meanings in an internal 
series with itself. What has been understood as semantic richness or excess would 
be better understood in terms of hyphenation, or the trace of hyphenation, as the 
multiple signifieds designated by each signifier exist in a hyphenated chain, linked 
together. This chain forms an internal sequence, but an internal series extending 
externally, as the chain is linked to synonyms, half meanings, associations, and 
eventually, the entire linguistic web. The hyphen therefore joins and separates the 
inside and the outside, parabatically transgressing metaphysical divisions. Thus, 
like the hymen,  
 
the syntactical composition and decomposition of a sign renders this 
alternative between internal and external inoperative. One is simply 
dealing with greater or lesser syntactical units at work, and with economic 
differences in condensation. Without reducing all these to the same, quite 
the contrary, it is possible to recognise a certain serial law in these points 
of indefinite pivoting: they mark the spots of what can never be mediated, 
mastered, sublated, or dialectised. (DS 221) 
 
The internal and external sequences of the mark(s) are hyphenated, conjoined 
through interruption. Hence iterability can be understood in terms of syntax, and 
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the ability of the mark to be repeated and alterable stems from its syntactical 
ability to link itself to any new context, to hyphenate itself. The mark is never 
self-present because it is always internally divided by a hyphen, as it contains 
within itself the cave of the between. It is always anacoluthically interrupted, 
turning its own code away from itself, stepping across its own joins.  
The hyphen can be likened to the movement of and/or, or, more accurately, 
as Derrida outlines in “Et Cetera”, a movement of and…and, or even just and, 
where “and” joins and disjoins.23 Thinking X and Y means thinking X as separate 
to Y, and therefore thinking of them together also separates them. Deconstruction, 
Derrida writes, introduces, or rather recognises, “an „and‟ of association and 
dissociation at the very heart of each thing” (ETC 282-83). This rule of the “and”, 
which is a style of ironic hyphenation, is explicitly outlined by Derrida: 
 
there‟s something like a rule, a privileged procedure in deconstruction 
which is, however, neither a method nor an appropriable technique, but an 
event or a style. The recurrence, the probability of this quasi-rule (a rule 
without a rule since each time the example is absolutely other) would often 
go via a sort of disjunctive conjunction at the threatened heart of each 
conceptual or verbal atom. (ETC 300) 
 
Deconstruction is of hypenation, an ironic style of interruptive, disjunctive 
conjunction. The hyphen can itself be thought of as a stylistic stroke. Derrida, 
speaking in Spurs of Nietzsche‟s use of distance – Distanz – changes the term to 
Dis-tanz. He refers to the hyphen as a “stylistic effect … which parodies the 
philosopher‟s language and the exclamation point, [and] suspends the word 
Distanz” (S 47-49). The “hyphen‟s pirouette” creates a “play of silhouettes” (S 49) 
that suspends the term while sending it to excess, multiplying its possibilities by 
showing its latent divides, splitting it into sections and subsections.  
The hyphen – a stroke which links while separating, anacoluthically 
interrupting while amalgamating – operates to disseminate meaning. Thus Derrida 
writes that we find “Dissemination in the folds of the hymen: that is the 
„operation.‟ Its steps allow for (no) method: no path leads around in a circle 
toward a first step, nor proceeds from the simple to the complex, nor leads from a 
beginning to an end” (DS 271). The ability of the hymen – of any mark – to 
refigure itself depending on the syntax means that “the hymen never presents 
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 Derrida speaks of the theatre of the „and‟ in “Aphorism Countertime”. “And” is a contretemps, a 
false relation. 
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itself. It never is – in the present –; it has no proper, literal meaning” (DS 229). 
Constantly pulled in different directions, the mark is never fully (self) present. It 
always awaits a different place in the series, never meaning in itself, but receiving 
meaning from its location(s). It is thus ironic, never fully there, caught in the 
temporal delay of a fragmented or hyphenated series, never stepping back to a 
clear origin or progressing to a definite end, interrupted and interrupting.  
Importantly, as Derrida establishes, the “between” itself ceases to simply 
function syntactically, as  
 
Through the re-marking of its semantic void, it in fact begins to signify. Its 
semantic void signifies, but it signifies spacing and articulation; it has as 
its meaning the possibility of syntax; it orders the play of meaning. Neither 
purely syntactic nor purely semantic, it marks the articulated opening of 
that opposition. (DS 222)  
  
Thus the force of conjoining interruption and interrupting conjunction precedes 
the syntactic/semantic opposition. The ironic force of hyphenation is, as Derrida 
writes, the possibility of syntax, the space that allows syntax and semantics to be. 
Hence what is required is a term that marks the potential for syntax and semantics, 
that contains the essence of reordering that syntax contains, while emphasising the 
disorder, the fragmentary nature of the chain that  
 
dislocates all oppositions. It carries them off, impresses upon them a 
certain play that propagates itself through all the text‟s moving parts, 
constantly shifting them, setting them out of phase, more or less regularly, 
through unequal displacements, abrupt slowdowns or bursts of speed, 
strategic effects of insistence or ellipsis, but always inexorably. [emphasis 
added] (DS 236) 
 
The syntactic/semantic opposition must be stepped away from, not inverted, and 
the infinite movement and chaotic alterity of the terms emphasised. Thus, in order 
to better name the “play of articulations splitting up that body or re-inscribing it 
within sequences it can no longer control” (DS 255) and the force of the 
“between”, this chapter proposes that the ironic force of the hyphenated mark be 
recognised, not as syntactic irony, but as paratactic irony.  
Parataxis – παπάηαξιρ – comes from the Greek meaning “to place side by 
side” or “to compare”. It places propositions or clauses beside each other without 
conjunction, so they are joined and yet not joined, grammatically correct and 
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complete and yet haunted by the absence of the co-ordinating conjunction.
24
 
Parataxis interrupts while conjoining, and brings together only to separate. It 
places terms and clauses side by side (entre) over the abyss (antre) of the absent 
conjunction, promising and yet committing perjury, allowing and requiring the 
reader to link as she sees fit. Parataxis steps away from the appearance of a logical, 
inevitable, necessary progression or system, and opens up the possibility of 
reordering and rewriting. Syntax privileges order at the expense of disorder, and 
ignores the permanent interruptive potential for reordering. It endorses the product 
over the process, poem over poiesis, destination over path. Each chain of lexemes 
always signifies beyond the supposedly closed system of its syntax; the excess 
overwhelming syntax is that of parataxis. Syntax has too much of the system, too 
much of the authority of the author or reader, too much of the centrality of the 
subject.
25
 Paratactic irony is the irony of a fragmented, infinitely interrupted and 
interrupting system. The ironic, hyphenated force of the entre is a paratactic force 
of potentiality, of possibility and becoming. Parataxis, as the possibility of both 
syntax and semantics is neither, but allows for both. Its separated terms retain the 
possibility of a semantic reading, and it thereby does not attempt to disguise the 
presence of a certain thinking of metaphysics. It is the possibility of both, a mode 
of writing that acknowledges the semantic and the syntactic while undeniably 
siding with a form of the latter.
26
  
“Syntax” is often used to describe the style or manner of an author‟s prose. 
While parataxis has not typically had this use, it by no means undermines the 
importance of style – it is (a) style – but a style that while calling attention to the 
very construct of a text refuses to privilege the author. It is a mode of writing that 
opens the text to the other, that emphasises the (re)writing of the reader. In 
paratactic writing a singular syntax is retained, the author‟s recognisable 
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 A typical example of parataxis would be “I came, I saw, I conquered”. 
25
 Against this strong syntax could be opposed the Beckettian “syntax of weakness” outlined by 
Simon Critchley in On Humour. For Critchley this comic syntax “can be found throughout 
Beckett‟s work in a whole series of wonderfully self-undoing, self-weakening phrases” (49). It is a 
syntax that makes us laugh and then calls us into question through that laughter; “the highest laugh, 
the mirthless laugh, the laugh laughing at the laugh. ... We realise in an instant that the object of 
laughter is the subject who laughs. After the wave of laughter has hit us with its saline spray, an 
undertow of doubt threatens to drag us under the water‟s surface” (49-50). This self-undoing 
syntax moves towards parataxis, but imposes a strong sense of doubt and restriction that isn‟t 
insisted upon in the spacing of parataxis.  
26
 In The Ear of the Other Derrida speaks of the syntaxless syntax Blanchot uses in The Step Not 
Beyond to approach “death in what I could call a step-by-step procedure of overstepping or of 
impossible transgression” (EO 19). This syntaxless syntax can be likened to parataxis, and to 
parabasis – a step which is not, a step which interrupts itself, and steps to transgress. 
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idiosyncrasies, tone and choice of terms are most definitely not ignored, but the 
fact that that style is always already anacoluthically interrupted by its own terms is 
emphasised.  
Parataxis places sentences or thoughts side by side without hierarchy or 
order. It operates, as such, as a mode of fragmentation. Parataxis should not be 
thought, however, to return to a mode of semantics by dint of effectively 
removing or reducing the functioning of any terms that don‟t “mean” – in other 
words, by privileging categoremes over syncategoremes. Parataxis does not 
eliminate the syncategorematic so much as open it up – it doesn‟t specify a 
conjunction but allows the reader to select one. The fragmented seriality of marks 
can be thought of a parataxis of affirmation, a “yes, yes, yes” or the 
syncategorematic “and, and, and” in which “and” separates and conjoins (ETC 
288). “And” means “binding, unbinding, conjunction, disjunction, opposition, 
addition, complement, supplement” (ETC 297) – it is parataxis and hyphenation. 
Derrida writes that “What counts is the formal or syntactical praxis that 
composes and decomposes” (DS 220). The term praxis, meaning action or 
practice, also denotes a synthesis of theory and action, or in linguistics, the 
performative aspect of language, that is, speech as action. This praxis is 
emphasised in a theory of parataxis. Parataxis is a promise always tainted by the 
possibility of perjury; it presents marks as though ordered and conjoined, but 
refuses to commit to a definitive or conclusive conjunction. Parataxis is always a 
literature that says more than the thetic or the propositional, as its statements are 
never wholly present, forwarding a truth contaminated by the possibility of a lie, 
presenting a phrase whose (in)completion is haunted by the catachrestic.
27
  
                                                 
27
 Jan Mieszkowski‟s “Who‟s Afraid of Anacoluthon?” (MLN 124.3 (2009)) argues that syntax is 
always anacoluthically interrupted, and as such, without using the term, posits a basic paratactic, 
ironic functioning for syntax. 
 
No grammatical or syntactic line has enough momentum to prevent another “movement” 
from usurping it, which is to say that any grammar or syntax is at best provisional, a 
gesture toward the paradigmatic rather than a sovereign model in its own right. At the 
level of the sentence, clause, or even the individual word, the grammar or syntax in force 
is at best a work in progress, a project that inevitably creates the illusion of a structuring 
authority that it does not possess. Anacoluthon reveals that where language is concerned, 
there is always enough directional movement to guarantee the emergence of at least the 
semblance of a pattern or a standard, but there can never be enough movement to create a 
truly monolithic organising schema that can defend itself against the possibility of 
usurpation. Language can never relate to itself as the unambiguous power to give form 
that it presents itself to be. (653) 
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The movement of parataxis can be related to Derrida‟s reinscription of the 
metaphor. “White Mythology” “disrupts the opposition of the semantic and the 
syntactic, and especially the philosophical hierarchy that submits the latter to the 
former” (WM 270). Derrida proposes without (directly) proposing an ironic, 
fragmentary interplay of marks that is paratactic, a meaning of interrupted 
juxtapositions. In a sequence outlining the connections made by metaphors, 
associations that appear grounded in semantics, Derrida asks if we do not have a 
 
long and hardly visible chain whose first link is quite difficult to 
exhibit. …. Rather than a metaphor, do we not have here an “enigma”, a 
secret narrative, composed of several metaphors, a powerful asyndeton or 
dissimulated conjunction whose essential characteristic is “to describe a 
fact in an impossible combination of words”. [emphasis added] (WM 243) 
 
The impossible combinations, the dissimulated conjunctions, the enigmatic 
connections, the hardly visible – invisible – links and chains describe the 
movement of paratactic irony. In this passage Derrida uses a direct synonym for 
parataxis – asyndeton – which comes from the Greek for unconnected. What 
replaces the concentration on diachrony, on univocal truth, on attainable intention, 
on semantics and semantic overloading, is not simply the syntactic, but a powerful 
ironic force of productive, and interruptive, parataxis. The danger with an 
understanding of the chains and juxtapositions as syntax is precisely in the use of 
the term to signify the signed system of a particular author. Derrida argues that the 
plurality of metaphor is inseparable from syntax – this can too easily be read as 
the privileging of a specific syntax, for example, that of metaphysics, or that of a 
particular author. The plurality of the system within singularities can be found in 
the term parataxis, without restricting the chain to one field or writer.  
 The path of the ironic, hyphenated, paratactic pas de métaphore, the 
metaphor as anacoluthon, can be traced in the blanc of “The Double Session”. 
Blanc (white/blank) is a term which inserts itself into itself, inserting a blanc into 
the blanc. Blanc inserts an interruptive space, the cave of the between, the abyss 
surrounding the narrow hyphen, into the white, the place of inscription. It is both 
the absence within the mark that prevents it from being fully present to itself, and 
the matrix in which work occurs, the absence that gives space to meaning. The 
space of the blanc contains each white object, and each white object is 
anacoluthically interrupted by the empty white space (of possibility). The plurality 
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of metaphors and their dissemination produces a tropological structure that turns 
around itself, collapsing the structure of metaphors. Nor can its excessive turning 
be said to signify through metonymy: as everything is metonymic, the part is 
always greater than the whole, and the whole is always smaller than the part, and 
so the concept of the metonymic collapses. The multiplicity of referencing that 
occurs, the doubling and redoubling, the folding and refolding stems from a force 
that does not present the simple turn of a trope, but the (re)turn of the trope of 
tropes, of the quasi-trope – irony. The blanc is the space between phrases in ironic 
parataxis, the divide that separates and conjoins, that makes each metaphor 
ironically excessive. The blank space is the space of infinite interruption and 
infinite production, an invisible hyphen or full stop.
28
 It calls attention to what has 
not been said, to what cannot be said, and to that which lies outside propositional 
speech or thematic content. The blanks are present through their absence, are 
wholly (in)visible, and turn each ordered system into a fragmented, ironic system 
of parabatic parataxis.
29
  
To return to Bennington, we must ask if we have answered his criticisms 
of Hobson‟s syntactic irony. Paratactic irony is a thinking of dispersion and 
alterity that acknowledges the (perhaps) inescapable tendency of the reader/writer 
to impose an ordered system on the text. It presents potentiality, allowing an order 
to be presumed/imposed, but without that order irreparably eliminating excess. 
Parataxis, as an ironic hyphen, will always represent contamination, and 
specifically the intermingling of engagement and disruption, as parataxis shows 
that any engagement is a disruption. Its potentiality, its force of becoming that is 
process rather than product does not eliminate the semantic nor the syntactic, but 
gives them space. And its ideal or eidetic form? Parataxis is neither order nor 
                                                 
28
 Julia Ponzio writes that Derrida uses the Greek word rytmos to refer to the law of spacing 
because rytmos does not imply the orderly sequence of “rhythm”, but is “a form that is always 
about to change or to break up” (“The Rhythm of Laughter: Derrida‟s Contribution to a Syntactic 
Model of Interpretation” Derrida Today 2.2 (2009) 235). Thus the rhythm of Derrida‟s blancs are 
paratactic and anacoluthic. 
29
 In Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987) Alan Wilde‟s description of modernist irony closely 
resembles the irony of parataxis. He writes that  
 
the clue to the ironic vision lies … in forms that render not merely the fact of disparity 
but its informing principles, not only the unconnected elements of life but, more tellingly, 
the disconnection itself: those unbridgeable spaces that define as they disfigure the map 
of modern life. (30)  
 
Irony is, for Wilde, horizontally paratactic – side by side – rather than vertically metaphoric – one 
behind the other. 
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chaos, system nor nonsystem, and exists only (im)purely. It is a linguistic 
structure of conjunction and disjunction and has no correspondent Form. As 
Derrida writes in relation to the (paratactic) pharmakon, it has no ideal identity. 
Any name will unfortunately hyphenate a mark to the proper; by naming the 
recurring force in Derrida work and the general system of marks paratactic irony a 
reduction has been perpetrated, but it is a reduction of deep blanks and caves. 
 
Parabatic Irony 
 
Deconstruction is the getting ready for the coming of the other, a preparation 
which “comes back in the step [pas] – and also as the step – of the other” (PI 39), 
and is often associated with a step or turn: 
 
Deconstruction … does not settle for methodical procedures, it opens up a 
passageway, it marches ahead and marks a trail; its writing is not only 
performative, it produces rules – other conventions – for new 
performatives and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a 
simple opposition between performative and constative. Its process 
[demarche] involves an affirmation. (PI 23)  
 
Deconstruction is the opening up of unexpected pathways, and the step it takes is 
the ironic step of parabasis, an aporetic step/not that transgresses limits and dead-
ends. Aporia, often associated with irony, is “the possibility of the impossible, the 
„play‟ of a certain excess in relation to any mechanical movement, oriented 
process, path traced in advance, or teleological programme” (WA xvii). Aporia is 
“the very condition of the step [pas], or even the experience of pathbreaking, route 
(via rupta), march [marche], decision, event: the coming of the other, in sum, of 
writing and desire” (WA xvii). Aporia, so long associated with Socrates‟ ironic 
dialogues, in Derrida‟s texts is redirected, and it becomes, rather than a dead-end, 
the way of pathfinding, a new step. Deconstruction‟s step/not of constructive 
aporia is the step of parabasis.  
  The term “parabasis” – παπάβαζιρ – is derived from the Greek verb 
parabainein – “to step forward”. It describes a dramatic device used in Greek 
Attic comedies whereby the flow of the play‟s primary action was interrupted 
when the chorus stepped out to speak directly to the audience. During the action 
of the play proper the chorus watched the actors, but for the parabasis they turned 
to face the audience, and spoke on a number of themes that did not directly relate 
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to the plot of the play itself. In the course of the seven sections of parabasis the 
fame and skill of the poet was lauded and defended, his rivals attacked, the 
audience flattered or mocked, the gods and the muses praised, humorous and 
satirical stories told and plot explanations given.
30
 Parabasis steps back from the 
play‟s plot without being wholly removed from it; it breaks the dramatic illusion 
of the play and introduces a sense of otherness and estrangement. The chorus 
steps away from its role as spectator and becomes a central spectacle, commenting 
on the play and the poet with an ambiguous voice, as it presents opinions which 
are undecidably those of characters, performers, the poet or the public. The poet‟s 
defence, for example, was delivered in the first or third person; as G. M. Sifakis 
writes; “In none of the comedies does the chorus have a consistent and unalterable 
dramatic character”.31  
While a digression and complete in itself, the parabasis was also highly 
intertextual, referencing other plays by the poet and his rivals. The parabasis, 
writes Hubbard, “gives us critical insight into the drama‟s articulation of 
meaning”.32 The parabasis was a “self-questioning, self-critical” form, a “highly 
context-bound and ironic rhetorical epideix[is]”.33 The parabasis was therefore a 
digression or interruption of the plot by a voice or chorus of voices presenting a 
commentary on the poet, play, and political situation from an undecidable point of 
view. It was a monologue or soliloquy that in its engagement with past plays and 
themes was also a dialogue, which the involvement of multiple voices rendered – 
even when spoken by one – a cacophonic polylogue. It was self-deprecating and 
boastful, so much so that Hubbard writes: “Nowhere are the postures of alazoneia 
and eirōneia more evident and nowhere is the question of self-knowledge more in 
the foreground that in the parabasis”.34  
Schlegel‟s most famous definition of irony – “irony is a permanent 
parabasis” (PF 668) – is read by many as referring to a breaking of illusion, and 
hence German Romantic irony is understood to be that which calls attention to the 
work as “unreal” or fictive. However, reading the step of parabasis as mode of 
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Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt is a misreading, both of Romantic irony and of the 
role of parabasis within Greek comedy. G. M. Sifakis goes so far as to claim that 
parabasis could not have been an interruption of dramatic illusion as Greek 
audiences would have never been involved in a dramatic illusion of reality as we 
understand it. He argues that Greek drama did not attempt to realistically represent 
human life on stage and there was no urge to understand actors as the characters 
they portrayed. Since the actors were only ever understood as actors, there was no 
illusion that was broken when they dropped their roles. Hubbard, however, 
disagrees with this reading; even when theatre is highly stylised audiences accept 
the actors as the people/gods/forces they portray. When the characters drop masks 
to present themselves differently there is an undeniable change in reception. Such 
playing with forms was, he feels, an important part of Greek comedy.
35
 
Raymond Immerwahr notes that Schlegel referred to the dissolution of 
illusion by the distinct and separate name of “arabesque”,36 but even without this 
information it should be clear that the parabasis performs a more subtle role than 
simply dividing reality from illusion. The interruption that takes place in parabasis 
is scripted, and as such as fictional as the primary action. While the chorus 
members may literally or metaphorically unmask themselves, and speak as “real” 
people, that is, as actors or as the poet, what disturbs the fiction of the drama is 
another fiction. The audience is recognised, but it is recognised as audience, as a 
construct inherently complicit in the artifice of theatre. The interruption is bound 
by the laws of the play, and as such plays its own interruption. Thus the parabasis 
does not serve to remind the audience of the fiction of the play, and thereby 
highlight the reality of that which lies beyond the play, but rather shows that the 
artistic fiction of the play is a reflection on and of the artistic fiction of the world, 
which has no more “reality” than that of the play. Hence the German romantic 
demand as voiced by Schlegel: “we demand irony: we demand that events, men, 
in short the play of life, be taken as play and be represented as such” (DP 89). 
Parabasis becomes an overstepping of the boundaries of fiction and reality, a 
crossing or transgression of their limits that presents a strange or uncanny version 
of life and of drama. 
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Parabasis exemplifies the movement of interruption as well as a 
transgression and elliptical turning. The skewed step of parabasis is a permanent 
step, which is an interrupted or failed step; a step that steps over itself. In stepping 
it steps away from stepping and thus turns away from itself, and can be linked to 
the double meaning in French of pas – it is a step [pas] and not [pas]. As a 
permanent step there is both movement and stasis in parabasis. As an anacoluthon 
the parabatic work turns in and away from itself, disrupting discourse by 
conversing on that discourse, a self-renewing and ceaseless interruption that 
fragments the work with simultaneous dissymmetric voices. It presents itself and 
comments on itself. The parabasis is then a digression, an interruption, a shift in 
focus and theme. And yet it can also become the object of primary focus; a 
contemporary account of Aristophanes‟ Frogs states that “The play was so much 
admired because of the parabasis contained in it that it was actually restaged”.37 
When the chorus speaks in the parabasis it speaks with an ambiguous 
voice, moving between monologue, dialogue and polylogue. The voices of many 
are presented as the voice of one, and yet the one is so undecidable as to be the 
voices of many. The single unit of the chorus comprises many separate identities, 
and so its totality is always split. It is always more and less than the sum of its 
parts. It is part of the play and not part of the play, both at its centre and wholly 
marginalised. Relative roles are turned upside down – the poet becomes a 
character, as does the audience, while the actors cease to be, within a carefully 
constructed illusion, actors. It is play and “literary self-defence”,38  a poetico-
literary performative.
 
It is a step forward and a step back, a transgressive, skewed 
step that is and is not the step of self-reflection. It crosses boundaries and markers; 
it is always inside and outside. It provides a path, a point of entry, a footbridge, 
and yet never quite takes you to your planned destination. It is a certain gait, a 
particular way of walking, a rhythm or style. It is reality and fiction, 
autobiography and self-defence, a performance and a description. It interrupts and 
continues, it explains and mystifies.  
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Irony and Performativity 
 
In “The Concept of Irony” de Man writes: “Irony consoles and it promises and it 
excuses. It allows us to perform all kinds of performative linguistic functions 
which seem to fall out of the tropological field, but also to be very closely 
connected with it” (AI 165). Irony is a productive force, an interruption that 
generates excess. In “This Strange Institution Called Literature” (1992) Derrida 
describes the literature that inspires him as containing a performative element: it 
comprises texts which are “literary works and works which say a lot about 
literature and therefore about themselves, works whose performativity, in some 
sense, appears the greatest possible in the smallest space” (SI 46-47). This 
understanding of the performative has been retained by a number of critics; 
Michael Naas, for example, writes that “the way Derrida says things, the way his 
texts are performative, is inseparable from what he says and the claims he 
makes”.39 A performative statement, for Naas, is one that does something, that 
engages the reader and reflexively enacts what it describes. 
In “This Strange Institution” Derrida understands the performative to 
occur when literature enacts what it says, so that the work interrogates itself and in 
so doing changes language itself: 
 
this experience of writing is “subject” to an imperative: to give space for 
singular events, to invent something new in the form of acts of writing 
which no longer consist in a theoretical knowledge, in new constative 
statements, to give oneself over to a poetico-literary performativity at least 
analogous to that of promises, orders, or acts of constitution or legislation 
which do not only change language, or which, in changing language, 
change more than language. (SI 55)  
 
What Derrida terms poetico-literary performativity was seen as the perfect 
Romantic, ironic work and pinnacle of literary achievement by Schlegel, and as a 
form inevitably produced by the text by Blanchot.
40
 In “This Strange Institution” 
Derrida understands performative literature to produce a work that is and produces 
more than propositional statements and descriptions. This literature promises, and 
in promising produces truths and events in a way that is neither literary nor 
functional, neither poetic nor legal.  
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The performative/constative opposition was first proposed by J. L. Austin 
in a lecture series given at Harvard in 1955. The constative is a true or false 
judgement or description, while a performative is that which performs the action 
to which it refers, so that in saying “I name this ship X” a ship becomes named, or 
in saying “I promise to lend you my book” an act of promising takes place. 
However, as Austin began to complicate felicitous and infelicitous instances of 
the performative, the distinctions began to dissolve. Verbs that appear to function 
only as performatives – I promise, I order, I bet – become constatives in different 
tenses and outside of first person present indicative use – “I ordered him”. The 
infelicity that occurs in performatives can also be seen to figure in constatives: the 
sentence “The King of France is bald” is neither true nor false but invalid, as 
France does not currently have a monarchy. Furthermore, the constative statement 
“We will go for dinner” can also be understood as a promise: “(I promise you) 
that we will go for dinner”, and hence as a performative. Even the introduction of 
a new set of divisions – locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary41 – failed to 
keep the categories from mutual contamination. Not only is the distinction unclear, 
it also becomes apparent that performatives are not a particular type of constative; 
instead constatives are in the category of performatives.  
Austin argued that intentionality impacts the success or failure of a 
performative not in the sense of someone inwardly or emotionally “not meaning 
it”, but in that all must know that a bet or promise is intended by the context. 
Which means that the context must be “serious”, that is, “I must not be joking or 
writing a poem”.42 Performatives fail – are infelicitous – when certain conditions 
aren‟t met, when the interlocutor “doesn‟t listen, or takes it as ironical, or wasn‟t 
responsible for whatever it was, and so on”.43 As Austin writes: 
 
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a particular way hollow 
or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or 
spoken in a soliloquy. ... Language in such circumstances is in special 
ways – intelligibly – used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its 
normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations of 
language. All this we are excluding from consideration. Our performative 
                                                 
41
 In saying “You had better watch out” (locutionary act), I threatened her (illocutionary act), 
which scared her (perlocutionary act).  
42
 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1975) 9. 
43
 Austin How 106. 
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utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary 
circumstances.
44
 
 
A literary, tropological or theatrical situation is for Austin a marginal and non-
serious instance of the performative, in which the performative is quoted or 
mimicked out of context, and is thus ineffective and void.  
Austin‟s performativity, in its (unobtainable) uncontaminated state, is an 
act of absolutely reflexive communication, where words immediately produce an 
act according to recognisable rules and contexts. It is logocentric and operates 
through absolute correspondence. All speech acts have an effect, but Austin 
attempted to isolate the pure act whereby the words do not describe an already 
existent state, or represent it in a new way, but produce the event of which they 
speak. The performative presumes upon immediacy, presence, comprehensibility, 
a clear context and legitimacy. Any performative that does not correspond to these 
conditions either simply fails or fails as it is parasitic or secondary to the normal 
functioning of the performative.  
It is these qualities that form the basis of Derrida‟s uneasy relationship 
with the performative. At the basis of this disagreement is communication itself, 
as Austin‟s formula depends on the existence of “a concept that is unique, 
univocal, rigorously controllable, and transmittable” (LI 1). For Derrida 
communication is not the transmission of a meaning, as an utterance possesses 
potential meanings of irreducible plurality that cannot be dismissed by context 
related interpretation. A speech act does not fail because of an overt confusion as 
to whether something is spoken ironically; this failure is inscribed as possibility 
into every apparently successful instance. As Derrida writes, what Austin 
excludes as anomalous “is the determined modification of a general citationality – 
or rather a general iterability – without which there would not even be a 
„successful‟ performative” (LI 17). The ability or possibility to “inauthentically 
cite” an original statement is not the misuse of an authentic speech act but a result 
of the iterable “force” of the mark. We are presented “with different kinds of 
marks or chains of iterable marks and not with an opposition between citational 
utterances, on the one hand, and singular and original event-utterances, on the 
other” (LI 18).  
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The performative literature that captivated Derrida was “a certain practice 
of fiction, the intrusion of an effective simulacrum or of disorder into 
philosophical writing” (SI 39).45 Thus Derrida‟s literary performativity is neither 
conventional nor simply reflexive; the disorder that it introduces steps beyond the 
immediate correlation of the traditional performative. It is a performativity in 
which the elliptical, quasi-reflexive step oversteps boundaries, overproduces, 
defies contexts and undoes the law of genre. Following on from this, a 
performative mode of philosophy is a mode that plays with the force or the 
economy of literature to reflect more than itself; that enacts a non-propositional 
engagement with constative knowledge, that questions the constative nature of 
knowledge itself, and that is haunted by its own impossibility and potential 
fictionality. Through performativity a skewed reflexivity in introduced into a text, 
a disjunction and a disorder that produces truth and untruths.  
In Memoires for Paul de Man Derrida presents the poetico-literary 
performative – presenting an argument while enacting that argument – as the 
performance of a descriptive exegesis, that is, as a contaminated 
constative/performative. As Derrida writes: 
 
These texts do not present themselves as texts on the theme of the promise; 
they demonstrate – show and envelope at the same time – the performative 
structure of the text in general as promise, including that of the 
demonstrative text, that which Paul de Man signs. (MF 93) 
 
“This structure”, Derrida writes, “never exists without disturbing – I might even 
say perverting – the tranquil assurance of the subject of what we today call a 
„performative‟” (MF 93). Thus, the irony of the signature, noted above as the 
interruptive doubling whereby a thetic text is also an autobiography, is the 
contamination of the performative and the constative: the exegetical description 
(constative) is also an autobiographical confession (performative). 
Over the course of his career Derrida employed the term “performative” 
with varying degrees of comfort, as he recognised that the performative names an 
important force, but was clearly uncomfortable with its traditional, referential use. 
While he commends Austin for recognising a mode of communication which “is 
not limited strictly to the transference of a semantic content that is already 
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constituted and dominated by an orientation towards truth” (LI 13-14), he is 
clearly troubled by what he calls in Rogues the power of the “I” that neutralises 
the eventfulness of the event (R 84). Throughout his texts Derrida anacoluthically 
interrupts his work with a term of pharmakon-like ambiguity; at times, like the 
“poetico-literary performative” (SI 55), it is used with approbation, at times it is 
strongly associated with conformity and intentionality – “In the strict sense, a 
performative still presupposes too much conventional institution to break the 
mirror” (PI 46). At others the term is used to denote a performance rather than 
Austin‟s performative, and in Spectres of Marx Derrida terms performative 
interpretation “that which transforms the very thing it interprets” (SM 63), 
although he acknowledges that this is an unusual usage.
46
  
In “Signature Event Context” Derrida describes the performative utterance 
as “the most „event-ridden‟ utterance there is” (LI 19).47 However, in “Typewriter 
Ribbon” he writes that the force of an event is “irreducible to the force or the 
power of a performative, even if it gives to the performative itself, to what is 
called the force of the performative, its chance and its effectiveness” (WA 235). A 
performative speech act traditionally functions through a direct correspondence 
between speaker, words and situation. This predictability means that where the 
performative is, an event worthy of the name cannot arrive.
48
 Yet not only is 
language itself a promise, Derrida‟s texts have always been promises, appeals, 
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confessions. In “The University Without Condition” he describes his text as “less 
a thesis, or even a hypothesis, than a declarative engagement, an appeal in the 
form of a profession of faith” (my emphasis) (WA 202). Derrida‟s texts partake of 
a performativity that creates a monstrous event, the impossible performative event 
that is the only possible event. 
 
Here again, to think both the machine and the performative event together 
remains a monstrosity to come, an impossible event. Therefore the only 
possible event. But it would be an event that, this time, would no longer 
happen without the machine. Rather, it would happen by the machine. 
(WA 74) 
 
The paradox of the performative, mechanical event also serves to 
distinguish between irony and the event in de Man and Derrida. De Man‟s text 
machine is the force of arbitrary, automated disruption of meaning that occurs in 
the text. It undoes reflexivity and narrative consistency, introducing arbitrariness 
and the aleatory. It employs, as Derrida writes, the “dissociative, dismembering, 
fracturing, disarticulating, and even disseminal power that de Man attributes to the 
letter” (WA 151). The ironic, parabatic machine of Derrida‟s texts is 
unprogrammable and anagrammatical, and also interrupts the unity of the subject, 
and language. Yet it is also a subjectile, a typewriter ribbon, a printing machine, 
that does not simply disrupt but also produces, that creates an event, interrupting 
the narrative and the reflexive while being their condition of possibility. The 
mechanistic in Derrida plays an important structural role of (im)possibility, and is 
the contamination of the singular and mechanical reproduction, of singularity and 
iterability.  
The effects of de Man‟s text machine can be seen in Miller‟s descriptions 
of irony. For him irony is “corrosive”,49 that which  
 
functions mechanically in detachment from any controlling center or 
centers, just as indirect discourse, which is irony as an operative principle 
of narration, can no longer be certainly identified as spoken or written by 
anyone in particular. … Irony can only be stabilised by an arbitrary act of 
the interpreter stilling the unstillable and ignoring other possibilities of 
meaning. No passage in a narrative, short or long, partial or incomplete, 
will stay motionless long enough, unless killed by the critic, in her or his 
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rage for certainty, to form the stable base for a further journey or line of 
interpretation.
50
  
 
Miller‟s irony is “a form of endless looping or feedback” which means that the 
interpreter remains “suspended interminably in an impossible attempt to still the 
passage‟s internal movement so that it can be used as a firm stepping-off place for 
a more complete journey of interpretation”.51 Against the looping and suspension 
of Miller‟s irony, inherited from de Man‟s text machine, is the aporias of 
Derrida‟s irony that is productive of new pathways and events.52 
Hence Derrida conceives of a performative that is not simply and directly 
reflexive, grounded in presence and convention. His performative is always 
anacoluthically interrupted by its contamination with the constative, and by what 
he terms the perverformative.
53
 The perverformative draws attention to the fact 
that every attempt to produce a simple, performative reflexivity between saying 
and doing is always undone. A perverformative is a performative that knows it 
cannot saturate context, that the trace of a different (mis)step will always haunt it 
and that it thereby never can possess the immediacy and totality that Austin 
proposed. The performative is always an ironic, interrupted, failed 
perverformative that steps away from intention and cognition. In Memoires for 
Paul de Man Derrida describes how de Man changes Heidegger‟s die Sprache 
spricht (language speaks) to die Sprache verspricht (sich) (language promises 
(itself)). To speak is to promise, to remember is to promise the future. The subject 
and the comprehension of the subject begins with the post-originary and 
performative modality of promissory speech. However, as ver is a German prefix 
close to the English mis, versprechen calls to misspeak, and so in German the 
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promise is always tainted by the possibility of a false promise or perjury. Thus de 
Man‟s performative language promises (itself) is Derrida‟s ironic perverformative 
language promises/perjures (itself).  
The shifting nature and unforeseeable destiny of the performative in each 
of Derrida‟s texts – be it dismissed as a restrictive, totalising category or 
employed as a force of interruptive, contaminated possibility – is exemplary of a 
certain ironic, anacoluthic style that Derrida employs. His texts are interrupted by 
the performative, as it introduces an unpredictable excess. More so than one of his 
non-synonymous substitutions which, while acting as quasi-transcendentals, tend 
to be somewhat more fixed in meaning,
54
 the performative – (Austin‟s) neologism 
and (Derrida‟s) paleonym – sneaks into Derrida‟s texts, each time wearing a 
slightly different mask. It sends the texts in unexpected directions, interrupting 
and conjoining, describing and performing events, a theoretical point analysed, a 
mode of invention implemented, a style espoused. The performative/constative is 
thus performed and constatively described within Derrida‟s work, and this 
overdetermined approach is what this thesis calls an ironic, nonthetic style, a 
mode of writing which strives to push language to its limits.  
 
The Performative Force of Irony  
 
Irony is construed in this thesis as a force, a force of perverformative reworking. 
Derrida describes force as “the common but always different possibility of the 
„movement‟ of „life,‟ of „desire,‟ of impulses” (N 35). A force is something that 
performs and produces, propels and pushes. It is essentially a “very common 
name for designating that for which we do not have a clearly expressible concept 
in a given philosophical code. In philosophy, the value of force has always been in 
representing what resisted conceptual analysis” (N 35). Force is, like irony, 
essentially always differential, lacks substance, and always escapes definition. 
Derrida writes:  
 
when I name force I am thinking of a differentiality, which thus, as 
differentiality, is also immediately trace or writing, a network of marks, 
and marks that are codeable, like any mark, in iterability, and at the same 
time inscribe and erase themselves or inscribe and can erase themselves. 
(N 35) 
                                                 
54
 Insofar as any mark is ever fixed. 
P a g e  | 85 
 
Force is something indefinable that steps up, like a trace or writing, while 
stepping back, or stepping up while covering its tracks. Like a mark, as a mark, its 
proper action is to erase itself, and thus “force is itself also a weakness. It is a 
manner of not appearing” (N 35). Force is powerful and feeble, and is thus, in a 
sense, unreliable, stepping in any number of possible directions. Force is not free 
and infinite play, but something that can and will push in the opposite direction. 
Force operates under the law of a structural ruse or twist so that the weakest 
becomes the strongest. Derrida‟s force is an ironic force of weakness and strength, 
that which ancoluthically interrupts itself. This ironic force, operating because of 
the mark, operating in the mark, is the force of iterability and is a force because of 
iterability. It is not a power, because it is not something. Rather, it is “always 
inscribed in a space where a ruse (not a subjective ruse but a ruse of structure) is 
possible, making the weakest strongest” (N 35). The force of structural irony is 
and stems from a “ruse” that is, as Royle writes, not a “space of play that would 
be tantamount simply to frivolity or having fun. It is a question of trying to reckon 
with the force of Derrida‟s language in terms of what we might provisionally call 
the counter-hoax”.55  
The ironic force, the structural “ruse” or “counter-hoax” is inextricable 
from the iterable mark, that which “multiplies and divides itself internally … a 
principle of indetermination, chance, randomness, or destinerring” (MC 360). A 
priori divided and internally unstable, Derrida‟s mark is iterable, that is, 
repeatable and in the repetition alterable. It cannot be grounded in one single finite 
identity to the extent that it can never be used again: it must be wholly capable of 
being remarked. It is divided, and never present to itself, never belonging to its 
own category. Iterability  
 
alters, contaminating parasitically what it identifies and enables to repeat 
“itself”; it leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is 
(already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something 
other than what we say and would have wanted to say, to understand 
something other than…etc.. (LI 62)  
 
Iterability means that creating firm divisions between intended and expressed 
meanings is immediately problematic. Iterability functions parasitically; it is 
always the para-site, the site within language that is beside, near, past, beyond or 
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contrary to intention, context, presence, location. Iterability is irony, it is the 
structure of the mark that enables irony to be. It is the parasitic, perverformative 
force we term irony. 
Like iterability différance functions ironically, containing within itself the 
“mute irony” (DI 3) of the anacoluthic letter a that interrupts the code and 
signification, permitting “the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing 
which permits the different threads and different lines of meaning – or of force – 
to go off again in different directions” (DI 3). As the temporal delay of a detour 
différance disrupts presence, as the mark keeps within itself the mark of the past 
element, and calls to – thus containing – the mark of a future element. It ironically 
introduces a temporal exigency, a fragmentary temporality.
56
  
Claire Colebrook refers to Derrida as “an exemplary figure in the history 
of ironic philosophy”,57 associating his irony with the structural functioning of 
iterability. She sees “an essential irony at the structural root of concepts; when we 
speak we use a system that precedes all use and that can therefore have effects that 
exceed all intent”.58 However, she makes the serious error of understanding the 
mark – which she refers to as “concept” – solely in terms of its repeatability, that 
is, she considers the essential quality of the mark the fact that each time it is used 
it remains recognisable and the same. She therefore states that for Derrida 
“concepts must have strict boundaries”.59 Because the meaning of the mark is 
always in excess of context a text will say more than the author intends, and 
“Derrida can look at how a concept works in a text such that what the text wants 
to say is belied by the force of the concept‟s said”.60 Colebrook overemphasises 
the rigidity and stability of the mark at the expense of its radical difference and 
instability. While the mark has a “certain self-identity” [emphasis added] (LI 10), 
this is no more than a “minimal remainder” (LI 53) of the same that is retained in 
alteration. The mark‟s self-identity is always contaminated in advance by 
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 Clare Colebrook Irony in the Work of Philosophy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002) 
32. 
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 Colebrook Philosophy 37. 
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 Colebrook Philosophy 34. It should be noted that this is not repeated in her later work Irony. 
Here Colebrook reads Derrida‟s irony through contaminated contexts, différance, and critique 
from within. 
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 Colebrook Philosophy 34. Colebrook expresses the traditional split in irony between intended 
meaning and expressed meaning with the terms saying and said, where the saying is the ironist‟s 
intended meaning and the said the expressed material open to interpretation. 
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discrepancy, by unthought-of alterations and contexts that through the most 
minimal shift alter the mark. 
Iterability is the force which makes “the statement of belonging an ironical 
exercise” (LO 72). The ultimate element that comprises our every means of 
communication is ironic, divided and non-present to itself. The style and 
functioning of Derrida‟s texts is not simply tropological, but the performance of a 
force and event that productively interrupts, that disjoins and conjoins to produce 
excess. Derrida‟s interest in performativity is an interest in poiesis, or production. 
He is interested in a certain productive force that anacoluthically, uncontrollably 
interrupts. This force, which is also a style, interrupts and changes every mark, 
and is the force of irony. Derrida‟s excessive, experimental style is the deliberate 
espousal of an ironic mode of writing which produces and reflects on this excess, 
which is a promise, a lie, a production, a work and theory on that work.  
 
Irony and the Anacoluthon 
 
Anacoluthon comes from the Greek άνακόλοςθον meaning “wanting sequence”, 
comprising “not” and “following”. A faulty, parabatic step, a failure to take the 
expected or proper path, an anacoluthon occurs when the syntax of a sentence or 
passage is disrupted, the disjunction thereby producing unexpected links and 
connections. In “The Concept of Irony” de Man terms an “interruption of the 
narrative line” (AI 178) a parabasis or an anacoluthon, thereby equating their 
ruptures.
61
 In “Excuses (Confessions)” he outlines the contamination without 
convergence or assimilation that occurs between the performative and the 
constative. The forms of speech act intersect without contact like the chiasmus, 
and the point of this interruptive intersection is the  
 
anacoluthon; in the language of representational rhetoric, one could also 
call it parabasis, a sudden revelation of the discontinuity between two 
rhetorical codes. This isolated textual event … is disseminated throughout 
the text and the anacoluthon is extended over all the points of the figural 
line or allegory; in a slight extension of Friedrich Schlegel‟s formulation, 
it becomes the permanent parabasis of an allegory (or figure), that is to say, 
irony. Irony is no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive 
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 In Singularities: Extremes of Theory in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) Thomas Pepper compares the disjunction of the parabasis and the 
anacoluthon to an absolute construction – a phrase independent of its grammatical surroundings. It 
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allegory of all tropological conditions, the systematic undoing, in other 
words, of understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological 
system, irony enforces the repetition of its aberration. (AO 300-01)  
 
In Without Alibi Derrida also names the ironic force that enables the mutual 
contamination and interruption of codes as anacoluthic. In “„Le Parjure‟, Perhaps: 
Storytelling and Lying” Derrida defines the anacoluthon as “a rupture in the 
consequence, an interruption in the sequence itself, within a grammatical syntax 
or an order in general, in an agreement, thus also in a set, whatever it may be, in a 
community” (WA 181). As Derrida writes, the “striking” and “productive” 
anacoluthon  
 
assures a powerful general formalisation even as it remains rooted and 
forever inscribed in the fictional singularity of a corpus that already 
produces it in itself, like a sort of general theorem, like a generalisable 
theoretical fiction, if I can put it that way, like a fiction having the value of 
a theoretical truth and an ethical dimension. … Doubtless more than a 
figure of rhetoric, despite appearances, it signals in any case toward the 
beyond of rhetoric within rhetoric. Beyond grammar within grammar. (WA 
166-67)  
 
The anacoluthon – irony – is for Derrida the perhaps, an undecidable point 
whereby the text can move in any direction, and where in interrupting the text it 
moves the text beyond itself. Interruption in the case of the anacoluthon is the 
production of an excess, the insertion of overdetermination into a rupture.  
In “Who‟s Afraid of Anacoluthon?” Jan Mieszkowski describes the 
anacoluthon as a use of language often read as a misuse, and thus both poetic 
device and dismissible error. 
 
Anacoluthon is thus both super-figural – the extension of creativity in 
language use to transformations in the rules of syntax and grammar 
themselves – and sub-figural, almost too deviant to register as a coherent 
representational gesture. As a figure for the difference between a departure 
from literal language and a mistake, anacoluthon is at once the figure of 
figures and a figure for the dissolution of figure, the collapse of the 
sustained comparisons between figurative and literal instances of language 
that allow for figuration to emerge in the first place.
62
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Mieszkowski 652-53. Mieszkowski‟s description of the anacoluthon in terms of the X of X(s), 
the figure of figures, echoes of a pattern that arises again and again with irony and ironic terms. 
Irony is that which disturbs the “meta”; it is itself and that which affects itself, irony and irony of 
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The anacoluthon is at the border of figuration and disfiguration – an interruptive 
prosopopeia. It  
 
names the fact that no linguistic norm can be normal enough to reign 
sovereign, or abnormal enough to strip itself of any pretension to being 
paradigmatic. Language simultaneously exceeds and disappoints the 
expectations it arouses. … This is why any individual anacoluthon seems 
to be both an instance of linguistic anarchy and a fully functional – even 
hyper-functional – formation.63 
 
Ironic interruptions within language are both a disturbance of language and its 
“normal” or proper functioning. Language is therefore “constitutively incapable of 
confirming its own pretensions to being a self-realising (auto-productive, auto-
validating) system”.64 Through irony language is, interrupted. 
Derrida quotes a line from Henri Thomas‟ novel La Parjure: “Just imagine, 
I was not thinking about it”. This line contains an imperative – “just imagine” – 
and what appears to be a constative statement, a description of fact – “I was not 
thinking about it”. However, “I was not thinking about it” is not simply an 
account of amnesia, it is also the performative act of a confession that “resembles 
an avowal that disculpates itself; thus, it also resembles a neutral description no 
less than a confession, a strange avowal of innocence, that of someone who, 
disavowing his avowal, in some way pleads guilty and not guilty at the same time” 
(WA 162-63). Thus the statement is performative and constative, and both 
(responsibly) confesses guilt while (irresponsibly) dismissing it. The statement 
anacoluthically interrupts itself, and “permits anyone to respond, in a manner that 
is at once responsible and irresponsible, as serious as it is insolent, undecided 
between provocative irony and disarming sincerity, perhaps in truth disarmed: 
„It‟s true. Just imagine, I was not thinking about it‟” (WA 167). The anacoluthon 
of the “I was not thinking about it”, the confession which is not a confession, is 
the permanent interruptive possibility of a disruption of thought, “a discontinuity, 
an interruptibility that is at bottom the very resource, the ambiguous power of the 
anacoluthon: the disappearing at work, a passive work, in the very essence of 
seeming, in the very phenomenality of appearing” (WA 191). The force of the 
anacoluthon, a force of irony, is a force that is not simply productive but also a 
force of disappearing, a force of non-work in the work.  
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The skewed performative/constative of perjury operates through the 
structure of the anacoluthon. When one lies one makes a new truth; the lie does 
not constatively describe a previously existent state, but falsely describes such that 
a new event/history is produced. When a subject perjures herself she doubles the 
lie as she lied about content and when she said she would not lie. Thus the time of 
perjury is always already divided. In a second moment betrayal can follow an 
authentic promise, or the seemingly genuine oath can from the first moment have 
always been a lie. “These two temporalities or these two structural phases seem 
after the fact to envelope one another. Hence the gulf of amnesia, the interruption, 
the possibility of anacoluthic discontinuity” (WA 173). Hence too the temporal 
instability of irony, perjury and the anacoluthon; it always takes place, whether 
one hears it or not, in the future perfect. As the sentence moves into the future it 
instigates a retrospective change in the past and renders what had seemed correct 
incorrect.  
The disjunctive, ironic force of the anacoluthon interrupts linear, 
progressive temporality: 
 
one who perjures himself or herself, can always seek to be excused, if not 
forgiven, by alleging … the unsublatable thickness of time and of what it 
transforms, the multiplicity of times, instants, their essential discontinuity, 
the merciless interruption that time inscribes in “me” as it does everywhere. 
This is the ultimate resource, or even the fatality, of the anacoluthon. (WA 
173)  
 
The anacoluthon breaks continuous time or identity into a series of fragmentary, 
ironic moments, moments that conjoin in a potentially infinite number of ways to 
produce an anacoluthic allegory or narrative. In breaking time in this way the 
anacoluthon “has also done its work in things themselves, if one can say that, here 
in the „subjects of the action‟, across and beyond the grammatical „I‟” (WA 194). 
The “anacoluthon interrupts forever the relation to self, the possibility of a relation 
to self” (WA 196), or as J. Hillis Miller writes, “An anacoluthon in its self-
contradiction cannot be taken as spoken by a single unitary mind”.65 It splits the 
self, and is a mode of “language that cannot be returned to a single paternal, 
patronising logos or speaking source”.66 It stems from irony – the “permanent 
possibility of disaster inherent in any narrative line and in the reader‟s 
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interpretation of it”67 – which Miller also terms “„alogism,‟ the absence of any 
ascertainable logos and the dissolution of the reader‟s instinctive understanding of 
narrative according to certain categories of unitary consciousness”.68 
 
Fables of Irony
69
 
 
In “Psyche” Derrida presents a performative (re)invention of Francis Ponge‟s 
“Fable” that, operating within rules and conventions, attempts to show a certain 
stretching of their limits, a certain beyond within them. This reading (re)invents 
Derrida‟s text to turn the wheel of the machine a little closer to irony, and through 
interruption to produce a new event. “„Fable,‟ owing to a turn of syntax, is a sort 
of poetic performative that simultaneously describes and carries out, on the same 
line, its own generation” (PI 11). “Fable” produces an event through an 
anacoluthic interruption that introduces a “disparity or gap into the customary use 
of discourse, by upsetting to some extent the mind-set of expectation and 
reception that it nonetheless needs” (PI 24). The analysis of “Fable” that follows 
is in a sense subject to the same interruptive movement. While it is based on 
Derrida‟s own reading, and on the irony and performativity posited thus far, it also 
prefigures the irony of the remainder of the thesis. It is a fable for the thesis, an 
“allegory of allegory” (PI 10) or, better put, an (ironic) allegory of irony.  
“„Fable‟”, writes Derrida, is “an allegory stating ironically the truth of 
allegory that it is in the present, and doing so while stating it through a play of 
persons and masks” (PI 17). Thus, since Derrida follows de Man‟s reading of 
allegory and irony from “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, and understands irony 
and allegory as specular inversions of each other, we are presented with an 
allegory that states the truth of allegory through or in the mirror (of irony), that is, 
that states an inversion of truth, a truth represented or performed. This “truth” is 
“a truth that is nothing other than its own truth producing itself” (PI 20), a truth 
produced through the mirror and through masks and play. “Fable” is a poem 
which breaks the mirror of (direct) self-reflexivity with the catachrestic 
specularity of irony, a skewed reflexivity which produces truth, and therefore 
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produces truth/fiction.
70
 There is no face before the mirror, there is nothing that is 
re-presented, and therefore reflexivity as traditionally understood does not occur. 
The face is produced in the moment of description, a “reflection that produces the 
self of self-reflection by producing the event in the very act of recounting it. An 
infinitely rapid circulation – such are the irony and temporality of the text” (PI 12). 
This production does not result in absolute correspondence, a self-affecting 
performative, but a perverformative that produces across an interruptive delay or 
leap, an I producing an I+excess, that is, an I+alterity.
71
  
 “[T]he first line states the truth”, states the second line of “Fable”, a line 
whose own veracity is unconfirmed. Truth is a fabulous invention of language and 
narrative that is subject to deferral or displacement, (re)turning to a different line, 
a different place. The descriptive assurance of the second line of the poem is a 
constative operating as a delayed or retrospective performative in the first; re-
promising or re-saying it. The mise en abyme of the second line functions as the 
temporally disruptive future perfect – the first line will have stated the truth – and 
thus in the hidden, analeptically revealed performativity a truth is performed as 
(potential) perjury. The two lines introduce a temporal disjunction; the stating of 
the truth is confirmed afterwards, by the second line, forcing a return to the first 
line in a movement of anacoluthic interruption. As the second line offers no 
guaranteed veracity, we are forced to undergo a potentially infinite interpretative 
loop, altering the past as necessary in line with the backward reinscription and 
production/destruction of anacoluthon or perjury.  
 The first sentence of the fable/poem/fabula contains “with” twice – “With 
the word with begins then this text” – but the doubling within the line does not 
merely stem from the twofold use. “With” is in fact doubled from the first 
instance. While in the first instance the word is supposedly used and in the second 
instance merely mentioned, the sentence cannot effectively begin until the second 
term arrives, and so what appears to be the inaugural event – the usage – is 
delayed and cannot begin at the beginning. Since it waits for the second(ary) and 
yet primary term to (not) begin, both terms exist undecidably between use and 
mention, and both become citations of an original term that never quite arrives. 
The beginning of the poem is doubled or divided by a description of the beginning, 
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and is thereby a quotation of the non-inaugural.
72
 Thus we find the catachrestic 
autopoiesis of the contaminated performative/constative,  
 
the singular structure of an event that seems to produce itself by speaking 
about itself, by the act of speaking of itself once it has begun to invent on 
the subject of invention, paving the way for it, inaugurating or signing its 
singularity, bringing it about, as it were; and all the while it is also naming 
and describing the generality of its genre. (PI 6-7) 
 
“Fable” tells the truth/fiction of “the desperate effort of an unhappy speech to 
move beyond the specularity that it itself constitutes” (PI 9); to move to the other 
side of the mirror and be rather than represent. The tain of the mirror also 
represents our modes of separating language between use and mention, between 
contexts, between performative and constative. But language can‟t be separated 
thus, and always crosses the hymen/hyphen that is the mirror. Hence irony, which 
Derrida describes as an infinitely rapid circulation, is the force of (dis)connection 
inducing the “infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative and the 
constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction and nonfiction, 
autoreference and heteroreference” (PI 13). Irony is the (impossible) movement 
across the mirror.  
As the poem turns in on itself, and produces itself in a temporal loop, the 
metalinguistic, constative aspect of the poem is seen to be impossible, as it 
describes that which did not exist prior to the description. Fable‟s impossible 
metalanguage is due to what Derrida, through de Man, calls the “temporal 
predicament” of irony and allegory. The alinear movement of irony is the 
temporality of “Fable”, which begins without beginning, and therefore splits or 
doubles its (non)inaugural movement. The name/description/genre mark “Fable” 
calls to “fabula”, a term denoting the order of events as they would have occurred 
in the “real” time of the fiction, a time fabricating authenticity from inauthenticity, 
a fiction of “natural” time produced and undone by the fiction. The temporal 
predicament which enables events to come before and after the other will be 
renamed in the fourth chapter as an ironic, fragmentary temporality, a force which 
introduces a paratactical exigency to time, making it fragmented and alinear. 
A fable usually comprises a narrative followed by a short moral. In “Fable” 
the order is reversed – the first six lines of the poem present an exegesis/moral 
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which is followed by a narrative in a short ironic burst or fragment. The first six 
lines are an italicised commentary in the present tense, containing a declarative, 
an interrogative, an apostrophe and a final ellipsis, while the last two, whose 
reassuring roman typeface is undone by the capitalised “AFTER” and the isolation 
of parenthesis, present a descriptive narrative in the past. Thus the tenses of the 
section do not progress but regress, and the poem‟s divided structure of first and 
last without middle stress an ironic, fragmentary temporality – the beginning as 
end and end as beginning – as the first section is an epilogue to the last, while the 
last section tells the story on which the first comments. Interrupting the simple 
tenses of the past and present is the haunting of the future perfect produced by the 
regressive movement of the second line: as in the grammar of the future perfect – 
and the movement of the anacoluthon or perjury – the sentence/act in the future 
changes the past, and the second line of the poem changes the first. 
The isolation of the narrative, enclosed in the mirrored walls of the 
parenthesis, is revealed to be a perjury, as the mirror is splintered by the preceding 
exegesis, which fills the cracks with fissures. The narrative recounts the traditional 
story of bad luck and the breaking of a mirror, but here the order is reversed, as 
the mirror is broken, deliberately, following seven years of hardship. The final, 
eighth line of the poem in which the mirror is cracked is preceded by seven lines, 
one for each year of misfortune. For Derrida the misfortune is the distress of self-
reflexivity, of presuming that there is an act of penetrative, final reading, and that 
categories are pure and uncontaminated. The poem is a work of mourning, but an 
ironic, melancholic mourning, as it takes place prior to the breaking of the mirror. 
The destruction of the mirror should not, however, be thought of as negative – in 
the poem misfortune is the cause not the result of the cracking of specularity. The 
broken mirror still reflects, but reflects with kaleidoscopic alterity and ends the 
obsession with the singular, centred subject and language.  
In keeping with fragmented temporality, Derrida describes “Fable” as 
contrapuntal (PI 7), where (ironic) point plays against (ironic) point, where voices 
are independent, yet polyphonically inhabiting a shared space.
73
 Line six mentions 
“our difficulties”, which expands to include the author, the speaker(s), the 
reader(s), and the fable itself. The first person singular/plural description, question 
and direct address changes into a third person omniscient narration for the last two 
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lines, outlining the actions of “she”. The anacoluthic interruption of voice is 
compounded by the plural address of the parabatic chorus that comments both on 
the creative difficulties of the work, and the difficulties of language in general. As 
the chorus steps up – as the personal “you” and the plural “our” are introduced – it 
fades off into the ellipsis and the blanc of parataxis. Shielded, separated, 
fragmented, the next sentence, across the absence of a conjunction, is the chorus‟s 
step of the antistrophe, the step back across the stage, the response that turns to 
the third person and the narration of an inverted story.  
Derrida names the female character of the allegorical story “Psyche”, and 
is then able to directly relate her to the end of “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, 
where de Man speaks of Eros and Psyche, two lovers who can never come fully 
into contact with each other. This passage is, according to Derrida, one which 
“points up the distance between the two „selves,‟ the two my-selves, the 
impossibility of seeing oneself and touching oneself at the same time, the 
„permanent parabasis‟ and the „allegory of irony‟” (PI 18). The self-reflexivity of 
the poem is undone by irony; there is no referent which is present to itself, but a 
movement of reflexivity which inaugurates or invents, catachrestically producing 
self as other in the moment of description/performance, an “invention of the same 
and the other, of oneself as (of) the other” (PI 8-9).  
 “Fable” is a deconstructive invention, split between the discovery of what 
was already there, and the production of something new. It is a performance in 
relation to rules and conventions but also a disruptive event and disordering 
mechanism that spontaneously destabilises – it is an ironic perverformative. It 
invents so that “To invent would then be to „know‟ how to say „come‟ and to 
answer the „come‟ of the other” (PI 39). Its hybridity means that it is “a unique 
event; but it is also a machine and a general truth” (PI 20). Its mechanicity resists 
programming, but opens itself up to the aleatory without simply partaking of 
chaotic free play. It is an anagrammatical irony which produces an event of 
alterity which steps away from the reflexivity or narcissism of the self-present 
subject and language system. It ironically reflects, producing the other through a 
fragmented mirror and contaminated categories. 
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Dialogues of Irony: Socrates and Plato  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter turns to Socratic and Platonic irony
1
, and the question that resounds 
throughout “Plato‟s Pharmacy”: “what can be said of irony here? What is its 
major sign?” (D 67) Against Plato‟s mode of philosophy that reads to suppress 
alterity and the structural irony of language, Derrida demonstrates the ironic – 
parabatic and paratactic – structures of writing, inheritance, intention and origin. 
Socratic irony is understood as a mode of ironic questioning that steps very close 
to deconstruction, a process of reading/writing that works to reveal aporias and 
inconsistencies. Socrates is a hyphen, a paratactic blanc, a catalyst, an anacoluthic 
interruption. Platonic irony is a dramatic irony which attempts to dominate and 
manipulate that which can be wielded but never wholly reduced or controlled. 
Plato attempts to use irony to suppress irony, producing – accidentally? – the 
ironic author, an (in)visible figure of interruption. This chapter moves between 
Derrida‟s primary texts on Plato – “Plato‟s Pharmacy” (1972), “Khōra” (1993) 
and “Envois” (1980), while reading Plato‟s dialogues and the work of classicists 
and philosophers on Platonic/Socratic irony. 
 
The (Writing of the) Paratactic Pharmakon 
 
Writing, according to the first ironic author – Plato – is bad because it is external, 
because it is the supplement of a supplement and relies on signs rather than the 
thing itself, “substituting the passive, mechanical „by-heart‟ for the active 
reanimation of knowledge, for its reproduction in the present” (PP 108). Writing 
does not have an independent, positive identity, nor is it a separate order of 
signification in itself. It is weakened speech, “a living-dead, a reprieved corpse, a 
deferred life, a semblance of breath” (PP 143). It cannot produce anything new, it 
can only repeat, remind or recall, the copy of a copy, a soporific repetition that 
lulls memory to sleep and causes it to fade into forgetfulness. Thus writing moves 
                                                 
1
 The entirely false distinction between Socratic irony and Platonic has been retained, so that 
“Socratic irony” designates, in a rather naïve sense, the irony associated with Socrates as 
autonomous instigator of his own actions, while “Platonic irony” is restricted to the irony of the 
figure of the author and his methods of textual manipulation. This distinction is preserved to 
emphasise how this mode of irony differs from traditional theorisations. 
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towards “the domains of death, of nontruth, of nonknowledge” (PP 105), a force 
of absence containing both the death of the author‟s meaning, and the death of the 
author herself. Without the parental authority that confirms the accuracy or 
inaccuracy of interpretations, writing is a ghost which “rolls (kulindeitai) this way 
and that like someone who has lost his way, who doesn‟t know where he is going, 
having strayed from the correct path, the right direction” (PP 143). Writing is a 
son who is lost, weary and footsore, an orphan who committed parricide, who 
replaced the father with absence, repetition and death. So it wanders the streets, an 
outlaw, a vagrant, homeless and fatherless, muttering to itself, repeating itself, 
blankly uttering the same response to every question and every questioner.  
The pharmakon is a metonym for (ironic) writing, a metonym that undoes 
itself, as pharmakon designates a general excess of the tropological, and the part 
becomes bigger than the whole. Derrida describes the pharmakon, which can 
signify “remedy”, “poison”, “drug”, “paint” and which is linked to “pharmakeus” 
(magician), and “pharmakos” (scapegoat), as an “ambivalent, indeterminate 
space … that which in logos remains potency, potentiality, and is not yet the 
transparent language of knowledge” (PP 115). Writing as pharmakon – for 
Derrida an (ironic) blanc of potentiality, for Plato a blank of absence – stems from 
a section in the Phaedrus that requires only a brief paraphrase. As Socrates 
recounts, one day the god Thoth or Theuth presented his new inventions to the 
king of the gods, Thamus. Each was presented, and to each was given measured 
praise or censure. However, when Theuth presented writing, which he described 
as a pharmakon for memory and wisdom, Thamus‟s condemnation was 
immediate. Writing, he said, was a pharmakon which would produce 
forgetfulness and idleness, as people would no longer need to actively or 
internally remember. Students would have only the appearance of wisdom, and 
would grow conceited and foolish. Thus the father passed judgement. 
In this short passage Plato introduced a mode of reading of the either/or, a 
way of understanding the paratactic play of language that reduced it to a regulated 
game of semantics. Plato, Derrida argues, chose an ambiguous lexeme in order to 
found a tradition that reads by repressing plurality, adhering to “a logic that does 
not tolerate such passages between opposing senses of the same word, all the 
more since such a passage would reveal itself to be something quite different from 
simple confusion, alternation, or the dialectics of opposites” (PP 99). Thus, in 
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reading the above passage, the good Platonist knows that here pharmakon means 
poison, and here it means cure. A useful example of this reading can be found in 
an article by Albert Cook. Arguing against Derrida‟s reading of pharmakon and 
play, he writes that 
 
[pharmakon] in the Phaedrus, each of the eight times it occurs, always 
means unambiguous “healing drug” rather than “poison”. … The 
fashionably resurrected neo-Frazerian term φαρμακός “scapegoat”, can 
still less be applied to this text, or to Plato in general. The word does not 
occur once in all of Plato, and it does violence to much that he says to 
enlist it under the heading of this anthropological commonplace.
2
  
 
Thus for Cook, inheriting in a direct line from Plato, context covers meaning, and 
the textual web of a signifier is wholly irrelevant. 
Pharmakon names the ironic force within a system of differences that 
takes one off the systematic path of uncontaminated categories and transparent, 
closed contexts, so that “writing, the pharmakon, [is] the going or leading astray” 
(PP 71). The ironic force or strength of the pharmakon lies its weakness, in its 
lack of distinct, determinable limits. The space its non-identity opens is the space 
of the between, the paratactic gap/conjunction that operates as hyphenated 
potential, not determinable univocal knowledge. It is a substance or, like irony, an 
antisubstance which “resists any philosopheme, indefinitely exceeding its bounds 
as nonidentity, nonessence, nonsubstance; granting philosophy by that very fact 
the inexhaustible adversity of what funds it and the infinite absence of what 
founds it” (PP 70). As Derrida writes, in a description very close to accounts of 
irony, “The „essence‟ of the pharmakon lies in the way in which, having no stable 
essence, no „proper‟ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, physical, 
chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance. The pharmakon has no ideal 
identity” (PP 125-26). Nothing in itself, a hyphen, it endlessly promises and 
perjures, presenting a path of labyrinthine complexity, a textual chain that 
infinitely moves between a series of signifiers.  
The pharmakon is not the result of the combination of two pure, 
heterogeneous terms, but is the agent of differentiation, “the [paratactic] medium 
in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that links them among 
themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over into the other (soul/body, 
                                                 
2
 Albert Cook, “Dialectic, Irony, and Myth in Plato‟s Phaedrus”, The American Journal of 
Philology 106.4 (1985) 427.  
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good/evil, inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing etc.)” (PP 127). 
This does not state that the pharmakon is an originary term or source, but that the 
pharmakon exemplifies the paratactic, parabatic functioning of the mark, which is 
riven by a force – irony – that resists propositional or univocal definition. The 
ambiguity of the mark leads to the decision to divide the world into binaries, but 
these binaries are always undone by the ironic force designated here by 
pharmakon. The pharmakon is a paratactic hyphen/gap that can be a plus or a 
minus, good or bad, inside or outside, and therefore precedes the determination of 
the sign as one or the other. It is the potentiality of the “difference of difference” 
(PP 127), the trope of tropes, the irony of irony, the force of external excess at the 
heart of the mark. Plato‟s system of opposites is not parasitically attacked by the 
subsequent and external, but by a force of externality and temporal disjunction 
that is/was always already internal. The very possibility of thinking of oppositions 
like the internal and external is established by the ironic plurality of the mark, of 
the pharmakon, which, however, also renders uncontaminated oppositions wholly 
unattainable. Interestingly, to return to the parataxis/syntax distinction, in Taking 
on the Tradition Michael Naas argues against a reading dependent on syntactic 
relations. 
 
To say straight-away that the meaning of pharmakon depends on its 
syntactical relation in the dialogue would already be, as Derrida shows, to 
accept the opposition between meaning and expression, signifieds and 
signifiers, where what is important would be what is meant and not what is 
said, what is thought and not what is expressed.
3
 
 
Naas is correct; the term “syntax” does have far too strong an association with the 
finished product and style of an author, and therefore with the univocal truth or 
intention of the author. Hence parataxis.  
Speech is conceptualised by Plato as a writing on the soul, a heuristic 
device which prompts Derrida to speak of the “stunning hand Plato has dealt 
himself” (PP 157). Writing is divided into good writing and bad writing, and eidos, 
truth, epistēmē, dialectics, elenchus all designated pharmaka that are opposed to 
the pharmakon of the Sophists; the game of language confuses them but Plato 
carefully separates them. The paratactic play of irony is turned by Plato into a 
game secured by rules and regulations, supervised and safeguarded by the author, 
                                                 
3
 Naas, Tradition 10. 
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ethics and politics. In the double use of writing Plato argues that either play and 
writing are nothing, and can be ignored, or they work in the benefit of truth and 
seriousness, and are redeemed, but also changed. So either they are nothing, or 
they are something, but when something, they are a wholly different something. 
Hence there is no real logical contradiction in Plato‟s work, just some excellent 
sleight of hand; irony used to suppress irony and alterity.
4
  
 
Ironic Reading 
 
The blank spaces of parataxis are not secret. But certain systems, certain syntaxes 
have left a legacy of myopia, and readers have inherited a blindness, an inability 
to see the force in the blanks. Derrida traces these problems of perception back to 
Plato‟s insistence on a mode of interpretation that translates potentiality into 
univocity and allows context and intention to restrict meaning. For Plato the 
spaces of parataxis – the passages of parabasis – should not open on to the web of 
(other) meanings of a term, but should be blocked by context and a concentration 
on authorial intention. For Plato authorial intention is prior to expression, and it is 
in the process of translation into language that ambiguity arises. Within language 
a re-translation should occur to counteract this ambiguity and redirect meaning 
back to the author. Thus a blindness to the paratactic movement of language is 
developed, and the spaces and hyphens in and between terms become invisible. 
Derrida‟s Plato created a direct way to read a text, but in so doing also created an 
indirect way, a hidden way, an ironic way. Hence the understanding of irony, or 
metaphor, or indirect, poetic modes of communication as subsequent or secondary 
to thetic, propositional, direct and contextualised discourses. And hence a need to 
read, or rewrite with irony, in a way that  
 
discovers new chords, new concordances; [that] surprises them in minutely 
fashioned counterpoint, within a more secret organisation of themes, of 
names, of words. It unties a whole sumplokē patiently interlacing the 
arguments. What is magisterial about the demonstration affirms itself and 
effaces itself at once, with suppleness, irony, and discretion. (PP 67)  
 
                                                 
4
 This repetition forms the nonoriginary origin of identity, as repetition is both the possibility of 
truth – the same and the stable that can be repeated – and its impossibility – it shows it to lack 
absolute singularity and unity. These forms of repetition cannot be separated, as “they repeat each 
other” (PP 169). Hence “What is is not what it is, identical and identical to itself, unique, unless it 
adds to itself the possibility of being repeated as such. And its identity is hollowed out by that 
addition, withdraws itself in the supplement that presents it” (PP 168). 
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An ironic reading sees the counterpoint, hears the meanings which beat a slightly 
different time, and does not attempt to ignore the anagrammatical potential of the 
lexemes. It reveals what we have been taught to see as hidden, trained to ignore as 
secret, and what, in its multiplicity, can never be made a stable object of 
knowledge. 
However, regardless of Plato, there is always secrecy to the text: “A text is 
not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its 
composition and the rules of its game” (PP 63). The plurality of parataxis, the 
potentiality of the hyphens and the spacing, makes it impossible to ever reach the 
end of the chain of meanings, and so every reading, no matter how subtle, 
sensitive or ironic, will be haunted by the trace of a different interpretation. Which, 
as Derrida writes, is the power of a text: “If a speech could be purely present, 
unveiled, naked, offered up in person in its truth, without the detours of a signifier 
foreign to it, if at the limit an undeferred logos were possible, it would not seduce 
anyone” (PP 71). There are always anagrammatical links that “can never be 
booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be called a perception” 
(PP 63). Univocal intention can never be made the centre or origin of a work – 
“the system”, Derrida writes, “is not primarily that of what someone meant-to-say” 
(PP 95). The mark, hyphenated by irony, has a certain inaccessibility of its own, 
as it never traces a path back to a single origin or intention. Thus, as Derrida 
explains, the “textual chain we must set in place is no longer simply „internal‟ to 
Plato‟s lexicon. … In a word, we do not believe that there exists, in all rigor, a 
Platonic text, closed upon itself, complete with its inside and its outside” (PP 130).  
In “Khōra” Derrida directly associates irony with this “structure without 
an indivisible origin” (K 119). In the Timaeus Plato writes a dialogue whereby 
“each narrative content … becomes in its turn the content of a different tale. Each 
tale is thus the receptacle of another. There is nothing but receptacles of narrative 
receptacles, or narrative receptacles of receptacles” (K 117). Derrida describes 
this structure, where “scenes interlock in a series of receptacles without end and 
without bottom”, as a “theatre of irony” [emphasis added] (K 119). The effect of 
this ironic movement is to remove the certainty of a definite, signed and 
authorised origin that can be clearly attributed to a single source. As Derrida 
writes, “how can one isolate a thesis or a theme that could be attributed calmly to 
the „philosophy of Plato,‟ indeed to philosophy as the Platonic thing? That would 
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be to misrecognise or violently deny the structure of the textual scene” (K 119). 
Irony is therefore exactly not of the categories of intention and expression, but of 
the a priori contamination of the expressed by excess. 
The logical contradiction of Phaedrus – the written condemnation of 
writing – is mirrored in the Timaeus, as when Socrates insists we move away from 
the poetic and sophistic to the philosophical and the political, we receive the 
repetition of a tale told by young Critias, heard from old Critias, who recounted a 
conversation with Solon, a poet who told of a further conversation with an 
Egyptian priest. This  
 
further excess of irony … accentuates the dynamic tension between the 
thetic effect and the textual fiction, between on the one hand the 
“philosophy” or the “politics” which is here associated with him – 
contents of identifiable and transmissible meanings like the identity of a 
knowledge – and on the other hand a textual drift [dérive] which takes the 
form of a myth, in any event of a “saying” (legomenon), whose origin 
appears always undefined, pulled back, entrusted to a responsibility that is 
forever adjourned, without a fixed and determinable subject. From one 
telling to the next, the author gets farther and farther away. (K 123-24)  
 
The contradiction between thesis and theme, the ironic incongruity – hyphenation 
– between content and archive pushes the stable origin back to a “threatened, 
bastard, hybrid” (K 126) non-originary origin. 
The secretive, excessive theatre of irony is what we inherit – “One always 
inherits from a secret – which says „read me, will you ever be able to do so?” (SM 
18) “To be”, writes Derrida, “means … to inherit” (SM 67). But, of course, “what 
characterises a heritage is first of all that one does not choose it; it is what 
violently elects us” (FW 3). Inheritance is “never natural, one may inherit more 
than once, in different places and at different times” (SM 211). Writing is the 
disorder of inheritance we once thought linear and simple: Plato inherits from 
Socrates, but also creates him. He inherits from one who is both his creator and 
his creation, and writes him and kills him. Derrida inherits from the son and the 
father, is rightful if reluctant heir of both irony and metaphysics, and in “Plato‟s 
Pharmacy” he steps up to and away from those traditions. As Naas writes: 
 
Anytime Derrida begins analysing the notions of reception or legacy 
within a particular text in the tradition, he ends up, because of the very 
necessity of taking on the tradition, performing and interrupting these 
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gestures in his own reading so as to make possible the coming of “another 
gesture,” one that is neither simply his nor the tradition‟s.5 
 
Derrida reads ironically, paratactically, reordering tradition and disrupting the 
“proper” so as to make welcome other steps and paths. Hence “Plato‟s Pharmacy” 
is about (ironic) modes of reading/inheritance that turn towards a text “without 
immediately and irremediably receiving it as it was meant to be received, that is, 
the possibility of receiving it at the limits of a theory of intention”.6  
 In direct opposition to Derrida‟s mode of reading/inheriting is the move 
towards a univocal truth found in Classical textual criticism, which has, as Martin 
West writes, “the immediate aims of ascertaining as exactly as possible what the 
authors wrote and defining areas of uncertainty”.7 Texts that are deemed to differ 
from the author‟s original are seen as somehow soiled, and errors are seen as 
“readings of a secondary origin”,8 mistakes bringing impurity to the author‟s work. 
These stains must be removed to uncover the “original, uncontaminated”9 source. 
Interpretation operates as does metaphor; one cleans away the stratification to 
return to presence and the “natural” meaning. The process of selecting the most 
viable variable is summarised by West as follows: 
 
1. It must correspond in sense to what the author intended to say, so 
far as this can be determined from the context. 
2. It must correspond in language, style, and any relevant technical 
points (meter, prose rhythm, avoidance of hiatus) to a way in which 
the author might naturally have expressed that sense. 
3. … it must be clear how the presumed original reading could have 
been corrupted into any different reading that is transmitted.
10
 
 
Thus from knowledge of the author‟s style, a presumption of authorial intent 
based on the context, and a mechanical awareness of how errors can arise the 
original text can be sought. Meaning, for those inheriting directly from the 
writings of Plato, is fixed and univocal and located in the author. This method of 
reading is reflected in the traditional understanding of Socratic irony. 
 
                                                 
5
 Nass, Tradition xix. 
6
 Naas, Tradition 20. 
7
 Martin L. West, Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1973) 8. 
8
 West 32. 
9
 West 36. 
10
 West 48. 
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Traditional Readings of Socratic Irony 
 
Traditionally, Socratic irony is understood as a mode of speech which creates a 
disparity between what is expressed and what is expected or what is meant and 
what is said. In the course of what are referred to as the early or ironic dialogues 
Socrates pretends not to understand an argument, feigns lapses in memory, 
requests detailed explanations, humbles himself and lauds his interlocutor(s), 
some of whom believe his often excessive praise, others of whom deem it 
mockery. A characteristic example of this is found in the Republic:  
 
Don‟t be too hard on us, Thrasymachus, for if Polemarchus and I [Socrates] 
made an error in our investigation, you should know that we did so 
unwillingly. ... Hence it‟s surely far more appropriate for us to be pitied by 
you clever people than to be given rough treatment.  
When he [Thrasymachus] heard that he gave a loud, sarcastic laugh. By 
Heracles, he said, that‟s just Socrates‟ usual irony. I knew, and I said to 
these people earlier, that you‟d be unwilling to answer, you‟d be ironical 
and do anything rather than give an answer. (Rep 337a) 
 
Here Thrasymachus‟ presumption is clear – Socrates means the opposite of what 
he says. Meaning was temporarily destabilised but through a simple inversion a 
literal, authentic sense has been regained.  
Socrates‟ ironic mode of engagement is typically invested with pedagogic 
aims, with examples primarily concentrating on Socrates‟ simulation of ignorance 
for the purpose of disabusing his interlocutor of false arrogance and awakening 
anemnestic (true, eidetic knowledge lost in the trauma of birth) knowledge in 
him.
11
 Socratic irony is thus most commonly deemed to be a wholly metaphysical 
concept, a process for returning to truth, be it the univocal truth of the author or 
the greater, eidetic truth. While the majority of commentators are linked by their 
basic presumption of truth as axiomatic, and their assumption that irony is a 
linguistic stratagem that can be defused and returned to a univocal meaning, many 
have refined readings of Socratic irony beyond the simple inversion shown above. 
This section presents a selection of theorisations of Socratic irony, from the 
simple to the complex, the reverse to the conditional, all of which read irony from 
firmly within the Platonic legacy. 
                                                 
11
 With the exception of an exchange between Socrates and Diotima in the Symposium Socrates‟ 
interlocutors are all men, therefore the masculine third person is employed throughout this section. 
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Gregory Vlastos, the most renowned theorist of Socratic irony, 
understands it as an ethical tool: a mockery that humbles the arrogant, removes 
false knowledge and opens the way for the true learning of anamnesis. Socrates‟ 
behaviour is maieutic; he performs the actions of a midwife who induces the 
arrival of knowledge in another, and while the labour may at times be difficult, the 
goal is always the good and the true. Vlastos reinscribes irony as “pretending” – 
and although he acknowledges that the latter term contains the negative 
connotations of duping, concealing the truth, and altering reality, in an act of 
Platonic bracketing he ignores those. His Socrates pretends as a child plays, in an 
action “as innocent of intentional deceit as is a child‟s feigning that the play chips 
are money, as free from shamming as are honest games, though, unlike games, 
serious in its mockery …, dead earnest in its playfulness”. 12  While much of 
Socrates‟ irony, Vlastos argues, can be understood through a simple act of 
inversion as shown above – hence simple irony – in some cases the intended 
meaning is not so transparent. Socrates‟ denial of knowledge, for example, cannot 
be resolved so simply, and so Vlastos posits complex irony. 
Complex irony describes a situation in which terms are affected by 
polysemy to a degree that prevents the context from enabling a quick or obvious 
resolution. As Vlastos writes: “in „complex‟ irony what is said both is and isn‟t 
what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense and false in 
another.”13  Vlastos is not positing a theory of contamination or simultaneous 
meaning, but argues that when a term is repeated each instance of the lexeme may 
signify a different signified. In other words, taking Socrates‟ denial of knowledge 
– I only know that I do not know – Socrates knows (common, everyday 
knowledge) that he knows (wisdom, definitional knowledge, anamnestic 
knowledge) nothing. Vlastos‟ argument is thus absolutely Platonic – while 
lexemes may signify multiple signifieds, in each instance they can be reduced to a 
univocal, uncontaminated meaning.  
Two further forms of irony have been described by Iakovos Vasiliou: a 
conditional and reverse irony. Conditional irony  
 
is expressed in a conditional, with the antecedent frequently explicit, but 
sometimes implicit though clear from the context. The irony lies in the fact 
                                                 
12
 Vlastos 29. 
13
 Vlastos 31. 
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that if the antecedent were true, then Socrates would really believe the 
consequent; however it is clear to the reader, though not always to the 
interlocutor, that Socrates believes that the antecedent is false, which 
therefore suggests that he believes the negation of the consequent.
14
  
 
According to Vasiliou when Socrates praises his interlocutors and humbles 
himself, he does not simply mean the opposite of what he says, but is instead 
playing on the conditional and describing as fact a situation which is potentially 
true. If the arrogance of his interlocutors was justified, if their knowledge was the 
wisdom they deemed it to be, then Socrates‟ statements of humility would be the 
simple truth. In this reading of irony the presence of a stable truth is still extant as 
there is no question that Socrates deems his interlocutors foolish in their self-
confidence. However, the truth does contain the trace of a potential truth-to-come, 
a reality in which Socrates‟ interlocutors have become wise.  
While reverse irony is as context-saturated as simple, complex and 
conditional irony, locating “truth” in the intentions of the author, it is produced by 
the audience‟s reception. “In „reverse irony‟ Socrates speaks candidly, with his 
intended meaning explicit, and yet his interlocutors understand him as speaking 
eirônikôs in the Greek sense.”15 Thus, for example, when in the Apology Socrates 
says “Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me 
more than you harm yourselves” (Apol 30c), he speaks no more than the truth, yet 
so unsuitable are these words as a defence that the jury presumes that Socrates is 
mocking them and the situation. Reverse irony has the potential to be deliberately 
manipulated, offsetting truth against a reception that cannot accept it to generate 
aporia and confusion, but can also result in accidental misinterpretation. While 
Vasiliou‟s “reverse irony” is one of the few (classicist) theories of irony to 
specifically allow irony to be produced by the reader, it too depends on a 
relatively simple inversion. It also ironically creates a false irony – truth still lies 
in the author‟s univocal meaning, irony is simply subsequently misapplied.  
Further examples of “Platonic” readings of irony are found in Jill 
Gordon‟s “Against Vlastos on Complex Irony” who sees irony as “an incongruity 
between phenomena within a dramatic context”.16 Again assuming that truth is 
embedded within context, passages are realised as ironic through a process of 
                                                 
14
 Iakovos Vasiliou, “Conditional Irony in the Socratic Dialogues”, The Classical Quarterly 49.2 
(1999) 462. 
15
 Vasiliou, “Socrates‟ Reverse Irony”, The Classical Quarterly 52.1 (2002) 223. 
16
 Jill Gordon “Against Vlastos on Complex Irony”, The Classical Quarterly 46.1 (1996) 134. 
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unfolding: words that contradict or mock earlier pronouncements, showing boasts 
to be empty and arrogance unfounded, are seen as ironic as they cause an 
analeptic understanding of incongruity. This reading retains authority in the 
meaning of the author, and while it divides Plato‟s and Socrates‟ audience into 
those who understand the dramatic irony and those who do not, meaning is still 
Plato‟s, who masterfully designs dialogues that refer back and forward to a 
univocal meaning. Charles L. Griswold Jr. sees Socratic irony as a tension 
between “between the deeds and words …, or between different views expressed 
by the same person”,17  with meaning controlled by authorial intent. Thus the 
classicist interpretation of Socratic irony and its investigation into the works of 
Plato can be seen to inherit from Plato modes of justifying Plato. Logocentrism is 
upheld, truth inscribed in the voice of the father of the thought, intended meaning 
remains prior to its (mis)translation into (ironic) speech or writing and the passage 
between meanings is blocked.  
For Paul Friedländer Socrates‟ irony lay in disjunction, in the rift between 
the expected and the expressed that was immediately exemplified by the beautiful 
interior which lay concealed beneath Socrates‟ ugly exterior. Socrates‟ body 
taught his interlocutors to continue to search for the truth beyond immediate 
appearances or impressions, and so, for Friedländer, “irony is the net of the great 
educator”. 18  Irony is the movement of “attraction and repulsion at the same 
time”, 19  a tension that conceals and reveals the truth. While Friedländer‟s 
formulation of Socratic irony presupposes a truth, his awareness of its potential to 
contaminate and mutate opposite poles is extremely interesting. As he writes 
regarding Socrates‟ relation to knowledge and ignorance: 
 
Obviously he [Socrates] did have knowledge. … But in particular, as he 
often said, he knew that he did not know anything. Thus knowledge turns 
into its opposite … [and] ignorance turns back to an ultimate stage of 
wisdom. For the ignorance revealed in the dialectical process was 
grounded in the living experience of the unknown.
20
  
 
Rather than Vlastos‟s very Platonic drive to specify and separate forms of 
knowledge, Friedländer notes how irony causes knowledge and ignorance to 
                                                 
17
 Charles L. Griswold Jr. “Irony in the Platonic Dialogues”, Philosophy and Literature 26 (2002) 
88. 
18
 Paul Friedländer, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (London: Routledge, 1958) 141. 
19
 Friedländer 142. 
20
 Friedländer 144. 
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become mutually contaminated. Irony does not dissolve differences to the point of 
rendering ignorance and knowledge indistinguishable, but it does reveal the 
complicity and proximity of supposedly distinct and distant poles. As Friedländer 
concludes, “Socratic irony, at its centre, expresses the tension between ignorance 
– that is, the impossibility ultimately to put into words „what justice is‟ – and the 
direct experience of the unknown, the existence of the just man, whom justice 
raises to the level of the divine”.21  
 
The Paratactic Irony of Socrates 
 
This section does not outline Plato‟s “intentions” surrounding his (re)presentation 
of Socratic irony, but looks at how irony functions in and through the character of 
Socrates in the early/middle dialogues. Socratic examination – elenchus – is read 
as an ironic dialogue/monologue that does not seek propositional knowledge but 
inhabits the movement and force of parataxis to step away from falsely held 
presumptions of wisdom. His examination is a questioning that leads to aporia, 
but parabatic aporia; a new step in a different direction. Socratic irony is a skewed 
mode of reflexivity, a process and a contamination of the inside and the outside as 
irony – and Socrates – functions as a paratactic hyphen, an anacoluthic 
interruption of argument and identity. 
Socrates‟ elenchus took the form of a series of questions, and sometimes 
answers, that scrutinised statements made by those who claimed to possess expert 
knowledge on a particular subject. The Socratic dialogues typically progress from 
a confident yet simplistic statement made by one of Socrates‟ interlocutors, to the 
demonstration of the insufficiency and contradiction in the statements given and 
to an eventual impasse or aporia. The purpose of Socrates‟ sometimes harsh 
engagement with speakers was to awaken the knowledge of anamnesis, the 
immortal, universal knowledge that the soul possesses but forgot in the shock of 
birth. Before this knowledge can be awakened, however, the undeserved and 
unjustifiable conceptions of personal wisdom held by the interlocutors had to be 
eradicated. Elenchus, under the guise of the search for truth, was thus a moral tool 
of revealing ignorance: it is better to correctly know you do not know than falsely 
think you do. 
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Socrates: At first he [Meno‟s slave] did not know what the basic line of the 
eight-foot square was; even now he does not yet know, but then he thought 
he knew, and answered confidently as if he did know, and he did not think 
himself at a loss, but now he does think himself at a loss, and as he does 
not know, neither does he think he knows. … So he is now in a better 
position with regard to the matter he does not know? 
Meno: I agree with that. (Meno 84a-b) 
 
The end of the dialogues in aporia is often seen as a failure, be it the 
failure of language, the failure of our modes of conceptualisation or the failure of 
the dialectic form as practiced by Socrates. However, in Dialectic and Dialogue 
Francisco Gonzalez argues that the aporia reached is in fact positive and 
constructive, but that to understand this one must realise that the knowledge that 
interests Socrates is in fact nonpropositional. Socrates is seeking a knowledge of 
essences which can never be encapsulated in propositional statements, as such 
statements describe an object‟s true predicates. What Socrates analyses are not 
objects of knowledge. As Gonzalez writes, “[Socrates‟] method is one exposed to 
risk and danger, aware that the truth is as elusive as the contingencies of battle and 
can never be mastered through rules or definitions”.22 He argues that Socrates 
does not attempt to substitute a definition for an essence; Socrates asks for 
definitional knowledge only because his interlocutors claim to have it, he does not 
presume that the Forms can be contained by a formulaic description. Hence 
elenchus does not strive for a definite end, but is a process of enlightening, and 
this process is an end in itself. It does not replace the experience of truth, beauty 
or virtue with a definition, but attempts to show that in our confused familiarity 
we have glimpses of truth. Thus the insight attained by the dialectic “is not a final 
answer that would render further discussion superfluous. It rather motivates and 
nourishes renewed questioning”.23  
Derrida paints Socrates as a “master of the pharmakon” (PP 117).24 He has 
the face of a magician, and is a “being that no „logic‟ can confine within a 
noncontradictory definition” (PP 117). As a magician he works his magic through 
the logos without the aid of an instrument, an unaccompanied voice whose 
penetration one cannot escape. What Derrida calls the Socratic pharmakon – 
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 Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato‟s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1998) 37. 
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 Gonzalez 61. 
24
 Interestingly, Kierkegaard describes Socratic irony in the sense of pharmakon, as he writes that 
it is “a healthiness insofar as it rescues the soul from the snares of relativity … a sickness insofar 
as it is unable to tolerate the absolute except in the form of nothingness” (113-14). 
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Socratic irony – operates like a venom which penetrates the interior, inducing 
mania or paralysis.  
 
Irony does not consist in the dissolution of a sophistic charm or in the 
dismantling of an occult substance or power through analysis and 
questioning. It does not consist in undoing the charlantanesque confidence 
of a pharmakeus from the vantage point of some obstinate instance of 
transparent reason or innocent logos. Socratic irony precipitates out of one 
pharmakon by bringing it into contact with another pharmakon. Or rather, 
it reverses the pharmakon‟s powers and turns its surface over – thus taking 
effect, being recorded and dated, in the act of classing the pharmakon, 
through the fact that the pharmakon properly consists in a certain 
inconsistency, a certain impropriety, this non-identity-with-itself always 
allowing it to be turned against itself. (PP 119) 
 
Socratic irony, as Derrida understands, it is not a literary ploy or piece of poetic 
excess that can be dissected or undone through an analysis that unlocks the hidden 
meaning. Socratic irony is what occurs when pharmaka come into contact, that is, 
when the hyphenated mark is conjoined, through interruption, with another mark. 
Socratic questioning – elenchus – and the resultant aporias are due to the divided, 
improper structure of the mark: when brought together marks result in hyphenated 
excess, when alone they remain in hyphenated excess with themselves. As Derrida 
describes Socrates in Of Hospitality, “Socrates [is] the disturbing man of question 
and irony (which is to say, of question, another meaning of the word „irony‟), the 
man of the midwifely question” (OH 13). Irony is elenchus, irony is the 
permanent process of questioning, the path to and from aporia. Like 
deconstruction, elenchus reveals the inconsistencies and improprieties of 
structures and concepts thought to be worthy of their name. 
According to Gonzalez Socrates does not seek definitional knowledge, but 
rather the opposite; he attempts to demonstrate the impossibility of propositional 
knowledge, as learning is not static and does not end. It could be argued that the 
term “Socratic method” is a misnomer, as the method is a nonmethod, a singular 
approach to a particular situation and person. What Socrates seeks is to respond 
and engage to a singular situation. Socrates‟ irony is a form of deconstruction, an 
ironic engagement with a text. While his life might be a “game of irony” (Symp 
216e) it is not, as his fellow debaters have complained, simply a word game: “Tell 
me Socrates, aren‟t you ashamed, at your age, of trying to catch people‟s words 
and of making hay out of someone‟s tripping on a phrase?” (Gorg 489c). While 
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Socrates purportedly seeks the truth, that is, seeks a universal element to the 
virtues he discusses, the way in which his nonmethod functions, and the aporias at 
which his dialogues arrive, does not signal a univocal truth. He insists that 
speakers speak their mind, and speak what they believe to be true – which is a 
request for a univocal, authorial truth – but invariably shows that these truths are 
confused and plural, that the interlocutors are not quite sure what they intend. 
Meaning is never simply univocal; it takes Socrates very few questions for this to 
be revealed.
25
 
Socrates‟ own position within the elenctic nonmethod is ambiguous and 
veiled. When the speakers become frustrated Socrates‟ repeated defence is that he 
simply pursues the truth, and that “the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved 
wherever it may lead him” (Euth 14c). Socrates, as he claims, follows the steps of 
an argument as dictated by the holder of knowledge; it is the argument that lays 
itself out in front of him, Socrates merely walks in its path. Socrates‟ (seemingly) 
leading questions do not lead to a pre-conceived contradiction but, following the 
route laid out by the interlocutor, arrive at an impasse generally if not specifically 
predicted by Socrates. In other words, Socrates knows that the dialogue will end 
inconclusively, but he neither knows nor foresees the specific inconsistency on 
which the dialectic will get stuck. As he says in Euthyphro:  
 
When you say this, will you be surprised if your arguments seem to move 
about instead of staying put? And will you accuse me of being Daedalus 
who makes them move, though you yourself are more skilful than 
Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? (Euth 15b-c) 
 
Socrates‟ role in the dialogues is therefore not directly active but reflexive; he 
presents the speakers‟ own arguments to themselves, inverted, different, from an 
other place. When speakers converse with Socrates they see their own thoughts 
and words in mirror image; exactly as they are but from a different perspective 
and a slightly different place. This distance pushes their argument forward, and so 
they present/agree to the next step of their proposition. Socrates is a mirror, an 
other through which the self can be viewed, but a reflection that never shows what 
the subject is used to seeing or expects to see. Socrates does not specifically 
forward a different argument, but re-presents the interlocutor‟s own argument to 
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 This is not to say that Socrates believed in the absence of an “eidetic” truth, but in a truth which 
exceeds propositional statements.  
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himself, revealing its inconsistencies and contradictions: “give your attention”, 
Socrates says, “to the argument itself to see what the result of its refutation will be” 
(Char 166e).
26
 In other words: look to yourself, says Socrates, look at yourself. 
The early dialogues are not in fact dialogues but monologues, and the interlocutor 
shadow-boxes with his own argument, speaking with the self through the mirror 
of the other until his knowledge begins to dissolve. Voluble and verbose, Socrates 
is a deafening silence, one who operates on the borders of the inside and the 
outside; he is the pharmakon who is outside and other, of indefinite identity, and 
yet who penetrates the speaker to reveal himself to himself. Socrates, as he 
describes himself, is “an empty jar” (Phae 235d), a blank sheet, glass with a silver 
backing, a space to be filled by the other, who sees himself through alterity. 
Socrates is a blanc, an interruptive space that nonetheless gives room to the 
interlocutor. Socrates is the hyphenated space of paratactic irony. Socrates, 
argues Blanchot, lived as permanent parabasis. His life was anacoluthic 
interruption: “Questioning, he interrupts and interrupts himself without cease, 
giving form ironically to the fragmentary” (ED 65). 
Socrates‟ role in the dialogues/monologues is the performance of an 
anacoluthon. The exchanges are constantly interrupted by the undecidability of his 
position; he leads and follows, he is active and passive, responsive and dictatorial, 
inside and outside, present and absent. He throws both the interlocutor and the 
reader into confusion as he operates on the borders of categories but always steps 
so as to turn the debater in on himself. As Alcibiades describes him he is the 
anacoluthon that is a Silenus. All his signs and codes point to one thing, a poor, 
fat, ugly man who loiters in the market place lusting after young boys and 
presenting arguments “clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn by the most 
vulgar satyrs” (Symp 221e). And yet at the same time he is a sober and temperate 
man, full of the beautiful and godlike. He is interruption, a contamination and 
confusion of discourses, vulgar and refined, wise and foolish, ugly and beautiful, a 
transgression between categories. As Kierkegaard writes, “The outer and the inner 
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 This is true of the early dialogues; the later dialogues, in which Socrates makes longer speeches, 
tend to proffer a firmer argument. This is one of the more concrete reasons why these dialogues 
are understood to present Plato‟s philosophy rather than Socrates‟ (non)method.  
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did not form a harmonious unity, for the outer was in opposition to the inner, and 
only through this refracted angle is he [Socrates] to be apprehended”.27 
Socrates is the personification of parataxis, an ironic sign of interruption 
and penetration that can move in any direction. His language operates as parataxis, 
phrases – his denial of teaching, his denial of knowledge – that point to any 
number of meanings. His is a (parabatic) step that both leads and follows, or 
perhaps more accurately, that follows on the path the argument dictates (once 
given a little push). He is a catalyst, a midwife causing others to give birth to 
themselves, to reorder themselves. In the Apology Socrates states that 
“Throughout my life, in any public activity I have engaged in, I am the same man 
as I am in private life” (Apol 33a) – what is the same for Socrates is his difference, 
his place at the centre that lies on the edge, the parabatic movement of the 
pharmakon. His is the irony that reveals that words, arguments, and subjects are 
ordered on a transgressive movement of disorder, that destabilises inside and 
outside, monologue and dialogue. His is an irony that hyphenates.  
The ironic movement of Socrates is never a superior vantage point – he is 
neither external nor elevated but an internal/external mirror presenting a skewed 
parabatic reflexivity. The subject sees his argument, and self, reflected through a 
disjoined reflexivity of anacoluthic interruption, one that presents a different self, 
an interrupted self. Which is not to claim that the dialogues successfully change 
the speakers; most interlocutors show little direct evidence of personal revelations. 
As Alcibiades says: “the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways” 
(Symp 216b). What Socrates‟ irony does is to turn the subject – person and theme 
– in on itself, and bring it to a point of interruption. As Derrida writes, “the 
Socratic pharmakon petrifies and vivifies, anesthetises and sensitises, appeases 
and anguishes” (PP 119n). Its aporia, however, is never a dead end, but a new path. 
As a mixture of two heterogeneous terms, the pharmakon is always a blend and an 
impurity, so that even “the good remedy, Socratic irony, comes to disturb the 
intestinal organisation of self-complacency” (PP 128). Its adulterated, 
contaminated status enables it to function inside and outside, as an internal mirror 
of alterity.  
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 Kierkegaard 50. In Atmosphäre: Essays zur neuen Ästhetik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995) Gernot 
Böhme argues that the figure of Socrates introduced the concept of disjunction between the inner 
and the outer self.   
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 In “Khōra” Derrida describes Socrates in relation to khōra, the third genus 
which “names neither this nor that, [nor] says this and that” (K 89). Khōra defies 
the logic of noncontradiction, and is that which “while giving place to that 
opposition as to so many others, seems sometimes to be itself no longer subject to 
the law of the very thing which it situates” (K 90). Khōra seems to somehow 
reverse the metaphorical tenor/vehicle modality, as the heuristic devices – mother, 
receptacle, imprint-bearer, nurse – used to explain it actually grow solid 
themselves. Khōra is a support or a subject which gives place, rather than taking 
place, a non-place never exactly or appropriately named. In the Timaeus the 
sophists are described as those who are outside, who roam, homeless, while the 
politicians and philosophers are inside, placed and positioned. Socrates‟ strategy 
operates from a non-place, as he says he resembles the poets. As Derrida writes,  
 
If Socrates pretends to include himself among those whose genus is to 
have no place, he does not assimilate himself to them, he says he 
resembles them. Hence he holds himself in a third genus, in a way, neither 
that of the sophists, poets and other imitators (of whom he speaks), nor that 
of the philosopher-politicians (to whom he speaks, proposing only to listen 
to them). … His speech occurs in a third genus and in the neutral space or 
place without place, a place where everything is marked but which would 
be “in itself” unmarked. Doesn‟t he resemble what others, later, those very 
ones to whom he gives the word, will call khōra? (K 109) 
 
Socrates is a “receptive addressee … a receptacle of all that will henceforth be 
described” (K 110). He puts himself in the place of khōra, in an “Irreplaceable 
and unplaceable place from which he receives the word(s) of those before whom 
he effaces himself but who receive them from him, for it is he who makes them 
talk like this. And us too, implacably” (K 111). Socrates isn‟t khōra, but he 
resembles her/it, whatever she/it is. It is the neutrality of Socrates, his speaking 
from inside and outside, that makes him the master of the pharmakon, the master 
of irony.  
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Platonic Irony 
 
Friedländer writes that “It is quite certain … that one cannot approach Plato 
without taking into account what irony is and what it means in his work”.28 Jean 
Paul writes that Plato‟s irony  
 
could, if there is such a thing as world humour, be called world irony, 
singing and hovering playfully not only over human errors (as humour 
hovers not only over human folly), but over all human knowledge, free as 
a flame that devours, delights, moves with ease, yet aspires only toward 
heaven.
29
  
 
Platonic irony is usually understood as a dramatic or authorial irony, an irony of 
form, and Plato portrayed as an author deliberately introducing complication and 
confusion into his work for reasons of pedagogy, play or power. While Alexander 
Nehamas, as we will see below, presents a dark and deceitful Plato, critics like 
John Seery deem Platonic irony a tool for teaching, for continuing Socrates‟ 
exhortations to live an examined life. Should Plato present his ideal in a way that 
becomes easy to follow, the reader will simply and thoughtlessly follow his 
directions, and learn nothing more than how to emulate. Seery‟s Plato instead 
invites the reader “to question the text itself, to think beyond it, and ultimately 
choose a path of justice independently”.30 This section argues that regardless of 
Plato‟s intentions in using irony – which appear to be the ironic use of irony in 
order to suppress irony – he is exemplary of the ironic author who produces and 
interrupts, who creates a work as process, who writes a blanc text of hyphens and 
abysses. 
Plato‟s irony is for Friedländer more complex and subtle than Socrates‟; it 
is “a guide on the path to the eternal forms and to that which is beyond being”.31 
Plato uses Socrates as form, as the figure of an “ironic division” who/which 
anacoluthically interrupts each scene. In the Symposium Plato has Socrates use 
Diotima to express certain views on love, so that Socrates is split into the priestess 
who is privy to the highest secrets, and one who represents the striving for truth in 
one who is ignorant. Hence the 
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 As quoted in Friedländer 137. 
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 John Evan Seery Political Returns: Irony in Politics and Theory from Plato to the Anti-Nuclear 
Movement (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) 140. 
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 Friedländer 153. 
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ironic tensions between him [Socrates] and the others are superseded, at 
the crucial point, by an ironic tension between the seeker for truth and a 
power that, though shining through him, is also above him. ... Thus the 
ladder of ironic tensions raises the reader to the divination of a higher 
being and leaves behind the impulse of unceasing search for what he has 
divined. It excites, to speak with Friedrich Schlegel, a feeling of the 
insoluble opposition between the unconditional and the conditional.
32
 
 
The ironic split within the character of Socrates is mirrored in the interruption that 
takes place in the “ironic shift of balance in a work of art”.33 What appears to be 
the theme of a dialogue is not quite the theme, and what appeared to be secondary 
is, if not primary, so involved with the primary as to render one impossible 
without the other. As Friedländer writes: 
 
Just as there are pictures in which the pictorial centre remains vacant, and 
the centre of attention is transferred by the arrangement of lines, colours, 
and light effect to one of the corners, so the dialogue, if seen as a whole, 
confers essential meaning on that which appeared only as a means; and 
this meaning, in turn, illuminates and deepens even that which, as long as 
we did not recognise this ironic shift, appeared to be its primary purpose.
34
 
 
Form and content both support and disrupt each other, so that each piece is an 
anacoluthon turning around the ironic anacoluthon that is Socrates himself. Plato 
created a character who is a hyphen, who ironically interrupts and disrupts, who 
alters each dialogue‟s theme and focus.  
In The Art of Living Alexander Nehamas envisions a Plato “whose disdain 
for people is matched only by his passion for improving them”,35 who  
 
uses Socratic irony as a means for lulling the dialogue‟s readers into the 
very self-complacency it makes them denounce. It [Plato‟s irony] is deep, 
dark, disdainful. It is at least as arrogant a challenge to Plato‟s readers as 
Socrates‟ irony was to his interlocutors and perhaps even more so.36 
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 Nehamas 48. Interestingly, Nehamas uses “permanent parabasis”, writing: “Socrates‟ irony 
towards Plato results in such a permanent parabasis: it makes it hard to remember that the figure 
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36
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Plato peoples his texts with arrogant innocents, and encourages his readers to 
adopt a “superior, ironic attitude towards Socrates‟ dialectical partners. And in so 
doing, he turns us into arrogant innocents like them. As we treat Socrates‟ victims 
ironically, unaware of our own misplaced confidence, we become ourselves the 
objects of Plato‟s own, higher-order irony”.37  
For Christopher Rowe irony is “a form of expression which, when taken 
with its context, tends to undermine itself”,38 a mode of discourse in which the 
serious and the playful interrupt each other. A single phrase or image can have 
both a philosophical content and a content that says something quite different, and 
irony is thus the mutual contamination of two different modes of discourse. As 
close to anacoluthic irony as this is, it is problematised by Rowe‟s insistence on 
the separation of the serious and the ironic, and by his need to differentiate 
between parts of the discourse which are ironic, and parts which are not. The 
complicity between codes that occurs in irony is restricted to sections of indirect 
discourse, and eradicated from others where, Rowe intimates, a single, direct or 
literal meaning remains extant. Sometimes then, there is a double meaning, but at 
others there is most definitely not. Rowe positions himself strongly against a 
reading which states that “because Plato describes writing as play, and because 
irony is, or can be, a form of play, this by itself gives support to the view that the 
whole of his output is somehow ironical”.39 Irony for Rowe is a device devoted to 
obstructing or concealing a direct meaning, one that can be used for positive or 
pedagogic purposes, but which is nonetheless a contrivance of the author as 
opposed to a basic effect of language.  
Rowe‟s platonic irony is specifically a “self-directed, or self-disparaging, 
irony”40 that “serves to deflate the pretensions of the author himself – pretensions 
that are implicit in the very act of writing”.41 Works are playful because they are 
insufficient, as “reality is something which ultimately eludes verbal expression”.42 
A writer uses irony as a warning, to show that the performance is a performance. 
Hence  
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 Rowe 89. 
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the ironic playfulness of the Phaedrus is consistent with the attitude of a 
writer who says that writing is, after all, a kind of play, and that real 
intellectual advance is to be made by other means. Irony, we should again 
notice, is peculiarly adapted to the lesson which is to be taught – that 
books are not all that they seem to be.
43
  
 
Thus while irony is the mixing of codes and the contamination of discourses, it is 
used to reveal the inadequacy of a particular form, and should be recognised and 
thereby diffused. Rowe‟s Plato is a humble man, deliberately inserting paradoxes 
and contradictions in order to negate an impious appearance of wisdom. Yet Rowe 
still indirectly states that while the surface content of Plato‟s work should be 
mistrusted, it nonetheless forwards a concealed, univocal, intended truth. The 
puppet-master may play with the form, but he is still, for Rowe, pulling the strings 
to create the appearance of humility.  
Derrida‟s formulation of Platonic irony has already been addressed, if not 
directly named. What Derrida refers to as “stunning hand Plato has dealt himself” 
(PP 157), Plato‟s concession that language is playful followed by the immediate 
reinscription of that play as a controlled game, is irony. But an irony used to 
control irony, to insist on a univocal truth. As Derrida writes, 
 
This authority of truth, of dialectics, of seriousness, of presence, will not 
be gainsaid at the close of this admirable movement, when Plato, after 
having in a sense reappropriated writing, pushes his irony – and his 
seriousness – to the point of rehabilitating a certain form of play. (PP 154)  
 
Plato‟s irony is the suppression of the ironic movement of language, an irony that 
attempts to change parataxis into syntax, into a rhythm and rule proposed by the 
author. It is an irony that ironically undoes itself, an irony anacoluthically 
interrupted. It ironically makes irony a dramatic device to be used and 
manipulated, rather than a functioning of the mark. His is a serious irony, an irony 
of contaminated opposites, where play becomes serious, and although he attempts 
to hide it, the serious can also become play. It is the ultimate ironic card trick, the 
sleight of hand that flips irony into univocity, that turns it over only to conceal it. 
Plato created a mode of reading that turned parataxis into strict context, 
into an ordered movement secured by the full presence of a univocal meaning 
because, as Derrida speaks for him, “One ought to distinguish, between two 
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repetitions” (PP 170). The ironic, paratactic pharmakon allows repetition to 
remain, but to remain in contamination. “Plato‟s Pharmacy” ends as Derrida 
describes knocks at Plato‟s door, two knocks, four knocks, traits, strokes or strikes 
that are inside and outside, that repeat the sound of his words hitting the rafters, 
and also signal the approach of the new, the other, the unconfined. But, as Derrida 
writes, “maybe it‟s just a residue, a dream, a bit of dream left over, an echo of the 
night … that other theatre, those knocks from without” (PP 171). It‟s hard not to 
hear in this line the repetition of the theatre of irony that Derrida outlines in 
“Khōra”, the theatre that disrupts the author‟s system, and contaminates 
repetitions. As Plato works in his pharmacy, mixing and separating, Derrida 
describes how the repetition of what has here been called parataxis causes his 
monologue to reverberate, so that it becomes a polylogue, or, as Plato‟s works are 
named, a dialogue. The monologue is parataxis reordered into a dialectic as 
 
words come apart, bits and pieces of sentences are separated, disarticulated 
parts begin to circle through corridors, become fixed for a round or two, 
translate each other, become rejoined, bounce off each other, contradict 
each other, make trouble, tell on each other, come back like answers, 
organise their exchanges, protect each other, institute an internal 
commerce, take themselves for a dialogue. Full of meaning. A whole story. 
An entire history. All of philosophy. [emphasis added] (PP 169) 
 
Plato‟s system is one that ironically interrupts itself, so that its repetitions and 
reverberations are repressed and reduced to univocal meaning.  
Derrida compares Socrates to a pharmakos, a scapegoat, someone who 
exists inside and outside the city, whose death protects the city from the harm 
lying in wait.
44
 If Socrates plays the role of the scapegoat for Athens, he also plays 
the role of scapegoat in Plato, an unpredictable impurity penetrating the inside of 
the text. One could suggest that Plato, in a slightly different way, plays the role of 
scapegoat in Derrida‟s texts. Plato is both inside and outside all of Derrida‟s 
works, a source of discomfort and irritation, a presence insisting on presence, 
dictating inescapable legacies of metaphysics. Derrida attempts to kill Plato; he 
seeks to replace the authoritative voice and presence of the father with absence. 
What Derrida removes Plato in order to protect, however, is not the pure and 
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sacrosanct but the contaminated and the paratactic, and therefore Derrida‟s drive 
against Plato can of necessity never succeed. The movement between Plato and 
Derrida is itself an anacoluthic, paratactic reordering, an ironisation of 
metaphysics, an interaction of the step/not. 
Regardless of Plato‟s intentions, this chapter argues that what Plato has 
produced in the dialogues is the figure of the ironic author. The ironic author is 
not simply masked or hidden, she is an anacoluthon, a permanent parabasis, an 
interruption and transgression. Plato wrote in a manner than confused the poet and 
the scribe, as he both created a character and transcribed the words of a 
friend/father. He wrote therefore fact and fiction, true accounts that could not 
possible be true to the letter, as he and his characters would then be possessed of 
superhuman memories. He is both character and author, although his presence as a 
character is marked by absence; he mentions himself by name only twice in the 
dialogues, once in the Apology (38b) and once in the Phaedo (59b), although the 
latter is to state his absence. He ostensibly writes to praise and honour Socrates, 
and yet his works seem to list the failures of an extremely exasperating individual. 
He conflates and confuses his own theories and opinions with those of Socrates, 
while leaving hints that the more complex and sophisticated are his own. He 
writes while condemning writing, lamenting its inadequacies while weaving 
beautiful prose and memorable speeches. He is humble, downplaying the author‟s 
role to near invisibility, and arrogant, as he devises a mode of reading that makes 
the author‟s light the only one to read by. He insists on truth, unity and univocal 
meaning, while employing a form that disguises or rebels against all three.  
The dialectic is lauded as the only form of philosophical inquiry, and yet 
its fate appears, in the early “Socratic” dialogues at least, to be doomed to failure. 
Plato argues against the emotive tricks of the sophists and the poets, but plays 
heavily on the senses himself. He deliberately employs dramatic devices – in the 
Phaedrus everything takes place outside the city walls in the place of the other, 
faces are covered and speeches born from under the cloak of surrogate fathers. In 
the Phaedrus words are serious and playful, writing is wholly other to speech and 
yet its brother, is dangerous and yet a valuable metaphorical or heuristic device. 
The reader, as a reader of the base and illegitimate form of writing, is portrayed as 
passive and potentially both dangerous and vulnerable to the text, and yet is 
presented with a range of complexities that demand active engagement. This both 
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protects the text, as the less able reader will not read it, and increases the potential 
damage done to and by the text. The reader is the interlocutor and Socrates and 
Plato, required to accept, as false as the distinctions are, the universal 
philosophical truth and the particular, singular, literary truth of each dialogue. 
Plato‟s works are as voluble and as silent as Socrates, and Plato equally, if 
differently, garrulous and reserved. 
Plato‟s work and Plato himself is an absolute anacoluthon, the ironic 
writer extraordinaire, who interrupts his own codes, who transgresses his own 
path. His texts paratactically reorder themselves, and yet give, as we have become 
accustomed to read parataxis, the appearance of order and linearity. He is the 
writer of irony who both produced and interrupted irony, who revealed the ironic, 
anacoluthic potential of language and instantly suppressed it. He presented his 
readers with fire and taught them to see it as a matchstick. From Plato and 
Socrates we receive ironic doubles, ironic masks, ironic concealment, and the 
basic sense of incongruity that is termed irony. And yet with commendable 
aplomb and a perfect sense of irony, Plato immediately restricts and controls it, 
until it is hidden and localised and dependent on the author‟s whim and truth. 
From Plato we ironically inherit, indirectly, hidden meanings and secret ironies. 
Why Plato wrote this way has been addressed by many theorists, four of 
whom are listed above. On the whole I agree with their – and Derrida‟s – basic 
common thread, namely that Plato, aware of the insufficiencies of writing, wrote 
to keep the dialectical exchange as alive as possible, to keep the reader as active 
as possible, to keep the memory and the mind as engaged and challenged as 
possible. Of course, this aim is taken in two different directions, as most 
classicists say that Plato wrote with irony in order to teach or breathe life into the 
dead logos that is writing, while Derrida argues that Plato wrote this way in order 
to link writing back to the words of the author.
45
 Regardless of Plato‟s aims, one 
cannot understand irony as a device that presents a solvable puzzle, a concealing 
veil laid over an already existent and independent truth. Which, to insert a proviso, 
does not state that there is no answer, that authorial intention is wholly irrelevant, 
or that each text presents an unfathomable jumble of words. Authorial intention is 
interesting, important and worthy of study, it is simply that irony prevents it from 
                                                 
45
 Of course, these different directions are also the same, as the life breathed into the text may be 
the potential to live beyond the author, but is usually taken as life from the author, that is, to be 
traced back to the author. 
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ever attaining the primacy of being the only possible reading of a text. Irony 
operates from the moment there is the mark, within and without the author‟s 
intention. To devote one‟s time only to the why is to fall into Plato‟s trap, if 
Derrida is correct in labelling it such.  
Plato‟s irony is a dramatic irony that, interrupted, plays on, from author to 
author, and so we come to Derrida‟s own card play of authorship, inheritance and 
irony – “Envois” (1980). Published in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud 
and Beyond, “Envois” takes the form of an interrupted series of postcards sent, it 
seems, by a man with the same history as Derrida, to a woman, perhaps, whom he 
loves. The author of the cards, who is Derrida and not Derrida, who is an author 
but without authority, investigates communication, legacy, language, metaphysics, 
metaphor and psychoanalysis through irony and parataxis. In French the card – 
carte – is an anagram of écart meaning division or interval. Thus the post card is 
the “écart postale” (E 37), the post interval, gap, difference; the post(al) parataxis. 
Derrida plays this card against Plato‟s perfect (sleight of) hand, the hand of one of 
the “greatest counterfeiters in history” (E 22). What is presented is both a récit 
and a record, a live, elenctic dialogue and a dead, false monologue: “our Socratic 
novel, our infernal post card history” (E 176), a prose always happening, always 
stepping and turning without arriving. 
 
Paratactic Postcards 
 
“Envois” is a text of anacoluthic, paratactic irony, a text of catastrophic tropes and 
turns. Catastrophe comes from the ancient Greek καηαζηποθή, to over-turn, to 
take a sudden turn, and as such is a radically interruptive movement, the “not-
following” of the anacoluthon. “Envois” is an ironic correspondence, a distorted 
reflection, the image of something always interrupted or just out of sight, out of 
the bright sun of the thetic and the propositional. The postcards on which the 
correspondence takes place – shocking postcards, that depict a beautiful, noble 
Socrates writing while a small, ugly Plato prods him in the back – operate as a 
performance of parataxis: the cards function as marks or letters that can be 
anagrammatically reordered according to the reader‟s whim. The cards are joined 
across the blanc of space – on the page – and time – in the narrative –; 
conjunctions are given to them in the process of reading. This parataxis is, 
however, doubly performed or repeated by the interruption that occurs within the 
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cards themselves. At irregular intervals the cards are ruptured by gaps of “52 signs, 
52 mute spaces” (E 5), blancs which point to missing sections of indeterminate 
length. At times the blanks are grammatically or syntactically insurmountable, an 
impassable abyss, while at others the structure permits continued reading, and a 
(false) sense to be gleaned from the passage: “I have said nothing in comparison 
to what you know in advance that I would have wanted to say to you [… 52 …] 
for it has not escaped you that the other omnipresent one, my immense one, is you” 
(E 107). 
The catastrophic postcard, a reproduction of a 13
th
 century engraving by 
Mathew Paris, constitutes an apocalypse, one that  
 
allegorises the catastrophic unknown of the order. Finally one begins no 
longer to understand what to come [venir], to come before, to come after, 
to foresee [prévenir], to come back [revenir] all mean – along with the 
difference of the generations, and then to inherit, to write one‟s will, to 
dictate, to speak, to take dictation. (E 21) 
 
In the age of the post card – in the post age – progression is confused, as to come 
before and to come after become contaminated; to be in front designates both the 
earlier and the later. Plato stands behind Socrates, forcing him, urging him, 
commanding him to write, and thus Plato inherits, not from Socrates, but from 
himself: “The presumptive heir, Plato, of whom it is said that he writes, has never 
written, he receives the inheritance but as the legitimate addressee he has dictated 
it, has had it written and has sent it to himself” (E 52). Hence, as Derrida explains, 
“everything begins, like the post card, with reproduction. Sophie and her 
followers, Ernst, Heinele, myself and company dictate to Freud who dictates to 
Plato, who dictates to Socrates” (E 63). The scene of inheritance of “Envois” 
plays out the theatre of irony outlined in “Khōra” – we inherit from and within a 
“structure without an indivisible origin” (K 119). The Plato we receive is one 
understood by years of interpretation, from Aristotle to Derrida, and so each new 
interpretation reprograms our reception and rewrites history. Each new work 
dictates to the old work, which swells to contain it, and so we are always “today 
on the eve of Platonism. Which can also, naturally, be thought of as the morning 
after Hegelianism” (PP 107-08).46 
                                                 
46
 This is performed in the reading of irony in this thesis, which traces a movement back and 
forward between – primarily – Socrates, Schlegel, de Man and Derrida.  
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There is no point of absolute origin, just re-readings and reproductions. 
The post card, its abyssal blanc or invisible hyphen emphasising its temporal 
exigency and remove from a single, direct proper name, is the reproduction of 
reproduction, the (re)birth of repetition that supports writing. As Catherine 
Malabou writes, the “fantasy of a whole metaphysics” consists in “knowing from 
whence one has left, whither one is going, writing after having spoken, seen, 
traversed, explored”.47 The post card is “the insupportable partition of the support” 
(E 27), a hymen or hyphen that gives no stable position in an order or system, that 
does not allow for the direct propositions of a thesis, that confuses subject and 
predicate, S and P, and therefore never presents or supports propositional 
knowledge. 
 
What I prefer, about post cards, is that one does not know what is the front 
or what is the back, here or there, near or far, the Plato or the Socrates, 
recto or verso. Nor what is the most important, the picture or the text, and 
in the text, the message or the caption, or the address. Here, in my post 
card apocalypse, there are proper names, S. and p., above the picture, and 
reversibility unleashes itself, goes mad. (E 13)
48
  
 
In the era of the post card we begin having already begun, and thus, in a 
performance of ironic, non-linear inheritance, we see that “in the beginning was 
the post” (E 66).49 Thus the post card era is not an era, and a new metaphysics 
cannot be founded on the postal system, even though “the very idea of the halt, 
and the idea of the epoch in which Being holds itself back, suspends, withdraws, 
etc., all these things are immediately homogeneous with postal discourse” (E 65). 
There is no longer a metaphysics, just “envois without destination” (E 66).50  
A letter – systematic, semantic, syntactic – is written, enclosed in an 
envelope, signed, sealed, addressed, sent and delivered. It has a strict sense of 
origin and destination; a recognised individual or institution sends a message of 
univocal meaning to an individual or institution equally recognisable. The 
                                                 
47
 Catherine Malabou and Jacques Derrida, Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida, trans. 
David Wills (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 189. 
48
 In “Of an Apocalyptic Tone” Derrida writes “One does not know (for it is not of the order of 
knowing) to whom the apocalyptic dispatch returns; it leaps from one place of emission to the 
other” (AT 27). 
49
 The deferred resolution of Vasiliou‟s conditional irony could be reinscribed here – were there a 
beginning then there would be an end, were there a legible address there would be a received 
delivery, were there a single author there would be simple destination. But there are not.  
50
 And yet metaphysics is always the verso, always the card‟s other side, ironically hyphenated, 
opposite and conjoined. 
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paratactic post card, however, overturns this logocentric system; it is “an open but 
illegible letter” (E 12), received by all who encounter it and yet understood – 
totalised, completed, saturated – by none. There is always destinerrance: the post 
card arrives everywhere and nowhere; as all code can potentially be cracked it 
cannot be encrypted or protected so that only the intended addressee will 
understand it. Arriving at its supposed destination does not make it present to 
itself or complete; as there is always remainder or excess it never fully arrives 
anywhere. It is thus “neither legible nor illegible, open and radically intelligible” 
(E 79). The post card is ironic parataxis or fragmentation, splinters that never 
added up to a whole: “a post card is never but a piece of a letter, a letter that puts 
itself, at the very second of the pickup, into pieces, and every piece appears 
simple, simpleminded, ingenuous and above all indivisible, unanalysable” (E 67). 
It is banal absence – all a post card ever says is “I am somewhere else” – and yet 
can contain the most catastrophic revelations or declarations – “I am (always) 
somewhere else”.  
An insupportable support, the post card undoes the notion of the single, 
self-present subject. The correspondence is signed only twice; once in the preface, 
once on the back cover. The first signature, which as a preface is also the last, has 
a note attached, which reads: “I regret that you [tu] do not very much trust my 
signature, on the pretext that we might be several” (E 6). Each person, each pair 
“is an immense dispersed collection” (E 186) of mutable gender, name and 
identity. “Envois” abuses “dates, signatures, titles or references, language itself” 
(E back cover), and deliberately confuses fact and fiction, as the figure of the 
author, authenticating and validating output, is anacoluthically interrupted. 
Pronouns in the post age function as ironic points of parataxis, signs that can sign 
in any direction – deixis adrift – and thereby perform the impossibility of 
autonomous identity:  
 
Plato‟s dream: to make Socrates write, and to make him write what he 
wants, his last command, his will. To make him write what he wants by 
letting (lassen) him write what he wants. Thereby becoming Socrates and 
his father, therefore his own grandfather (PP) and killing him. (E 52)  
 
As Plato becomes Socrates, becomes his own father, the pronouns fade into each 
other. Instead of turning towards the mirror, and in the turn constituting the self, 
in the ironic, post card era it is always “a question of turning one‟s back [dos]. Of 
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turning my back to them by pretending to address myself to them and to make 
them bear witness” (E 178). 
In presenting what looks like a mode of performative reflexivity – 
“publishing that which concerning the post card, looks like a „post card‟” (E 175) 
– the author disguises the truth; that there is no more perfect, direct or literal 
correspondence – plus de metaphore. In keeping with the strange doubling that 
takes place between the author and Plato the author gives his own perverformative 
mark – the 52 spaces.51 These spaces hint at important secrets concealed, at a 
discourse that was entirely other, and yet their elusive promise may be no more 
than perjury. The mark of omission is omitted in an important promise – the oath 
read aloud by Derrida before entering the Bodleian.
52
 This reads: “„I hereby 
undertake … not to bring into the library or kindle therein any fire or flame … 
and I promise to obey all rules of the Library‟” (E 216). Why, on promising not to 
commit anything to the flames, does Derrida ignore the mark that designates the 
incinerated? Was the promise never properly made? Does Derrida break or keep 
both promises? What of the section of cards that make up “Telepathy”? What do 
they do to the promise of having burnt all the rest? Every post card promise 
becomes a perverformative perjury.  
Socrates, writes the author, plays with parataxis, “with the blank spaces, 
the indentations, the simulacra of punctuation in the other‟s text” (E 49). The post 
cards are a performance of a mode of writing that manipulates irony and parataxis, 
the non-thetic and the non-propositional: “At bottom I am only interested in what 
cannot be sent off, cannot be dispatched in any case” (E 14-15). The ironic 
parataxis of the post cards and their blank spaces is excessively matched by the 
parataxis within the cards:  
 
I tend to you, I tender nothing, I tender you, yourself, I tend myself 
towards you, I await [attends] you, I say to you “hold”, keep what I would 
like to give you, I don‟t know what, more than me doubtless, keep, come, 
halt, reassemble, hold us together, us and more than you or me, we are 
awaited [attendus] by this very thing, I know neither who nor what, and so 
much the better, this is the condition, by that very thing which destines us, 
drop it. (E 64-65) 
 
                                                 
51
 See chapter two and “Envois” 136. 
52
 This point is an extension of Simon Morgan Wortham‟s in Derrida: Writing Events (London: 
Continuum, 2008) 24. 
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This passage of almost perfect parataxis – an interrupted parataxis – exemplifies 
the ironic movement of the cards throughout, as figures, language, and themes 
hyphenate themselves to join and disperse in myriad ways. Writing is a hyphen 
that attracts and repels: “Do I write to you in order to bring you near or in order to 
distance you, to find the best distance – but then with whom?” (E 78) Words leave 
footprints, and have a progression and evolution that is as alinear as inheritance. 
They consist of vast spaces normally concealed: “a b s o l u t e” (E 167) and “i l l 
e g i b l e” (E 176), and comprise levers and paratactic units that rework and 
reorder themselves, tiny movements than make countries fall: “I love the delicate 
levers that pass between the legs of a word, between a word and itself to the point 
of making entire civilisations seesaw” (E 78).53 
Parataxis is a style that stresses movement and process, emphasising 
production over the product. The postal principle is a “differantial relay, that 
regularly prevents, delays, endispatches the depositing of the thesis, forbidding 
rest and endlessly on the run” (E 54). In the “becoming-prose of our Socratic 
novel” (E 173) the author is always en train, on the course, in the course, in the 
process; moving, travelling, going, leaving, turning. “Envois” is a work of 
movement, of negotiation, of forces, of re-ordering, of re-writing, of inter-ruption, 
irony and parataxis. Identity passes each by while doubling and mirroring (itself): 
“I pass you and you pass me [je te double et tu me doubles]” (E 200). This 
paratactic path of the cards makes it impossible to settle on a single, univocal 
meaning; there is no clear dividing line between the literal and the figurative. The 
post cards comprising “Envois” address  
 
everything that concerns the voie, viability, crossroads, walking, feet and 
legs, back-and-forth, the fort/da, proximity and distancing. Of course it 
will be difficult to decide, to sort out, to separate on the one hand and on 
the other: when is it a question of all this directly, or “literally”? And when 
by means of a detour, a figure or presupposition? (E 177) 
 
The figures spend their lives en voiture, always moving, always in the car, always 
(in) the vehicle. Never the tenor. Thus while Derrida pits his cards against Plato‟s 
sleight of hand both are playing with parataxis, with the irony of performativity 
                                                 
53
 The author complains about spelling mistakes throughout the text. Interestingly, in the English 
translation Schlegel‟s journal Athenaeum (Athenäum) is misspelled as “Athaeneum” (E 189). 
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and skewed reflexivity, a force of potentiality, a style that always says more than 
it explicitly states.  
A “metaphoric catastrophe” (E 46) occurs in the post card era. “No more is 
post a metaphor” (E 46), instead “metaphor is a stamp: the tax, the duty to be paid 
on natural language and on the voice” (E 46). Metaphor is no longer a simple turn 
from a direct communiqué, but “as the site of all transferences and all 
correspondences, [is] the „proper‟ possibility of all possible rhetoric” (E 65). 
Which is itself always improper, plural and paratactic. The post cards are the 
“retreat [retrait] of metaphor. I have made a story of voyages (and not a narration 
of a voyage) and of the very very divided trait (Riss) out of it” (E 153): the re-treat 
and re-tracing of language that turns away from “natural” language. 54  The 
saturation of the system of differences by metaphor results in a form of 
performative reflexivity. As Derrida writes regarding metaphor: “I cannot treat it 
without dealing with it …, I can no longer stop the vehicle or anchor the ship, 
master without remainder the drifting, skidding or sideslipping [dérapage]” (RM 
49). The reflexivity of this general metaphoricity, in which a discourse on a topic 
becomes an example of the topic, is the performance of a descriptive content.
55
 In 
this case again the perverformative breaks the mirror; the excess of metaphoricity 
undoes itself. This catastrophic reflexivity can be found in the term metaphor 
itself. Metaphor comes from the Greek to carry, to transport, and is still a vehicle 
or load bearing term. A metaphor is a metaphor, and as such has an unusual 
relation to the law of genre; unlike the mark “novel”, it is what it designates. Thus 
in this case, the mark of belonging does belong as the mark is included in what it 
classifies, but it is this very act of reflexivity that undoes reflexivity. A general 
metaphoricity undoes the very notion of the metaphor – there is no proper from 
which to turn. The metaphor is always thus (im)properly named, always a mixed 
metaphor and catachrestically turning on and away from itself.  
                                                 
54
Trait, in both English and French, signifies a line, a stroke, a style, a characteristic, while retrait 
translates from French as a (parabatic) step back, a withdrawing, and is used with a hyphen by 
Derrida to denote re-trait, redrawing. See “The Retrait of Metaphor”. The trait of the retrait of 
metaphor is a force which connects in a way that allows meaning to be. It is something while being 
nothing in itself, an ironic hyphen that exists to join, but that begins, through juxtaposition, to 
parasitically absorb a certain degree of signification. It is the metaphor of metaphor, the trope of 
tropes, the irony of parataxis and parabasis. Always plural it is always a fragmented parataxis, 
stepping beyond the thematic and the thetic. Metaphor as retrait has a parabatic step, the excessive 
step of irony. Metaphor is re-drawn as ironic catachresis, as a valency that can turn in any direction, 
that will always signify beyond itself and can never be thetically contained. 
55
 See chapter two. 
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The cards perform parabatic, anacoluthic irony, as theme and tone is 
infinitely interrupted. Philosophical reflections on the nature of inheritance are 
interrupted by images of Plato as a tram conductor, of Socrates as a croupier. 
Theories of dissemination are disrupted by speculations on sending sperm via the 
post card (E 24), discussions of maieutics by conjectures that “Socrates is having 
his period” (E 133). As the author writes: “His friend had told me one day (or 
wasn‟t it you?) that a given, apparently rigorously theoretical text was written 
such that it gave him an erection whenever he read it” (E 175). The academic is 
intermingled with the sexual, and so the postal principle becomes the pleasure 
principle. The cards are an anacoluthic apostrophe – “Thus I apostrophise. This 
too is a genre one can afford oneself, the apostrophe. A genre and a tone” (E 4). 
The apostrophe, the direct address, is both interruption – the sequence is 
interrupted as the speaker or writer turns to directly address someone – and is 
interrupted – direct address from one to another is impossible.56 In keeping with 
the confused monologue/dialogue of the post cards, apostrophe becomes an 
address to the self, and even then it is indirect and interrupted (by the selves). A 
mark used to denote absence – don‟t – and possession – Derrida‟s – the 
apostrophe turns in on itself, its address, presence and absence a permanent 
parabasis. It, like the hyphen, is a mark of addition and subtraction, a time 
difference or delay within the postal network.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 In “Telepathy” the author turns to the reader in an apostrophe, asking her to speak, to interrupt 
as a comma: “Tell me, the truth, my little comma [dis-moi, la verité, ma petite virgule]” (T 246). 
As Naas writes, in the telepathetic, and yet wholly interrupted exchanges that occur/are 
investigated,  
 
“Telepathy” now means not the correspondence between an interior psychic event and an 
external “reality” but the welling up of both that event and that reality from a wholly 
other source – from the wholly other within: an other that could even go by the name “the 
unconscious”. (Taking 85) 
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Fragments of Irony: Schlegel, Blanchot and Aphorisms 
Introduction 
  
As de Man wrote, “if you are interested in the problem and the theory of irony, 
you have to take it in the German tradition” (AI 167). This chapter turns to the 
writer credited for re-instating a philosophical irony – Friedrich Schlegel. “No 
idea is isolated”, wrote Schlegel, “but is what it is only in combination with all 
other ideas” (I 95) – his is a theory and performance of radical fragmentation, 
hyphenation and progression. For Schlegel works must be produced “as a great 
hyperbaton
1
, anacoluthon, hysteron proteron
2” (FI 989), that is, containing and 
performing an irony of interruption and conjunction that is not an aesthetic 
reflection on the limitations of the self, but a project of progression, poiesis, and 
Bildung: “Bildung is antithetical synthesis and perfection to the point of irony” 
(PF 637). 
 “The Athenaeum is our birthplace”,3 boldly state Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy. While Derrida very rarely (directly) addresses this place of birth, this 
heritage is inescapable, as German romanticism is not simply “a contradictory 
entity, but … a phenomenon that has to a great extent shaped our attempt to grasp 
it”.4 We (re)receive romanticism having already received it; Derrida, despite his 
claims not to have read Schlegel, has already read it, and his engagement with 
with “the infinite powers of fiction, of poetry, and of irony” (P 166) is strongly 
indebted to and engaged with the fragmentary writings of Friedrich Schlegel.
5
  We 
thus use Blanchot to hyphenate the ironies of Derrida and Schlegel.  
The connections between Blanchot and Schlegel are long established. 
Gerald Bruns writes that “It looks as if Jena Romanticism were the tradition in 
which Blanchot would seem most likely to situate himself, and so, in a sense, it is, 
                                                 
1
 A figure of speech in which logical word order is interrupted or inverted for emphasis or effect.  
2
 A figure of speech in which word order is inverted, and what should come last comes first: shoes 
and socks. In logical terms the petitio principii, the logical fallacy in which the principle to be 
proven is already assumed in the premise, is also sometimes referred to as a hysteron proteron.  
3
 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. Philip Bernard and 
Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988) 8. 
4
 Marc Redfield, “Romanticism, Bildung, and the „Literary Absolute‟”, Lessons of Romanticism: A 
Critical Companion, ed. Robert F. Gleckner and Thomas Pfau (Durham N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1998) 41-42. 
5
 See “Istrice 2: Ick bünn all hier” in Points. 
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since it is the tradition of the fragment or of plural speech”.6 Leslie Hill sees in 
Blanchot and Schlegel a common interest in authorial anonymity, symphilosophy, 
revolution, self-reflexivity, fragmentation, the reworking of the 
literature/philosophy relationship and theory as fiction and commentary.
7
 Seeking 
a plural speech of dissymmetry and irreversibility, a mode of writing such that 
“the continuity of the movement of writing might let interruption as meaning, and 
rupture as form, intervene fundamentally” (IC 8), Blanchot turned to the 
fragmentary, over which we cross from romanticism to deconstruction. From 
Schlegel to Derrida we turn from transcendence to transgression, the subject-
(non)work to alterity-text, the incomprehensible to the impossible, the literary 
absolute to the absolute nonabsolute, and from Schlegel‟s novels – the “Socratic 
dialogues of our time” (L 26), to fragmentary, interrupted post cards – the 
“becoming-prose of our Socratic novel” (E 173). We conclude with a reading of 
“Che cos‟è la poesia?” (1988); the poematic, the fragments of the “by heart” and 
ironic citation. 
 
 
The German Romantic Subject-(non)Work 
 
According to Schlegel, in the beginning was absolute nothingness (PF 592), 
followed by the chaos and incomprehensibility from which reality is constructed 
(OI 305).
8
 However, in attempting to comprehend the chaos of the infinite through 
system and reason, humanity distances itself from it. It is only by anacoluthically 
hyphenating system and non-system, reason and chaos, the playful and the earnest, 
the objective and the subjective through a poiesis or production that is poetry and 
philosophy, intention and instinct, real and ideal that the finite individual can 
(endlessly) transcend her limitations and step towards the unattainable infinite. 
German romantic art did not simply aim to represent chaos, but be the becoming 
of chaos. That, wrote Schlegel, is the work‟s “real essence: that it should forever 
be becoming and never be perfected” (A 116). The romantic work was “a 
progressive, universal poetry [that] tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and 
                                                 
6
 Gerald L. Bruns, Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997) 149.  
7
 Leslie Hill, “A Fragmentary Demand”, The Power of Contestation: Perspectives on Maurice 
Blanchot, ed. Kevin Hart and Geoffrey H. Hartman (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 2004) 105-06. 
8
 That is, that which appears chaotic to the human senses. Following Schlegel‟s conversion to 
Catholicism, “chaos” was either rewritten as the divine, or used to represent it. 
P a g e  | 132 
 
prose, inspiration and criticism” (A 116).9 It was “capable of the highest and most 
variegated refinement” as, “on the wings of poetic reflection”, it could “raise that 
reflection again and again to a higher power … multiply it in an endless 
succession of mirrors” (A 116).  
The romantic work was what Derrida termed a poetico-literary 
performativity or contaminated performative/constative, a work that 
describes/critiques itself as it presents itself, that is always, in “artist reflection and 
beautiful self-mirroring … simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry” (A 
238). Schlegel repeatedly emphasised the need for reflexivity between content and 
form, writing that “Poetry can only be criticised by way of poetry. A critical 
judgement of an artistic production has no civil rights in the realm of art if it isn‟t 
itself a work of art” (L 117). In performing what it describes and reflecting on 
itself, the romantic, ironic work was not simply a production, but a theory of 
production, a reflexive autoproduction or autopoiesis. Which, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy establish, is the absolute of literature – the literary absolute. However, 
the reflexivity or self-consciousness of the romantic work operates through a 
concave lens – it does not tend towards a single point, but diverges out in ironic 
excess. 
As autopoiesis, the romantic work was not simply a becoming of itself, but 
the becoming of the author: an autobiography
10 , “quintessence” (DP 103) or 
“encyclopaedia” (L 78) of the subject. In a burst of inspiration, instinct and 
intention the author produces the work, and in that act produces herself; the work 
is thus both the “portrayed” and the “portrayer” (A 116), the “producer” and the 
“product” (A 238). The work (re)presents the author at the moment of creation; 
once the work has been written and is capable of being analysed, the self that 
created it is no more. The finitude of the subject has been destroyed; the subject is 
                                                 
9
 The term “work” in Schlegel, like most of his terms, doesn‟t have a fixed or static meaning. 
While the work is defined as that which is in a state of (unsystematic) becoming, Schlegel also 
wrote that “System is not so much a method of form as the essence of the work itself” (FI 931). 
The work is systematic and non-systematic, closed and open. The work is not restricted to a 
particular genre: the novel, the poem and the fragment are not rigorously separated in Schlegel‟s 
texts. Thus Schlegel writes that the “keystone” of a “real aesthetic theory of poetry” would be “a 
philosophy of the novel” (A 252). Fragment 116 moves between the poem and the novel, 
Shakespeare is a poet (A 253), all prose is really poetic (LN 608) and “The entire book is a 
struggle of prose and poetry, where prose is trodden underfoot and poetry breaks its own neck” (A 
418). 
10
 Interestingly, when Schlegel describes dramatic irony in “On Incomprehensibility” he defines in 
terms of autobiography – “when an author has written three acts, then unexpectedly turns into 
another man and now has to write the last two acts” (OI 304). 
P a g e  | 133 
 
now a work which is always in excess of itself, and therefore infinite. However, in 
opening herself up to this infinity, the subject also loses herself in the 
symphilosophy
11
 and the infinite complexities and ironies of language. As 
Schlegel writes, “words often understand themselves better than do those who use 
them” (OI 298): the subject becomes interrupted by the potentiality of language. 
The subject thereby becomes open to the ironic, hyphenated connections of 
language and society; “freely relinquish[ing] first one and then another part of 
one‟s being”, operating as “a plurality of minds and a whole system of persons” 
(A 121). Thus the act of self-creation is an act of self-destruction, and the subject 
can now reflect, transcend herself, and progress to a new level of understanding. 
Which spurs on a new act of creation, and the process continues. 
 “Only a system is really a work. Every other essay cannot close, only 
break off or cut off; it ends always necessarily annihilatingly or ironisingly” (FI 
893). If a work implies closure, it is not surprising that romanticism is renowned 
for its absence of (completed) works; Blanchot describes romanticism as creating 
“the work of the absence of (the) work” (IC 353), where writing and literature in 
its quest to be undoes itself. The essence of the romantic work is that “it is always 
only coming into being, and can never be completed” (A 116); as such it is a work 
that can never be a work, and is rather an interrupted, parabatic (non)work. 
Critchley describes romanticism as “unworked”, though he sees this failure not as 
“a proof of weakness, but … as a sign of strength”.12  The romantic work is 
described by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy as the “subject-work”, “the becoming-
artist of the work or absolute auto-production itself: man as a work of art creating 
itself, art henceforth identified with the being-artist”.13 While Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy‟s term subject-work is an excellent expression of the romantic product, 
its fault lies in just that – it over-emphasises the product. The rather ugly term 
subject-(non)work is more appropriate, as it indicates both the absence of 
completion and the process. 
 
                                                 
11
 Symphilosophy, the working together and union of minds, is of necessity an engagement that is 
oppositional and fraught, as without confrontation and a rigorous questioning of ideas nothing will 
be learnt: “Philosophers who aren‟t opposed to each other are usually joined only by sympathy, 
not by symphilosophy” (A 112). As part of the symphilosophy the subject is individual and of a 
multiplicity. Gary Handwerk sees symphilosophy as the defining, ethical feature of Schlegelian 
irony (Irony and Ethics in Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) 18-90). 
12
 Simon Critchley, Very Little … Almost Nothing (London: Routledge, 1997) 97. 
13
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 77. 
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Schlegel and Irony 
 
“Irony,” wrote Schlegel, “is the clear consciousness of eternal agility, of an 
infinitely teeming chaos” (I 69). Irony is that which enables the mind, petrified by 
the (Platonic) system of order and contexts, to step up to the connections and 
transgressions of language and life, and create a life/art which steps towards the 
infinite. “Irony,” furthermore, “is the form of a paradox. Paradox is everything 
simultaneously good and great (L 48). Paradox lies between extremes, between 
the vast gulf of the (human, debased) good and the (divine, transcendent) great, 
but also plays on and within the extremes themselves, in the hairbreadth between 
what is good and what is great. Irony is thus a paradoxical irony that does not 
allow paradox to rest. It is that which parabatically undercuts and undermines 
itself, a permanent anacoluthon. 
Socratic irony was for Schlegel the classical basis for a progressive 
romanticism, and was not (simply) a rhetorical irony, but an irony of the “sublime 
urbanity of the Socratic muse” (L 42). Socratic irony is a poetic irony, a “truly 
transcendental buffoonery” (L 42) that pervades all and raises it up to the heights 
of philosophy through parody and play. Lamenting the fact that to his 
contemporaries irony was no more than sarcasm, Schlegel described Socratic or 
Platonic irony as a “scientific irony of exploratory thoughts and the highest 
cognition … a consciousness and thinking that has attained harmony and become 
aware of the secret contradictions even in its innermost striving for the highest 
goal” (ZW 352). Philosophy as practised by Socrates was deeply ironic: 
“Philosophy is the real homeland of irony, which one would like to define as 
logical beauty; for wherever philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues – and 
is not simply confined into rigid systems – there irony should be asked for and 
provided” (L 42). But while Socratic irony is elenctic inquiry and transcendental 
questioning, it is also  
 
nothing more than the astonishment of the thinking spirit about itself, 
which so often dissolves in a gentle smile; and again this smile of the spirit, 
which is although a deep lying sense, conceals and encloses an other, 
higher meaning of sublime seriousness under the carefree surface. (ZW 
353) 
 
Socratic irony was playful and yet deeply earnest, hiding deep engagement behind 
a carefree smile. Socrates‟ irony lay in the unattainability of his position – there 
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was always something concealed about him, and as such he physically 
exemplified ironic communication, an “involuntary and yet completely deliberate 
dissimulation” (L 108).14 It is always in excess of itself, always performing its 
own parody, a hyphenation of intention and instinct. As that which is both 
automatic and deliberate it causes the speaker to receive her own words, to listen 
to what language says beyond her control or intention. Hence irony is the 
“impossibility and the necessity of complete communication” (L 108). It is the 
“continuous self-parody” (L 108) of the author, the work and language, 
anacoluthically synthesising the self with the self to reveal incompletions and 
inadequacies. An “alternating parody, parody to a higher power” (FI 517), irony is 
the parody of parody. 
For Schlegel irony is non-propositional; it can never be explained in direct 
statements but must be instinctively grasped. Those who have no feeling for irony, 
writes Schlegel, will endlessly alternate between its poles, inverting meaning as 
they “fluctuate endlessly between belief and disbelief until they get dizzy and take 
what is meant as a joke seriously and what is meant seriously as a joke” (L 108). 
Georgia Albert notes here a contradiction: while Schlegel condemns those who try 
to understand irony through inversion as “harmonious bores”, he then goes on to 
describe them as taking “what is meant as a joke seriously, and what is meant 
seriously as a joke”. This implies that there is in fact a right and a wrong way to 
take irony. Albert opines that there is a certain inescapability to the state of 
harmonious boredom, and that irony will always involve some vertigo. Albert 
summarises Schlegel‟s position as: “there is a right and a wrong way to read irony: 
the wrong way is to think that there is a right and wrong way”.15 But, as Albert 
notes, every way of reading irony that involves definitions is the wrong way; one 
can only define and not define.  
For Schlegel “Irony is a permanent parabasis” (PF 668).16 Parabasis is that 
which raises the work and the subject to a higher power – “Parabasis and choir 
[are] necessary (as intensification) in every novel” (FII 1682). Every system, 
                                                 
14
 And yet irony, according to Schlegel, plays no part in deception; it deceives only those who 
consider it a hidden, duplicitous tool to be wielded, and tricks only those who think of it as direct 
or simple inversion. Irony has an ethical force; it is not rhetorical but philosophical, committed to 
enquiry and pedagogy. Dialogic philosophy as practised by Socrates – and Plato – was ironic 
philosophy, a philosophy open to becoming, and for Schlegel irony was central to education and 
development. 
15
 Georgia Albert, “Understanding Irony: Three Essais on Friedrich Schlegel” MLN 108.5 (1993) 
832. 
16
 See chapter two for more on parabasis. 
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writes Schlegel, should have a prologue, an epilogue, and be centred around an 
interruption, a digression, a parabasis (FI 933). The parabasis – in the romantic 
work not a separate section but a permanent movement within (FI 395) – was in 
Greek comedy a moment of theoretical reflection on the play, the author and the 
context. As a permanent parabasis, irony was then a performance of theory and 
work that characterise the ideal Romantic work. The step of parabasis is a 
movement of excess that interrupts the work and disallows correlation with a 
finite focus. It is the potency or intensification of the novel, the work as work and 
theory, the work of the work, and hence a reflection on and of the work.  
Werner Hamacher describes the step of parabasis – he follows Schlegel 
and terms it parekbase – as the non-reflective condition of reflection; that which 
allows reflection while interrupting it: 
 
on the one hand, the reflection must step back from what is reflected – and 
indeed necessarily step back by means of the eccentric step of parekbasis – 
in order to be able to move in the medium of intuition, representation, or 
thought towards what is reflected. On the other hand, parekbasis brings to 
nought every representation and undoes the self-securing of the subject by 
“completely interrupting and cancelling” every relation in the act of 
positing. Poetic parekbasis constitutes an uncontrollable, dramatic-
grammatical trope whose exorbitant movement displaces the framework 
for every epistemological paradigm of reflective representation.
17
  
 
Parabasis – irony – does not cancel self-reflection, as it provides the step back 
from the subject to allow it to reflect, yet in stepping back it interrupts the self-
reflection and self-positing of the subject. As a “complete interruption and 
suspension” (CG 88) of both itself and the work‟s content it becomes the “highest 
antiform” (FI 395) on which no reflection can be imposed, a chasm in the work 
that reflection cannot (quite) penetrate. Like writing, ironic parabasis is the anti-
form or anti-tain of the mirror that does not (simply) show the subject, but the 
absolute, the infinite, that which has been there long before the self-positing (of 
the) subject. It is the disruption that is both the space of reflection and the absolute 
cancellation of that reflection, the stepping away from reflection that allows 
reflection to be.  
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy see Socrates as the subject, or Subject, of 
irony. He is, for them, “the locus of the very exchange that, as both a figure and a 
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 Hamacher 249. 
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work, defines irony (or „logical beauty‟ …), which is the exchange of form and 
truth or, and this is strictly identical, of poetry and philosophy”.18 This means that 
Socrates is not merely subject, but subject-genre, through whom “literature is 
inaugurated (and inaugurates itself, with all the force of the reflexive, since irony 
is also precisely this: the very power of reflection or infinite reflexivity – the other 
name of speculation)”.19 Speculation, or theorisation, is for Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy a reflexivity that is productive of a subject. In the case of the reflexivity of 
irony, they argue, we are confronted with an infinite reflexivity or productive 
speculation that posits a self-positing subject. However, Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy fail to note that the productive reflexivity of irony does not produce an I=I, 
but an I=I+excess, a self-positing that posits more than the self. Irony is a 
perverformative reflexivity that produces but is always anacoluthically interrupted 
and catachrestically askew. The subject is always in a metonymic or fragmentary 
relation to itself, only ever a part of itself. 
 According to Fichte, I=I performs unconditioned, pure positing, in which 
the subject creates itself in the act of speaking about itself. “I am” is an expression 
of action and of the deed done, the I is actor and product of the action. Hamacher 
proposes that this formula can be broken down into the performative act of the 
positing I, and the constative statement of the posited I that reflects on the 
performance. The performative and the constative dimensions are joined by the 
copula – is – which performs the transition from positing to posited. But in the 
break – the hyphenation – of the copula a delay is introduced, so that there is a 
difference in the Is, and the subject, which for Fichte is immediately posited and 
positing without difference or delay, is in fact separated or fragmented by what 
Hamacher calls a leap. This leap – the step of parabasis – “impedes every 
immediate unity of the I with its reflection and … makes it possible for this unity 
to appear at best as an infinite project”.20 It is on this leap that Schlegel based his 
notion of a progressive, universal poetry. 
 By wanting to say itself, the subject says itself as an always already 
objectified subject, and thus says neither itself nor Being. It says nothing, and 
exceeds itself in saying this. The subject asserts itself from the position of already 
positing itself, and thus as something it is not. In other words, it does not posit 
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 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 86. 
19
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 86. 
20
 Hamacher 233. 
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itself. It is the “already” of its being, and so I=I is “I will have become”. It 
parasites itself, and is its own parabasis. “I is only the fiction of its existence”21 
and thus a parabatic, interrupted subject, more and less than itself, stems not from 
a pure performative to a pure constative, but an interrupted, parabatic 
performative/constative. 
Schlegel‟s essay “On Incomprehensibility” (1801) is a performance of the 
impossibility of restricting irony to a rhetorical trope contained within isolated 
passages of a text. One can let “irony go to the winds” (OI 301) and realise that 
this simply causes it to spread, or “declare [one‟s intentions] point-blank” (OI 301) 
and have them step awry: irony is unavoidable. Ostensibly attempting to 
comprehensibly discuss the impossibility of comprehension, and to address, 
without irony, the concept of a pervasive irony, “On Incomprehensibility” is an 
engagement with the dizzying flux and alternation of irony. Schlegel argues both 
for and against incomprehension, stating that he absolutely detests it (OI 297) and 
that he wishes to create a new reader who will understand his work. And yet he 
also insists that everything depends on an impenetrable excess: 
 
even man‟s most precious possession, his own inner happiness, depends in 
the last analysis … on some such point of strength that must be left in the 
dark, but that nonetheless shores up and supports the whole burden and 
would crumble the moment one subjected it to rational analysis. Verily, it 
would fare badly with you if … the whole world were ever to become 
wholly comprehensible in earnest. (OI 305) 
 
While Schlegel states that this dark point of strength would crumble if subjected 
to rational analysis, this does not imply that one should not question or investigate, 
nor that the incomprehensible is so easily annihilated. Rather that it is in excess of 
analysis, strong in its weak crumbling; it will collapse and spread and thereby 
stand firm. It is this insistence on the inevitability and necessity of the 
incomprehensible that leads Ronell to describe the Athenäum as “unassimilable, 
incomparable, dissociated. … It cannot be grasped by philosophy or literature, by 
a history that counts on reference or accounts for itself with relative narrative 
tranquillity”.22 
 The author‟s text exists – perhaps – only once, at the point of writing (the 
subject-(non)work); after that it is open to the excess of the act of reading, and 
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 Hamacher 238. 
22
 Ronell 160. 
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becomes a text anacoluthically and infinitely interrupted by possible 
interpretations. As potential readings propagate, so too do modes of irony, until 
we are left with the irony of irony, an irony that is an excessive, infinitely mutable 
force of indeterminacy. Or, put simply, “something that happens in more ways 
than one” (OI 304). This irony is the irony that the author cannot control, and that 
occurs 
    
if one speaks of irony without using it, as I have just done; if one speaks of 
irony ironically without in the process being aware of having fallen into a 
far more noticeable irony; if one can‟t disentangle oneself from irony 
anymore, as seems to be happening in this essay on incomprehensibility; if 
irony turns into a mannerism and becomes, as it were, ironical about the 
author; if one has promised to be ironical about some useless book without 
first having checked one‟s supply and then having to produce it against 
one‟s will, like an actor full of aches and pains; and if irony runs wild and 
cannot be controlled any longer. (OI 304) 
 
Irony pervades – she who is aware of irony will find it everywhere in excess. 
Should we manage to “swallow up all these big and little ironies” (OI 304) the 
solution will be short lived and a “new generation of little ironies” (OI 304) will 
arise. Irony is never static; it is uncontrollable, and while being play is nonetheless 
something “one simply can‟t play games with” (OI 304). The irony of irony, the 
ironic idea of irony, an irony of absolute perfection, is an irony of infinite 
mutability, a constant turning and interruption. 
 
Irony and Antithetical Extremes 
 
“Join the extremes”, wrote Schlegel, “and you will find the true middle” (I 74). 
For Schlegel most thoughts were incomplete, no more than the “profiles of 
thoughts” which “have to be turned around and synthesised with their antipodes” 
(A 39). But the truth of the “true middle” is incomprehensible and incomplete; it 
is always a few steps ahead, always requiring a new connection, a new unification 
of a new pair of opposites. The process of infinite hyphenation is none other than 
irony – “the analysis of the thesis and antithesis” (FI 802). Irony is the movement 
between endlessly adapting extremes such that an “idea is a concept perfected to 
the point of irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute antithesis, the continual self-
creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts” (A 121). The ideal is marked by 
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an internal interruption that changes a perfect, absolute Idea into a hyphen or 
fragment, always incomplete and awaiting a further connection.  
“Irony is regulated alternation; it is more than mere oscillation” (PF 592). 
Irony is not an infinite, static oscillation but an alternation of incomplete 
syntheses. That is, while irony does synthesise, each point of synthesis is marked 
by the absolute incompletion of thesis and antithesis, as each term is a hyphen 
linked to and interrupted by every other term. Hence, while Critchley, for example, 
is correct in reading the ironic movement as a dialectics without reconciliation, 
“not completed in any intuition or in any coincidence of thought and the object of 
thought, i.e. the Concept”, the movement is not, or not simply, a “quasi-dialectical” 
or “interminable oscillation devoted to the indissoluble conflict of the absolute 
and the relative”. 23  The conflict between the absolute and the relative is 
indissoluble because of their a priori complicity – the absolute contains within it 
the chaos of hyphenated connections. One synthesises and does not synthesise, as 
each point is infinitely linked to every other point. There is not so much a lack of a 
synthesis, as a lack within the synthesis.
24
 The hyphenation and paratactical 
functioning of irony means that each moment of synthesis is never closed. The 
antithetical poles of Schlegel‟s opposites are already the pharmakon, already 
conjoined – and interrupted – but made to appear separate and distinct by a form 
of context-related reading. Thus the post cards get passed from Socrates to 
Schlegel. 
For Schlegel the alternating movement of irony “unifies all, always 
destroys itself, always posits itself again” (FI 208). The work, and the subject, is 
infinitely perfectible, striving beyond itself, (re)creating itself and then destroying 
itself. Romanticism was committed to self-destruction – “That which doesn‟t 
                                                 
23
 Critchley, Very Little 115. 
24
 The problem of synthesis in Schlegel is contested. De Man argues that the “dialectic of the self-
destruction and self-invention … is an endless process that leads to no synthesis. … irony 
engenders a temporal sequence of acts of consciousness which is endless” (BI 207). Peter Szondi 
states that “Schlegel prepared the way for the Hegelian dialectic” (On Textual Understanding and 
Other Essays, trans. Harvey Mendolsohn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 57) 
and “In the interplay between self-creation and self-destruction there occurs that „hovering‟ 
which … is the anticipation of a synthesis” (66). For him Schlegel‟s obsession with unity and 
contamination is the drive for synthesis. Manfred Frank refers to the process as a “negative 
dialectic” (The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millán-
Zaibert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004) 214). Somewhat earlier Kierkegaard 
argued that the Hegelian dialectic incorporates the negative and achieves unity and progressive 
movement, while ironic questioning aims to “suck out the apparent content with a question and 
leave only an emptiness remaining” (Kierkegaard 73). Irony for Kierkegaard never achieves 
Aufhebung; it does not unify opposites but moves between them. 
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annihilate itself, has no worth” (FI 226) – but this self-destruction was 
accompanied by self-creation, by a positing different and anew. Many theorists 
have linked irony to self-restriction and the negative, antithetical position of a 
dialectic, as a response to Critical Fragment 28: “Feeling … is divided spirit, is 
self-restriction: hence a result of self-creation and self-destruction”. However, 
positing irony simply as self-restriction ignores the fact that Schlegel also 
described irony as “the mood that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all 
limitation, even above its own art, virtue, or genius” (L 42).25  
Anne K. Mellor understands irony as “the counterforce to love and 
creative imagination”.26 Irony is “a sceptical negation, with a „critical examination‟ 
and rejection of existing beliefs and errors”,27 the opposite of creative, romantic 
abandon: 
 
the authentic romantic ironist is as filled with enthusiasm as with 
scepticism. He is as much a romantic as an ironist. Having ironically 
acknowledged the fictiveness of his own patternings of human experience, 
he romantically engages in the creative process of life by eagerly 
constructing new forms, new myths.
28
 
 
The distinction created by Mellor between romanticism and irony falsely 
presumes that romanticism and irony are separate categories. In fact, even though 
Mellor opposes irony to “love and creative imagination”, in a later essay Schlegel 
states that “True irony … is the irony of love” (ZW 357). And while irony is 
related to scepticism – “Irony is the highest, purest σκέψις [skepsis]” (PFZ 1023), 
scepticism is not negation: “Scepticism is the condition of hovering reflection” 
(PFZ 955).
29
  
                                                 
25
 Self-limitation is a movement affirming self-identity and the ability to control oneself, that is not 
“unlimited free will” (CF 37). Essentially all that Schlegel is proposing in this fragment is 
academic or artistic distance, whereby the author waits until she is no longer in the process of 
discovery and inspiration to present a measured view of something. This aesthetic standard has 
been overlooked by critics, who rushed to view irony as that which ties or limits one to the self. 
Frank argues that “Precisely this surpassing of all self-imposed limits is what Schlegel calls irony” 
(Frank 216). 
26
 Anne K. Mellor, English Romantic Irony (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980) 11. 
27
 Mellor 11. 
28
 Mellor 5. 
29
 Mellor‟s misreading of irony is compounded by a misreading of deconstruction: “modern 
deconstructionists choose to perform only one half of the romantic-ironic operation, that of 
sceptical analysis and determination of the limits of human language and consciousness” (5). 
Deconstruction, for Mellor, is a sceptical negation, which means, by her own argument, that 
deconstruction is irony. She argues that irony, allegory and deconstruction are all reflections on the 
subject‟s failure to encompass the world and the infinite. 
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Critchley also sees irony – accurately – as “the sceptical dissolution of the 
markers of certitude by which we attempt to understand the world and others 
within the world”.30 The problem lies in the positing of this sceptical engagement 
as a strict oppositional position. Irony, for Critchley, “is the counter-concept to 
wit. If wit is synthetic, the chemical mixing of disparate elements, then irony is 
diaeretic, the separation or division of those elements. This diaeresis establishes 
an irreconcilable conflict between separated elements”. 31 While Critchley 
acknowledges the interdependence of wit and irony, it is only as separate and 
opposing poles, part of “a ceaseless alternation between self-creation and self-
destruction”32 that never connects. Irony is a conflict between opposites,33 but a 
conflict that contaminates and conjoins – Critchley ignores the hyphenation. Wit 
is not, as he argues, simply synthesis: a “witty idea is a disintegration of spiritual 
substances which, before being suddenly separated, must have been thoroughly 
mixed” (L 34), while irony “is the synthesis of reflection and fantasy, of harmony 
and enthusiasm” (IP 1271). Irony is “philosophical wit” (FII 2172) – without 
enthusiasm it is a flat, empty form (FI 1047). Wit and irony posit the same 
movement of contaminated interruption, a conjunction that is a paratactic 
disjunction.
34
 Irony is thus a relation rather than a determinate content, and a 
negation only insofar as it complicates identities and ideals.
35
 Its movement shows 
that those we thought to be independent and totalised are contaminated, partial 
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 Critchley Very Little 114. 
31
 Critchley Very Little 114. 
32
 Critchley Very Little 115. 
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 Wilde posits an interesting movement between antithetical poles for irony without recourse to 
Schlegel. He argues that irony always generates its opposite, producing “as a response to its vision 
of disparity … a complementary, more conceptual vision of wholeness or singleness, which I want 
to refer to as the anironic” (30). The ironic and the anironic themselves come together to form a 
radical, absolute irony which embraces the extremes of chaos and unity. The antithesis or 
anironical pole to absolute irony is then, for Wilde, “more narrowly and perhaps exclusively 
channelled into an exclusive identification with art” (32). Wilde is fundamentally arguing for a 
sublation turned sublimation, a unification of (self-generating) opposites in the form of the 
complete harmony of art: “Art is, finally, the exiled artist‟s home, in which, remaining true to his 
perceptions, he is yet able – or so it seems – to bring consciousness to rest” (33). 
34
 This is not to completely dissolve the differences between wit and irony, but to show that 
positing uncontaminated poles ignores the polyvalence of irony. Wit is predominantly the ability 
to recognise similarities, but also differences. 
35
 A system suppresses and restricts the ironic movement of alternation: “In chaos + and – 
alternate, in a system both are fused” (IP 1520). Hence, if one wished to posit an opposite to irony, 
it is tempting to select stasis or the system, as Schlegel writes that “Every non-systematic form can 
be ironic” (FI 895). However, as with all the other dialectical pairings proposed by Schlegel, their 
a priori complicity and contamination cannot be ignored. Socrates is described as having lived 
systematically (FI 945), while the romantic novel, the permanent becoming, is “absolute system” 
(FII 1683). As Schlegel famously pronounced, “It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system 
and to have none. It will simply have to decide to combine the two” (A 53). 
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and contradictory. As Schlegel writes, irony is, as it were, “the επιδειζιρ [epideixis] 
of infinity, the universal, of the sense for the whole world” (PF 76). Epideixis was 
a praise-by-blame speech designed to showcase the orator‟s skill, and as such it 
emphasised not only the disjunction of the content of the speech, but also the 
orator‟s abilities. Irony, as epideixis, showcases form, the form of interruption. 
Irony “reveals to the poet that his truth – from the point of view of the infinite – is 
his own limitation, or in other words, his finitude”.36  But this finitude is not 
simply or statically negative, it is the infinite movement of becoming 
poet/philosopher: “One can only become a philosopher, not be one. As soon as 
one thinks one is a philosopher, one stops becoming one” (A 54). 
 
Schlegel’s Fragments  
 
Romanticism sought the absolute of literature, a poiesie that transcended divisions 
of literature and philosophy, a self-theorising work that encompassed all genres. 
In encompassing all genres the work becomes an act of production – poiesis – to 
the extent that it would be, rather than represent, or as Blanchot wrote, that it 
would 
 
be everything, but without content or a content that is almost indifferent, 
and thus at the same time affirming the absolute and the fragmentary; 
affirming totality, but in a form that, being all forms – that is, at the limit, 
being none at all – does not realise the whole, but signifies it by 
suspending it, even breaking it. (IC 353) 
 
The agenre that effectively destroys all notions of genre while simultaneously 
being a theory on genericity should comply with the permanent becoming of the 
romantic idea, reveal the (in)dependence of the individual, embrace the 
contradictory and disclose the work of art as the production and expression of this 
subjective/objective consciousness. This radical form was the fragment, “the 
romantic genre par excellence”37. For Blanchot the fragment‟s discontinuous form 
is “the sole form befitting romantic irony, since it alone can make coincide 
discourse and silence, the playful and the serious … the mind‟s obligation to be 
systematic and its abhorrence for a system” (IC 358). The fragment is the perfect 
form that is at the same time the failure of form; “a genre that embodies failure 
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 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 40. 
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within itself, whose completion is incompletion, whose structure is essentially 
ambiguous”.38 It is, as Hamacher writes,  
 
precisely the language that is not entirely language, not entirely itself but 
something other than, and different from language itself: a fragment would 
be that in which the face of language passed behind or beyond it; a 
fragment would be the language in which something other than itself – 
nothing, for example – also spoke and, therefore, a language in which at 
least two languages always spoke – a broken language, the break of 
language.
39
  
 
The romantic fragment is not an unfinished work or a section torn from a 
totalised whole, but a deliberate form simultaneously complete and incomplete, 
sovereign while calling to an indeterminate whole. As one of Schlegel‟s most 
quoted fragments states, “a fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be 
entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a 
hedgehog” (A 206). The fragment must be totalised, independent and autonomous. 
Thus each fragment must be its own example, and as a romantic work theorise and 
comment upon itself. Its uniqueness rejects an example other than itself, and it is 
thereby itself and representation of itself, whole and internally fragmented, one 
and divided. It is a form of limits and limitlessness, a form of interruption and 
borders whose margins generate excess: “A work is cultivated when it is 
everywhere sharply delimited, but within those limits limitless and inexhaustible; 
when it is completely faithful to itself, entirely homogeneous, and nonetheless 
exalted above itself” (A 297). 
 The fragment is a thought that is both complete and incomplete, an 
instance of a single thought that exists complete in itself, and simultaneously is 
part of a progression or becoming: “a dialogue is a chain or garland of fragments. 
An exchange of letters is a dialogue on a larger scale, and memoirs constitute a 
system of fragments” (A 77). Thus while each fragment stands alone and extant, it 
still calls into the past and the future, sending itself to what preceded and will 
succeed it. In its divided structure the fragment calls attention to its boundaries, 
making them not a rift in what was a totalised whole, but limits that call to further, 
arbitrary progression. Each fragment is a project, a “fragment of the future” (A 
22), a calling to what comes next and what will, even with each addition, remain 
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indeterminate. Fragments are not themselves incomplete, they are removed from 
all notions of completion. Permanent becomings that call ahead to the unknown, 
they are a sending forward of thought and theory for subsequent and postponed 
resolution, so that “work in progress henceforth becomes the infinite truth of the 
work”40. The fragments form a whole that is not the sum of their parts, and is 
neither greater nor lesser than each individual fragment. They cannot be read 
solely as aphoristic totalised wholes, nor as paragraphs that conjoin to form a 
greater whole, but as a form that is simultaneously both (and neither); that which 
“makes possible new relations that except themselves from unity, just as they 
exceed the whole” (IC 359). Fragments are a writing of discontinuity on which 
continuity is imposed, a force of alternating, ironic energy in which “every whole 
can be a part and every part really a whole” (L 14). 
 The lacunae that separate the fragments serve also to pull them together; 
they become borders that call to an entity beyond the border, that project the 
fragments into the future to infinite irresolution. The lacunae cause the fragments 
to operate on the borders of parataxis and syntaxis: non-conjunctional and 
paratactic, the fragments are autonomous, as separate from a greater whole they 
can neither be said to contradict nor support each other. In the act of reading the 
lacunae are charged, however, to positive and negative signs that create of 
parataxis a random syntax of fragments. In the illusion or supposition of a whole 
thought progresses past the interstices, rendering them conjunctions that create an 
unfixed syntax whose meaning is transient and indeterminate. Within this syntax 
the centre of thought can be fixed on any fragment, and thus the centre is eternally 
shifting, each fragment both its own centre and the possible centre of a illusionary 
whole. Each fragment, isolated and alone, is always joined by an invisible hyphen 
to every other fragment. Both the author and the reader can make the error of 
syntax – imposing a false order on a paratactic system of fragments: “so powerful 
is the instinct for unity in mankind that the author himself will often bring 
something to a kind of completion which simply can‟t be made a whole or a unit; 
often quite imaginatively and yet completely unnaturally” (L 103). Fragments are 
the performance of parabatic, paratactic irony, moments of contradiction and 
alteration that synthesise only through and with a lack – or excess.41 Inheriting 
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 The contradiction between the fragments is also a contradiction between each fragment and the 
absolute: “the fragment, which carries the contradiction of the infinite and the finite in itself … 
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from Plato we too often attempt to impose a false order on what should remain 
paradoxical, forgetting that our systems stem from the suppression and denial of 
contradictions and inconsistencies. Hence Schlegel writes that “Every system 
grows only out of fragments” (FI 494), and “the greatest system is certainly only a 
fragment” (FI 921). 
 The fragment is the result of a flash, a lightning burst of inspiration, that 
“can elicit brilliant sparks and lustrous rays – or smashing thunderbolts” (L 34), 
and which is/represents the thought and experience of the author subject at a 
single instant. As such fragments are an assertion of the individuality and 
subjectivity of the author, preserved at that moment of insight: “All fragments as 
such belong to absolutely individual poiesie” (FI 476). In the act of production 
they simultaneously produce the author, they are her consciousness made into a 
work, and in that act of production move the author beyond herself – destroy her 
older self. This permanent becoming of the author creates a dialogue, “a chain or a 
garland of fragments” (A 77) with herself, which moves the author beyond herself 
and closer to the communal. Thus inasmuch as the fragments assert individual 
subjectivity they also destroy it, moving to the objective and the community. We 
cannot speak of a fragment, but rather of fragments, an unending, non-totalised 
plurality, and in the same way we do not speak of a subject, but subjects, the 
fragments dissolving the ego to create a universal symphilosophy. The fragment is 
an absolute close-up of a subject at a single moment in time, a microscopic 
concentration on a cell of thought to the extent that it reads as an anonymous 
particle, rather than the singular thought of a named and known subject. The 
fragment is thus absolutely individual, and a collective, symphilosophic writing, 
identity through non-identity.  
 Schlegel writes: “as yet no genre exists that is fragmentary both in form 
and in content, simultaneously completely subjective and individual, and 
completely objective and like a necessary part in a system of all the sciences” (A 
77). In a sense then, Schlegel‟s fragments are not fragments, but failed and 
interrupted fragments, the projects of fragments, the becoming of fragmentation. 
They do not exist and are thus non-works, or unworkings. The fragment thus 
performs its own theory, is its own theory and is irreducibly literary. Centred and 
                                                                                                                                     
does not avoid stepping into new contradictions with other fragments, which in fact all share the 
tendency towards the infinite, but on the basis of their individuality provoke new reciprocal 
contradictions” (Frank 213). 
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centreless, singular and plural, unique and highly stylised, it is a highly self-
conscious form that is yet invisible, insubstantial compared to the process that it 
allows to take place. Thus Blanchot names it the “work of the absence of (the) 
work” (IC 353), a formless form that reveals poetic production, “pure 
consciousness of the moment” (IC 353). The romantic fragment was an act of 
pure poiesis, a work whose pure production of the poetic act was superior to the 
product. Contradictory and beyond oppositional form, paratactic and syntactic, 
centred on itself while calling beyond itself, disrupting linear temporality, masked 
and open, subjective and objective, the fragment performs and produces itself and 
the author, destabilising itself and meaning.  
 
The Step Bridge: Blanchot and the Fragmentary 
 
Blanchot‟s texts employ a fragmentary writing of ironic permanent parabasis, the 
“interruption of the incessant” (ED 21) whereby interruption has “the same 
meaning as that which does not cease” (ED 21). As an anacoluthon the work turns 
in and away from itself, disrupting discourse by conversing on that discourse, a 
self-renewing and ceaseless disturbance that fragments the work with 
simultaneous dissymmetric voices. As Leslie Hill writes on The Madness of the 
Day, “Blanchot‟s stumbling narrative leads narrator and reader into an experience 
where each step forward is necessarily a step back”.42  In Blanchot each step 
forward is a step back, but each step is also not at step at all, or a skewed step, a 
step always interrupted. Language is the language of the other, the language that 
no one speaks, “nothing other than an allusion to the initial detour that is borne by 
writing and that carries it away, causing us, as we write, to yield to a sort of 
perpetual turning away” (IC 385).  
For Blanchot the romantic project was a based on failure, on a promise 
contaminated by a perjury. That romanticism was a becoming means that it has 
not come and may never come. At its heart is a non-belonging, or as Blanchot 
puts it, the “non-romantic essence of romanticism” (IC 357). This inclusion of the 
antithetical results in a worklessness, and a speech “whose task is not to say things 
(not to disappear in what it signifies), but to say (itself) in letting (itself) say, yet 
without taking itself as the new object of this language without object” (IC 357). 
The mode of writing that exemplified this internal, ironic otherness was the 
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fragment, although Blanchot deemed the romantics to have misused the fragment; 
for Schlegel “to write fragmentarily is simply to welcome one‟s own disorder, to 
close up upon one‟s own self in a contented isolation” (IC 359). Blanchot argues 
that Schlegel‟s formulation of the fragment is too close to the aphorism, which he 
describes as “the closure of a perfect sentence” (IC 359). Schlegel‟s fragment is to 
be faulted for “having its centre in itself rather than in the field that other 
fragments constitute along with it”, for “neglecting the interval” between the 
fragments, and forgetting that the fragment “makes possible new relations that 
except themselves from unity, just as they exceed the whole” (IC 359). Schlegel, 
argued Blanchot, refused or ignored “the opening that the fragmentary exigency 
represents; an exigency that does not exclude totality, but goes beyond it” 
[emphasis added] (IC 359). 
 For Blanchot the fragment should be neither an independent totality – an 
aphorism – nor part of a greater whole – the fragment in the traditional sense – but 
that which is other to the totality and completion associated with a work. As such 
what interests Blanchot is not the fragment but the fragmentary, that which gives 
form to what this thesis has called ironic parabasis and parataxis. As parabasis the 
fragmentary is a border discourse, “a play of limits in which no limitation plays” 
(SB 44). The fragmentary plays no part in the setting forth of boundaries that 
mark and delimit; it is instead that which “has no external limit – the outside 
toward which it falls is not its edge – and at the same time no internal limitation 
(it is no hedgehog, rolled up and closed on itself)” (ED 46). Fragmentation is 
always of “fragments” (ED 60), and fragments are “unfinished separations” (ED 
58), always insufficient and incomplete. 
In The Infinite Conversation Blanchot precedes fragments with a positive 
and negative power: “±”. The fragments can be given a positive or a negative 
value, used in opposition or support, depending on the reading, so that the 
fragment is always wholly ambiguous, that is, always non-identical.
43
 The act of 
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 Leslie Hill‟s essay “A Fragmentary Demand” lists the other symbols used by Blanchot in his 
fragmentary or dialogic texts, and notes:  
 
Oddly enough, these various icons rarely recur from one text to the next and are for the 
most part specific to the place in which they occur. While they gather together verbal 
material to form a series of textual fragments, identifying them as such, they also mark 
the singular placement of those fragments, which therefore remains irreducibly dispersed. 
And this double movement of gathering together and scattering apart is reflected in the 
given typographical devices, which function as a series of discrete syntactic markers 
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reading takes the parataxis of the fragments, in which they are “destined partly to 
the blank that separates them” (ED 58), partly to each other, and partly to deferral, 
and orders them into a syntax. As Blanchot states, “if to write is to arrange marks 
of singularity (fragments) from which routes can indicate themselves without 
reuniting nor joining the marks …, there is always a risk that reading, instead of 
animating the multiplicity of crossing routes, reconstitutes a new totality from 
them” [emphasis added] (SB 51). Reading imposes order and closure, attempting 
to force the fragmentary to signify something concrete when it “refers to nothing 
and has no proper reference” (SB 49). Fragmentation is a writing of the disaster, a 
language that is estranged from itself and undoes limits and absolutes: “I call 
disaster that which does not have the ultimate for a limit: it bears the ultimate 
away in the disaster” (ED 28). 
 Blanchot‟s fragments are distanced from Schlegel‟s; no subject-work, or 
even subject-(non)work, the fragmentary “dismisses, in principle, the I, the author” 
(ED 61). They do not support a subject, nor (a univocal) meaning, but are 
anarchistic slogans like graffiti; “forms that are impossible to socialise or 
control”.44 Writing, according to Blanchot, “belongs to the fragmentary when all 
has been said” (SB 42), when writing is catastrophic, disastrous, always a 
rewriting or citation. “When all is said, what remains to be said is the disaster. 
Ruin of words, demise writing, faintness faintly murmuring: what remains without 
remains (the fragmentary)” (ED 33).45 Hence what Blanchot calls grand irony, 
which is not Socratic irony, not a feigned ignorance, but “saturation by 
impropriety (when nothing whatsoever suits anymore), the grand dissimulation 
where all is said, all is said again and finally silenced” (ED 45). Irony for 
Blanchot is “the power that is dissolution‟s” (ED 45), the saying of everything 
that says nothing, that shows it impossible to say everything. Thus writing and 
irony are always disappointing: “it is impossible to lay claim to either; both 
exclude all mastery” (ED 35). 
                                                                                                                                     
implying crossing (and crossing out), astral (i.e., dis-astral or dis-astrous) dispersion, 
neutrality, and violent inscription or incision. (116)
 
The typographical markers themselves perform the irony that reworks and unworks meanings 
within the fragments.  
44
 Philip Beitchman “The Fragmentary Word” SubStance 12.2 (1983) 76. 
45
 This is very close to Schlegel‟s fragment: “„Nothing is yet said.‟ – <Tout est dit >” (FI 180). See 
Hamacher‟s essay, quoted above, for an exposition of this fragment.  
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In Blanchot‟s “The Wooden Bridge”, an analysis of Kafka‟s The Castle, 
there is a parabasis in the fragmentary relation between works, between the work 
as work and the work as discourse on the work. Each work is a self-exegesis 
which infinitely repeats itself (IC 390), as the work, lacking a beginning, can 
never end, and so commentary translates the work‟s ambiguity with an even more 
ambiguous exegesis. Blanchot sees the essential aspect of The Castle, K.‟s 
traversing of the village in an attempt to reach the elusive stronghold, as a 
movement from exegesis to exegesis, from fragment to fragment. The castle 
becomes “a truth that seems always to say of itself more than anything one could 
say about it” (IC 394), while also being infinitely less, and the book itself, in 
being both work and self-commentary becomes the principle of ambiguity, where 
ambiguity is the “difference of the identical, the non-identity of the same” (IC 
395). The Castle does not consist of a linked chain of events but a series of 
fragmentary exegeses that parabatically interrupt and step across each other, with 
each instance making the centre, the meaning of (the) narrative, as represented by 
the castle, recede further.  
For Blanchot the fragmentary is not a production as it is for Schlegel, but 
an unworking or worklessness. This is not an inversion of poiesis but a self-
fragmenting poiesis; the subject is not involved in an infinite, productive 
becoming but an infinitely occupying unworking: “In me there is someone who 
does nothing but undo this me: infinite occupation” (SB 66). To write then, in the 
fragmentary, is the “work of the absence of work, production that produces 
nothing except (or out of) the absence of a subject, mark that unmarks, infinitive 
in which the infinite would like to play itself out even to the neuter” (SB 55).  
 
Derrida and the Irony of Aphorisms 
 
“The idea of the book”, writes Derrida, “which always refers to a natural totality, 
is profoundly alien to the sense of writing” (OG 18). Hence “We have played the 
post card against literature” (E 9), and turned to the fragment. 46  Derrida‟s 
aphorisms/fragments operate on the border of the system, and perform a false step 
or off beat within the system. They are a “discourse of dissociation” (AC 9) that 
nonetheless reveals an implicit association; an infinite series of finitudes that defy 
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 Because, after all, “is this interruption that condemns one to the aphorism not the condition of 
every conversation?” (ETC 290) 
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laws of continuity and transgression without their contradictory nature causing 
them to undo themselves. While Blanchot‟s fragments are an unworking, 
Derrida‟s can be seen as a hyphenated reworking that infinitely reorder to produce 
the unforeseeable event.
47
 Derrida‟s aphorism/fragment is the name, the title, the 
post card; texts that demonstrate an operation beyond language within language; a 
parabatic, paratatic irony. 
 Derrida‟s texts appear at first glance to strongly differentiate between the 
fragment and the aphorism.
48
 In “Istrice 2: Ich bünn all hier” Derrida states that 
The Literary Absolute clarified the reservations he had always felt regarding the 
fragment and totalisation,
49
 as it pointed to a “certain cult of the fragment and 
especially of the fragmentary work which always calls for an upping of the ante of 
authority and monumental totality” (P 302).50 This sentiment is echoed in Spurs, 
where Derrida writes that the fragment‟s “fracturedness is itself an appeal to some 
totalising complement” (S 125).51 However, despite Derrida‟s reservations, his 
use of the fragment is very close to Schlegel‟s. In “Envois” the author describes 
the post cards which have survived the conflagration as fragments, appearing to 
use the term in a traditional, colloquial way: “Out of these two years, I would 
deliver to them only fragments circled with white” (E 177). 52  And yet the 
existence of a unit pre-existing the act of fragmentation is persistently and 
pointedly in doubt; the fragments are taken from a whole that (arguably) never 
existed. The author insists that letter, that paradigm of the system and of closed 
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 This opposition should not create a strong sense of difference in the result of the modes of 
fragmentation, but note an important difference in verbalisation of the process. 
48
 This is not to imply that Derrida uses either term with much frequency. As Daniel Watt, in 
“Derrida‟s Theatre of Survival: Fragmentation, Death and Legacy” briefly notes: “That Derrida 
rarely addresses fragmentation is an interesting issue, because so many of his texts have 
fragmentary modes, or aspects of the fragmentary form” (in Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy, ed. 
Madeleine Fagan et al, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 194.) 
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 The relation of Schlegel‟s fragment to the totality of the infinite is as an impossible aspiration. 
50
 Watt follows this (mis)reading of Derrida‟s, referring to the “programmatic fragmentation of the 
German Romantics” (194). He draws a clear distinction between the aphorism and the fragment, 
referring to the latter in terms of its “obscure self-referentiality” (195). He proposes that a 
distinction between them lies in the name: “An aphorism is authored, a fragment gestures towards 
the anonymous” (196). Over the course of his article, however, Watt does recuperate the fragment, 
writing that the “movement of fragmentation will be one of chance then, of a connectivity which 
cannot be prescribed, but will be under the sway of a language that continually assumes a 
programmed system of reading” (201). 
51
 Derrida refers to fragments and fragmentation in Spurs as he analyses Nietzsche‟s “I have 
forgotten my umbrella”. In a step away from any associations of totalisation, Derrida refers to this 
sentence as a “nonfragment” (S 127).  
52
 Names and dates are always ash, always unreadable. “The unreadable is readable as unreadable, 
unreadable insofar as readable; here is the madness that burns a date, consuming it from within. 
Here is what renders it ash, here is what renders ash from the first instance” (SQ 40). 
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units, “at the very instant when it takes place ... divides itself, puts itself into 
pieces, falls into a postcard” (E 81). A totalised whole never existed and so we 
“begin” with fragmentation. 
Derrida describes the aphorism as surrounded by borders and boundaries: 
it “separates, it marks dissociation, it terminates, delimits, arrests” (AC 2). It is 
authoritative, it prophesises, speaks the truth and commands. It “must never refer 
to another. It is sufficient unto itself, a world or monad” (AF 24). Like Schlegel‟s 
fragment, the aphorism “gathers everything together” (AF 44) – in including 
everything in itself the aphorism incorporates inside itself everything which it is 
not, it invaginates itself, taking within what (it) is without. In comprising 
everything it is nonetheless incomplete and awaiting a further step: “there is 
always more than one aphorism” (AF 45). The aphorism is thus always in a series, 
hyphenated internally and externally, its absolute isolation an absolute series. It is 
a full stop (AF 25) within ellipsis, a closure becoming interruption, omission, 
openness. Hence both the fragment – “Insaturable context” (BL 107) – and the 
aphorism are metonymies – parts of a whole – that point to the general absence of 
an uncontaminated whole, be it of the thing itself, or that from which it 
supposedly originated.
53
  
The fragmentary movement of Derrida‟s aphorisms is a performance of 
ironic parataxis, an anagrammatical reworking of points within an endless ellipsis. 
The aphorisms are a “theatre of irony”, a mise en abyme or hypertext of term 
within a term within a term such that “Nothing ... is absolutely assured, neither the 
linking nor the order” (AC 9). At times the fragments delve deep into the 
definitions and associations of a term, explicating in one aphorism a term 
employed in the preceding fragment.
54
 At others the link is not made until many 
fragments later, while in others the movement is not a progressive specificity but a 
generalisation.
55
 There is no set, logical progression, just reworking and rereading 
through difference and alterity: “Aphorism: that which hands over every 
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 Should a distinction be insisted on, one could argue that Derrida‟s aphorism is Schlegel‟s 
fragmentary principle radicalised, its transgressive, ironic hyphenation – separation and 
conjunction – emphasised. See Timothy Clark, “Modern Transformations of German Romanticism: 
Blanchot and Derrida on the fragment, the aphorism and the architectural”, Paragraph 15 (1992) 
243. 
54
 For example, in “52 Aphorisms for a Foreword” aphorism 2 contains the word “true”, and so 
truth becomes the focus of aphorism 3, which contains the word “aphorism”, which then becomes 
the primary content of aphorism 4, which employs the term “problem”, which is taken up in 
aphorism 5. 
55
 For example, in aphorism 6 we move to question what a project is in general. 
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rendezvous to chance” (AC 11). Hence the ironic parataxis of the aphorisms, 
hence the injunction: “Reader, visitor, get to work!” (AF 24).  
The lacunae that figure between fragments and aphorisms are paths that 
allow for an infinite number of routes to be taken between fragments, and hence 
an infinite possibility of readings. At the same time, however, the caesuras present 
an unbridgeable abyss between fragments; the fragments are too isolated to be in 
opposition or contradiction. A collection of aphorisms presents ideas that radically 
contradict or consolidate an argument; these agreements or resistances are not 
however part of a set system, and any attempt to systematise them should 
recognise that the system is imposed and wholly born from the act of reading. One 
might compare the difference between the fragments to Lyotard‟s problem of the 
differend, in which a case between parties “cannot be equitably resolved for lack 
of a rule applicable to both arguments”:56 their particularity is such that no general 
rule can do them justice. Yet, as Derrida writes, “aphorisms can only multiply or 
be put in a series if they either confirm or contradict each other” (AF 44). 
Reworking – reading, interpreting – occurs through the false but necessary 
imposition of a system.  
The complicity and contaminations between fragments and supposedly 
closed systems is exemplified in “52 Aphorisms” by the hyphenation of the 
aphoristic asystem and the architectural system. Derrida prefaces a book on 
architecture with a series of aphorisms, causing an immediate tension between 
content and form, as “There is a genre forbidden to the preface – it is the aphorism” 
(AF 20). The prefatory and the architectural – the metaphysical – imply 
systematicity, laws, legitimisation, authority, order, points of entry to that which 
can be inhabited, that is, made present (to itself), known, understood, 
intellectually possessed. In opposition to this is the aphorism, which “One never 
enters or leaves …; it has therefore neither beginning nor end, neither foundation 
nor end, neither up nor down, neither inside nor outside” (AF 11). The aphorism, 
always in a state of reworking, always waiting for another step, does not exist as 
an aphorism as such. Despite its appearance as axiomatic truth it has no univocal 
meaning; its serial position means that it is always in a state of flux. Hence the 
aphorism has to be left on the threshold, as “Architecture does not tolerate the 
aphorism” (AF 11).  
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Jean-François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) xi.  
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  And yet “There is nothing more architectural than a pure aphorism” (AF 
43). In its (seeming) autonomy the aphorism is dogmatic, a self-legitimising, self-
supporting structure which “reassembles in itself, arranges the foreword, the 
project, the master of the work and the putting to work” (AF 44). The preface – 
explanation, justification and authorisation of a book – is always disordered; 
placed first it was written last, and thus disrupts logical, progressive order.
57
 The 
architectural is at its most authoritative when it revokes the traditional demands of 
the edifice, “when it does everything to save itself [faire économie] a structural 
demonstration” (AF 43). Thus the systematic is contaminated by, or hyphenated 
to, the asystematic. Hence the aphorism exists, if and when it does, to proclaim: 
“This is not an aphorism” (AF 21). An aphorism is never wholly self-present, it is 
never singular, it is not what it is, it is always less than or more than itself; a point, 
a plan, a preface, a project, a problem. It both promises and perjures, a 
performative that is also a constative, a plan of itself enacting itself. 
 The serial (il)logic of the fragment is such that each “aphorism in the 
series can come before or after the other, before and after the other – and in the 
other series” (AC 9). Each aphorism is centre of a series and the border of 
(another) series, the death knell and morning bell for every other aphorism, and 
the fragmentary thus introduces a spatial and temporal exigency. This is the 
confusion of time and lineage of “Envois”: as Socrates inherits from Plato and 
Plato inherits from Socrates there is always “the one in the other, the one in front 
of the other, the one after the other, the one behind the other” (E 19). Each 
fragment is before and after every other fragment, and it is through this radical 
temporality that Romeo and Juliet, as Derrida argues in “Aphorism Countertime”, 
can both impossibly die before the other and survive the other. Romeo sees the 
“dead” Juliet, and kills himself. Juliet awakens, sees the dead Romeo, and takes 
her own life. Thus, both see the other dead, both die before and after the other.
58
 
This is the “theatre of double survival” (AC 17), a theatre of ironic divided origins 
and ends.  
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 As Critchley notes, “the „Athenäum Fragments‟ are not themselves fragments, they should not 
be fragments, they are merely indications or forewords for future fragments, promissory notes for 
an infinite work yet to be written” (Very Little 110). The post card fragments in “Envois” are, like 
Schlegel‟s, promissory notes, and “the preface to a book I have not written” (E 3).  
58
 Juliet‟s death, it should be noted, is as real to Romeo as her eventual death after him is to the 
remaining characters. 
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The aphorism is of an impossible synchronisation, an “exemplary 
anachrony, the essential impossibility of any absolute synchronisation” (AC 11) – 
each aphorism is as separate and removed as (the dead) Juliet is from (the dead) 
Romeo. And yet the aphorism – and Romeo and Juliet – could not exist “without 
the promise of a now in common” (AC 13), a (paratactic) space in which and from 
which comparisons and conjunctions can be made.
59
 Each aphorism is always in 
contretemps, in countertime or counterpoint.
60
 Their relation is one of syncopation 
– a normally unaccented note is stressed, a usually unstressed beat is foregrounded, 
and the regular flow of the tempo is interrupted. Fragments interrupt (“normal”) 
rhythm, producing an off-beat, irregular time, a time out of joint.
61
 The term 
“syncopation” is also used in linguistics to denote the loss of unstressed sounds 
within a word; for example, “over” changed to “o‟er”. Hence while syncopation 
interrupts it also conjoins, bringing together over an elided space.  
Romeo and Juliet is a story of syncopated rhythm where the suppressed 
law of mishap and mischance takes sway. The “weaker” beat takes the lead, as all 
is lost when a letter, sent post-haste, misses its mark – destinerrance. As Romeo 
fails to hear that Juliet‟s death is a simulation, it becomes real (for him), and the 
off-beat marks the time. Post-haste as speed – hasten the post, hasten the delivery 
– becomes post-haste as death – hasten the post, hasten the subsequent, hasten 
demise. Post-haste: speed after the fact, speed too late, speed that misses its time 
and brings the temporal exigency of the fragmentary to Romeo and Juliet. What 
“Envois” and Romeo and Juliet show is that the letter can always not arrive at its 
destination, and that the weaker beat can always be the stronger one. This 
“confounds a philosophical logic that would like accidents to remain what they 
are, accidental” (AC 12).  
 In Romeo and Juliet Derrida notes a coldness that freezes the play, a 
coldness which he terms   
 
irony, the figure or rhetoric of irony, the contretemps of ironic 
consciousness. It always places itself disproportionately between the finite 
                                                 
59
 The multiple meanings of a signifier exist in a series with each other, “are ahead of or lag behind 
one another” (LO 94), and as such operate through fragmentation. 
60
 Counterpoint is both a counter-point, an antithetical statement, and a (harmonious) relation 
between independent voices. It is a working in unison and a working against. 
61
 When Martin Hägglund writes that “time itself is constitutively out of joint. Or more exactly: 
time itself is the impossibility of any „itself‟” (Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) 79), the exigency he is naming is that of fragmentary 
time.  
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and the infinite, it makes use of inadequation, of aphorism, it speculates, it 
analyses and analyses, it analyses the law of disidentification, the 
implacable necessity, the machine of the proper name that obliges me to 
live through precisely that, in other words, my name, of which I am dying. 
(AC 33) 
 
While Derrida specifies that the irony in question is “the rhetorical sense of the 
figure of irony: conveying the opposite of what one says” (AC 36), the disorder 
that this structure produces is the irony of parataxis and parabasis. This is an irony 
of opposites, of analysis, negotiation and speculation – examination, 
contemplation, anticipation, theorisation, risks and profit, a game of cards. It is the 
abyss between each singular use, and the infinite potentiality of each singularity. 
It is an event of mechanical (im)possibility, of laws and counterlaws, conjunctions 
and dislocations, engagement and disengagement. It is the “Irony of the aphorism” 
(AC 37), of the double and divided law of the fragmentary, in which first and last, 
single and multiple, life and death, in time and out of time become conjoined. 
Always singular and plural, always fragments, the “aphorism lives on [survit], it 
lives much longer than its present and it lives longer than life” (AC 14). It lives on 
border lines, it gives and delays death. 
 The irony of the aphorism, the irony of illogical seriality and temporal 
exigency, is, for Derrida, the “Irony of the proper name” (AC 34). The subject is 
hyphenated to her name; it is other to her, it preceded her and will outlive her, and 
yet it places her, names her, is her.
62
 “Romeo would not be what he is, a stranger 
to his name, without this name” (AC 24). Romeo‟s identity is inescapably tied to 
his name – he might tear the word but it remains – and yet he is stranger to his 
marker, as the “name is only a title, and the title is not the thing that it names” 
(AC 26).
63
 The irony of the aphorism is the structural, syncopated irony of the 
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 Against the feminine neuter as used in this thesis is the importance of the son as bearer of the 
family name. “Paradox, irony, reversal of the common law?” (AC 138): the fact that Juliet asks 
Romeo to give up his name, but, against common practice, no mention is made of her giving up 
hers. But, as Derrida writes, it is important that the son keep the name of the father, not important 
that the daughter does. Hence Juliet‟s insistence that Romeo free himself – themselves – from the 
war of the names.  
63
 As the centre/border of a shifting series, the aphorism is both title and text, that is, title to its 
own text, text to its own title. Each aphorism operates therefore as a titleless text and/or textless 
title. As centre to the series it entitles the series, and is the series‟ (main) text. As border to the 
series it entitles the series and is the series‟ (main) text. The title in general is a “literary fiction” 
that seeks “to produce political effects and change conventions, to legitimise or de-legitimise, to 
constitute, through its very irony, a new right” (MF 115). The title is a promise/perjury. For a title 
with a particularly ironic relation to itself and its text see Derrida‟s “Title (to be specified)”, in 
which the text is titleless, and yet titled by a title that delays its own arrival and postpones its own 
legitimacy, and therefore that of the text.  
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name, which labels without comprising, which interrupts while presenting. Under 
Derrida‟s pen even rhetorical irony becomes the never quite what it is, and always 
something other, a structural irony of counterpoint and contretemps.  
 
 
Parabatic Quotation  
 
In 1899 Alcanter de Brahm suggested that a mark resembling an upside down, 
inverted question mark be used to indicate irony.
64
 The problems such a mark 
would cause are obvious, and unsurprisingly it was abandoned. This section 
proposes, however, that a punctuation mark already exists that, while not denoting 
irony, performs the mode of ironic fragmentation outlined in this chapter. 
Quotation marks. Quotation marks anacoluthically interrupt, as the syntax of the 
sentence carrying the quotation suddenly changes, not through grammatical 
inaccuracy, but through the insertion of a wholly different passage torn from a 
wholly different syntax. The interruption/conjunction that they affect and denote 
is radically ambiguous, however, and as such quotation marks become 
punctuation points signalling a general complication or paradox. 
Quotations marks indicate the immediacy of direct speech, and the 
distance of the cited words of an other. They refer to a specific speech act and to a 
general, popular turn of phrase. They frequently signify that the lexeme in 
question is not an active member of a sentence, grammatically extant from the 
functioning of the syntax that is built around it – mentioned rather than used. They 
demonstrate that the word in question is inadequate, insufficient, imperfect. They 
reveal that while an expression may have a “proper” sense, this instance isn‟t it. 
They hint that the utterance, for a number of possible reasons, should be treated 
with caution and questioned. Quotation marks demarcate, but what they mark and 
why is haunted by ambiguity. They fragment, their delimitations an ironic 
transgression of limits. For Derrida these marks punctuate a discourse where use 
and mention are no longer rigorously defined, where inside and outside is 
destabilised, each use a quotation of old words by another and a new use by the 
self. Marks of ironic conjunction and interruption, signifying in antithetical ways, 
they ironically fragment discourse, not only with visible points, but with 
“invisible quotation marks, even within a word” (LO 148).  
                                                 
64
 Booth 55. 
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In “Some Statements and Truisms” Derrida describes the proliferation of 
quotation marks in our works and in our speech as a “general irony” (ST 75) that 
renders everything a mention rather than a use. Against this general, postmodern 
irony, he posits “events of writing whose force nevertheless consists in „using‟ 
language again, but in „using‟ language again by submitting it to the effects of 
deconstruction, that is, without reconstituting what is being deconstituted and thus 
without giving up the quotation marks” (ST 75). Thus Derrida presents what this 
thesis has called a parabatic irony: 
 
another writing of the quotation marks themselves, which, being doubly 
vigilant, being doubly in quotation marks and redoubling the quotation 
marks in an inventive way, destabilises even the opposition between 
discourse with and discourse without quotation marks, mention and use, 
and the entire system of associated values; that is, philosophy in its 
entirety, theory in its entirety. (ST 75) 
 
Language does not descend into mere mention, but transgresses the limits between 
use and mention. It operates beyond the marks within the marks, becoming an 
ironic literature of edges transposed and limits overstepped. Thus quotation marks 
are ironic “hooks that unhook”, “pliers or cranes … that grab in order to loosen 
the grasp” (P 9).65  
Quotation marks do not simply surround a phrase, emphasising its self-
contained isolation, but “divide it, rework its body and its insides, until it is 
distended, diverted, out of joint, then reset [it] member by member, word by word, 
realigned in the most diverse configurations” (LO 63). Quotation marks suspend a 
phrase, placing it out of grasp and yet underfoot. They fragment inside and 
outside their limits, turning the edge in on itself, revealing an internal, hyphenated 
abyss. If “a text quotes and requotes, with or without quotation marks, when it is 
written on the brink, you start, or indeed have already started, to lose your footing. 
You lose sight of any line of demarcation between a text and what is outside it” 
(LO 67).  
Blanchot‟s The Madness of the Day is a radical example of this absence of 
the totalised and separate. Derrida describes the récit as 
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 This image is found too in Spurs, where Derrida describes quotation marks as “the screeching 
machinations of a hooker, or crane (grue), its flight and clapping claws” (S 57). Nicholas Royle 
also refers to “the tweezers of quotation marks” which show, he argues, “a characteristic sense of 
irony and comedy” in Derrida (“Derrida‟s Event”, Derrida‟s Legacies: Literature and Philosophy 
ed. Simon Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone (London: Routledge, 2008) 39). 
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quotations, quotations of requotations with no original performance, [as] 
there is no speech act not already the iteration of another, no circle and no 
quotation marks to reassure us about the identity, opposition, or distinction 
of speech events. The part is always greater than the whole, the edge of the 
set [ensemble] is a fold [pli] in the self. (LO 79-80)  
 
The line with which The Madness of the Day appears to begin is quoted at the end 
of the narrative in such a way as to throw the originality of the first usage into 
doubt – does the second instance quote the first, or does the first instance 
prefiguratively quote the latter?
66
 In the case of such a structure the text is 
deprived of any beginning, and any edge or border. As Derrida writes, “It is 
impossible to say which quotes the other, and above all which one forms the 
border of the other. Each includes the other, comprehends the other, which is to 
say that neither comprehends the other” (LO 82). Edges thus become interiors, 
which causes “an essential unfinishedness that cannot be reduced to an 
incompleteness or an inadequacy” (LO 85), an unfinished of the fragmentary as it 
always awaits a further fragment, a further reworking. 
The general parabatic irony that Derrida proposes does not reduce 
language to a stagnant, eventless referentiality. The destabilisation of the limits 
between use and mention enables the performative production of a new event, as 
in quoting one is no longer citing a predecessor but producing a paleonym, a new 
use of an old term. Or, more radically, a neologism, a wholly new term: 
 
One is thus inaugurating another word, in sum, a homonym that must be 
put forward cautiously between quotation marks. Another word-concept is 
thus staged whose event one causes to come about. The quotation marks 
signal in this case that one is citing only oneself at the moment of this 
invention or this convention, in a gesture that is as inaugural as it is 
arbitrary. (WA 76) 
 
In producing a new use, one is no longer citing an other, but also citing oneself. 
Thus, through what Derrida termed the irony of the signature, the text, full of 
visible and invisible quotation marks, becomes a work on and of the self. 
But quotation marks also protect, so that cited phrases preserve the 
singularity of their first use and remain untouchable. The more they are reworked, 
the more commentary imposed upon them, the further they retreat, and the more 
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 And we return to “With the word with begins then this text” (see chapter two). 
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aphoristic and uninhabitable they become. On Celan, witnessing and bearing 
witness, Derrida writes that we cite knowing that we do not know; we know 
neither the poem nor what it is to bear witness (to the poem). Hence Derrida 
repeats and repeats the lines from Celan‟s “Aschenglorie” “Niemand/ zeugt für 
den/ Zeugen” (No-one/ bears witness for/ the witness) while never coming closer 
to them. Quotation marks preserve and alter, point to the self and the other, to 
alterity and singularity, to a citation of the self and a citation of the other, to an old 
use used anew, and a new use immediately old. They operate with the complexity 
and difference of irony, hooking and unhooking, rendering inhabitable and 
uninhabitable, touchable and untouchable. After Derrida‟s ironic step we can no 
longer “be confident in the law of quotation marks” (E 98).  
 The parabatic step that transgresses limits in citation can be found in the 
dividing line that is the genre. The genre demands respect for norms and 
demarcations, and guards against “impurity, anomaly, or monstrosity” (LG 57). 
But what, Derrida asks, if there were, deep within the law of genre, “a law of 
impurity or a principle of contamination? And suppose the condition for the 
possibility of law were the a priori of a counter-law, an axiom of impossibility 
that would confound its sense, order, and reason” (LG 57). Suppose that we are 
dealing with a force of irony, that turns a law around to include or be predicated 
on its opposite, that reveals that the thesis rests on the antithetical. Derrida begins 
“The Law of Genre” with three statements – “a fragmentary discourse” (LG 55) – 
that can be read as constative or performative propositions. But very quickly we 
see that the “line or trait that seemed to separate the two bodies of interruption is 
affected straight away by an essential disruption” (LG 57). That which allows us 
to differentiate, the law of genre, is rendered open by “a counter-law that 
constitutes this very law, renders it possible, conditions it and thereby renders it 
impossible” (LG 58). The title of a genre, the genre-mark, is not of the genre it 
designates. Consider then, writes Derrida, the “paradox, consider the irony (which 
is irreducible to a consciousness or an attitude): this supplementary and distinctive 
trait, a mark of belonging or inclusion, does not properly pertain to any genre or 
class” (LG 64-65). A deep, structural irony – not rhetorical, not based on intention 
or effect – is in operation, an irony of counterlaw within the law, an irony of thesis 
and antithesis. This irony means that the mark of a genre both allows a genre to be, 
gives it a name, a place, a title, and prevents it from fully being: “The clause or 
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flood-gate of genre declasses what it allows to be classed. It tolls the knell of 
genealogy or of genericity, which it, however, also brings forth to the light of day” 
(LG 65). The law – counterlaw – of genre is such that it “makes the statement of 
belonging an ironical exercise. It interrupts the very belonging of which it is a 
necessary condition” (LO 71-72). In a movement similar to that of Schlegel‟s 
alternating self-creation and self-destruction the mark puts to death that which it 
engenders, although Derrida‟s formulation is a structural principle of a law and 
counter law, a possibility and impossibility. The mark of belonging does not 
belong, and the law of genre is “a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a 
parasitical economy” (LG 59).  
 
Incomprehensibility to Impossibility, Transcendence to Transgression  
 
For Schlegel, Blanchot and Derrida incomprehensibility is an important structure 
within the text. As Derrida explains; “one does not always write with a desire to 
be understood … there is a paradoxical desire not to be understood” (TS 30). 
Complete transparency robs the text of a future as its univocity closes it – its 
survival depends on a degree of non-acquaintance between the reader and the text, 
on an excess that allows future contexts to remain open. When the text remains 
open through a certain unintelligibility a kenosis occurs, a self-emptying 
stemming from the lack of self-presence, self-contemporaneity, and self-
totalisation. It is a making room for the other, a giving over to the other. Despite, 
however, the space which incomprehensibility gives to the other, an analysis of 
the text in this way remains predicated on the centrality of the subject, that is, on 
an author or reader who is not in control of language.
67
 Of greater importance then 
are the structural and logical impossibilities that Derrida and Blanchot see in the 
text.  
Deconstruction “might perhaps be „the experience of the impossible‟” (PM 
81) – the impossible is that which enables an event to arrive.68 Impossibility as a 
condition of possibility is best understood through the word perhaps, where the 
“experience of the „perhaps‟ would be that of both the possible and the impossible, 
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 Schlegel thought of the work in terms of its incomprehensibility, that is, in relation to a subject‟s 
ability to understand it. No text is ever fully comprehensible, he argued, and nor should it be. 
However, it should be noted that he did not conceive of the reader as a structure in the text – of 
primary interest was the relation between the work and author.  
68
 Derek Attridge gives a useful overview of Derrida‟s uses of the impossible in Reading and 
Responsibility: Deconstruction‟s Traces (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 60. 
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of the possible as impossible” (PM 74). If what arises is already possible and 
hence capable of being anticipated and predicted, it is not an event. An event is 
only possible when it cannot be calculated, when it contains something of chance 
and of the “perhaps”. The impossible is therefore the “perhaps” which resists and 
exceeds expectations and that, by being unforeseen, paradoxically allows the 
event to be. “When the impossible makes itself possible, the event takes place 
(possibility of the impossible). … For an event to take place, for it to be possible, 
it has to be, as event, as invention, the coming of the impossible” (PM 90). The 
impossible and the perhaps, “far from breaking off the question, gives it room to 
breathe” (PM 74).69 Outside of expectation, the impossible exceeds knowledge 
and introduces the aporia that is necessary for an event to arrive. The impossible is 
then the interruption of the possible that allows it to occur, the deviant and 
deviating parabatic step away from the suffocating inertia of inevitability. From 
“the very heart of the im-possible, one would thus hear the impulse or pulse of a 
„deconstruction‟” (PM 91). While the incomprehensible allows the text to survive 
through its excess, it is the impossibility of literature that preserves it as 
possibility. 
Blanchot writes that what exceeds the system is 
 
the impossibility of its failure and likewise the impossibility of its success. 
Ultimately nothing can be said of it, and there is a way of keeping still (the 
lacunary silence of writing), that halts the system, leaving it idle, delivered 
to the seriousness of irony. (ED 47) 
 
In Derrida‟s work the system is that which strives for a “totalisation in the 
configuration, a continuity of all statements” (TS 3), despite the presence of what 
deconstruction recognises as an (ironic) “force of dislocation, a limit in the 
totalisation, a limit in the movement of syllogistic synthesis” (TS 4). The system 
is (partly) composed of that which is other to the system, as is the case in 
Hegelian dialectics, which is composed of a thesis, and that which is other to the 
thesis, the antithesis. Thus in the dialectic of dialectics we therefore have the 
dialectical and the non-dialectical, where the “non” is itself split between that 
which dialectically opposes, and the “non” that is radically heterogeneous and 
irreducible to the oppositional structure. It is the presence of the heterogeneous – 
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 The impossible is an urgency, Derrida writes in Rogues, that “cannot be idealised any more than 
the other as other can. This im-possible is thus not a (regulative) idea or ideal” (R 84). 
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“that which does not even oppose” (TS 33) – that makes dialectising impossible, 
that makes it consist of a process of “dialectising the non-dialectisable” (TS 32). 
Hence we have “a concept of dialectics that is no longer the conventional one of 
synthesis, conciliation, reconciliation, totalisation, identification with itself; now, 
on the contrary, we have a negative or infinite dialectic that is the movement of 
synthesising without synthesis” (TS 33). This negative dialectic is a process of ex-
appropriation, the nec plus ultra of dialectics that cannot be assimilated into 
dialectics as it does not oppose. There thus exists in the system that which is other 
to the system, that renders the system (im)possible, and means that synthesis is 
always predicated on a lack.  
For Blanchot and Derrida we do not transcend so much as transgress – we 
take the parabatic step/not that, in crossing, does not give rise to another limit, but 
reveals that the limit, already crossed, also remains uncrossable: “the limit, in as 
much uncrossable, summons to cross, affirms the desire (the false step) that has 
always already … crossed the line” (SB 24). For Derrida a “transcendent reading” 
is a reading that moves towards meaning, one which seeks to ground itself in 
determinability. It is the nontranscendent that transgresses, that is in excess of a 
thetic or direct relation between signifier and signified. The non of the 
nontranscendent is not a negation but a complication, a mark of alterity or a 
different step, as a “literature which forbade that transcendence would annul itself. 
This moment of „transcendence‟ is irrepressible, but it can be complicated or 
folded” (SI 45). The nontranscendent takes the aporetic path, and has a  
 
suspended relation to meaning and reference. Suspended means suspense, 
but also dependence, condition, conditionality. In its suspended condition, 
literature can only exceed itself. No doubt all language refers to something 
other than itself or to language as something other. (SI 48)  
 
The excessive, transgressive nature of literature means that it “stands on the edge 
of everything, almost beyond everything, including itself” (SI 47), and is a 
threshold discourse, a border crossing. Thus Derrida speaks of the text that 
recognises itself to be fragmented, a paratactic hyphenation,  
 
a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something 
other than itself, to other differential traces. Thus the text overruns all 
limits assigned to it so far (not submerging or drowning then in an 
P a g e  | 164 
 
undifferentiated homogeneity, but rather making them more complex, 
dividing and multiplying strokes and lines) – all the limits. (LO 69) 
 
 
Poematic Strophes 
 
For a 1988 issue the Italian journal Poesia asked Derrida to answer the question 
with which each of their issues began: “Che cos‟è la poesia?” – what is, or rather, 
what thing, is poetry?
70
 Against the direct, thetic question that heralds the death of 
poetry and “salutes the birth of prose” (CC 237), Derrida presents an apostrophe 
written to an informal tu, an event, which does not (simply) engage with the 
technical details of the meaning or “essence” of poetry, but performs a 
presentation and demonstration of the singular “poematic”, “this thing which in 
the same stroke exposes itself to death and protects itself” (CC 229). 71  In 
“Shibboleth” Derrida writes that “To create a work is give a new body to language, 
to give language a body so that this truth of language may appear as such, may 
appear and disappear, may appear as an elliptic withdrawal” (SQ 106). In “Che 
cos‟è la poesia?” Derrida gives to the poematic the body of the hérisson, istrice, 
hedgehog, a fragment of life that turns in on itself, an animal of chance hidden 
under the false protection of its spines, whose relation to itself exposes it to death 
and disaster.
72
  
“Che cos‟è la poesia?” is a manifesto and a performance, a prose poem 
enacting the life and death (drive) of the poematic. It is excessive and 
impenetrable and beautiful, an overturning of the methodological, systematic or 
propositional as, like the poematic, Derrida‟s essay “never gathers itself together, 
rather it loses itself and gets off the track” (CC 233). It answers – elliptically – the 
dictated question, it presents, in translation(s), a piece on the impossibility of 
translation.
73
 It also instigates its own performative problems – in presenting a 
singular, poetic response to a general, thetic question, Derrida tempts the reader to 
(re)formulate his poematic into a poetics. Despite its difficulty, the aleatory roll of 
                                                 
70
 Although Derrida doesn‟t directly address it, immediately we engage with titles and aphorisms 
and the quotation of titles: “poesia” is both poetry and the name of the journal. 
71
 In “Psyche” Derrida links the apostrophe and the parabasis as the detour of direct address (PI 
17). 
72
 One wonders if Derrida was thinking of Schopenhauer‟s hedgehog, also used by Freud, and 
usually referred to in the context of the “Hedgehog‟s Dilemma”. In the cold, a group of hedgehogs 
want to huddle together to keep warm, but know that coming in contact with each other will cause 
mutual pain.  
73
 The essay was originally published with the French and Italian side by side. However, 
translation does not simply refer to the move between languages. 
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the hedgehog is all too easily systematised into a general theory of poetry. The 
prediction/imperative – “You will call poem from now on a certain passion of the 
singular mark, the signature that repeats its dispersion, each time beyond the logos” 
(CC 235) – is both performed and interrupted, as while one attempts to address 
each work singularly, the paths of approach are in danger of being mapped onto a 
programme or method. 
Derrida‟s poematic is “the aleatory rambling of a trek, the strophe, that 
turns but never leads back to discourse, or back home” (CC 225). Each strophe, 
each turn, is an apostrophe, a catastrophe, a metastrophe – a radical change or 
transformation that turns away from circularity so that there is neither infinite 
repetition of the same nor totalising completion. The turning that occurs in this 
text is, despite Derrida‟s protestations, a turning with and from Schlegel. The 
poematic is neither process nor product, neither poiesis nor work. It is an aleatory 
reworking, an assortment of paratactic phrases that manifest a desire to be rather 
than to represent. But in so being it makes no claims to the literary absolute: it is 
the ironic hyphenation and contamination of the “absolute nonabsolute” (CC 239-
31). Its drive to be without support is a drive to not be, its life drive a death drive. 
It is not the work of the self but a dictation from the other, and as such no subject-
(non)work but alterity-text, where the irony of the signature signs self to other and 
other to self. It is phrase learned by heart, (in) fragments, the ruin of a totality that 
never existed, the citation of – dictation from – a non-original yet singular source. 
Derrida‟s answer to the question “What thing is poetry?” predates the 
asking; in the 1984 text “Shibboleth” he writes that “the poem speaks beyond 
knowledge. It writes, and what it writes is, above all, precisely this: that it is 
addressed and destined beyond knowledge” (SQ 34). A poem is in excess of the 
thetic and systematic, and so, in “Che cos‟è” Derrida proposes that in order to 
approach the poem one must “set fire to the library of poetics” (CC 233).74 The 
poem cannot be made subject to propositional knowledge; an anonymous 
fragment, it calls for itself to be “disfigured, transfigured or rendered 
indeterminate in its port” (CC 227) – port of origin in the author and its 
destination in the reader. Rather than the permanent becoming of Schlegel‟s 
                                                 
74
 A poem will always offer a poetics, a theory of itself. “But not with the idea of applying a 
previously existing art of writing, or of referring to one as a charter written somewhere else” (SQ 
65-66). The methodical reference library and the general rules of systematic, formalised approach 
must be burned to make way for singular reading, negotiation or invention of the text. 
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romantic poetry, the poematic is a permanent coming, the postponed appearance 
of (saturated) meaning and determinability. Always the “advent of an event” (CC 
227), its origins recede into the theatre of irony, and it rolls not teleologically 
forward but across and across the road.
75
 The poematic is thus ironic negotiation 
between the finite event of experience and the infinite coming of other events. 
This excess spawns a multitude of commentary, but the poetic will always elude 
exegetical prose.  
The poematic desires to be singular and untranslatable; like Schlegel‟s and 
Blanchot‟s fragments it longs to exist rather than represent, to be, “without 
external support, without substance, without subject, absolute of writing in (it)self” 
(CC 237). It thus urges the reader to “destroy me, or rather render my support 
invisible to the outside … do what must be done so that the provenance of the 
mark remains from now on unlocatable and unrecognisable” (CC 227). In reading 
the text we both preserve and destroy it – by reading and assimilating we 
annihilate its alterity and reduce its potential. The poematic resists translation, 
resists exegesis, resists repetition but at the same time needs it in order to exist – 
to be read. Hence it “Reiterate(s) in a murmur: never repeat” (CC 233). Hence the 
desire of the poematic: translate me but don‟t translate me, let me be in language 
and yet beyond it. 
The logic of Derrida‟s hedgehog is an ironic counterlogic of the 
within/beyond, and it is hard not to immediately hear a citation of Schlegel‟s Igel 
(hedgehog). “A fragment,” wrote Schlegel, “like a miniature work of art, has to be 
entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a 
hedgehog” (A 206). But, Derrida insists, and again the misreading of Schlegel‟s 
fragments is clear, his hedgehog has none of the totality of Schlegel‟s. His 
creature “has no relation to itself – that is, no totalising individuality – that does 
not expose it even more to death and to being-torn-apart” (P 303). It does not 
gather itself together in strength, but in vulnerability. Its name is a nickname, a 
“name beyond a name” (CC 235), a catachresis, improper and yet defining, a 
name and a description: hedgehog. Poematic. This improperly titled fragment 
does not emphasise poiesis or process as does Schlegel‟s; instead “it lets itself be 
done, without activity, without work, in the most sober pathos, a stranger to all 
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 In “Psyche” Derrida writes that there is no invention without an advent, as “advent” means “the 
inauguration for the future of a possibility or of a power that will remain at the disposal of 
everyone” (PI 5-6). 
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production, especially to creation” (CC 233). It is not a moment of pure 
production, or pure poetry, but a contamination, an accident, a catastrophe.
76
 It is 
just a hedgehog rolled up on the road, an animal that, despite Derrida‟s denials, is 
rolled up like a fragment: “turned toward the other and toward itself” (CC 235). 
The poematic is a (singular) dictation: “I am a dictation, pronounces 
poetry, learn me by heart, copy me down” (CC 223).77 The citation of the words 
of an other, the poematic is learnt by heart, assimilated and internalised, a process 
which appears to represent “pure interiority, independent spontaneity, the freedom 
to affect oneself actively by reproducing the beloved trace” (CC 231). However, it 
also represents exteriority and “the laws of mnemotechnics” (CC 231), and as 
such poematic dictation is a writing on the soul; absolute immediacy, interiority, 
and instinct signified through the mechanical, the technical, the external, 
constructed and automatic. As a dictation the poematic is ironic citation, a new 
use and an old mention, the “by heart” a metaphor for fragmentary relations: 
internal and external, a shifting centre. We recite and repeat and re-cite in order to 
assimilate precisely because we do not and cannot understand: the poem cannot be 
reduced to a thetic object of knowledge. “The reciting compulsion, the „by heart‟ 
desire, stems from this limit to intelligibility or transparency of meaning” (SQ 87).  
As Catherine Malabou writes, “The „by heart‟ is the breaking in of the 
outside into the inside of the heart”.78 The heart, the centre, which creates the 
subject through the grammatical I, is no longer interior but a contaminated, 
transgressed interior/exterior. Thus “A poem, I never sign(s) it. The other sign(s). 
The I is only at the coming of this desire: to learn by heart” (CC 237). Poetry 
occurs not as the subject produces, but as the subject is transcribed from the 
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 Describing the “pure poem”, while also asserting that it does not exist, Derrida writes in 
“Shibboleth”: “the impossibility of what which, each time only once, has meaning only by having 
no meaning, no ideal or general meaning, or has meaning only so as to invoke, in order to betray 
them, the concept, law, or genre – is the pure poem” (SQ 11). 
77
 In The Gift of Death Derrida, reading Matthew, writes that the truth that God rewards those who 
sacrifice is a truth to be  
 
„learned by heart‟ in the first place because one has the impression of having to learn it 
without understanding it, like a repeated and repeatable formula. … It is a matter of 
learning „by heart‟ beyond any semantic comprehension. … But we say „to be learned by 
heart‟ for another reason. This passage is also a mediation or sermon on the heart, on 
what the heart is and more precisely what it should be should it return to its rightful place. 
(GD 97) 
 
That which is learned by heart is absorbed or assimilated rather that understood – it goes straight to 
the heart, and as such is the ethical or responsible action of “doing before understanding”.  
78
 Malabou 262. 
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dictation of the other. Creation is thus reception.
79
 For Derrida the work, the 
poematic, is not Schlegel‟s subject-(non)work, but an alterity-text, a text of radical, 
ironic possibility and difference that, through the irony of the signature, is also a 
writing of the (alterity within the) self.  
Schlegel presents the literary absolute: production and theory of 
production. Derrida describes the origin of the poetic as the “absolute 
nonabsolute”; that which is absolutely nonabsolute, monstrous and contaminated, 
parabatically transgressing the borders and boundaries of limitation itself. Without 
origin, without form, without genre, without archive, the absolute of writing, as 
Derrida posits it, is the absolute nonabsolute, a state of (counter)law, and ironic, 
parabatic contamination. 
 
 Literally: you would like to retain by heart an absolutely unique form, an 
event whose intangible singularity no longer separates the ideality, the 
ideal meaning as one says, from the body of the letter. In the desire of this 
absolute inseparation, the absolute nonabsolute, you breathe the origin of 
the poetic. (CC 229-31)  
 
The poematic desires to be ideal and to be real, to be itself and the idea of itself, 
the perfect form of itself, ideally nonideal, literally nonliteral. It wishes to be 
absolutely singular and learned by heart. In the drive to be absolutely inseparable, 
a moment of absolute ironic hyphenation, it is both “vulnerable and dangerous” 
(CC 233), force and weakness, law and counterlaw.  
If the absolute is that which is self-referential, unconditional, complete in 
itself and inwardly focused, the nonabsolute is contingent, conditional and 
inseparable from the other. However, the choice of the prefix non should be noted 
as setting up an opposition to the absolute that is in excess of opposition: non is 
both opposition and irreducibility. It is therefore the other against which the 
absolute can be defined, and that which is heterogeneous to definition and 
comparison – wholly other. Thus nonabsolute, in being both the notabsolute and 
aabsolute doubly stresses both its alterity and its inseparability, its hyphenation. 
The hyphenation of the nonabsolute denotes referral without completion, a referral 
always to the other. The absolute nonabsolute is that which in referring to the 
other beyond refers infinitely to itself, and relates to itself as other, to itself 
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 The injunction to “learn by heart” is also extended to the reader, who becomes a structure in the 
text. “Che cos‟è la poesia?” is an apostrophe directed to an reader who is external and (structurally) 
internal. Despite Schlegel‟s love for symphilosophy, for him the reader is always just receiver.  
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through alterity. Its inseparability from the other is the drive to be in alterity and 
to extinguish alterity, to relate to itself through singular alterity such that it ceases 
to be. The desire for the absolute nonabsolute is as such a wish for ironic 
contamination, for a catastrophe, for a law that is predicated on an antithetical 
counterlaw (of autoimmunity), a protection that endangers, a self that is other, a 
presence without presence, an excess without essence, an event without event.  
Importantly, the ironic hyphenation that occurs between the two terms of 
the phrase is found within the terms themselves, so each term is a priori complicit 
in the other (term). The absolute, centred on itself, is itself and example of itself, 
itself and other. The absolute is thus a priori nonabsolute. The nonabsolute, 
centred on the other contains and refers to everything through the other and as 
other, and therefore acquires a certain completion. The absolute nonabsolute, 
interruption and conjunction, is ironic hyphenation, a parabatic transgression of 
limits, a de-limitation. As Clark writes: 
 
Identity-to-self, as a structure of auto-affection, is necessarily constituted 
through otherness in a movement that prevents subjectivity being 
conceived except nonabsolutely, as an impure difference, touched with a 
radical finitude. … The poetic is the interruption or injunction that, 
dislocating the notion of subjectivity as presence-to-self, is an experience 
of finitude; a syncope.
80
  
 
A syncope – syncopation – the loss of sounds, a gap or interruption of a word, an 
off-beat within the rhythm, is the fragmentation of the subject and the change 
from the poem to the poematic. Against Schlegel‟s production and progression is 
an infinite finitude, an open closure, and subject-(non)work becomes alterity-text. 
The poematic is thus ironic, parabatic poetry, a permanent interruption and 
conjunction, a transgression of its own limits. It is an aporetic poetry, turning 
towards new paths and new limits while reworking limitation. 
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 Timothy Clark, The Theory of Inspiration (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1997) 265.  
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(Ir)Responsibility and Irony: Levinas and Ethical Language 
Introduction 
 
After Levinas, writes Blanchot, to converse  
 
is not only to turn away from saying what, thanks to language, is – the 
presence of a presence. To converse is also to turn language away from 
itself, maintaining it outside of all unity, outside even of the unity of that 
which is. To converse is to divert language from itself by letting itself 
differ and defer, answering with an always already to a never yet. (ED 34-
35) 
 
This chapter addresses the diverted, interrupted conversation between Derrida and 
Levinas on language as response to alterity and the other. It steps up to “the 
response of responsibility” (OB 142), to the modes of language and engagement 
that are responsible, or, perhaps better, (ir)responsible. (Ir)responsibility is, as 
Critchley puts it, “my experience of a claim or demand that I both cannot fully 
meet and cannot avoid”. 1  It is, Catherine Malabou writes, “a responsibility 
without a program, a responsibility that doesn‟t believe in the response, if by 
„response‟ one intends an axiomatic evidence”: an (ir)responsibility that is 
“eminently aporetic”.2 The ethical, or (ir)responsible, relation  
 
is expressed linguistically or articulated philosophically by recourse to an 
ethical language that has a paradoxical relation to that which it is 
attempting to thematise. … [It] is a question of trying to say that which 
cannot be said, or proposing that which cannot be propositionally stated, 
of enunciating that which cannot be enunciated, and what has to be said, 
stated or enunciated is subjectivity itself.
3
 
 
This requires a writing that singularly presents the self only to erase the self 
before the other, a perverformative without a present that signifies an obligation 
without origin. It requires a writing of interruption, a permanent parabasis that 
fragments the self.   
This chapter does not try to present a prescriptive formula for Derrida‟s 
ironic (ir)responsibility or Levinas‟s “ethics of ethics”. Instead it outlines the 
                                                 
1
 Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary 
French Thought (London: Verso, 2009) 66. 
2
 Malabou 249. 
3
 Critchley, Ethics-Politics 185. 
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specifics of how and why the ethical or responsible content of Derrida‟s and 
Levinas‟s texts is ironic, and is approached through an ironic use of language. It 
does not argue that either theorist deliberately espouses an opaque or evasive style 
simply to allow the other to sign, but that their writings contain very careful and 
specific knots, faults, repetitions and interruptions that step away from the 
thematic and prescriptive. For Levinas this is in order to respond to the other 
without constraining or reducing her otherness; in Derrida this is complicated by a 
further explication of the double binds of engagements with otherness and alerity. 
The chapter ends with a reading of the impossibilities of obligation and 
responsibilities – impossibilities that only serve to increase their urgencies – 
performed in the final fragment of “At This Very Moment in This Work Here I 
Am” (1980). 
 
A Deconstructive Ethics? 
 
Deconstruction, Derrida has repeatedly argued, has always been engaged with 
what can be termed, hesitantly, the ethical. Hesitantly, because if the ethical is a 
system of immediately applicable propositions and descriptions, then 
deconstruction does not contain an ethics. Hesitantly, because if deconstruction is 
not a method, then it can never be an ethical or moral method to apply to life or to 
a text. J. Hillis Miller describes ethics as containing a necessary authoritative 
prescription: “I must do this; I cannot do otherwise, and I ought not to do 
otherwise”.4 While deconstruction does embrace the il faut, the “one must”, it 
embraces an obligation without procedure, offering no rules, no comprehensive, 
systemic laws that supply normative, constative decrees. As John D. Caputo 
writes in Against Ethics,  
 
Deconstruction issues a warning that the road ahead is still under 
construction, that there is blasting and the danger of falling rocks. Ethics, 
on the other hand, hands out maps which lead us to believe that the road is 
finished and there are superhighways all along the way.
5
 
  
                                                 
4
 J. Hillis Miller, The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and Benjamin 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) 47. 
5
 John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant 
Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) 4. 
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Bennington is even more direct: “Deconstruction cannot propose an ethics. ... 
Ethics is metaphysical through and through and can therefore never simply be 
assumed or affirmed in deconstruction. The demand or desire for a 
„deconstructive ethics‟ is in this sense doomed to be disappointed”.6 
In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas Derrida writes, via Levinas, that ethical 
language “does not come from an ethical intervention laid out over descriptions. It 
is the very meaning of approach, which contrasts with knowing” (AE 52). If the 
writings of Levinas and Derrida are ethical, then the ethics they contain is far from 
a standard prescriptive system. It is the non-ethical opening of ethics, an 
(ir)responsible parabatic stepping up which lends itself to a political or juridical 
content determined only 
 
beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts, all possible 
intuition, in a singular way, in the speech and the responsibility taken by 
each person, in each situation, and on the basis of analysis that is each time 
unique – unique and infinite, unique but a priori exposed to substitution, 
unique and yet general, interminable in spite of the urgency of the decision. 
(AE 115) 
 
Pure ethics, Derrida writes,  
 
begins with the respectable dignity of the other as the absolute unlike, 
recognised as nonrecognisable, indeed as unrecognisable, beyond all 
knowledge, all cognition and all recognition: far from being the beginning 
of pure ethics, the neighbour as like or as resembling, as looking like, 
spells the end or the ruin of such an ethics, if there is any. (R 60)  
 
 “Ethics”, as deconstruction recognises it, does not force the other into a system of 
universally applicable rules and regulations, but begins in the heterogeneity of the 
other and the impossibility of containing that alterity within general prescriptive 
decrees.  
 Deconstructive “ethics”, deconstructive responsibility, “consists in not 
providing ready-made responses for a problem, not transforming the promise or 
imminence of the wholly other into a calculable program”.7 Responsibility lies in 
the seeming irresponsibility of deconstructing intentionality, freedom, will, 
conscience, consciousness, subject, community and decision (FL 248). It is found 
                                                 
6
 Bennington, Interrupting 34. 
7
 Malabou 239. 
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in the knowledge that a good act performed leaves other good acts undone, and 
that the other who is welcomed may or may not be worthy of that welcome. 
Responsibility, a banal word before Levinas, argues Blanchot, is that which 
separates me from myself, and requires “that I answer for the impossibility of 
being responsible” (ED 25). If my attempt to act responsibly towards the other 
suppresses or denies the other her singular alterity, then I do not act responsibly. If 
my approach to the other signals a retreat from an other other, then I do not act 
responsibly. “Responsibility is irresponsibility”, writes Miller, “and 
irresponsibility is responsibility, in a whirling that boggles the mind, like being 
caught in a revolving door”.8 It is an endless, “spiralling movement” (OB 44), a 
responsibility in which “I can no longer appeal to any ethics, any experience, any 
practice whatever – save that of some counter-living, which is to say an un-
practice, or (perhaps) a word of writing” (ED 26). Responsibility is the 
insufficiency and irresponsibility of each response, the step up that is always also 
a step away.
9
 
If ethics is a thesis engraved on stone, then deconstruction‟s 
(ir)responsible ethics is a poetics breathed out in (near) silence, an anachronous 
interruption. The silence of the non-response of the other  
 
conditions my responsibility, there where I alone must respond. Without 
silence, without the hiatus, which is not the absence of rules but the 
necessity of a leap at the moment of ethical, political or juridical decision, 
we could simply unfold knowledge into a programme or course of action. 
Nothing could make us more irresponsible; nothing could be more 
totalitarian. (AE 117) 
 
Responsibility is found in an aporetic, impossible commitment. As Derrida asks, 
“how does one assume a responsibility that announces itself as contradictory 
because it inscribes us from the very beginning of the game into a kind of 
necessarily double obligation, a double bind?” (TO 29) The interruption of 
paradoxical obligations is what allows responsibility to be, a responsibility that is 
each time a singular, performative reaction to the other. Responsibility forces one 
to impossibly commit oneself, promising oneself to two incompatible laws, to two 
                                                 
8
 J. Hillis Miller, For Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009) 214.  
9
 To pre-empt chapter six, one could argue that responsibility as Derrida describes it is 
autoimmune in relation to humanity – in helping one I effectively attack an other, each of my 
actions is always a protection and attack, a defence and an exposure.  
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contradictory demands.
10
 It demonstrates that what may seem open and ethical 
and legal and responsible – signing with one‟s own name, taking legal 
responsibility for one‟s own actions – is also an act of irresponsibility, as 
sometimes the most authentic signature is that of a pseudonym (GD 58). 
If ethics is being at home, grounded in structure and architecture, then the 
ethics of Derrida and Levinas is a homelessness, whereby the subject‟s house is 
the home of the other. As Derrida writes in Altérités, “To enter into a rapport with 
the other, interruption must be possible. The rapport must be a rapport of 
interruption. Here interruption does not interrupt the rapport with the other, it 
opens it”.11 The subject‟s obsession with the self must be turned outward towards 
the alterity of the other in order to render it ethically responsible. The step is thus 
a parabatic step, an ironic permanent parabasis of ethics.
12
 The ethics of Levinas 
and Derrida is an ironic (ir)responsibility, an “ethics” interrupting ethics: a beyond 
ethics within ethics. (Ir)responsibility is a fragmentation of prescriptive ethics into 
singular engagements of (ir)responsibility. For Derrida and Levinas it is a force, 
structure and style that steps away from a system centred on the subject and up to 
alterity and the other.  
 Despite Derrida‟s openly acknowledged debt to Levinas it is important not 
to conflate the two thinkers, different in their treatment of gender, literature, 
justice, politics, passivity, the decision and particularly in their use of the 
“other”.13 Most basic, perhaps, is that while the first relation for Levinas is the 
subject and other, for Derrida the “first” relation is always complicated by 
multiple responsibilities for others. Martin Hägglund forwards a persuasive 
                                                 
10
 This position should not imply, as Derrida writes, that “in order to take an authentic 
responsibility it [is] necessary to limit oneself to impossible, impractical, and inapplicable 
decisions” (TO 45-46). What is required is a stepping between the unconditional and the 
conditional that analyses “the disparities between law, ethics, and politics, or between the 
unconditional idea of law (be it of men or of states) and the concrete conditions of its 
implementation” (TO 57). One must, to return to chapter one, negotiate. 
11
 Jacques Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarrière, Altérités (Paris: Éditions Osiris, 1986) 82, trans. and 
cited in Jill Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999) 31. 
12
 Ethics, for de Man, is “the structural interference of two distinct value systems” (AO 206), the 
contamination or anacoluthic interruption of what is considered to be universally, absolutely true 
and what is considered necessary and right. These ethical prescriptions are deemed so “right” as to 
be “true”, but there is a perjury involved here, as what is right may not be true, and what is true 
may not be right. The ethical law is a law of reading or judging or interpreting – absolutely 
necessary but not demonstrably or unequivocally true. It has no basis outside itself, and as such is 
just and unjustified. It is bound up in a general impossibility of reading, or perhaps better, of the 
impossibility of ever finishing reading – there is always another fragment, always another mode to 
the anacoluthon, always another parabatic step. 
13
 See Attridge “Posthumous Infidelity” in Reading and Responsibility, and Bennington 
“Deconstruction and Ethics” in Interrupting Derrida for more. 
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argument against the conflation of Levinas‟s other with Derrida‟s other/alterity, 
arguing that while Levinas posits an other who is fundamentally good, Derrida‟s 
concept of alterity is inextricably bound up with violence.   
Ethics as first philosophy presumes an originary peace, and is therefore a 
movement that moves the absolute other closer to an absolute, self-present, 
totalised Same. Levinas‟s face-to-face relation, argues Hägglund, is not with a 
human other but with the Good, and therefore with the same, not the unpredictable 
other. There is the (human) other and the absolute other that is God or the Good – 
the latter is present as a trace in the encounter with the human face. Hägglund‟s 
Derrida, on the other hand, argues for an arche-violence that acknowledges that 
any first principle is a contaminated principle of corruptibility: undecidable and 
incalculable. There is an ethical responsibility to the other not because she is 
infinitely good, but because she is finite and mortal. It is the finite that demands 
responsibility; were it impossible to hurt or kill the other then there would be no 
need for responsibility. Responsibility itself becomes infinite through the finite 
nature of the self and the other: finite relations between terms means that each 
term, as finite, is always surpassed by another finite term. Finite terms therefore 
extend infinitely, and create a “negative infinity of finitude”,14 which, it should be 
noted, is the structure of fragmentation. 
Derrida‟s other is of alterity, of a negative infinity of finitude, the spacing 
of différance, “not because it is absolutely [Good] in itself, but on the contrary, 
because it can never be itself”. 15  Thus Derrida‟s “absolutely other” is not a 
positive infinity but refers to the radical finitude of every other. An act of 
responsibility towards one is an act of irresponsibility towards another, the 
struggle for justice is a struggle for lesser violence, and each decision is haunted 
by the trace of what it must exclude. The other that is welcomed “can always be a 
plunderer or rapist, since the other who comes cannot be anticipated and can 
change its character at any juncture”.16 For Hägglund‟s Derrida the relation to the 
other is not ethical as such, as the other is unpredictable, but is a non-ethical, non-
prescriptive opening to alterity. Infinite responsibility becomes then “another 
name for the necessity of discrimination”.17  
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 Hägglund 94. 
15
 Hägglund 94. 
16
 Hägglund 124. 
17
 Hägglund 95. 
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However, it should be stressed that Hägglund misreads Levinas by arguing 
that the alterity of the other is reduced to the Good and the same. One is hostage 
to other without condition and in all circumstances; hence the emphasis in Levinas 
on physical suffering and sacrifice. Derek Attridge also faults Hägglund‟s reading 
of Derrida, proposing that Hägglund reduces openness to the other to a 
“mechanical necessity” 18  that bears very little resemblance to the ironic 
impossibilities of hospitality, responsibility, the gift etc. etc.. There is, as Attridge 
argues, very little struggle in Hägglund‟s reading of hospitality, just calculation. 
Thus, while Hägglund‟s reading of Levinas and Derrida points to some important 
distinctions, there is, in a sense, not enough sense of potentiality and irony.  
 
Irony and the “Ethical” 
 
The connection between ethics and irony has been made before, although with 
rather different formulations of both the ethical and the ironic. Paul Allen Miller 
sees the ethical not as a set of rules or codes, but a creative act of self-formation: 
“the ability to reflect back upon the very fabric of our language and our selves, to 
make them anew”.19 The ironist is ethical as she seeks “the folding back of the 
fabric of language and thought against itself, enabling the creation of radically 
new forms of meaning and self-understanding”. 20  Reading primarily through 
Lacan, Miller argues that irony is “a function in language of the emergence of 
moments of nonmeaning”. 21  “Irony is the moment when the enunciative act 
causes the pre-existing code to double itself, thereby creating new possibilities for 
new language games, new modes of description, new forms of existence”.22 The 
ironic presents a difference that cannot be recuperated within meaning, a way of 
accessing the outside, that which is other to the prescriptions and norms of the 
culture of the Symbolic – the Real.23 For Miller irony is therefore ethical, as it 
permits us to reconceptualise ourselves: ironic doubling is “the predicate of the 
critical in thought and hence of any ethics of self-formation”.24 It is only by “not 
saying what you mean”25 that one can have any approach to the Real, and thereby 
                                                 
18
 Attridge 141. 
19
 Paul Allen Miller, “Ethics and Irony”, SubStance 120 38.3 (2009) 51-52. 
20
 P. Miller 51. 
21
 P. Miller 54. 
22
 P. Miller 69. 
23
 That is, the ironic enables a step towards the Real, but is not itself the Real.  
24
 P. Miller 55. 
25
 P. Miller 55. 
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to an ethical and critical reworking of the self. Miller‟s subject-centred irony and 
ethics incorporate the perlocutionary, and anacoluthic interruptions and doublings, 
but also bring irony uncomfortably close to the self-involvement condemned by 
Hegel. His ironic ethics begins at home, with the subject, and makes no provision 
for the other. 
In Irony and Ethics in Narrative, Gary Handwerk presents a mode of 
ethical irony which combines Schlegel‟s symphilosophy and Lacan‟s formulation 
of the subject. For Handwerk ethical irony “focuses on how verbal 
incompatibilities set up and provoke a deeper interrogation of self-consciousness. 
For ethical irony, an incompatibility in discourse suspends the question of identity 
by frustrating any immediate coherence of the subject.”26 Ethical irony hence  
 
attacks the notion of the subject as equivalent to a conscious intentionality 
or a personal self-consciousness. To be in language is instead to be located 
in and by the social domain. Ethical irony relocates identity in the 
language through which we pose the question of identity.
27
  
 
Irony is a process of negation which “puts in question the very possibility of 
determinate meaning, for it hints at the awareness that all local meanings must 
finally depend on an inexpressible global signification, an elusive unity of 
discourse”.28 It is sceptical, but “adds to scepticism a doubt of one‟s ability to 
doubt, because it recognises the incurable positivity of the mind and of 
language”.29 Irony is thus  
 
a sceptical enactment of one‟s own position of ignorance, which submits 
the adequacy of one‟s scepticism to another subject for further evaluation. 
Irony establishes an intersubjective bond based on an awareness of the 
partial identity of the subject – at once part of the dialogue and only part 
of itself.
30
 
 
Effectively Handwerk argues that language is iterable, but this iterability is 
precisely what makes us move towards the general or, in Schlegelian terms, the 
symphilosophic. 
                                                 
26
 Handwerk 2. 
27
 Handwerk 3. 
28
 Handwerk 172.  
29
 Handwerk 173. 
30
 Handwerk 173. 
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Handwerk‟s is a fragmented subject of radical contingency, whose identity 
is absolutely “dependent upon an alien language, speaking with the voice of the 
other”.31 The subject is through language and through intersubjective relations, 
and thus engages in what Handwerk terms ironic intersubjectivity; “an interaction 
where the recognition of ignorance serves as a springboard to ethical involvement 
with another subject”.32 Handwerk‟s formulation of ethics remains what Levinas 
would call ontological rather than ethical, as it is the subject rather than alterity or 
the other who is at the centre of the system. Gary Peters, however, steps closers to 
the ironic ethics of this chapter when  he writes that irony is a “strategy of forging 
integrated structures which either fail to integrate or achieve a degree of 
integration that, as a consequence, demands precisely the infinite movement of 
irony to disengage the ironist from the non-ironic stasis that threatens”. 33  It 
consists of a “perpetual flight from identity to difference and back again infinitely, 
its spectacular restlessness for the sake of the other who risks incarceration within 
the dubious totalities that are everywhere apparent”.34 Irony is of difference, a 
mode that attempts to avoid the imposition of a system on that which resists 
systemisation.  
Irony is the preservation of alterity through the ahierarchical disorder of 
parataxis and fragmentation. In The Ethics of Deconstruction Simon Critchley 
argues that “deconstruction „is‟ ethical”35 because the interruption of ontological 
closure that it contains/produces is the “ethical transcendence”36 of ontology. He 
writes that “for Derrida, the ethical moment is the interruption of the general 
context of conditioned hypothetical imperatives by an unconditional categorical 
imperative. Ethics arises in and as the undecidable yet determinate articulation of 
these two orders”.37 From the undecidability of these two codes comes a moment 
of unconditional appeal, a “yes” to alterity and the other. The ethical content of 
deconstruction lies in its saying “yes” to the unnameable, a “yes” found in the 
abyss between the conditional and the unconditional: in the openness to alterity. 
                                                 
31
 Handwerk 173. 
32
 Handwerk 169. 
33
 Gary Peters, “Dissymmetry and Height: Rhetoric, Irony and Pedagogy in the Thought of Husserl, 
Blanchot and Levinas”, Human Studies 27.2 (2004) 191.  
34
 Peters 191. 
35
 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 
2. 
36
 Critchley, Ethics 30. 
37
 Critchley, Ethics 40. That is, it interrupts the ethical relations that operate to satisfy our own 
desire for happiness – the convenient, prudential maxims, with categorical imperatives that strive 
for unconditional, universal good.  
P a g e  | 179 
 
Hägglund disagrees. He argues that the “yes” of deconstruction is not an 
ethical affirmation but an affirmation of the trace structure of time, a “yes” to the 
coming of the future that is also contaminated by a negation, since the future may 
bring threats and difficulties. Undecidabilty, according to Hägglund, is not respect 
for the other, as alterity is itself too incalculable to be bound to a positive value: 
“the disjointure that opens the relation to the other is inseparable from the 
nonethical opening of an undecidable future”.38 Deconstruction, for Hägglund, 
does not allow for the primary ethical relation to the good, but addresses the 
undecidable coming of the other. Deconstruction happens. It is neither good, nor 
bad, it just occurs. Thus, deconstruction is “in itself” value neutral; it enables a 
new understanding of the contradictions affecting ethics and politics, but provides 
no guide to negotiate these problems, and does not make us better at dealing with 
them.
39
 Evaluation, claims Hägglund, is not necessarily good.
40
  
Samir Haddad, responding to Hägglund in “Language Remains”, proposes 
that the value of deconstructive evaluation comes from language itself, which is 
never value neutral: “one never evaluates in a neutral context, since the language 
with which one must necessarily engage is already infused with value in a 
sedimented history”.41 Deconstruction, he argues, is conducted in and through 
language, and therefore takes on its values. The terms that Derrida uses function 
within a textual web that contains weighting, and are therefore used with a 
sensibility of their connotations and associations. “Democracy”, to follow 
Haddad‟s example, is privileged in Derrida‟s writings through its descriptive 
merit, through the weight and generally accepted positive implications of the term 
rather than any – nonexistent – “essence” of democracy itself.42 Deconstruction is 
not value neutral because language is not value neutral; the social, cultural, 
political, and philosophical implications of each term predominantly point in a 
particular direction in a specific context. “This”, he writes, “does not mean that 
                                                 
38
 Hägglund 102. 
39
 Hägglund 171. Hägglund speaks here on the specific problem of “lesser violence”.   
40
 One might argue that questioning, interrogating, moving slowly but urgently through texts is a 
positive thing, but this itself is not necessarily “good” – think of the extensive medical experiments 
performed at Auschwitz, Dachau, Ravensbrück, or the Japanese unit 731. The results have been 
medically valuable, but were attained through absolutely tortuous practices.  
41
 Samir Haddad, “Language Remains”, CR: The New Centennial Review 9.1 (2009) 139. 
42
 See chapter six.  
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one is forced in one direction over another, but there will be paths of lesser and 
greater resistance”.43 
Ostensibly Haddad is reminding Hägglund of irony and iterability. While 
one reads, in deconstruction, by “inhabiting” a text, one does so within a structure 
that cannot be inhabited, that is, that cannot be filled or moulded to one‟s needs 
without excess or remainder. The value or force of a term is an ironic force, a 
force of weakness that imposes itself in and through its mutability. If 
deconstruction has a value from language, it is an ironic and transient value, a 
force of weakness, a value of radical variability. Knowing that the value 
judgements being made are subject to mutability, that language remains (radically) 
iterable, that the paths of and through language are impossible and aporetic, is 
“better” and more (ir)responsible than blindly following outcomes or aims, than 
jealously adhering to strategy, than resolutely “progressing” at any cost. The value 
of deconstruction is the value of theory, of thought. In response then to Hägglund, 
it is in the awareness of the complexity of the happening, of the singularity of 
events, of that fact that the other is not necessarily good that deconstruction is, if 
not good, then positively (ir)responsible. One might note here too the basic (ironic) 
contradiction in Hägglund‟s arguments: deconstruction is both value neutral and 
founded on violence. It is violent and yet struggle free, as Hägglund‟s 
deconstruction ignores the difficulties that the irony of (ir)responsibility brings 
about. In response to Hägglund, deconstruction is not the good, it is not peace or 
rest or death or the worst, but is an aporetic, parabatic step of irony, a response of 
(ir)responsibility. And it is better to respond than to stay silent.  
Deconstruction operates within and through language, metaphysics, other 
systems. It is, in a sense, a parasite. There is no outside the text, there is no outside 
deconstruction, it happens (to other, non-separate things). It happens to 
prescriptive systems, undoing and revealing, showing the excess and unsystematic 
by being itself excessive and unsystematic. Deconstruction does not happen alone, 
but happens to something, with something, in something – it is a priori 
contamination. Deconstruction does not seek to eradicate the programmatic, the 
systematic, the prescriptive, the denotative, the said, but to undo their solidity and 
supposed inevitability. Not edifices as such, not, strictly, ruins as such, but 
edifices in ruins. Deconstruction and metaphysics are always mutually implicated 
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in ironic, anacoluthic hyphenation. Recognising the terrain we half inhabit as 
fragmentary and ruinous is positive. “A deconstructive thinking … has always 
pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well 
as the undeconstrucibility of a certain idea of justice” (SM 112). Deconstruction 
promises, knowing that the promise is tainted with perjury, and affirming the 
value of that knowledge. It is not an ethical stride, but an ironic, parabatic step of 
(ir)responsibility that allows for alterity and the other, knowing that who and what 
comes may threaten and harm. It takes the step, knowing without definite 
knowledge that the step towards is a step away, and that the step taken depends on 
an ironic, iterable mark.  
 
The Ironic Response  
 
In “Whom to Give to (Knowing not to Know)” Derrida addresses the story of 
Abraham and Isaac, a story which is “monstrous, outrageous, barely conceivable” 
(GD 67). The monstrosity of the story stems from the ironic double bind that pulls 
between responsibility to the other, and the irresponsibility of the occlusion of the 
other other that this entails. Abraham places his duty to obey God over his duty to 
protect his family, and thus engages in “ethics as „irresponsibilisation‟, as an 
insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between responsibility in general and 
absolute responsibility” (GD 61). In order to be responsible and fulfil his duty to 
the other – God – Abraham must become a murderer, and thereby betray the other 
– his son. Absolute responsibility demands that one transgress ethical duty, but the 
moment or step of transgression does not undo ethics: “Abraham must assume 
absolute responsibility for sacrificing his son by sacrificing ethics, but in order for 
there to be a sacrifice, the ethical must retain all its value” (GD 66). Were 
Abraham not bound ethically – by love, responsibility and duty – to his son then 
in killing him he would feel no loss, and the act would not be a sacrifice.  
The ethical or responsible exigency rests on the fact that “the simple 
concepts of alterity and of singularity” (GD 68) constitute duty and ethics as much 
as responsibility to the (absolute) other. As such I cannot respond to the other 
without ignoring the call and stepping away from an other other: “I am 
responsible to any one (that is to say to any other) only by failing in my 
responsibility to all the others, to the ethical or political generality. And I can 
never justify this sacrifice” (GD 70). There is “no front between responsibility and 
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irresponsibility, but only between different appropriations of the same sacrifice, 
different orders of responsibility” (GD 70). As soon as I enter into a relation with 
the other, I can respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing the ethical 
need to respond, in the same instant, to all the others. Abraham is faithful to God 
only in absolute treachery of the betrayal of his son.
44
 
 When Isaac asks Abraham where they will find the sacrificial lamb 
Abraham replies “God will provide”. As Derrida writes, “By speaking without 
lying, he responds without responding. This is a strange responsibility that 
consists neither of responding nor of not responding” (GD 74). Derrida compares 
it to the (non)response of Melville‟s Bartleby – “I would prefer not to” – which  
 
takes on the responsibility of a response without a response. It evokes the 
future without either predicting or promising; it utters nothing fixed, 
determinable, positive, or negative. The modality of this repeated utterance 
that says nothing, promises nothing, neither refuses nor accepts anything, 
the tense of this singularly insignificant statement reminds one of a 
nonlanguage or a secret language. (GD 75) 
 
Bartleby‟s response suspends dialogue. Not quite a “no” and far from a “yes”, its 
incompleteness prevents the interlocutor from following the conversational thread 
– it is a response without responding that prevents (further) response. It is a 
permanent parabasis, a step/not that interrupts without interrupting, that answers 
without answering. Bartleby does not reveal what he wants, simply that he would 
prefer not to. Abraham does not reveal what he wants, simply that God will 
provide. Bartleby airs his preference without action, Abraham acts without airing 
his preference. In the strangeness of their replies they do not lie but speak in secret, 
operating in a strange space between truth and falsity, affirmative and negative.  
Bartleby‟s response can be likened to writing as Socrates condemns it in 
the Phaedrus. It repeats itself incessantly, responding in the same way to every 
question. Its presence is an absence, it has no real identity. It is absolute passivity; 
it is not given in response or specific engagement but simply reiterates a negative 
preference. As Blanchot writes, Bartleby‟s refrain expresses an abdication that 
precedes all decisions, “abnegation understood as the abandonment of the self, a 
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 As Attridge points out, most practical ethical systems thus “try to find a way to rank 
responsibilities; Derrida‟s point is that such systems are necessarily incoherent, for they use a 
systematic philosophical language in an attempt to capture and legislate for what is constitutively 
resistant to such language” (68).  
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relinquishment of identity, refusal which does not cleave to refusal but opens to 
failure, to the loss of being, to thought” (ED 17). Its passivity does not house 
identity; its abstention steps away from presence, identity and the self-present 
moment. The passivity of Bartleby‟s phrase, a passivity “which would interrupt 
our reason, our speech, our experience” (ED 16), also interrupts time; each use 
reverberates with every other use, placing the moment – at this very moment – 
aphoristically out of joint. Bartleby is a copyist, and his words copy time, placing 
each fragmentary recurrence out of step with itself, and causing time and dialogue 
to falter. The ironic parabasis of his phrase is a passive rupture, a step that is not. 
It is a constative description that presents nothing, a performative that produces 
nothing. It simply reverberates.  
Bartleby‟s responses are a 
 
sublime irony. Speaking in order not to say anything or to say something 
other than what one thinks, speaking in such a way as to intrigue, 
disconcert, question, or have someone or something else speak (the law, 
the lawyer), means speaking ironically. Irony, in particular Socratic irony, 
consists of not saying anything, declaring that one doesn‟t have any 
knowledge of something, but doing that in order to interrogate, to have 
someone or something (the lawyer, the law) speak or think. Eirōneia 
dissimulates, it is the act of questioning by feigning ignorance, by 
pretending. (GD 76)  
 
Irony here is speaking otherwise, speaking anacoluthically, speaking so as to 
interrupt speech and speaking so as to let the other speak.
45
 It is a conversation 
held differently, a conversation of interruption, a response of parataxis in that it 
follows but does not specifically engage, and does not demand a particular 
response. It is next in line but without logical conjunction, a paratactic fragment 
that resists assimilation into an ordered syntax. “It isn‟t”, Derrida writes, “unlike 
the incongruous yet familiar humour, the unheimlich or uncanniness of the story” 
(GD 76). As a phrase it is grammatically unremarkable and semantically prosaic, 
and yet it anacoluthically and ironically interrupts itself, making itself strange and 
disconcerting. It is apathetic and yet oddly decisive, active and passive, simply 
descriptive and yet powerfully performative in the stasis it produces. “I would 
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 Bartleby‟s response is ironic, in that it speaks “in order not to say anything”. It is not an example 
of Derrida‟s reading of Socratic irony, as it does not give room to the other, but silences her.    
P a g e  | 184 
 
prefer not to” produces interruption, produces a conversational or dialogic abyss. 
It confesses and excuses and promotes hiatus, a permanent parabasis.
46
  
Kierkegaard, Derrida writes, sees irony in Abraham‟s response too, as “it 
is always irony when I say something and still do not say anything” (GD 77): 
when speech is silent. And yet this irony is not rhetorical: “Abraham doesn‟t 
speak in figures, fables, parables, metaphors, ellipses, or enigmas. His irony is 
meta-rhetorical” (GD 77). He doesn‟t make recourse to enigmatic language, 
because he doesn‟t know what God is going to do. “He decides, but his absolute 
decision is neither guided nor controlled by knowledge” (GD 77). But a decision 
is, in the end, always secret, responsible and irresponsible: “Abraham‟s decision is 
absolutely responsible because it answers for itself before the absolute other. 
Paradoxically it is also irresponsible because it is guided neither by reason nor by 
an ethics justifiable before men or before the law of some universal tribunal” (GD 
77).
47
 The irony of saying without saying (anything) is not always or necessarily 
intentional or based on knowledge, but an irony of the parabatic, paratactic 
structure of language. Irony speaks and does not speak; it speaks in 
(ir)responsibility. Abraham‟s and Bartleby‟s (non)responses, though perhaps 
intended in vastly different ways, stem from the same ironic structure of the mark. 
Abraham‟s attempted responsibility is hyphenated to Bartleby‟s irresponsibility. 
The (secret) response of irony indicates a further parabatic interruption 
within ethics and responsibility. Abraham lies and doesn‟t lie when he responds to 
his son‟s question about the sacrificial lamb. He says that God will provide, which 
is true, while revealing nothing and keeping his secret.
48
 In this way Abraham 
transgresses the ethical order, at least according to Kierkegaard, who sees the 
highest expression of the ethical as what binds us to our own – the family or the 
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 The strangeness of “I would prefer not to” can be likened to the odd contamination that occurs 
in the phrase “Just imagine, I was not thinking about it” addressed in chapter two. This quotation 
contains an imperative while referring to something already defined and in the past tense. “I was 
not thinking about it” does not simply mean that I forgot. Beyond the amnesia, there is a 
confession that acknowledges a dereliction of duty, and which “pleads guilty and not guilty at the 
same time” (WA 163). It moves between past and present/future, imperative and descriptive, 
confession and avowal, constative and performative, guilt and innocence.  
47
 “A decision”, Derrida writes, “always takes place beyond calculation” (GD 95). For a decision 
to be worthy of the name there must be an element of breaking free, of the perhaps and the 
incalculable. A decision must not be simply the automatic and inevitable expression of the subject. 
We begin by responding, not deciding. This, however, does not work to absolve the subject from 
the nature of her response to the other, nor to justify her response. The subject‟s failure to step up 
to every other is unjustifiable.  
48
 Abraham is correct, but only, in a sense, accidently, as the sacrificial lamb that God provides is 
not Isaac, as Abraham thinks, but a ram caught in a nearby thicket.  
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community of friends/nation. Abraham‟s spoken silence betrays ethics. Each 
subject is singularly responsible, but the first effect of language is to deprive the 
subject of her singularity. This causes her to renounce her liberty and her 
responsibility, since once she speaks she is never and no longer herself: “as soon 
as one speaks, as soon as one enters the medium of language, one loses that very 
singularity. One therefore loses the possibility of deciding or the right to decide” 
(GD 80). It is usually thought that responsibility is tied to the public and the 
nonsecret, to accounting for what you say and do. But Derrida states that “the 
absolute responsibility of my actions, to the extent that such a responsibility 
remains mine, singularly so, something no one else can perform in my place, 
instead implies secrecy” (GD 60). We strive for a mode of responsibility whose 
ironic interruption takes the least irresponsible step.  
 
Ironic Hospitality 
 
Ironic (ir)responsibility is exemplified by the double bind of hospitality. As 
Derrida writes in Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, “hospitality is not simply some 
region of ethics … it is ethicity itself, the whole and the principle of ethics” (AE 
50).
49
 Hospitality is anacoluthic interruption, both of the self – “One will 
understand nothing about hospitality if one does not understand what „interrupting 
oneself‟ might mean, the interruption of the self by the self as other” (AE 52) – 
and of itself, as it is split between the absolute and the conditional. Unconditional 
hospitality is the welcome without reservation, limitation or calculation given to 
“the absolute, unknown, anonymous other[s] … without asking of them either 
reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names” (OH 25). Absolute 
hospitality welcomes the other, even though the other may bring damage, harm or 
hurt: a risk that is “necessary so that good hospitality can have a chance, the 
chance of letting the other come” (AE 35). Conditional hospitality, on the other 
hand, is the mode whereby individuals, societies and states attempt to protect their 
property by determining and defining the other and the form of hospitality she 
will receive. Thus conditions are imposed that transform gifts into contracts and 
betray the principle of unconditional welcome. 
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 In Rogues the emphasis is somewhat different: “I have always ... held unconditional hospitality, 
as impossible, to be heterogeneous to the political, the juridical, and even the ethical” (R 172).  
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 However, even within absolute hospitality lies an impossible tension. The 
other, the foreigner, must be welcomed unconditionally and without questions, but 
must also be welcomed individually and in her own name. Hospitality therefore 
consists of doing everything possible to welcome the other singularly, in her own 
name, without making the question “what is your name?” a point of control. 
Welcoming the foreigner, giving her rights and recognising her name and place 
within a legal system, is a condition of possibility for hospitality, but also that 
which makes it impossible, as it changes the other from the foreign to the familiar. 
Thus hospitality always takes a parabatic step, a step forward that is a step back, a 
step that is not. Conditional and unconditional hospitality exist in aphoristic 
relation; contradictory yet inseparable they are moments of simultaneity without 
simultaneity, “instant[s] of impossible synchrony” (OH 81). Each step of 
hospitality is a step out of time, a moment out of joint split by the ironic antinomy 
of (in)hospitality.  
Hospitality to the other, as the welcome of the other, is also always subject 
to the interruptive, anacoluthic doubling that occurs within the genitive “of”, so 
that the welcome of the other is always a welcome received from the other and a 
welcome given to the other. The welcoming host (hôte) who considers herself the 
owner of the establishment, and who receives the guest (hôte), is in truth an ironic 
hôte (host/guest) received in her own home. She receives the hospitality that she 
offers, and receives it from her own home, which does not, in the end, belong to 
her. “The one who welcomes is first of all welcomed in his own home. The one 
who invites is invited by the one whom he invites” (AE 42). The welcome given 
to the other is a response to a pre-orginary, anarchic pre-welcome received from 
the other. It is the possibility of responding to the other in welcome that enables 
the self to be at home, though at home in the home of the other. The home is 
loaned to the self so the other can be welcomed. The guest/host is also hostage, a 
subject/object valuable only in the way in which she can be substituted for the 
other. Thus not only are the subject‟s acts of hospitality tainted by inhospitality, 
but the subject as host is ironically interrupted by subject as hostage. Homeless in 
her own house, the subject receives an anarchic welcome at the very moment that 
she gives it.
50
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 For Derrida and Levinas the pervertibility of hospitality is linked to gender difference. The pre-
orginary welcome is feminine:  
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The ironic interruptions and excesses that transfigure ethics, rendering it 
(ir)responsibility and (in)hospitality, are performed in Derrida‟s phrase “tout autre 
est tout autre”. This expression translates tautologously as every other is every 
other, or non-tautologously as every other is every bit other. It thus ironically 
interrupts itself, its ambiguous grammatical structure functioning like parataxis – 
its grammar pivots, allowing tout to function both as adjective and adverb, and 
autre as noun and adjective. “If the first tout is an indefinite pronominal adjective, 
then the first autre becomes a noun and the second in all probability, an adjective 
or attribute. One no longer has a case of tautology but instead a radical heterology” 
(GD 83). The anacoluthic excess of its paratactic blancs enables what appears 
tautologous to step up to alterity, and back again. There appear, in ironic 
movement, as if “on the same musical scale, two alarmingly different themes 
[partitions, (musical) scores] that, through their disturbing likeness, emerge as 
incompatible” (GD 83). The sentence fragments itself, creating a paratactic series 
with itself. It includes the singular other and the other other(s), ethics and politics. 
Its step towards a suppression of difference – every other is every other, all 
otherness is the same – is interrupted by its own anacoluthic heterogeneity – every 
other is every bit other, each other is different. It denies any form of hierarchy 
within relations – each other is equally other. It emphasises that every other is an 
other of absolute alterity and difference. As we should not speak of fragment but 
fragments of irreducible singularity, we should not speak of an other but a series 
of singular others to whom each subject is singularly – and impossibly – bound. 
The anacoluthon of the other interrupts the sentence, performing the interruption 
of the self, responsibility and hospitality that takes place. Thus, in a single phrase, 
a fragment of ironic responsibility. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
The absolute, absolutely originary welcome, indeed, the pre-original welcome, the 
welcoming par excellence, is feminine; it takes place in a place that cannot be 
appropriated, in an open „interiority‟ whose hospitality the master or the owner receives 
before himself then wishing to give it. (AE 45) 
 
The master of the house exists in his ambiguous position of host and hostage, because the other, as 
woman, is already there, as the womb, khōra, always pre-exists. In The Gift of Death Derrida 
writes that “Perhaps irony would permit us to find something like a common thread in the 
questions I have just posed [regarding sacrificial responsibility and the woman] and what Hegel 
said about woman: “that she is the eternal irony of the community‟” (GD 77). I am very reluctant 
to equate irony and the feminine or femininity. For an interesting work on the topic, see Lydia 
Rainford‟s She Changes by Intrigue: Irony, Femininity and Feminism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005). 
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Levinas and the Responsible Response 
 
For Levinas ethics is of response and interruption, an ironic, parabatic engagement 
in which the self interrupts itself so as to give the other room to speak. It is a 
skewed, asymmetrical and unequal dialogue wherein answer precedes question as 
the subject responds prior to the request. A responsible dialogue is an aphoristic, 
contrapuntal one, always out of time, as responsibility began in a diachronic time 
beyond memory or recuperation. The response comes before the question, but the 
question comes/came in an inaudible, diachronic past. The first word is never the 
first word, and there is no last word. It is a responsibility which never ends, and is 
never enough, and as such is what Blanchot calls a disastrous responsibility – “the 
responsibility that never lightens the Other‟s burden (never lightens the burden he 
is for me), and makes us mute as far as the word we owe him is concerned” (ED 
27). Levinasian responsibility, writes Blanchot, requires  
  
that I answer for the impossibility of being responsible – that to which it 
has always already consigned me by holding me accountable and also 
discounting me altogether. And this paradox leaves nothing intact – not 
subjectivity any more than the subject, not the individual any more than 
the person. (ED 25) 
 
There is no longer a difference between a responsibility for and a responsibility to 
– the subject is generally and unlimitedly obliged, in an anarchic responsibility 
which began in a prepast; an irrecuperable, immemorable past.
51
 
 Responsibility is the “endless critique” (OB 44) of permanent, ironic 
parabasis, the interruption of the self for the other. As Simon Critchley 
summarises, ethics “is the critical mise en question of the liberty, spontaneity, and 
cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself”.52 The 
post-Cartesian subject, the ego cogito, is a subject engaged in self-reflection, 
                                                 
51
 Bernhard Waldenfels, “Response and Responsibility in Levinas”, Ethics as First Philosophy: 
The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed. Adriaan T. 
Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995) 43. Waldenfels argues that the responsibility in question is 
not a response – it is predetermined and therefore no decision, as a response without possible 
alternatives is not really a response at all. In response to this Hugh Miller notes that the “question” 
asked by the other/neighbour precedes consciousness, and therefore decisions. It is a “prick of 
conscience” that places the other in obsessive proximity such that consciousness can no more deny 
it than breathe. This does not annihilate the self, but enable the self to be the-one-for-the-other 
(Hugh Miller, “Reply to Bernhard Waldenfels”, Ethics as First Philosophy 55). Levinas‟s concept 
of responsibility is involuntary, and therefore does not partake of the difficulties of the decision 
outlined above in relation to Derrida. This is an important difference between Levinas and Derrida. 
52
 Simon Critchley, Ethics 5. 
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being in the act of analysing being. Levinas seeks to make ethics first philosophy, 
replacing an ontology of the subject, with its attendant preoccupations with truth, 
apophansis, essence and consciousness, with a being-for-the-other outside of 
thematisation and comprehensibility. The subject is then a subjectile, “a passivity, 
wholly a supporting” (OB 180), “a sub-jectum … under the weight of the universe, 
responsible for everything” (OB 116). The subject‟s responsibility is a pre-
originary obligation, an order obeyed before it is given, and as such the subject 
cannot choose, subsequently using that choice to consolidate an identity. The 
subject is therefore sacrificed rather than self-sacrificing, as “it is only in this way 
that the for-the-other, the passivity more passive still than any passivity, the 
emphasis of sense, is kept from being for-oneself” (OB 50). And yet only the 
subject can substitute herself, she is “unique in the unexceptional requisition of 
responsibility” (OB 53), and a suffering that might always be a suffering for 
nothing. The subject must incessantly alienate herself, be dis-interested in herself, 
perform a kenosis. She is a stranger in her own home, hostage to the other; the 
welcome she offers is not hers to give and is given/taken even before a request is 
made. She steps in dissymmetrical step towards the other: “I have always taken 
one step more toward him – which is possible only if this step is responsibility” 
(OB 84). 
Levinas‟s ethical subject does not self-reflect, but reflects on the other – 
the face in the mirror is never hers:  
 
the recurrence to oneself cannot stop at oneself, but goes to the hither side 
of oneself; in the recurrence to oneself there is a going to the hither side of 
oneself. A does not, as in identity, return to A, but retreats to the hither 
side of its point of departure. (OB 114)  
 
Even reflexive forms of verbs are not centred on the subject but signify “a 
modality of passivity which in substitution is beyond even passivity” (OB 138). 
The very grammar of the subject is altered, so that “The word I means here I am, 
answering for everything and for everyone” (OB 114). As Derrida writes,  
 
“Here I am”: the first and only possible response to the call by the other, 
the originary moment of responsibility such as it exposes me to the 
singular other, the one who appeals to me. “Here I am” is the only self-
presentation presumed by every form of responsibility: I am ready to 
respond, I reply that I am ready to respond. (GD 71) 
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“I” is not longer the mark of a self-present identity, but an empty pronoun said by 
she who, in responsibility, is simply “the-one-for-the-other”. The ethical subject is 
“only this unlimited passivity of an accusative which does not issue out of a 
declension it would have undergone starting with the nominative” (OB 112). She 
is always accused, and cannot decline; she can never be grammatically 
repositioned and hence loses the power to ever refuse. 
The absolute obligation of the ethical face-to-face relation between “the-
one-for-the-other” and the other is complicated by what Levinas terms the third, 
or the neighbour: “The third party is other than the neighbour, but also another 
neighbour, and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply his fellow” (OB 157). 
It “introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other 
until then went in one direction” (OB 157). The contradiction leads to justice,53 
the exigencies of responsibility and the constant negotiating between the 
conditional and the unconditional, the possible and the impossible, the 
thematisable and nonthematisable. The responsible interruption between the face-
to-face and the third is mirrored in the ironic anacoluthons of the saying and the 
said, and the synchronic and the diachronic. Synchrony and the said are the time 
and language to which we have direct access. The anacoluthon that occurs in both 
instances is a radical ironic interruption that steps beyond a (simple) doubling of 
codes – the synchronic and the said are disrupted by that which is radically other 
to their content/form/structure/theme/time/code but which can only be accessed 
through their content/form/structure/theme/time/code. They are hence interrupted 
by an ironic anacoluthon of alterity and absence – interrupted by that which 
figures as a trace within their codes, by that which is not quite in the same time or 
space but in and out of time, in and out of step: beyond and within. Contamination 
is here contiguity, a contiguity that doubles space and time without rendering it 
quite the same space or time. The ironic anacoluthon parabatically steps out of 
itself.  
The said is a language which comprises themes, concepts and 
propositional statements, and which irresponsibly binds the other to the cognitive 
and the systematic. In the said language functions to underwrite ontology and the 
                                                 
53
 Not Derrida‟s undeconstructible justice, but justice as inseparable from politics and political 
practice. As Attridge puts it, Levinas “wishes to avoid compromising the primacy of the ethical 
relation with the singular other, but at the same time to avoid relegating the third and justice to a 
merely secondary and subsidiary role” (107). 
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centrality of the subject: “The said is not simply a sign or an expression of a 
meaning; it proclaims and establishes this as that” (OB 35). It is grounded in “the 
very impossibility of anything else, of any revolution that would not be a 
revolving upon oneself” (OB 182), and presents everything before us, “be it at the 
price of a betrayal” (OB 6). Against this is the saying, a responsible, ethical 
language that does not systemise or thematise, that does not centre itself on 
comprehensible communication and definable knowledge, which is not spoken by 
a strong “I” and does not presuppose a “sovereign and active subjectivity, [an] 
undeclined self-consciousness” (OB 47). Saying “signifies otherwise than as an 
apparitor presenting essence and entities” (OB 46); it is an ethical “language”54 
that cannot be reduced to a language centred on impersonal, general Being as it is 
(of the) otherwise than Being, other to ontology and a subject-centred discourse. 
The saying says the responsibility,
55
 passivity, proximity and obsession of the 
subject who breathes for the other; it speaks of perlocution, of effects rather than 
statements, of an asymmetrical discourse of nonreciprocal responsibility, of “the 
most passive passivity” (OB 50).  
The saying is the condition for all communication, the exposure to the 
other that allows communication to be. Communication in this sense is therefore 
not the mirroring of mark and concept in an auto-affection of certainty; it is not “a 
modality of cognition” (OB 48) but a giving of the self to the other in an 
asymmetrical discourse that is not grounded in the exchange of concepts.
56
 
Responsible communication is a strange dialogue, a response given before the 
question – always responsibility over questionability – a performative “here I am” 
that exceeds any constative context. However, the saying cannot be said without 
the said; it cannot be expressed without the reduction and betrayal of the 
constative or propositional form. This betrayal is not an absolute defeat, as “the 
saying that is absorbed in the said is not exhausted in this manifestation” (OB 46). 
But in order to approach the other what is required is a said that is not said but 
which is unsaid, that unthematises itself, a language of the same that steps to the 
language of the other: “The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must 
                                                 
54
 The saying is not a language as we know language – it is the exposure to the other that we 
attempt to express in language (the said). 
55
 “The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to the said” (OB 43). 
56
 As Levinas writes, “The problem of communicating reduced to the problem of the truth of this 
communication for him that receives it amounts to the problem of certainty, of the coinciding of 
self with self, as though coinciding were the ultimate secret of communication, as though truth 
were only disclosure” (OB 119).  
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also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in 
which it already comes to signify but a being otherwise” (OB 7). 57 The said must 
be reduced to the saying.
58
 The saying and the said exist in ironic hyphenation – 
wholly separate the said nonetheless always contains a trace of the saying, and the 
saying can only be accessed through the said. As Edith Wyschogrod writes, it is 
not that language can be used to express the excess beyond expression, but that 
“thought that betrays as it exposes this excess can be regarded as envisaging a 
certain difference, as a thinking of the ligature between philosophy and that which 
transcends it, that separates as it unites them”.59 Communication is always an 
ironic hyphenation of two codes, or, perhaps better, the anacoluthon between the 
codified and the noncodified, between the system and the excess of the system. 
Responsible communication sides with the nonthematised, which can only be 
approached through the ironic interruption of the thematised. 
In formulating a mode of linguistic response to the other, Levinas divides 
time into the synchronic – that which formulates identity – and the diachronic – 
that which is wholly other to identity, consciousness and the recuperable or 
assimilable. For Levinas the essence of an entity is its process or event of being, 
its placement in time as a verb, and so temporalisation is that which allows for 
identity to be. Consciousness is therefore temporalisation. 
Consciousness/temporalisation is the differing of the self from itself – the 
“differing of the identical” (OB 9) – that allows it to reflect, and as such is the 
temporal distance of the self from itself. Over the course of this infinite differing 
the past is modified without changing as it sinks deeper into the past, and 
“memory recuperates in images what retention was not able to preserve, and 
                                                 
57
 This is not to imply that Levinas in any way thought to eradicate propositional language. He 
writes:  
 
Our task is to show that the plot proper to saying does indeed lead it to the said, to the 
putting together of structures which make possible justice and the „I think‟. The said, the 
appearing, arises in the saying. Essence then has its hour and its time. Clarity occurs, and 
thought aims at themes. But all that is in function of a prior signification proper to saying, 
which is neither ontological or ontic. Our task is to establish its articulation and 
signifyingness antecedent to ontology. In correlation with the said (in which the saying 
runs the risk of being absorbed as soon as the said is formulated), the saying itself is 
indeed thematised, exposes in essence even what is on the hither side of ontology, and 
flows into the temporalisation of essence (OB 46). 
58
 The reduction that takes place here is not a traditional phenomenological reduction as it does not 
step back to the sovereign self, but to something prior to the ego. 
59
 Edith Wyschogrod, “Language and Alterity in the Thought of Levinas”, The Cambridge 
Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 189. 
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historiography reconstructs that whose image is lost. To speak of consciousness is 
to speak of time” (OB 32). That is, to speak of synchronic time.  
Diachronic time is a time that is otherwise. It is a lost time that cannot be 
re-presented – or represented – and that is therefore non-ontological as it cannot 
be used to consolidate a knowledge of the ego. This time is “the disjunction of 
identity where the same does not rejoin the same: there is non-synthesis, lassitude. 
The for-oneself of identity is now no longer for itself” (OB 52). It is the time of 
the beyond being, that does not allow the reduction “of men to self-consciousness 
and self-consciousness to the concept, that is, to history, to deduce from the 
concept and from history the subjectivity and the „I‟” (OB 18). As a result of 
diachrony the identity of the subject comes to it from outside itself as it substitutes 
itself for the other; it can no longer be for-itself but must be for-another. The 
saying is thus of diachronic time: “saying, in the form of responsibility for another, 
is bound to an irrecuperable, unrepresentable, past, temporalising according to a 
time with separate epochs, a diachrony” (OB 47). 
The diachronic speaks of “a past more ancient than every representable 
origin, a pre-original and anarchical passed” (OB 9); a past which never occurred 
in a present. This anarchic past is a time in which the unlimited responsibility to 
the other began: “The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from 
the hither side of my freedom, from a „prior to every memory,‟ an „ulterior to 
every accomplishment,‟ from the non-present par excellence, the non-original, the 
an-archical, prior to and beyond essence” (OB 10). Were my responsibility to 
figure in a present it would figure in a time that had a beginning and an end: a 
responsibility in a finite time is a limited responsibility. Since responsibility 
begins in a diachronic time, it did not begin and therefore cannot end. It is 
anarchic; it begins have already begun. And therefore occurs in a lost time “that 
flows between the fingers of Mnemosyne” (OB 84). Diachrony, a radicalisation of 
ironic, aphoristic time, is the time of Lēthē.60 
Diachronic time can be likened therefore to the time of the permanent 
parabasis as it ironically interrupts and oversteps relations, both the self-relation 
of the subject and the relation between the subject and the other. The reaction of 
the “I” to the face is one of a lapse in time, a relation that takes place in a present 
that is already a past and which cannot be re-presented. The “I” is always late, 
                                                 
60
 See chapter two. 
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always out of time, relating to the other in an impossible, diachronic, aphoristic 
time – the self and other, and the self and the self are in ironic counterpoint, never 
synchronised, never contemporaneous, never present. It is not that dicharonic time 
is ironic time, but that ironic, aphoristic temporal relations stem from the parabatic, 
anacoluthic interruption of the synchrony of the said by the diachrony of the 
saying. These ironic interruptions form the theoretical basis of Levinas‟s ethics – 
the next section addresses how these anacoluthons are employed in ethical writing. 
  
 
Ironic, Ethical Writing(s) 
 
How can one write ethically? How can one write so as to betray the other the least? 
Blanchot writes that  
 
the word “responsibility” – contrasting as it does with our reason without 
thereby consigning us to some facile irrationality – comes as though from 
an unknown language which we only speak counter to our heart and to life, 
and unjustifiably. ... One would thus have to turn toward some language 
that never has been written – a language never inscribed but that is always 
to be prescribed – in order that this incomprehensible word be understood 
in its disastrous heaviness and in its way of summoning us to turn toward 
the disaster without either understanding it or bearing it. (ED 26-27)  
 
How does one approach the other and write in a language that has never been 
written? How can one avoid systemisation and homogeneity? As Robert 
Bernasconi writes, a major objection to Levinas‟s work prior to Otherwise than 
Being was that “in the course of articulating his claim that ethics is beyond being 
and so unthematisable, he makes a theme of the unthematisable”.61 Jill Robbins 
agrees, arguing that 
 
all of Levinas‟s ethical discourse can be seen to run precisely this risk of 
falling into a discourse on the ethical. A speaking to the other becomes a 
speaking about the other. How to speak about this ethical language without 
rendering its performative dimension constative, without returning it to the 
denotative language of the same?
62
  
 
                                                 
61
 Robert Bernasconi, “Skepticism in the Face of Philosophy”, Re-Reading Levinas, ed. Robert 
Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991)149. 
62
 Robbins 13. 
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An aesthetic, rhetorical, ludic language may seem to be the answer. Yet Levinas is 
notorious for his distrust of poetry and art: “Reality and its Shadow” decried art as 
unethical to such an extent that on its first publication in 1948 in Les Temps 
Modernes the editors also published a commentary voicing severe disagreement. 
As Leslie Hill writes, “it is well known that from the outset Levinas was deeply 
suspicious of poetry, all too often associated by him with mystification, pagan 
magic, and sorcery”.63 Levinas may not, as Robbins writes, “seem a philosopher 
who would be wedded to the propositional style: he has too many quirks, both 
conceptual and stylistic. But there is no question that he is a philosopher who is at 
pains to exclude the aesthetic”.64  
An ethical writing must not annihilate the subject in overwhelming, poetic 
rhythm, since the subject must be singularly able to substitute itself for the other. 
A responsible writing must step up to the other in straightforward sincerity, but 
not restrict the otherness or alterity of the other by wholly betraying it in the 
constraining propositions of the said. However, a straightforward ethical step by 
no means corresponds to a straightforward said – sincere language is not “easy” 
language. An ethical language is one that interrupts the subject and the said to step 
straight up to the other and the saying, but the straight step to the saying is not the 
same as the straightforward in the said.  
Robbins notes how, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas is opposed to the 
tropological: “In privileging such an ethical language, Levinas quite explicitly ... 
excludes rhetoric – as a form of language which is devious, that is not straight, 
that does not face – and with it, implicitly, any language that is figured or 
troped”.65 However, despite this, as Derrida establishes,  
 
Levinas‟s writing ... in which stylistic gestures (especially in Totality and 
Infinity) can less than ever be distinguished from intention, forbids the 
prosaic disembodiment into conceptual frameworks that is the first 
violence of all commentary. Certainly, Levinas recommends the good 
usage of prose which breaks Dionysic charm or violence, and forbids 
poetic rapture, but to no avail: in Totality and Infinity the use of metaphor, 
remaining admirable and most often – if not always – beyond rhetorical 
abuse, shelters within its pathos the most decisive movements of the 
discourse. (WD 397-98) 
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 Leslie Hill, “„Distrust of Poetry‟: Levinas, Blanchot, Celan”, MLN 120 (2005) 988. 
64
 Robbins 53. 
65
 Robbins 76. 
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In Otherwise than Being the for-the-other is described as a trope containing the 
non-assemblable elements of diachrony (OB 69), and “The tropes of an ethical 
language are found to be adequate for certain structures of the description: for the 
sense of the approach in its contrast with knowing, the face in its contrast with a 
phenomenon” (OB 120). The face-to-face relation is not a metaphor, but the 
tropological steps so as not to fall into the presumption of knowledge and control. 
Ethical language is a force, an approach, an apology and pledge, a promise and a 
perjury. It can never (just) describe the ethical, but must perform it. It steps in a 
style/force of interruption and proximity, counterpoint and anacoluthon, a said 
ironically interrupted by the saying, a synchrony ironically interrupted by 
diachrony. Robbins writes: “Self-interruption is the trope for a form of ethical 
discourse in which the interruption is not reabsorbed into thematisation and 
totality, namely, an ethical discourse that performs its own putting into 
question”.66  
Robbins briefly describes an ethical language in terms of parataxis, 
although she doesn‟t use the term: “Composed entirely of vocatives and datives, 
such a language cannot have a syntax. It stammers „you, you, you‟”.67 Ethical 
language is ironic – parabasis and parataxis – a writing that singularly presents the 
self only to erase the self before the other, a writing without order and syntax 
which presents the self to the other in noncognitive disarray: a gasped parataxis, a 
breathing for the other. It interrupts and fragments itself, presenting a text that 
elides the cognitive and the propositional. As Lyotard writes, “Instead of being the 
description of an experience, conducted by an I in quest of self-knowledge, 
perhaps Levinas‟s writing is the testimony of the fracture” [emphasis added].68 
Rather than presuming that this means using language against itself, or forcing it 
to step outside of its possibilities, in “At This Very Moment In This Work Here I 
Am” Derrida asks “if it is not this language, this tongue, that is untied by and from 
itself, therefore opened to the wholly other, to its own beyond, in such a way that 
it is less a matter of exceeding this language than of dealing otherwise with its 
own possibilities” (AM 150). We must move beyond language within language, as 
the “passage beyond language requires language or rather the text as a place for 
the trace of a step that is not (present) elsewhere” (AM 154). A responsible 
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 Robbins 145. 
67
 Robbins xxiii. 
68
 Lyotard, The Differend 113. 
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discourse that steps up to the saying gives space for a parabatic step, a step that 
never occurred in any present or presentable time, but that nonetheless leaves 
footprints along the way.  
 In response to Derrida‟s question – “How, then, does he [Levinas] write?” 
(AM 150) – we must answer: “With irony”. Parabatic irony, the step that is not, 
steps up to the unpresentable, and is a mode of writing that, to borrow Derrida‟s 
term, is faulty, so that “the fault, the one that consists in inscribing the wholly 
other in the empire of the same, alters the same enough to absolve it from and of 
itself” (AM 150). The fault is the fault of irony, of anacoluthic interruption, 
paratactic hyphenation, and parabatic transgression. Thus Levinas‟s ethical 
response, which “responds to the Other – for the Other – and approaches writing 
by ordering itself according to this for-the-Other” (AM 150), responds through 
irony. Levinas writes:  
 
Language would exceed the limits of what is thought, by suggesting, 
letting be understood without ever making understandable, an implication 
of a meaning distinct from that which comes to sign from the simultaneity 
of systems or the logical definitions of concepts. This possibility is laid 
bare in the poetic said, and the interpretation it calls for ad infinitum 
[emphasis added]. (OB 169-70)
69
 
 
The poetic said lays bare the possibility of a language which exceeds the limits of 
what is thought, that enables the receiver to do before understanding as a meaning 
is transferred that is other to a propositional meaning. It is a language, and 
remains in the provenance of the said, but is, so to speak, the least bad said. As 
Levinas explains, the “unnarratable other loses his face as a neighbor in narration. 
The relationship with him is indescribable in the literal sense of the term, 
unconvertible into a history, irreducible to the simultaneousness of writing, the 
eternal present of a writing that records or presents results” (OB 166). The poetic, 
ironic said does not narrate or describe the other as it does not tell a tale but 
performs an approach to the other: “As a sign given of this signification of signs, 
proximity also delineates the trope of lyricism: to love by telling one‟s love to the 
beloved – long songs, the possibility of poetry, of art” (OB 199). It is a poetry 
                                                 
69
 While the possibility is laid bare in the poetic said, it should not be presumed that Levinas 
thought that poetry was ethical. Poetry and art are too self-involved to be wholly ethical. “Art is 
the pre-eminent exhibition in which the said is reduced to a pure theme, to absolute exposition, 
even to shamelessness capable of holding all looks for which it is exclusively destined. The said is 
reduced to the Beautiful, which supports Western ontology” (OB 40). 
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taking dictation from the other, tracing the words of the other across the heart, 
turning but never leading back to home. It is a passive perlocutionary act 
signifying towards the other. Levinas uses language ironically, playing with 
lacunae, interruption, quotation, repetition, disjunction and non-contemporaneity, 
producing, as he describes it, a very “strange discussion” (OB 183) indeed.70  
Levinas‟s texts abound with phrases and typographies that perform ironic 
hyphenation and interruption. Certain terms are schismed with hyphens, split 
between prefix and stem so that the step between their independent and composite 
meanings is emphasised – an-archic, dia-chrony, extra-ordinary, dis-interested, 
de-posing, ex-ception. In other phrases expected lacunae are elided, or replaced 
with hyphens – one-in-the-place-of-the-other, one-for-the-other – conjoining 
words so that new composites are created. Phrases are (seemingly) tautologous: 
“passivity more passive than all passivity” (OB 14), “The subjectivity of 
subjection of the self is the suffering of suffering, the ultimate offering oneself, or 
suffering in the offering of oneself” (OB 54), “saying, saying, saying itself” (OB 
143), and (apparently) contradictory – “unsayable saying” (OB 44). The repetition 
of terms within sentences – and over the course of Levinas‟s text(s) – causes 
phrases to spiral in on themselves and wheel outward, their tautology interrupted 
or undone when the phrases are broken down. Their recurrence is always an 
interruption, both by future and past contexts, and by the terms that succeed them, 
so that obsession, substitution, proximity, exposure, sensibility all operate in ways 
similar to Derrida‟s nonsynonymous substitutions. Each one is interrupted before 
it can solidify into a defining theme. Robbins notes that Levinas‟s phrases are 
subject to the inversion of hysteron proteron, a term used by Schlegel to describe 
irony. Hence phrases like “the hand was thrown in before the game began”,71 
whose temporal exigency or inversion can be likened to the ironic interruption 
that occurs in the phrase “do before understanding”, an ironic obligation that 
figures throughout Levinas‟s work.72  
                                                 
70
 Interestingly, Levinas describes Derrida‟s work as strange too: “A new style of thinking is 
dawning on us in reading these exceptionally precise texts which are yet so strange” (WO 3). 
71
 Robbins 26-27. 
72
 The act of doing before understanding is one that, as “Che cos‟è” would argue, has to be learned 
by heart. As Lyotard outlines, for Levinas the order as ethical command is more important than the 
content of the order or any commentary on the order. A prescriptive statement can easily slip into a 
denotative one by being questioned – it thus describes or mentions rather than obliges – or by 
being disobeyed – it becomes an object of commentary. In order for a prescriptive statement to 
remain as such it must be instantly obeyed before understanding, as making something an object of 
knowledge reduces it to the order of constative description. “Close the door” thus becomes a 
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Otherwise than Being is a permanent parabasis of interruption and 
conjunction that operates as infinite fragmentability; the text is fragmented into 
three sections – “the argument”, “the exposition” and “in other words”. These 
fragments are fragmented into six chapters, which are divided into numbered 
fragments, many of which are divided into alphabetised fragments. While these 
sections and subsections give the appearance of a rigorously thematised order, 
they are interrupted by constant repetition. Each fragment exists independently of 
each other fragment, and forms part of a text that is a very faulty, fragmentary 
whole. The repetition is and is not repetition; figuring in a different fragment – 
and the fragments themselves comprise fragments of sentences and phrases – 
repeated expositions of, for example, proximity, cognition, sensibility, the saying 
and the said, are not simple repetitions by dint of their different position and frame. 
Thus Levinas‟s text performs “the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return 
and repetition, always, of the same wave against the same shore, in which, 
however, as each return recapitulates itself, it also infinitely renews and enriches 
itself” (WD 398). The interruptive step of parabasis reverses the transmutation of 
alterity into sameness that occurs in philosophical systems, and instead uses the 
(apparently) same to sign towards the other in alterity. The fragments form a 
“seriality of derangement”, a series of mutually interrupting, parabatic repetitions 
where “one must hear each philosopheme deranged, dislocated, disarticulated, 
made inadequate and anterior to itself, absolutely anarchic to everything that is 
said about it” (AM 170).  
This fragmentary disorder is heightened when one looks back to Levinas‟s 
earlier texts on art and the aesthetic which are vehement in their denunciation of a 
use of language that obscures and distorts reality. Yet the terms that condemn and 
denote irresponsibility are the same terms that later praise a responsible turn 
                                                                                                                                     
metalinguistic commentary or descriptive quotation; “Lyotard says, or mentions, or uses, „close the 
door‟”.  
The problem expressed in Levinas‟s work is that if the commentator understands the 
work, then she does not understand it, and if she does not understand it, then she understands it. 
While the classic example of the problematic can be likened to the impossibility of the order 
“Disobey!”, the paradox is also found in the simple “Obey!”. “Obey!” is an interrupted order, an 
injunction to obey the order previously received, or, of course, the order to come. “Obey!” is itself 
an empty proposition, it cannot itself be executed; it is that which renders all orders executory. It 
demands immediate conformity without any specific content located in its present time – the 
content of the order has passed or is to come. In the present one must simply obey without 
information or understanding, one exists to obey, one hears and obeys. “Obey” is a fragment, an 
interrupted, ironic injunction. (Jean-François Lyotard, “Levinas‟ Logic”, Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).) 
P a g e  | 200 
 
towards the other. Thus what in a single text seems open and unambiguous 
becomes haunted by irony and iterability. In “Reality and its Shadow” terms like 
passivity, loss of initiative, and the non-cognitive, terms that in Otherwise than 
Being denote ethical responsibility, are used to decry its absence. Vocabulary 
remains the same, but there is an absolute anacoluthon, an interruption in the 
shape of a reversal in polarity. Levinas‟s later texts hence radically interrupt and 
rewrite his earlier texts, and, as Critchley argues, form “a series of palaeonymic 
displacements, where the ancient words of the tradition are repeated and in the 
iterability of that repetition semantically transformed”.73 Levinas‟s writing, both 
in relation to his own texts and the texts of the philosophical canon, performs a 
radical, ironic interruption.
74
  
The difficulty of the act of producing the unsaid means that Levinas‟s 
terms function like pharmaka; medicine and poison, responsible and irresponsible, 
ethical and unethical, as the saying and the said have to inhabit the same linguistic 
space. Levinas‟s faulty, parabatic style employs a poetic, ironic mode of 
expression that is the permanent parabasis of the “incessant unsaying of the said” 
(OB 181), and which attempts, if not to wholly unsay the said, then to step as 
close to saying as possible.
75
 Thus Levinas is obliged to write, for example: 
“Saying states and thematises the said, but signifies it to the other, a neighbour, 
with a signification that has to be distinguished from that borne by words in the 
said” [emphasis added] (OB 46). Despite saying‟s absolutely antithetical position 
to statements and thematisations, such terms are sometimes required to 
demonstrate and thereby perform the turn operating between the saying and the 
said. When the saying “states” or “thematises” – as a trace in the said – it 
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 Critchley, Ethics-Politics 75. 
74
 Gerald L. Bruns analyses art and poetry in Levinas in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, 
although he reads Levinas‟s engagement as more sustained and systematic, arguing that Levinas 
sees the aesthetic as one of darkness. See “The Concepts of Art and Poetry in Emmanuel Levinas‟s 
Writings”, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas.  
75
 Alphonso Lingis‟s translation of “dédit du Dit” as “unsaying the said” adds a paradoxical 
element to the phrase. Comparatively the French expression translates as “unsaid the said” and 
avoids the confusion which occurs in English when one is forced to “unsay the said”. In English 
complications arise because to “unsay” implies to move away from the saying, which would, if 
possible, intensify the saidness of the said. If we retain the term “say” we have to rather hear “say 
the said”, that is, move the said towards the saying, or more logically, using said, “unsaid the said”. 
While the latter presents the correct sense, it opens a temporal dilemma, as it renders the action in 
the past tense, and adds, if this can be said, an element of the diachronic, of the already passed. In 
English “unsay the said” takes a parabatic step which hyphenates it to what it is not – it is both a 
movement towards and away from the saying.  
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interrupts the said, and the “normal” functioning of terms. The saying and the said 
exist in ironic hyphenation. 
Levinas‟s language is an ironic mixture of the poetic and the sceptical. 
Scepticism, as a position of extreme doubt, rewrites Socrates‟ “I only know that I 
do know not” as “None of us knows anything, not even this, whether we know or 
do not know”. 76  The sceptical “states the rupture, failure, impotence or 
impossibility of discourse” (OB 168), and is audacious enough to “affirm the 
impossibility of statement while venturing to realise this impossibility by the very 
statement of this impossibility” (OB 7). Scepticism is that which turns in on itself, 
which persists through promise and perjury, as each negative or doubtful 
statement is always also a promise or affirmation: “[I affirm that] It is false”, “[I 
affirm that] We do not know”. There is thus always an interruption or disjunction 
within the sceptical statement, an interval or abyss between affirmation and 
negation. Scepticism is that which recognises and retains interruption: it is a 
“refusal to synchronise the implicit affirmation contained in saying and the 
negation which this affirmation states in the said” (OB 167). This interruption is 
double – it is a negative proposition interrupted by a positive affirmation, and the 
act of saying interrupted by – and interrupting – the content of the said. There can 
never be a last word, as while the said is the final content, it is ironically 
interrupted by the final act of exposure.
77
 The exposure and the content operate in 
ironic counterpoint and “do not resound in the same time” (OB 168): they are 
ironically hyphenated as they are brought together and kept apart. Thus for 
Levinas is it not the contamination of the saying and the said that is important, it 
is the radical anacoluthic interruption or disjuncture that occurs within the 
contamination. The contrapuntal diachrony within the contamination or shared 
space is what prevents scepticism from being simply self-contradictory. It is the 
permanent interruption and “permanent return” (OB 171) of ironic permanent 
parabasis; “it recommences as soon as one interrupts it” (OB 169). “Language”, 
writes Levinas, “is already scepticism” (OB 170): interrupted, interrupting, it goes 
on.  
The interruptive force of scepticism is explicitly tied to irony by Blanchot 
in The Writing of the Disaster: 
 
                                                 
76
 Bernasconi attributes this to Metrodorus of Chios in “Skepticism” 150. 
77
 See Jan de Greef, “Skepticism and Reason”, Face to Face with Levinas 159-79.  
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Scepticism, a noun that has crossed out its etymology and all etymology, is 
not indubitable doubt; it is not simply nihilist negation: rather, irony. 
Scepticism is in relation with the refutation of scepticism. … Scepticism is 
indeed the return of the refuted, that which erupts anarchically, 
capriciously, and irregularly each time (at the same time not each time) 
that authority and the sovereignty of reason, indeed of unreason, impose 
their order on us or organise themselves definitively in a system. 
Scepticism does not destroy the system; it destroys nothing; it is a sort of 
gaiety without laughter, in any case without mockery, which suddenly 
makes us uninterested in affirmation, in negation: thus it is neutral like all 
language. (ED 76-77) 
 
In crossing out etymology scepticism erases beginnings and definitional meaning. 
A permanent parabasis of proposition and refutation, statement and rebuttal, there 
is neither a first nor final word, just an interruption that takes place without 
contact or contemporaneity. For Blanchot it does not destroy the system but 
reveals the system to be already interrupted by its own asystematicity, already 
contaminated by alterity, already undone and incomplete. The neutrality that this 
leads to for Blanchot is not, however, where Levinas would have it lead; 
scepticism and irony are for Levinas a subversion of essence that overflow the 
said and lead not to neutrality or the il y a, but to the saying, to an ethical 
discourse. The impossibility simultaneity of meaning in (sceptical) language leads 
to the responsible, contradictory voice of the excluded middle in a (non)place 
which “would exceed the limits of what is thought, by suggesting, letting be 
understood without ever making understandable” (OB 169). This is language that 
ironically interrupts itself in what Derrida calls a serisure, an interrupted series 
whose meaning does not comprise a whole and is noncontemporaneous. This is 
sceptical, ironic, responsible language.  
 
Ironic Interruptions 
 
Levinas‟s ethics is an ironic ethics of interruption, whereby, as Derrida writes, 
interruption is that which “regularly puts an end to the authority of the Said, the 
thematical, the dialectical, the same, the economical, and so on, what demarcates 
itself from this series so as to go right straight beyond essence: to the Other, 
toward the Other other” (AM 163). Interruption is represented in Otherwise than 
Being by the image of a knot. As Robbins explains, in rabbinical interpretation, 
“Knots are cruxes – hidden meanings, sometimes mystical meanings – that need 
to be untied. But ... untying a knot merely produces another knot; untying is 
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inseparable from retying, and the unravelling is always a re-knotting”. 78  The 
logical discourse of the said will always contain knots, points of complexity and 
excess, which it will try to smooth over by ignoring or cutting. But these points 
cannot be eradicated; once cut their trace will remain in the new join between the 
threads. “Does not the discourse that suppresses the interruptions of discourse by 
relating them maintain the discontinuity under the knots with which the thread is 
tied again?” (OB 170) Thus the said interrupts the saying – the logical discourse 
attempts to suppress the unthematisable excess – and the saying interrupts the said, 
as each logical discourse steps up, despite itself, to the other. 
This interruption “is true of the discussion I am elaborating at this very 
moment” (OB 170). The phrase “at this very moment”, entitles Derrida‟s essay, in 
which he reveals how the repetition of the phrase turns its urgent and immediate 
present into anachrony and dislocation – each “now” is a different “now”. “At this 
very moment” – Levinas‟s phrase and Derrida‟s essay – repeats so as to dislocate. 
Within each moment is contretemps, an ironic, contrapuntal relation. The first 
instance takes a step that marks a strong, thematised, stable statement – “now” – 
only for the second instance to show that the step was not, that “now” is neither 
strong, thematisable or stable. For Derrida the instances of the phrase form an 
ironic, fragmentary series, a seriasure (sériature) – a series under erasure (rature) 
– “a series (a stringed sequence of enlaced erasures), an interrupted series, a 
series of interlaced interruptions, a series of hiatuses (mouths agape, mouth 
opened to the broken-off word, or to the gift of the other and to the-bread-in-his-
mouth)” (AM 175). In this way the said becomes unbound, or, more accurately, 
less bound, found to contain a necessary, ethical interruption, or fault. 
 A series of interruptions functions like a paratactic series, in which the 
“absolute paradox (of the ab-solute) is that this series, incommensurable with any 
other, an incomparable series out-of-series [hors-série] does not tie together 
threads but the interruptions between threads, traces of intervals that the knot must 
only remark, give to be remarked” (AM 165). In this ironic parataxis it is not the 
marks that are joined, but the interruptions or gaps between the marks. This is a 
series of (k)nots, a series of the abyss, that “does not re-tie threads but the 
interruptions without-thread, leaving open the interruptions between interruptions” 
(AM 165). It does not join the thematisable but the non-thematisable, it makes 
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 Robbins 140. 
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chains of fragments that do not house meaning but approach the other. And this 
not only explains how Levinas writes Otherwise than Being, it determines the 
mode in which Derrida must respond. Derrida writes:  
 
this is how he fabricates the fabric of his work, interrupting the weave of 
our language and then weaving together the interruptions themselves, [so 
that] another language comes to disturb the first one. It doesn‟t inhabit it, 
but haunts it. Another text, the text of the other, without ever appearing in 
its original language, arrives in silence with a more or less regular cadence 
to dislocate the language of translation, to convert the version, turn it 
inside out, bend it to the very thing it pretends to import. (AM 152-53) 
 
Levinas writes through ironic anacoluthon, a writing of interruption that contains 
the syncopation or counterpoint of meanings, the said and the trace of the saying. 
The different beat within the grammar of the said opens it “to the Other, outside of 
theme, outside presence, beyond the circle of the Same, beyond Being” (AM 160). 
Interrupting the series within Levinas‟s text is the gift that Derrida gives to 
Levinas in the form of the essay/quotation “At This Very Moment”. In order to 
respond responsibly, and avoid the cycle of debt and restitution, Derrida argues 
that his response must be one of ingratitude, one which does not inscribe 
Levinas‟s work within the thematisable same but acknowledges alterity. “If I 
restitute, if I restitute without fault, I am at fault. And if I do not restitute, by 
giving beyond acknowledgement, I risk the fault” (AM 147). Derrida‟s gift must 
interrupt Levinas and present the faulty writing of an ironic seriasure. So, in a 
filigree of parabatic irony Derrida links “gestures or moments that do not let 
themselves be linked, which are absolutely singular each time” (N 30). He 
negotiates the paratactic chain of singularities, putting “in a series things that do 
not let themselves be put in a series” (N 30).  
In order to ethically respond to Levinas, Derrida moves in a parabatic, 
paratactic series from “he”/“il”, to “E. L.”, to “she”/“elle”.79 He responds not to E. 
L (Emmanuel Levinas, among others) but to elle, passing his gift on to the female 
voice ignored by Levinas‟s text. Writing as the other – writing as a woman – 
                                                 
79
 These marks, woven together in Derrida‟s responsible, erased series, are “intr(el)aced” – 
“entre(el)lacement” [“between”, “el”, “laced”]. Intr(el)acing, which can be thought of as a 
neologistic synonym for hyphenation, brings together in interruption the said and the saying, the 
same and the other. Crocheted between each word or phrase is the undecidable, the el that is 
Emmanuel Levinas, God (AM 187), il (he/it), elle (she), the neuter, the specific. Thus the 
undecidable is inscribed within each interlacing, a permanent interruption or parabasis that exists 
as a trace within each syntactical weaving. The syntactic is interrupted, and shown to operate as 
parataxis, as a weaving of marks and spaces.  
P a g e  | 205 
 
Derrida argues that the default subject in Levinas‟ work is a masculine subject, a 
subject that is not to be opposed to the feminine subject, but an arche subject 
predating sexual difference. The other may be sexually undecidable, but is 
nonetheless He. If first comes He, and then the he/she of sexual difference is made 
secondary. And if sexual difference is derivative and secondary to the primary and 
originary He, woman is also – even more so – subordinate and dependent. The 
same is privileged over the other, and Levinas‟s text can been seen to reduce and 
restrict alterity and the other. Thus Derrida describes the fault, and writing as a 
woman, performs the response to the fault, giving voice to the other other. And 
hence, the female voice asks, should we not reinscribe the line with which 
Derrida‟s essay began – “he will have obligated” (AM 143) – with “it [elle] will 
have obligated” (AM 188)? 
 “It will have obligated” – an epigraph, a subtitle, and a phrase used and 
mentioned in Derrida‟s text. In the future perfect tense, obligation reaches us 
without having ever existed in the present – suddenly an event in the future 
changes the past. Hearing the phrase “it will have obligated” places the listener in 
a present under siege, attacked from the future and the past. Derrida repeats the 
sentence, placing it in a seriasure that moves the “he” from the abstract to the 
specific, that is, to Levinas. As we receive the sentence each time slightly 
differently we are obliged to interrupt each reading, fragmenting the sentence 
through excess, stepping from the general he, to the specific he of Levinas, and off 
again to the other she. 
 “It will have obligated”, with its invisible, directionless, contentless 
apostrophe – it will have obligated me? you? them? – is not a phrase that meaning 
can comfortably inhabit. Again we see the structure of the beyond/within: 
 
He will have obligated – at a distance from every context … because of a 
certain inside of what is said and the saying of what is said in the sentence, 
and that, from within, if this may still be said, infinitely overflows at a 
stroke all possible context. (AM 144) 
 
This phrase gives no stable point of entry; it is a priori interrupted and incomplete. 
Not only is it temporally adrift, but it awaits further information: he will have 
obligated [pronoun] to [verb] [object]? As such “it will have obligated” is an 
exemplary phrase of ironic responsibility: in a time that disrupts temporality, there 
is responsibility. Without having made a choice, there is responsibility. Without 
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knowledge or specific limitation, there is responsibility. “It will have obligated” is 
not a descriptive, instructive injunction, but an indefinite, undecidable and 
therefore absolute statement and performance of responsibility. It constatively 
describes – although the description is curtailed – while also performatively 
producing a responsibility that has always existed. In so doing, it demonstrates a 
mode of the performative, or perverformative, that operates outside the present. 
Derrida writes that in order to engage with Levinas‟s work, one would need “a 
writing that performs, but with a performative without present (who has ever 
defined such a performative?), one that answers for his, a performative without a 
present event, a performative whose essence cannot be resumed in presence” (AM 
173). A performative without the present, and without the first person. This ironic, 
perverformative is found in “he/she/it will have obligated” – a sentence of 
performative, constative responsibility that does not contain “I”, and that takes 
place without having taken place in the present. The answer it begs is the answer 
of the ethical statement – “here I am”, or, in ironic parataxis, “you, you, you”. An 
answer that offers without content, that has the mystery of “God will provide” or 
“I would prefer not to” but with absolute responsible signification. “Interrupt me” 
(AM 188). 
Quotation marks proliferate throughout Levinas‟s text, a series woven into 
a structure that spatially and temporally displaces it – an ironic, aphoristic series. 
What Derrida refers to as the “infinite law of quotation marks” (AM 172), the 
ironic counterlaw of contradictory punctuation points,
80
 is that which makes the 
work open to the borderless context of endless reference, but still makes reference 
to the other:  
 
The infinite law of quotation marks seems to suspend all reference and to 
enclose the work on the borderless context that it gives to itself: yet here is 
this law making absolute reference to the commandment of the wholly 
other, obligating beyond any delimitable context. (AM 172) 
 
The phrase within quotation marks is neither use nor mention, neither rigorously 
attributed to a different, specific author nor opened to a morass of general 
referentiality, a language always mentioned but never used. A phrase exists, like a 
fragment, in absolute isolation while wholly conjoined to language, to the new use, 
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the old mention, the self and the other. The proliferation of quotation marks does 
not return the work to the same, but signifies an ironic dislocation which is “found 
in the interior without inside of language” that is “opened to the outside of the 
wholly other” (AM 172): beyond/within. Thus language speaks while ironically 
interrupting itself, parabatically “drawing it [its language] along while leaving it 
in place” (AM 154).  
 
Whence the essential function of a quotation, its unique setting to work 
that, by quoting the uncitable, consists in accusing language, in quoting it 
in its entirety to appear at the same time as witness and as accused within 
its limits, (sur)rendered to a gift, as a gift to which language cannot open 
up on its own. (AM 154) 
 
Derrida‟s example is Levinas‟s formulation of the responsible subject, 
where “I” is replaced with “here I am”. Or, more accurately, ““here I am””. Even 
when used “here I am” takes quotation marks; it is both speech that presents itself 
as immediacy, and the representation or quotation of speech. Thus when 
mentioned a double set of quotation marks is required. By making the first person 
pronoun a quotation at the very moment of its first use, we recognise that the 
subject can never say “I” in full, authoritative self-presence, but is always, even in 
the first person, distanced from itself. “Here I am”, Derrida writes, “is not the 
complacent exhibition of the self but the unreserved exposition of its still secret 
secret” (AM 154). As a quotation the self exists anachronistically, out of time and 
out of synchronisation. The responsible subject gives herself over to the other and 
is there only for the other, but this giving is not an act on which the subject can 
found a self-present identity. Instead the self can only repeat and quote herself in 
(ir)responsibility. By replacing the self-present pronoun with a quotation, the 
grammar of the sentence is retained, but is also contaminated by an 
agrammaticality that interrupts as it quotes the unquotable; a subject that is (a) 
subjected and therefore cannot be fully grammatically placed. Recognising the 
first person pronoun to be “here I am” and therefore always a quotation places a 
stress upon language that causes it to ironically step beyond itself by stepping into 
itself. Thus, as Derrida writes, the phrase “here I am” “forces language into a 
contract with the stranger, with what it can only incorporate without assimilating” 
(AM 154). 
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Ethical Fragments
81
 
 
Derrida‟s essay/citation “At This Very Moment” ends with an (almost) 
impenetrable fragment, a short text printed in the capital letters of screamed 
urgency or sonorous slowness, split – refragmented – at “random” points by an 
italicised wave. It is a demanding text, obliging the reader to negotiate the paths of 
an untraceable pattern, an intricate lacework of paradoxes and ambiguities. It is a 
text of ironic, paratactic hyphenation, a chorus of interruption that never ends: 
there is no full stop, just the final, life-and-death injunction to drink. Drink and 
live. Drink and assimilate, and thereby destroy. Drink in the metaphor, learn it by 
heart. 
Responsibility is impossibly demanding, requiring an impossible 
negotiation between obligations. Derrida‟s final fragment does not describe the 
paradoxes of duty and commitment, nor does it outline ways of accommodating 
conflicting claims. It is instead a performance of the urgent and irreconcilable 
dictates made upon us; the multiple, contradictory paths it presents are the 
aporetic paths of (ir)responsible engagement. A cryptic text, a step beyond, within, 
it approaches Levinas‟s texts, and Derrida‟s own texts, beyond logic, beyond 
measure, beyond the propositional. It pulls the reader in multiple directions, and 
presents no easy path, no simple answer. It is thereby a performance of the infinite 
task – the impossible task – of responding to obligation. 
The fragment is near impossible to summarise, but Critchley outlines it as 
follows: a female speaker calls to a male other to join her in burying her daughter, 
who personifies the faulty text, the “she” which interrupts the jealous “he”. 
Together they bury her, and the fault thereby dissolves in “the bottomless crypt of 
the Same, within an economy that makes sexual difference secondary”.82  The 
fragment ends as the woman begs for a new body that allows for alterity, and does 
not need to be buried. Critchley‟s reading is not inaccurate, although he is rather 
too quick to assign gender and identity to the speakers. There is also a 
contradiction in his formulation of the effects of the burial: he proposes that 
placing the text/daughter in the ground “render[s] the fault illegible”83 and means 
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 For a full text (English and French) of the fragment see Appendix ii. Page numbers are all AM 
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 Critchley, Ethics 140-41. 
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that “ethical alterity has been maintained”.84 However, the fading of a fault does 
not preserve alterity; it reduces it to the same, and requires a new interruption. As 
the preceding fragments states: “I no longer hear your voice, your fault suddenly 
becomes illegible to me. Interrupt me” (AM 188). 
However, beyond any specific disagreements about content, what 
Critchley‟s neat summary has done is change the non-hierarchical parataxis of the 
text to a brief, ordered syntax. There is no reading (of this text) that fails to do so; 
a reading is a singular engagement that is both new event and act of reduction. As 
Derrida‟s fragment is a performance of the difficulty of responsibility, a critical 
engagement should demonstrate the multiple pathways and multiple obligations 
that (ir)responsible engagement presents. This section therefore attempts to read 
the (unreadable) fragment while retaining irony and alterity, negotiating the 
unnegotiable and exegetically describing/re-presenting a performance of ironic 
(ir)responsibility. It does not argue that the incomprehensible or secret is 
automatically more “ethical”, but that the complications and conflicts of 
responsibility and obligation should be acknowledged rather than repressed. It 
attempts then to be responsible, and to present the different threads of the 
fragment(s), knowing that it misses myriad possibilities and reduces the 
potentiality of those it recognises. Rather than listing the allusions to and 
inversions of Levinas‟s texts – knots, faults, “here I am”, “at this very moment”, 
the (female) other, the third etc – it concentrates on the contradictions that the 
fragment presents, acknowledging that each reading is an invention, and the 
promise of another reading still to come. It thus first addresses the temporal, 
grammatical and logical contradictions of the content, and then the aporias and 
incongruities arising from the – falsely separated – form.   
 “HERE AT THIS VERY MOMENT I ROLL UP THE BODY OF OUR INTERLACED 
VOICES FAULTY CONSONANTS VOWELS ACCENTS IN THIS MANUSCRIPT.” The 
speaker – singular or plural – places a body – body as text written in/on the 
manuscript, body (as text) rolled up in the manuscript – into the ground, allowing 
it to slowly dissolve into the earth. According to Derrida, presenting Levinas‟s 
reading of the Talmud, once inscribed the name of God cannot be erased, even if 
it is misused or misplaced within a text. Like a dead body, the text must instead be 
buried, allowed to decompose in a work of mourning that enables the other to 
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remain other. The word to be buried in this fragment is, however, not the 
(traditional) name of God but a nameless, mute, female other produced by the 
interwoven voices of a (parabatic) chorus. She, the other, is singular, wholly 
human, wholly female, but her body (also) comprises the faulty language of her 
parents, her producers, her speakers. She is the text of her predecessors‟ fault, she 
is her inheritance. Stillborn, dead before she lived, tainted by an incestuous union 
– the sin of the same – she is placed within the ground, a sacrifice to the other.  
Because of the fault, we are told, because of the fault of the female, the 
fault of the incest, the fault of the same, the fault of alterity, the fault of the 
interwoven voices, the fault of misreading (Levinas), there is total destruction: 
“BY FAULT OF HER BODY SHE WILL HAVE LET HERSELF BE DESTROYED ONE DAY 
AND WITHOUT REMAINDER”.  However, the destruction without a trace is to come 
in the past/future of the future perfect, in the time of a temporal disjunction or 
exigency. One day, in an unspecified future, she will have been destroyed in an 
unspecified past, but until that day of the future/past, of interrupted, aphoristic 
time, one can hope that, even in death, the girl will protect herself (and her 
fault/erase her fault). For now there is “NO LONGER ENOUGH DIFFERENCE THERE 
BETWEEN THEM BETWEEN THE FEMININE INHUMED OR THE ASHES OF A BURN-
EVERYTHING”. Buried or burnt, slowly dissolving in the ground – the space of 
alterity? the same? – or swiftly consumed by fire – the flame of difference? 
homogeneity? – the trace – of a sort – remains. “Ash”, writes Derrida, “is the 
figure of annihilation without remainder, without memory, or without a readable 
or decipherable archive” (SQ 68). It is the “remains of what does not remain” (SQ 
42), and as such is nothing: “There is ash, perhaps, but an ash is not” (SQ 43). 
And yet ash, which is not and is unreadable, which “annihilates or threatens to 
annihilate even the possibility of bearing witness to the annihilation” (SQ 69), is 
also the condition of possibility for witnessing, as (the possibility of) erasure is 
what makes witnessing necessary and valuable. Ashes are not, and yet they are a 
remnant (that enable). They are a trace and not, a catastrophic remnant of erased 
singularity that does and does not bear witness. The body of the daughter returns 
to the earth, eradicated and yet remaining, a marker of difference and sameness, a 
trace or no trace, preserved/abolished. The dissolution, if it is such, is slow, and so 
the (Abrahamic?) sacrifice is a gift that delays the time of restitution and places, 
insofar as it is possible, the gift outside economy as it remains until the impossible 
time of the interrupted future/perfect.  
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Even though “YOU ALWAYS KNEW THAT SHE IS THE PROPER BODY OF 
THE FAULT”, “SHE WILL ONLY HAVE BEEN CALLED BY HER LEGIBLE NAME BY 
YOU AND IN THAT IN ADVANCE DISAPPEARED”. Despite knowing, sensing, that 
the text/daughter/gift is beyond language, she is now constrained by language, and 
can only be referred to by her legible name, by linguistic signs and marks of the 
said. She is thus betrayed, reduced to a shadow, made to disappear by being made 
appear(ant). But in the “BOTTOMLESS CRYPT” of the ground/language “THE 
INDECIPHERABLE STILL GIVES ONE TO READ”. The trace remains; one betrays the 
indecipherable saying by attempting to decipher it, one has failed before one has 
begun, but through the process something slips in, contraband ironically 
hyphenated to the said. 
 The parabasis states that it is always the other who gives – for better or for 
worse we inherit from the other – and the other who hears better: “YOU HEAR HER 
BETTER THAN ME AHEAD OF ME”. The other is, with absolute alterity, undecidable; 
other and other other, male, female, third. Finally what is asked for is a new body, 
a new work, a new text, a new step that is without jealousy, that doesn‟t need to 
acquire or keep or possess or guard, that opens the blinds to alterity and the other. 
And so Derrida gives to Levinas – and the reader – a faulty, fragmented text that 
attempts to respond in alterity, in ingratitude, in (ir)responsibility. It is the gift of a 
perverformative, a perverformative outside the present that produces an event of 
(ir)responsibility. 
The temporal, aphoristic disjunctions of the text proliferate, presenting a 
non-synchronised syncopation, a counterpoint in contretemps. Injunctions and 
requests are made impossible; the present tense of the order/suggestion “COME 
BEND DOWN” is disrupted by the future perfect of the description of the gestures, 
which “WILL HAVE HAD” an inconsolable slowness. The deceased child/text 
“WILL HAVE LET HERSELF BE DESTROYED ONE DAY AND WITHOUT REMAINDER”. 
Her death/destruction takes place in the ironic, interruptive temporality of the 
future perfect, and yet this future/past death that destroys without remainder – and 
which is not the same as the stillborn death she has already undergone – does not 
rob her of a present or a future tense. She is dead now, but not destroyed: 
“ALREADY SHE LETS HERSELF BE EATEN” – present tense – by “BY THE OTHER 
BY YOU WHO WILL HAVE GIVEN HER TO ME” – future perfect tense. Before the 
action in the future/past she is ready and prepared, awaiting the other in death, in 
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her “BOTTOMLESS CRYPT”. Stillborn, she dies before she lives, her death 
aphoristically precedes her life. She dies of an incest – perhaps – an incest 
promised, and thus the cause of her death is itself yet to come. Time – “at this 
very moment” – is interrupted, fragmented and refragmented. 
The 14 fragments of the fragment are separated by an italicised wave that 
ambiguously denotes an absence, a section buried or burnt, and/or a break that 
was always so, a fault not secondary or subsequent but always extant. The 
fragments, like the post cards of “Envois”, thus present a faulty and inconclusive 
originality: ash precedes us? “Ash awaits us” (SQ 20)? The hyphenation of the 
wave conjoins and separates fragments that appear complete and logically 
sequential – “I MUST PUT IT IN THE EARTH FOR YOU ~ COME BEND DOWN” – and 
fragments that appear to run into each other – “ALREADY SHE LETS HERSELF BE 
EATEN ~ BY THE OTHER BY YOU”. The interruptions are sometimes violent, 
sometimes invisible, and the traits of the wave are (inversely) reflected in the 
parataxis within:
85
 
 
SHE DOES NOT SPEAK THE UNNAMED ONE YET YOU HEAR HER BETTER 
THAN ME AHEAD OF ME AT THIS VERY MOMENT WHERE NONETHELESS 
ONE THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS MONUMENTAL WORK I WEAVE WITH MY 
VOICE SO AS TO BE ERASED THERE THIS TAKE IT HERE I AM EAT  
 
The proper and the improper anacoluthically interrupt each other and the text, and 
yet the anacoluthon itself is faulty, as the unexpected changes in syntax, the 
constant turns and interruptions cease to disorient the reader and instead become 
familiar and prosaic. As the fragment preceding this states, “your fault suddenly 
becomes illegible to me” (AM 188). Hence the request/command: “Interrupt me” 
(AM 188). Without a new parabatic step, a new interruption, the text given over to 
alterity is always in danger of returning to the same. Parataxis is always in danger 
of becoming syntax, and the knots of language and meaning concealed.  
We require, according to the fragment, “A NEW BODY ANOTHER WITHOUT 
ANY MORE JEALOUSY THE MOST ANCIENT STILL TO COME”, the oldest who is yet 
to come and thereby also the youngest, the body of a temporal exigency, the body 
of a faulty, ironic time. “PLUS DE JALOUSIE” is more and no more jealousy, while 
jalousie translates both as “jealousy” and “slatted blinds”,86 a green eyed monster 
                                                 
85
 All reflections are inversions. 
86
 “Jalousie” remains a term in English for slatted blinds.  
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obstructing the view, or imposing a certain view. More and no more blinds, more 
and no more retention. The fragmentary text attempts to be a gift that tries to 
delay time and restitution, a gift inscribed within the double, parabatic movement 
of more and no more jealousy. The female voice of a preceding fragment writes “I 
give and play ingratitude against jealousy” (AM 187) – I parabatically play a step 
away/beyond against a step within. But ingratitude guards itself zealously, a 
“without-jealousy [that] jealously guards and keeps itself, otherwise said, loses 
itself, keeps-itself-loses-itself” (AM 187-188). No more jealousy is always more 
jealousy: jealousy is an anacoluthon, an interruption, a hyphenation.
87
 
The fragment, spoken in response – perhaps – to the order/request 
“Interrupt me” (AM 188), is voice or voices, voices in unison or voices in 
sequence, that step up to the audience, to you. The apostrophe – a parabasis – 
explains, defends, describes, and implicates, as the child, the manuscript – the 
script of the play – is “OUR MUTE INFANT”. The gift – the text, “THE BODY OF 
OUR INTERLACED VOICES” – is laid in the ground, laid before “YOU”, and yet 
received in the future/past of the future perfect tense from “YOU”: “YOU WHO 
WILL HAVE GIVEN HER TO ME”. The parabasis, spoken by an undecidable voice or 
voices, addresses all and none, a fragmented series under erasure of interlaced, 
interwoven voices that speaks in the singular first person. It speaks for the text/girl, 
speaks with the text/girl, speaks as the text/girl, making of everyone an other 
turned to and from in (ir)responsibility. Like/as the text/girl, the parabasis offers 
itself/herself/themselves: “ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS MONUMENTAL WORK I 
WEAVE WITH MY VOICE SO AS TO BE ERASED THERE THIS TAKE IT HERE I AM 
EAT”. Eat what I offer, eat, what I am I offer, eat. Or, as well as or instead, let us 
add to or interrupt the eating. Instead, for now, at this very faulty, interrupted 
moment, let us “COME CLOSER”, let us “DRINK”. The parabasis steps up, steps 
closer, turning from the mode in which “SHE LETS HERSELF BE EATEN” and 
instead moving – commanding – to drink, to swallow, to take in whole, to take all. 
Learn me by heart. Thus Derrida presents, in ironic time and fragmentary 
interruption, the conflicts and impossible demands – demands that are equally 
impossible to ignore – of responsibility.  
 
                                                 
87
 For more on jealousy see Peggy Kamuf‟s introduction to A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) xiii-xlii. 
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Ironic Inter-Views: Autobiography and Self-Defence 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2001 Derrida declared that “the media is the main political problem facing the 
world today”. 1  Ludovic Glorieux and Indira Hašimbegović state that it was 
precisely the problem of the media that led them to compile Derrida: Negotiating 
the Legacy. 
 
It was a question of not allowing these [media obituaries] to become 
definitive; to respond in order to defeat those biting epigraphs. Tinted by 
misunderstanding and ill-advised criticism, displaying a malignant wit and 
vicious satire, some journalists found the silence of the philosopher a weak 
point to exploit. Condemning his thought as “obscurantism”, of being 
“murky”, “enigmatic” or self-contradictory, The New York Times and The 
Economist made remarkable efforts to denigrate his work.
2
  
 
While the media in general was problematic for Derrida, this chapter focuses on a 
particular media trait that spread across genres and disciplines: the interview. “Ah 
interviews! Yes, I have always suffered from the laws of the interview. After 
several decades, I really must recognise that I have too often done what I said I 
didn‟t like doing” (PM 136). The law of the media interview is a rule of speed, 
summary, directness, plainness, sound-bites, and transmittable, translatable units. 
This chapter proposes that the laws of the interview brought about a self-relation 
that can be termed autoimmune, and that together these laws and self-relation 
played a significant role in bringing about a stylistic shift in Derrida‟s later work. 
The general demand for reduction masquerading as clarity, speed simulating 
inspiration and the anecdotal as the explanatory resulted in a relation between 
Derrida and deconstruction that is autoimmune. 
 The autoimmunity stemming from the media interview is echoed in the 
autobiographical inter-view. The autobiography is an ironic, fragmentary, 
autobiothanatoheterographical opus, a writing that exposes itself and erases itself, 
                                                 
1
 Jacques Derrida, “Discussion”, Deconstruction Engaged: The Sydney Seminars, ed. Paul Patton 
and Terry Smith (Sydney: Power Publications, 2001) 45. In an interview first published in Le 
Monde in 1982 Derrida is somewhat milder, saying that the problem is not the media in general, 
but the normalisation, and thereby silencing, of the media that takeovers and conglomerates cause. 
Specifically, however, the media‟s first problem is always exclusion, of what does not get 
published or translated (P 87). One might add that in 1982 Derrida had not personally suffered the 
worst onslaughts of the press. 
2
 Ludovic Glorieux and Indira Hašimbegović, “Introduction: Inheriting Deconstruction, Surviving 
Derrida”, Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy 1. 
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presenting and absenting itself in autoimmunity. Interview and inter-view function 
through the step of protection and exposure, life and death, possibility and 
impossibility, force of weakness that is (ironic) autoimmunity. Derrida‟s text 
Circumfession (1991) is read as the ironic hyphenation of the interview/inter-view, 
as Derrida engages with the presentation of his work through the countersignature 
of an other. He responds to himself and counterexample(s) of himself, and frees 
himself from the programmatic restriction of Bennington‟s Derridabase by 
proffering a periphrastic, circumlocutory, fragmentary text of contaminated 
Thoughts/thoughts. Circumfession is seen to be exemplary of structural irony, of 
the parataxis, hyphenation, parabasis and fragmentation that this thesis has 
outlined. 
 
 
Derrida’s Later Style 
 
The ironic contamination within Derrida‟s texts – the thetic and the non-thetic, the 
constative and the performative, the literary and the philosophical – renders 
definite comments on his style near impossible.
3
 Given his denial of “a political or 
ethical turn in „deconstruction‟” (R 39), it is equally difficult to make definitive 
comments regarding his work‟s themes or periods. Geoffrey Bennington states 
that Derrida‟s oeuvre, remarkable, he writes, for its consistency and diversity, 
“cannot be divided into styles or periods: even the quite widespread idea that there 
are first of all very philosophical texts and then, after Glas (1974), a more „literary‟ 
and less „serious‟ tendency, is doubtful as to its empirical accuracy and irrelevant 
to our understanding” (DB 13-14).4  Derrida‟s style in particular has garnered 
                                                 
3
 The contamination between genres is described perfectly by Derrida in an interview in 1975, 
when the interviewer attempts to divide Derrida‟s texts into three category types:  
 
theoretical or critical texts of a relatively classical form …; interventions on certain 
political or institutional questions …; and more wide-ranging texts which are 
unclassifiable according to normal standards … in which you implicate yourself, along 
with your “body”, your “desire”, your “phantasms”, in a ways that perhaps no 
philosopher has ever done until now. (P 5)  
 
Derrida responded by saying that 
 
in the texts you classify as “theoretical” …, the demonstration inasmuch as it is effective 
in classical terms, is constantly overrun, carried beyond itself by a scene of language, of 
counter-signature run adrift, of smuggled-in fiction (generally either unreadable or 
neglected) which affiliated it with texts that you have classified differently, with Glas for 
example. (P 17) 
4
 Although this was written in 1991. 
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enough comments to fill numerous books: Vincent Leitch, for example, describes 
Derrida‟s style as giving “the appearance of being thrown together like 
preliminary thinking exercises, lacking editing ... and careful organisation, 
performances that amble loosely, sometimes stunningly”. 5  Nicholas Royle 
describes Derrida‟s language as a “spectral machine, yes, a mad line drawing, 
with remarkable hatching, done blind, or else, but this is not an alternative, a 
luscious, furiously green grass field featuring mole hills with, in places, see-
through cross sections”.6 But, as his career progressed to what Herman Rapaport 
carefully terms the “so-called later Derrida”,7 is it not possible to argue that his 
language, style and approach grew somewhat less “mad”, less “blind” and less 
“loose”, with cross-sections that were rather more “see-through”? This is 
absolutely not to suggest that Derrida‟s work grew less engaged, less academic, 
less thorough, but that the tendency to have, as the overt approach, a singularly or 
deliberately “playful”, experimental style decreases towards the end of Derrida‟s 
career. This is not, again and of course, to say that Derrida‟s later texts 
consistently espoused a dry, denotative mode of exposition, but that in his later 
works vocabularies, allusions, and themes began to change, an overt ethical and 
political engagement takes precedent, and images of technology, medicine, justice, 
democracy, human rights come to the forefront.  
Phrases change, for example while the phrase il faut (one must) figures 
repeatedly in his later texts – figures to the point whereby in her introduction to 
Negotiations Elizabeth Rottenberg writes of “the never-ending, unrelenting „il faut‟ 
of deconstruction” (N 1) – in 1976 he referred to it as an “ethico-pedagogico-
professorial prescription” (P 19) that should be avoided.8 In Derrida and the Time 
of the Political Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac “insist on a visible mutation in 
Derrida‟s writings since the late 1980s”,9 while J. Hillis Miller states that “Derrida 
wrote so much about politics in his last decades that it might even be possible to 
assert (not quite truthfully) that he became almost exclusively a political 
philosopher, a political theorist, or even a political scientist in the strict, 
                                                 
5
 Vincent B. Leitch, “Late Derrida: The Politics of Sovereignty”, Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 231. 
6
 Nicholas Royle, Memory 92. 
7
 Herman Rapaport, Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work (Routledge: New York, 2003) vii. 
8
 The shift in meaning of terms and phrases of Derrida‟s work of course proves the iterability of 
the mark, but also indicates that rather than a concentration on isolated marks or units, these 
components should be read in isolation and conjunction – through parataxis.  
9
 Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, “Introduction” Derrida and the Time of the Political 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2009) 6. 
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disciplinary sense”. 10  Tom Cohen goes so far as to propose that Derrida 
“artefacted a „late Derrida‟” who could “enter into the main arteries of humanistic 
traditions … in order … to counter the entrapping clichés of him as anti humanist 
„post-structuralist‟ (he saw what happened to de Man)”.11 
 It is possible to argue then that Derrida‟s style changed simply as his 
source material shifted. “The laws of reading,” he argued, “are determined by the 
particular text that is being read” (DC 124). Each reading is a singular 
engagement, and text needs a different measurement or “method”.12 We could 
then argue that Derrida ceased to write in a “playful” manner because the 
texts/topics he was addressing required a more directed, less open and ambiguous 
treatment. Which implies that texts on literature and the literary “naturally” 
require a more literary treatment than texts directly addressing politics, law, 
hospitality, democracy etc. It seems to betray Derrida‟s work to imply that his 
later texts were less economic and playful because he began to deal with more 
“serious” topics, topics that would themselves be defrauded by anything other 
than serious and transparent treatment. It presumes that the reader has only a 
passive relation to the text, and that the text provokes a direct exegetical re-
presentation in line with its codes, genre, approach etc. Derrida leaves little doubt 
that this is not the case: “[in reading we should not] simply abandon ourselves to 
the text, or represent and repeat it in a purely passive manner” (DC 124). The 
analysis of the text must remain faithful to the text, but this faithfulness is 
absolutely not without potential violence and upheaval. Presuming a simple 
correlation between text and commentary bestows a sacrosanct or untouchable 
originality and authenticity on the text, and ignores Derrida‟s injunction: “it is 
important to tamper with what is mistakenly called the „form‟ and the code, to 
write otherwise even as one remains very strict as regards philosophical reading-
knowledge and competence” (P 85). Perhaps most importantly it depends upon a 
text that is itself uncontaminated, and which presents a genre and approach that is 
                                                 
10
 Miller, Derrida 229. 
11
 Tom Cohen, “The Geomorphic Fold: Anapocalyptics, Changing Climes and „Late‟ 
Deconstruction”, The Oxford Literary Review 32.1 (2010) 78. 
12
 While “deconstructive questions cannot give rise to methods, that is, to technical procedures that 
could be repeated from one context to another” (P 200), it is also true that “every discourse, even a 
poetic or oracular sentence, carries with it a system of rules for producing analogous things and 
thus an outline of methodology” (P 200). Thus 
 
In what I write, I think there are also some general rules, some procedures that can be 
transposed by analogy … but these rules are taken up in a text which is each time a 
unique element and which does not let itself be turned totally into a method. (P 200) 
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somehow pure. It is no exaggeration to say that a mode of reading which is blind 
to the polyphony of subjects and the complicity of styles is barely reading at all. 
The eye that the text produces is one that sees beyond the surface, and penetrates 
the multiplicity of potentiality in the text.  
It is also possible to argue that Derrida‟s style changed as the future or 
legacy of a deconstruction worthy of the name became an increasing concern. 
Derrida says in “As if I were Dead”, “if you want to „do deconstruction‟ – „you 
know, the kind of thing Derrida does‟ – then you have to perform something new, 
in your own language, in your own singular situation, with your own signature, to 
invent the impossible” (AS 217-18). Following Derrida‟s death Michael Naas 
writes that we are now at the opening of a new possibility wherein Derrida‟s work 
can be read “on its own terms, … without the spectre … of Derrida‟s presence. … 
[It] is perhaps now possible as it never really was before to read his work without 
the phantasm of an author or a father coming to master our reading”.13 But while 
the absence of the father may, as Tom Cohen argues,
14
 enable deconstruction to 
shake off the shackles of “Derrida studies”, it may also take it in a direction 
wholly antithetical to Derrida‟s beliefs. In a 1993 interview with Bernard Steigler 
Derrida said “I‟m not under any illusion about the possibility of my controlling or 
appropriating what I do, what I say or what I am” (ET 37). “But”, he continued,  
 
I do want – this is the point of every struggle, of every drive in this domain 
– I would at least like the things I say and do not to be immediately and 
clearly used towards ends I feel I must oppose. I don‟t want to appropriate 
my product, but for the same reason, I don‟t want others doing this 
towards ends I feel I must fight. (ET 37)  
 
Over the course of a long and often contentious career Derrida‟s work was subject 
to an excessive amount of misappropriation, mistranslation and misreading.
15
 But 
while Derrida was all too familiar with the misuse of deconstruction by its 
vociferous detractors, critics have recently argued that towards the end of his 
career it was Derrida‟s supporters who became a source of anxiety.16 Naas‟s bold 
                                                 
13
 Naas, Derrida From Now On (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) 9. For more on the 
phrase “worthy of the name” see chapter two and Bennington‟s “Dignity”. 
14
 See conclusion. 
15
 While examples of misappropriation and misreading are too numerous to mention, an example 
of mistranslation is the notorious Richard Wolin translation of Derrida‟s “Heidegger: 
Philosopher‟s Hell”. For more see “The Work of Intellectuals and the Press” (P 422-54). 
16
 As Cohen suggests in “The Geomorphic Fold”, it‟s possible that the de Man and Heidegger 
affairs played a role in the change in Derrida‟s style and focus. Seeing the media circus that arose 
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striding forward to the future of deconstruction may have been precisely what 
concerned Derrida, and caused his later texts to partake of a certain dogmatism or 
pedagogic insistence.  
Cohen coins the term “Derridawars”17 to refer to the struggles between 
Derrida and his academic heirs, arguing that in On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy 
we do not witness a gesture of connection or homage but see Derrida “tracking … 
a renegade off-spring, one who imagines himself to have surpassed 
deconstruction”.18 Cohen notes struggles within Derrida‟s texts as he reacted to 
“betrayal” by his academic family, who, in “wanting to be heir and official 
extension, wanting to build a more or less officious „deconstructive‟ network”19 
move too soon, too quickly, and “must be yanked back, reinscribed, exscribed, cut 
off and restituted, in a manner bearing on what might come „after‟ J.D.‟s 
writing”.20 While Martin McQuillan, addressing On Touching in an earlier issue 
of Derrida Today, never expressly relates Derrida‟s criticism of Nancy to a 
preservation of his legacy, his outline of Derrida‟s analysis supports Cohen‟s 
argument. He proposes that “Derrida turns on Nancy some of the guns that are 
usually trained on himself by others (the self-deconstructing text, the 
transcendental reduction, the excessive word play that destroys the category) and 
lets Nancy have both barrels”.21 In other words,  
 
“There is deconstruction and there is deconstruction!” … There is what 
Derrida does and there is a use of the term “deconstruction” in an 
institutional context as an act of affiliation to a certain reading project but 
the work pursued under this name may or may not be any more 
“deconstructive”, i.e. Derridean, than work going on outside it.22 
 
McQuillan‟s argument implies a certain insistence by Derrida that deconstruction 
retain his name, his trace, and his intentions. A direct consequence of this is the 
replacement of deconstruction as a live  act of reading with a cult of the master‟s 
text. As Leitch writes, “given the scope and complexity of his corpus, Derrida‟s 
                                                                                                                                     
when details of their sympathy/collaboration with the Nazi party came to light, Derrida – perhaps 
– began to grow concerned about the future of deconstruction, and the potential treatment of its 
legacy. 
17
 Tom Cohen, “Tactless – the Severed Hand of J.D.”, Derrida Today 2.1 (2009) 3. 
18
 Cohen, “Tactless” 6. 
19
 Cohen, “Tactless” 10. 
20
 Cohen, “Tactless” 8. 
21
 Martin McQuillan, “Toucher I: The Problem with Self-Touching”, Derrida Today 1.2 (2008) 
210. 
22
 McQuillan 206.  
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scholarly readers, no matter their approach, risk becoming disciples rather than 
critics, expending copious energy systematising, deciphering, standing by 
attentively, ventriloquising”.23 
 There is no definitive reason, be it fiendishly complex or beautifully 
simple, for the stylistic and thematic changes that occurred in Derrida‟s texts. 
Woven together are the arbitrary choices and deliberate paths that a life and an 
academic career take, the swerves of clinamen that produce new, unmappable 
trajectories. However, as Derrida‟s career progressed a number of direct 
statements can be made. First, the amount of engagements to speak at conferences 
and colloquiums increased. A change in style could therefore be convincingly 
explained away by arguing that Derrida‟s later texts seemed less “written” 
because they were exactly that: oral deliveries that were later published with few 
alterations. Thus The Politics of Friendship may present a less “literary” style 
because it stems from a series of seminars given in 1988-89. Memoires for Paul 
de Man comprises the text of a eulogy and subsequent seminars, Given Time and 
Archive Fever stem from conferences, and Rogues and Aporias from the Cerisy-
la-Salle lectures. Dissemination, on the other hand, Glas, The Post Card, The 
Truth in Painting, and On Touching were all texts written for publication, and 
take a certain complexity and ornate or “experimental” style from the indulgences 
offered by the form. However, Spurs, Signsponge, and H.C. for Life were first oral 
deliveries at Cerisy. “Ulysses Gramophone” was first presented at a conference on 
Joyce and Monolingualism breathed its first words out loud. What this brief 
selection aims to show is that the undeniable restrictions of oral delivery cannot be 
wholly charged with the pervasive change to Derrida‟s style.    
Second, the amount of time Derrida spent reading, explaining and 
referencing his own texts also increased.
24
 The conferences and symposiums 
mentioned above were often dedicated either to Derrida‟s texts or to specifically 
“deconstructive” readings, and so Derrida either explicated themes from previous 
works, or performed a deconstructive engagement. More and more, however, 
Derrida tied his texts to previous texts, noting how paths taken in one provide a 
ghostly side road to another, so that, as Catherine David said in a 1983 interview; 
                                                 
23
 Leitch 230. 
24
 See Samir Haddad, “Reading Derrida Reading Derrida: Deconstruction as Self-Inheritance”, 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14.4 (2006) for an exposition of Derrida reading 
Derrida, and the auto-immunity that involves.  
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“To read you, one has to have read Derrida” (P 117).25 Readings of Nietzsche and 
Hegel become, as Eugenio Donato pointed out, a performance of “Derrida 
rereading Of Grammatology today” (EO 55). Texts and themes previously thought 
apolitical were revealed to have a political dimension – in Rogues Derrida states 
that “The thinking of the political has always been a thinking of différance and the 
thinking of différance always a thinking of the political, of the contours and limits 
of the political” (R 39).26 Under the irony of citation outlined in chapter four, 
Derrida citing Derrida inaugurated a new text. Derrida reading Derrida changed 
Derrida.
27
 
Derrida‟s texts operate in ironic, aphoristic relation to each other, each a 
foreword and an epilogue to another, each a reengagement and a rewriting – 
independent and conjoined. Each text is in counterpoint with every other text, in 
time and out of time. Each new text changes every other text, always a preface to 
a further fragment. Hence “Envois” is “the preface to a book I have not [yet?] 
written” (PC 3), and The Politics of Friendship “resembles a length preface. It 
would rather be the foreword to a book I would one day wish to write” (PF vii). 
There is, however, absolutely no direct correlation between self-inheritance or 
self-citation and a more prosaic style; one would in fact presume it to have 
precisely the opposite effect. But at issue is the fact that as Derrida‟s neologisms 
and paleonyms increased in number and relations, a corresponding tendency to 
explicate and trace those connections is also visible. The deconstructive interest in 
undoing and unsealing became not so much an act of engagement but of 
disclosure, of showing how the knots were tied. Not to perform a reading that 
gives a chance, but arguably a reading that operated to suppress chance. While 
Derrida could never be accused of presenting “easy” or instantly accessible papers, 
                                                 
25
 Derrida exclaimed in reply: “But that‟s true of everyone! Is it so wrong to take account of a past 
trajectory, of a writing that has in part sealed itself, little by little? But it is also interesting to undo, 
to unseal” (P 117). 
26
 A brief overview detailing academics who engaged with the political aspects of Derrida‟s work 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and the more sustained engagement after the 1990s, can be found in the 
introduction to Derrida and the Time of the Political. 
27
 An excellent example of this is given by Haddad in “Reading Derrida Reading Derrida”. Here 
he compares a passage from The Politics of Friendship with a citation of the same passage in 
Rogues. In The Politics of Friendship Derrida writes that, with regards to democracy, the limit 
between the conditional and the unconditional “will have inscribed a self-deconstructive force in 
the very motif of democracy” (PF 105). In Rogues he adds a clause: “… will have inscribed a self-
deconstructive force [I could have in fact said „autoimmune‟ force] in the very motif of democracy” 
[emphasis added] (R 90). As Haddad writes, although he rather understates the case, “In thus 
suggesting that we today read „self-deconstructive‟ as „autoimmune‟, in changing names, Derrida 
ever so gently brings the earlier analysis into line with the latter” (511). 
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the content of these pieces was often a performance of a deconstructive reading 
which operated to explicate deconstruction. Derrida, in a sense, demonstrated how 
Derrida would read the topic in question – Derrida performed Derrida reading.  
As oral deliveries and explanations increased, a third factor was 
exponentially growing, an event that brings oral delivery and explanation together, 
and is most commonly productive of a direct, reductive style. The interview. This 
chapter proposes that in response to the laws of the interview Derrida‟s work 
began to confess and expose itself in a way that can be termed autoimmune. 
Autoimmunity is a parabatic inter-view, a critical look, a self-deconstruction, a 
view inside that undoes what it sees, Medusa turned on herself. Autoimmunity 
means that, as Naas writes, the sovereign subject must guard and expose itself, 
“protecting itself and so compromising itself, compromising itself by protecting 
itself, expressing and justifying itself by introducing within itself counter-
sovereignties that threaten to destroy it”.28 Autoimmunity means that the entity 
turns on itself, and “must then come to resemble [its] enemies, to corrupt itself 
and threaten itself in order to protect itself against their threats” (R 40). The more 
Derrida was obliged to rewrite and re-explain his own work – and that of others – 
in clear, accessible form, the more he had to reduce or constrain modes of 
expression and approach, restricting his own freedom, predicting and anticipating 
the lines of certain counter-signatures. We thus first look at the mode of the 
interview, then turn to the relation between irony and autoimmunity, before finally 
outlining the ways in which the interview caused deconstruction to turn in on 
itself in ironic autoimmunity. 
 
The Laws of the Interview 
 
From “Implications”, his first interview, to Learning to Live Finally, his last, the 
amount of time Derrida spent in consultation regarding his work increased 
exponentially.
29
 Derrida repeatedly expressed exasperation with a mode of 
                                                 
28
 Naas, Derrida 128. 
29
 Compiling an exhaustive list of Derrida‟s interviews is a difficult task. However, from Points, 
Paper Machine, Negotiations, the numerous volumes that contain interviews, for example 
Sovereignties in Question, Who Comes After the Subject, Applying: To Derrida etc. the film and 
screenplay, and online resources at http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jacques-derrida/bibliography/ and 
http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/jdentre.html a sense of the amount of interviews Derrida 
gave each year can be acquired. There was at least one in 1968, two in 1973, and a steady yearly 
increase to at least 11 in 1986, 13 in 1990, with a slight slowing down from 1994. Finding the 
interviews held by academics is easier than acquiring a complete list of those held by journalists, 
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discussion whose price was “simplification, impoverishment, distortion, 
displacement of argument by symptom” (P 10), but was obliged to continue to re-
present, re-elaborate, and reduce his work in explanatory interviews, clarificatory 
interventions and elucidatory dialogues. While the best of the interviews, 
academic discussions engaging with the finer points of Derrida‟s work, provided 
subtle and rewarding dialogues,
30
 too many were premised on the disappointing 
“„An interview with Derrida? At last maybe we‟re going to understand something 
about him!‟” (P 115) Obliged to quickly unravel texts that of their very nature 
resist summary and “plain” exegesis, the demand for speed and accessibility 
caused Derrida to make some pained remarks – “The one thing one cannot accept 
these days … is an intellectual taking his time, or wasting other people‟s time” (N 
89). Against the demand for swift simplification – bypasses that simulate direct 
access – Derrida believed “in the necessity of taking time or, if you prefer, of 
letting time, of not erasing the folds” (P 116). Against the stipulation for direct 
engagement Derrida tried “to respect, as much as possible, the indirect conditions 
or invisible detours of the question” (N 91). The format and constraints of the 
interview – “I‟m going too fast, of course; surely I‟m being unjust; the interview 
genre elicits that; I‟d refine this if we had the time and the texts in hand” (N 174) 
– can often lead to a dangerously reductionist presentation of work. As this 
chapter argues, it is precisely the law of the interview – a quick entry, a speedy 
transfer of information, and a fast exit – that imposed itself on Derrida, leading to 
an autoimmune relation to himself and his texts.  
 The word interview comes from the old French entrevue, to have a glimpse 
of, and s‟entrevoir, to see each other. Inter + view: to see between, to see inside, 
to enter through a view, to enter with a view. An inter view is many things; a 
neutral glance, an interested gaze, a sharp look, an accusing stare. It can 
informally chat, or formally demand defence, justification, and consolidation (P 
10). Public and private, formal and informal, the interview seeks an audience, and 
aspires to make public private or insider knowledge. It asks for explanations and 
elucidations, demanding more information in a more accessible way, and thereby 
running the risk of turning more information into less knowledge, transforming 
                                                                                                                                     
and making precise qualitative judgements about the value of the interviews is extremely difficult. 
Yet it seems clear that Derrida did give a large number of interviews, and that he found (many of) 
them quite taxing.     
30
 See, for example, interviews by Attridge, Norris, Weber, Bennington, Nancy, Kamuf, Ferraris 
etc. 
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greater detail into reduced content. Too often the potential for the interview to be 
a true inter-view is abandoned for the sake of an over-view that takes little regard 
for the long view. Despite its name, despite its simulation of an open dialogue or 
movement between focuses, the interview is all too often a place of marked maps 
and single directions, with roles – she who questions and she who replies – clearly 
determined.  
The interview too often strives – and pretends – to go straight to the centre, 
straight to the heart of the matter, to uncover, without prevarication, play, or 
extraneous detail, speaking plainly and directly, exactly what the interviewee‟s 
intentions were, and what her meaning is. It presupposes a determinable, 
translatable, univocal meaning that can be uncovered and presented, simply and 
immediately. It presumes that the mode of expression is separate from the content, 
so that an idea presented in an ornate or elaborate style will remain the same when 
expressed simply and plainly. In this mode of the interview speed is always the 
key – “the tape does not wait and there is no time to look for the right words” (P 
32). It is presumed that speed is honesty, that the quick answer is the candid 
answer as it taps into meaning without the activity of the censor.
31
  
The speed of the interview and its simulation of a “greater” truth is even 
further heightened in a filmed interview that is broadcast live. Here the illusion of 
the absence of intervention, the lack of anything coming between, is even stronger, 
as the event is seemingly captured and presented, live and in real time. Against 
this view of presence and direct presentation is a need to demonstrate, Derrida 
reminds us, that the interview is “an extremely artificial device” (P 133), “that 
„live‟ communication and „real time‟ are never pure”, and that “they permit 
neither intuition nor transparency, nor any perception unmarked by interpretation 
or technical intervention” (N 88). The laws of the interview present content as 
                                                 
31
 While the slow and careful route may, in a sense, multiply defences against the impromptu, the 
careful path will always contain improvisation. Defences are always betrayed (P 49-50). In 
“Choreographies” Derrida asked, “Will I be able to write improvising my responses as I go along? 
It would be more worthwhile, wouldn‟t it? Too premeditated an interview would be without 
interest here” (P 90). In “As if I were Dead” Derrida explains that he is improvising because “I 
wanted to expose myself to the event, to the singular event, of being in front of you, totally 
disarmed, totally exposed, totally vulnerable” (AS 215). In an unpublished interview presented in 
Derrida, Derrida says, “I believe in improvisation and I fight for improvisation. But always with 
the belief that it‟s impossible. And there where there is improvisation I am not able to see myself. I 
am blind to myself” (DP 93). Improvisation – possible and impossible, as there are always filters 
and delays – is not something Derrida was opposed to. His stance was never specifically against 
improvised responses, but against the presumption that improvising is somehow more “true”. Or 
indeed possible.  
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absolutely singular, as an untouched event; as the final, or only, word. As 
definitive: “what makes the rule of such an interview impossible, impracticable, is 
a law of genre that orders us always to make as if: as if everything we are 
speaking about in a quasi-spontaneous fashion had not been treated elsewhere” 
(AR 135-36). 
The interview presumes that “what is there is there and what is not is not” 
(P 6). While the interview recognises the inseparability of the thinker and the 
thought, it attempts in a rudimentary, pseudo-psychoanalytic way – “What was 
your father‟s name?”, “How old were you when you left Algeria?”, “Do you have 
specific memories of that fear?” (P 120) – to explain the thoughts through the 
thinker. Thus, under the laws of the interview, deconstruction is x. And 
deconstruction is x because Jacques Derrida, among other things, “„was-born-in-
El Biar-on-the-outskirts-of-Algiers-in-a-petit-bourgeois-family-of-assimilated-
Jews‟” (P 119-20).  
Antoine Spire asks, “Isn‟t it necessary to simplify in order to spread 
knowledge? And when we simplify, are we absolutely and irreducibly led into 
betrayal? Do you think that all interviews are betrayals, because they can‟t enter 
into the details?” (PM 148). Derrida replies that while simplifications are 
sometimes necessary to transmit knowledge and to speak in general, there must be 
rules, or precautions, so that one offers “the best or least bad simplification” (PM 
148). In any text some simplification will always occur, as one can never present, 
in perfect detail, every aspect of each case. But, “perhaps, perhaps, it is better to 
simplify a little while letting something get through, like contraband, rather than 
to be silent with the excuse that one can never be equal to the complexity of things” 
(PM 149). In betrayal arising from simplification, one hopes that a measure of 
“truth” slips in between the glances. The good interview, with the least bad 
simplification, points the receiver elsewhere, towards the longer, less simplified 
texts, and does not presume to be an end in itself. Derrida‟s slow weaving through 
a textual web may seem like an attempt to “bog down the interview, to paralyse it” 
(P 37), but is rather an attempt to step in a different direction, and create a new 
event. As Derrida says, evoking Heidegger, 
 
What matters is the trajectory, the pathway, the crossing – in a word, the 
experience. The experience is then the method, not a system of rules or 
technical norms. … In an interview, even if one repeats the same thing, the 
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same “contents” – even so, the situation, the context, the mode of address, 
the addressees, and the signature are all different every time, and it‟s the 
impromptu of this “situation” that is what the reader or listener is waiting 
for, I suppose. Otherwise, it is always better to read the books. (PM 137)  
 
The “good” interview must be an event, a different path, an experience. It must be 
recognised as a plurality of voices, a multiplicity of addresses and addressees. Not 
a direct presentation of a univocal truth achieved through plain speech, pithy, 
quotable summaries and touching biographical reminiscences.  
 
Irony and Autoimmunity 
 
In Spectres of Marx Derrida writes: 
 
the living ego is auto-immune. To protect its life, to constitute itself as 
unique living ego … it must … take the immune defences apparently 
meant for the non-ego, the enemy, the opposite, the adversary and direct 
them at once for itself and against itself. (SM 177) 
 
In Rogues Derrida describes autoimmunity as the “strange illogical logic by which 
a living being can spontaneously destroy, in an autonomous fashion, the very 
thing within it that is supposed to protect it against the other, to immunise it 
against the aggressive intrusion of the other” (R 123). The strange, illogical logic 
of the “autoimmune contradiction or counterindication” (R 83) is a step “both 
self-protecting and self-destroying, at once remedy and poison” (AR 124) – the 
parabatic, contradictory irony that operates within a structure and causes it to undo 
or attack (part of) itself. Autoimmunity is the “double bind of threat and chance, 
not alternatively or by turns promise and/or threat but threat in the promise itself” 
(R 82). It is a force of weakness, a suicidal drive of threat and chance, promise 
and perjury, of (ir)responsibility. It is what this thesis has referred to as a force of 
irony. 
Autoimmunity is a deferral, a sending off, a renvoi, a turn, an interruption, 
a parabatic stepping away. It is a protection through exposure, an ironic, parabatic 
step that is not, a step under erasure, a step that steps in a different direction, that 
undoes what it proposes, that steps into itself. It is the parabatic step that allows 
the event to be, that steps up to the other: “autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or 
evil. It enables an exposure to the other, to what and to who comes – which means 
that it must remain incalculable. Without autoimmunity, with absolute immunity, 
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nothing would ever happen or arrive” (R 152). Autoimmunity is the aporia that 
opens another path, that has, as irony, “an internal contradiction, an indecidability, 
that is, an internal-external, nondialectisable antinomy that risks paralysing and 
thus calls for the event of the interruptive decision” (R 35).32  
 Derrida sees “a freedom of play, an opening of indetermination and 
indecidability in the very concept of democracy” (R 25) – it is mutable, “lack[ing] 
of the proper and the self-same” (R 37). Like irony, democracy is elusive and 
undecidable, always insufficient to meet its own needs and demands, pervertible 
and perfectible,
33
 and better reinscribed, Derrida writes, as the democracy to come. 
Democracy to come has the structure of a promise, but a promise in and of irony, 
a promise/perjury, an aporetic “force without force, incalculable singularity and 
calculable equality, commensurability and incommensurability, heteronomy and 
autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or shared sovereignty” (R 86). 
Democracy to come is autoimmune, parabatically undoing itself, overstepping 
itself, transgressing itself. It is a different thinking of the event, an event that is 
unique and unforeseeable. A mondalisation, a thinking beyond national borders, 
of justice, and of self-criticism. 
The contradictions of “democracy to come” include that of the 
performative/constative hyphenation. The phrase can “correspond to the neutral, 
constative analysis of a concept” but can also inscribe a performative, operating as 
a promise, belief, or command. “The to of the „to come‟ wavers between 
imperative injunction (call or performative) and the patient perhaps of 
messianicity (nonperformative exposure to what comes, to what can always not 
come or has already come)” (R 91). The two possibilities alternate, haunt each 
other, parasite each other, parabatically stepping over and into the other, and 
Derrida directly links this movement to the step of irony. “In saying this myself 
right now, in cautioning you that I can by turns or simultaneously play on the two 
                                                 
32
 Autoimmunity is an effect of irony, that is, its contradictions stem from the ironic contradictions 
and hyphenations that effect the mark. The undoing that occurs is also one of the effects of irony, 
but by no means the only result. 
33
 In Rogues Derrida uses the example of the 1992 Algerian elections, in which democratic 
elections were halted as the government felt that the electoral process would end – democratically 
– in the cessation of democracy. Similarly, in response to the September 11th attacks the American 
government restricted its own freedom and democratic processes, deciding, in order to save 
democracy and freedom, to temporally suspend (a degree of) democracy and freedom. In so doing 
it added friendly fire to the loss of life. In protecting itself democracy turns on itself, and “must 
then come to resemble these enemies, to corrupt itself and threaten itself in order to protect itself 
against their threats” (R 40). In turning into something other, turning in on itself, autoimmunity 
designates an anacoluthic step, an ironic movement of self-interruption.  
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turns or turns of phrase, I withdraw into the secret of irony, be it irony in general 
or the particular rhetorical figure called irony” (R 91). Irony: the alternation and 
simultaneity of meanings, a parabatic step of hyphenation.  
Democracy‟s force is an ironic, parabatic force of weakness, and yet,  
 
is it not also democracy that gives the right to irony in the public space? 
Yes, for democracy opens public space, the publicity of public space, by 
granting the right to a change of tone (Wechsel der Töne), to irony as well 
as to fiction, the simulacrum, the secret, literature, and so on. And, thus, to 
a certain nonpublic public within the public, to a res publica, a republic 
where the difference between the public and the nonpublic remains an 
indecidable limit. There is something of a democratic republic as soon as 
this right is exercised. … It … already opens, for whomever, an experience 
of freedom, however ambiguous and disquieting, threatened and 
threatening, it might remain in its “perhaps”, with a necessarily excessive 
responsibility of which no one may be absolved. (R 91-92)   
 
The ironic, autoimmune, parabatic step of democracy means that democracy is 
always open to the other, and to an alterity which may attack it. Derrida‟s use of 
the term nonpublic is very important here. He does not oppose, as does Rorty, a 
public and a private, with irony of the side of the private, but a public and a 
nonpublic, a public and that which prevents the notion of the homogenisation of 
the public. The nonpublic designates an alterity within the public that prevents the 
public from closing in on itself, from considering itself the proper and forming 
strict boundaries between itself and the other. The nonpublic is also the nonsubject, 
and the nonhuman – the book, the building, the animal, the environment. Irony is 
the acknowledgement of the non-public within the public arena, the right to a 
secret, without which “we are in a totalitarian space” (TS 59). As Jonathan Culler 
writes: 
 
It has been proclaimed that 9/11 brought the end of irony. If that were true 
that would be a worrying indication of the possibility of an end of 
democracy also, an onset of totalitarianism, as total information awareness 
would herald the end of the secret. Literature, as the possibility of the 
secret and of irony, is both indispensable to democracy to come and to the 
hyperresponsibility to which thinking calls us, especially the thinking of 
Jacques Derrida.
34
 
 
                                                 
34
 Jonathan Culler, “The Most Interesting Thing in the World”, Diacritics 38.1-2 (2008) 15. 
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What, however, is the right to irony? The right to irony is the right to 
ambiguity, the right to undecidability, to a certain play, to elliptical approaches, to 
a mode of engagement that is open, that acknowledges inconsistencies, 
instabilities and contradictions, that recognises – without suppressing – 
differences and alterity. It is the right to recognise the mark as divided. It is the 
right to engage with troubling questions, and to acknowledge the difficulties, 
interruptions, exclusions and autoimmunity that rights, and laws, entail.
35
 Not to 
lose oneself in meaninglessness, in the impossibility of decisions or infinite 
deferral, but each time and in each situation to act knowing that it‟s not that 
simple. To attempt to address the fact that the unconditional towards which we 
(should) strive is contaminated by or hyphenated to the conditional, and that 
responsible steps towards are always also irresponsible steps away.
36
   
Derrida argues that freedom and sovereignty
37
 always presume upon an 
empowered self with a certain power to decide, to speak for itself and know 
                                                 
35
 And which absolutely steps away from the political associations and implications of Rorty‟s 
private ironist – see chapter one. 
36
 The contradictions and complications of irony can be likened to doublethink. As Orwell writes:  
 
[Winston‟s] mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know and not 
to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully constructed lies, 
to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be 
contradictory and believing in both of them … to believe that democracy was impossible 
and that the Party was the guardian of democracy. (George Orwell, 1984 (New York: 
New American Library, 1977) 35) 
 
Doublethink is defined in the OED as “The mental capacity to accept as equally valid two entirely 
contrary opinions or beliefs”, and as such bears a striking similarity to irony. As a negotiation 
between extremes irony cannot be wholly appropriated by democracy or totalitarianism – its 
freedom can always be used as a control. It does not work specifically to produce apathy or 
confusion or the horror and trauma that characterises 1984, but nor does it work specifically to 
introduce democracy, liberalism or responsibility. Hyphenation can join and interrupt in any way; 
the right to irony is the right to open a door to the other, knowing that the door, the other and the 
event are undecidable. However, it is precisely the movement of openness and negotiation that 
renders irony not wholly neutral but a positive opening in and of itself.  
37
 Wendy Brown criticises Derrida for his recuperation of a “conditional and conditioned 
sovereignty from its absolutist and unconditional heritage” (“Sovereign Hesitations”, Derrida and 
the Time of the Political 114). She argues that democracy and sovereignty are simply incompatible, 
as in democracy the people suspend their power, and “a sovereign that suspends its sovereignty is 
no sovereign” (117). Derrida, argues Brown, mistranslates the cracy (rule) of democracy as force 
or power, and thereby “occludes the most difficult feature of democracy: the regular practice of 
sharing power, of self-governance. Shared rule, shared power … is very different from the 
collective force of the people on something or against something” (124). Not only does Derrida 
underline the sovereign force of democracy, Brown claims that Derrida‟s definition of democracy 
emphasises individual, sovereign freedom in such a way as to make it difficult for each individual 
to participate in the rule of the demos: the individual is too busy, so to speak, being free. It thereby 
separates freedom and rule, and means that we are ruled by something external – it requires the 
state. The “sharp distinction between personal liberty and political rule” (125) places democracy in 
an impossible position. And so Derrida attempts to redeem it by opening freedom beyond the 
human and democracy beyond the nation-state. But, as “freedom is detached from concrete 
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itself.
38
 But as soon as the sovereign self tries to place itself or explain itself it 
begins the process of autoimmunity. In defining itself, sovereignty/the 
self/democracy opens itself up to counter-interpretations that dissolve any 
conceptualisation of the entity as in possession of an absolute “natural” right or 
essence. The autoimmune process thus does not simply consist in attacking one‟s 
own defences, a murder/suicide,  
 
but in compromising the self, the autos – and this ipseity. It consists not 
only in committing suicide but in compromising sui- or self-referentiality, 
the self- or sui- of suicide itself. Autoimmunity is more or less suicidal, but, 
more seriously still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its meaning 
and supposed integrity. (R 45) 
 
Suicide may kill a body, but autoimmune suicide does away with the very concept 
of a self, annihilating suicide as there is no longer a self present enough to itself to 
take its own life. Derrida does not propose to eradicate the sovereign subject, but 
shows that the sovereignty of the subject is a priori divided, parabatically 
interrupted, a divided sovereignty of the democracy to come.  
Derrida parabatically steps between a sovereigntist and antisovereigntist 
stance, showing that sovereignity and nonsovereignty are hyphenated. As he says 
in For What Tomorrow, “according to the situations, I am an antisovereignist or a 
sovereignist – and I vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain times and a 
sovereignist at others” (FW 92). For Derrida, in this context,  
 
responsibility is what dictates the decision to be sometimes for the 
sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its deconstruction … 
according to the singularity of the contexts and the stakes. There is no 
relativism in this, no renunciation of the injunction to “think” and to 
deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very condition of 
decision and responsibility – if there is any. (FW 92) 
 
Despite this openness, however, and against Hägglund, deconstruction does not 
neutrally tread; it “demands a difficult dissociation, almost impossible but 
                                                                                                                                     
subjects, it is also detached from power and the political” (127). Hence freedom becomes the way 
in which people are isolated from political power. While Brown‟s criticisms are well-argued and 
persuasive, her criticism of Derrida‟s use of the term “force” ignores its complicated status in 
Derrida‟s work. Force, as outlined in chapter two, is always a force of weakness. Force is always 
an ironic force, and the sovereign force of an individual is thus neither quite as powerful as Brown 
believes, nor quite as insurmountable an obstacle to democracy. 
38
 As Derrida points out, too often the self so in command of itself is “master in the masculine: the 
father, husband, son, or brother, the proprietor, owner or seignior” (R 12). 
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indispensible, between unconditionality (justice without power) and sovereignty 
(right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionality, even 
when it seems impossible, and not sovereignty, even when it seems possible” (FW 
92). Deconstruction “is not neutral. It intervenes” (PO 93). 
 
The Autoimmune Inter-view 
 
Under the laws of the interview, and through the ironic, autoimmune double bind 
– protecting and endangering, correcting and reducing, making accessible or 
comprehensible and making lesser – Derrida was obliged to adopt a certain 
propositional, programmatic relationship to his texts. These “laws” demand that 
that deconstruction present a Thinker, a responsible subject to whom questions 
can be directed, and from whom explanations and accessible summaries can be 
gleaned. The nonmethod of deconstruction came closer to a method, and Derrida 
became, to an extent, the controller of that method. In protecting himself and 
deconstruction Derrida exposes himself and deconstruction, autoimmunely 
reading, presenting, attacking the non-method of deconstruction, and pushing it 
towards a method. The public self-critique and self-defence of deconstruction 
entails an autoimmune relation with itself, an undoing of deconstruction by 
conceptualising it, and causing it to resemble its “enemies” (R 40) – interviews.  
If deconstruction is openness to alterity and to the other, and posits not a 
subject but a subjectile, under the laws of the interview it autoimmunely posits a 
subject – a thinker responsible for thoughts – and a certain closure. Thus it is 
autoimmunely forced to become immune. Deconstruction, like democracy, has to 
be autoimmune in order to be itself, but being itself opens it to the undoing of 
itself. If autoimmunity is “that strange behaviour where a living being, in quasi-
suicidal fashion, „itself‟ works to destroy its own protection, to immunise itself 
against its „own‟ immunity” (AR 94), in the case of deconstruction a parabatic 
step occurs, an ironic twist that turns autoimmunity on itself. The 
(ir)responsibility that is deconstruction is forced to comply with certain legal and 
social “responsibilities” – present your work accessibly, systematise and sign your 
work simply and on the dotted line – and thereby become autoimmunely 
irresponsible. As Derrida was obliged more and more to expose himself in the 
form of the interview, and subject himself to the demands for explanation, 
definition and précis, he was forced into an autoimmune relationship with himself, 
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a relationship that contaminated the style of his later texts. This autoimmunity 
operates both in terms of the attack on part of the self outlined in “Faith and 
Knowledge” – Derrida in autoimmune relation to the section of himself that is 
deconstruction – and the attack on the “whole” self in Rogues – 
Derrida/deconstruction in autoimmune relation to Derrida/deconstruction.  
As Derrida re-read his texts, and grew increasingly worried about his 
legacy, the position of Thinker grew, and in protecting deconstruction it began to 
resemble “Derrida studies”. By bringing deconstruction under his wing it is 
protected, but exposed to the possibility of dying with him. It becomes not so 
much that which happens, but that which happens when Derrida reads. Protecting 
deconstruction causes it to attack itself, to close its openness. The inter-view 
caused a certain jealousy – a certain blindness – and a rather more zealous 
protection of the legacy. 
The autoimmune problems of speaking of deconstruction can be likened to 
the difficulties of speaking democratically. To speak on democracy “in an 
intelligible, univocal, sensible fashion, would mean making oneself understood by 
anyone who can hear this word or the sentences formed with this word” (R 71). 
How does one speak democratically of deconstruction? Is it even necessary?
39
 
Deconstruction by no means has to be understood by all, and yet a constant 
accusation levelled against Derrida was the deliberate obfuscation of ideas, “a 
written style that defies comprehension” (P 420). 40  As Derrida continues in 
Rogues,  
 
To speak democratically of democracy, it would be necessary, through 
some circular performativity and through the political violence of some 
enforcing rhetoric, some force of law, to impose a meaning on the word 
democratic and thus produce a consensus that one pretends, by fiction, to 
be established and accepted – or at the very least possible and necessary: 
on the horizon. (R 73) 
 
Deconstruction, a non-method, has no univocal, dictionary-friendly definition. 
Like democracy, and like irony, its proper state is a certain impropriety. As such it 
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 In “Unsealing (“the old new language”) Derrida says “No one gets angry at a mathematician or a 
physicist whom he or she doesn‟t understand at all” (P 115). “Why is it apparently the philosopher 
who is expected to be „easier‟ and not some scientist or other who is even more inaccessible?” (P 
116) 
40
 This is taken from the letter penned by Barry Smith et al in protest against Derrida‟s honorary 
degree from Cambridge. 
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can never be presented in the simple, thetic statements that the law of the 
interview demands. Hence the public self-critique and self-defence of 
deconstruction entails an ironic, autoimmune relation with itself, an undoing of 
deconstruction by conceptualising it. 
The interview is the time and the place of explanations, excuses, and 
confessions. As a performative, a confession produces truth: “Saint Augustine 
speaks often of „making the truth‟ in a confession” (P 347). By explaining, 
representing, reciting and reworking, a new reading, a new understanding, a new 
truth is born. But once truth can be produced it becomes impossible to distinguish 
from a lie; a confession is truth/perjury. The confession is furthermore subject to a 
temporal rift: one can only confess for oneself, but the temporal delay that exists 
between an act and the confession of the act means that the self that confesses is 
different to the self that perpetrated. An “anacoluthic substitution of the subject” 
(WA 189) occurs as the self that confesses confesses at the wrong time and for a 
self that no longer exists. In the interview/confession Derrida re-read and re-
presented his work and therefore changed it, confessed and read as a different 
person, and produced the truth/perjury of a different text. The impossibility of the 
confession – it‟s always too late to confess – is joined by the autoimmunity of the 
confession – confessing, too late, undoes the text confessed and changes it. A 
confession, which exposes to protect, admits wrong to do right, is always an 
autoimmune process. 
In a 1983 interview Anne Berger said to Derrida: “I don‟t know if I‟m 
addressing the man or the „writer-thinker,‟ I don‟t know what their relation is” (P 
132). Their relation, Derrida has shown us, is one of mutual, dynamic 
contamination, as the public and the private Derrida merge together. This 
intermingling operates within the structure of Derrida‟s texts, so that Derrida the 
man, Derrida the thinker, Derrida‟s theory and Derrida‟s autobiography become 
conjoined. As Derrida stated repeatedly, 
 
I do not believe in the conceptual value of a rigorous distinction between 
the private and the public. There can be the singular and the secret, but 
these resist the “private” as much as they do the “public”. In what I write 
one should be able to perceive that the boundary between the 
autobiographical and the political is subject to a certain strain. (N 17-18) 
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The contamination between categories and the gathering that so fascinated 
Derrida generates its own autoimmune problems.
41
 An autobiographical, 
confessional text – all texts – requires the bringing together of all the threads that 
explain, expose, present and re-present the self. It presumes upon the existence of 
a pre-existent subject which then outlines its own story. But not only does the act 
of gathering conjoin the threads of the other, it also assembles threads of events 
that never took place: “Still today there remains in me an obsessive desire to save 
in uninterrupted inscription, in the form of a memory, what happens – or fails to 
happen” (SI 34). The gathering attempts to present a stable, unified, self-present 
self, but by gathering truth, truth is produced, events are changed. The self that 
gathers is wholly different to the selves that are gathered: 
 
There is not a constituted subject that engages itself at a given moment in 
writing for some reason or another. It is given by writing, by the other: 
born as we were bizarrely saying a moment ago, born by being given, 
delivered, offered, and betrayed all at once. (P 347) 
 
Thus the self, preserved, is a different self, and the autobiography comprises 
heterography, and thanatography, as the written self is always other and dead. 
Preserving and gathering becomes suicide, but an autoimmune suicide, as what 
dies is not the self as such, but the very idea of a whole, self-present, pure self. 
Furthermore, in the drive to preserve a memory or two the memories themselves 
are changed, as the mode of preservation changes the memories.  
Hägglund proposes that gathering or totalising impulse found in the 
autobiography is the drive to survive; Derrida‟s wish to live on in his work. In 
“Dialanguages” Derrida speaks of a “memory machine”, in which everything is 
inscribed without loss or distortion. But, as Hägglund notes, the machine is 
impossible, as inscription must be susceptible to erasure or change. The 
temporality that allows the machine to be also renders it impossible, and Derrida‟s 
absolute desire to have such a machine automatically undoes itself, as absolute 
fulfilment would negate any desire. The desire to keep everything and protect it is 
also the desire to kill it, as protecting it from everything protects it from life. For 
Hägglund the double bind of the desire to keep is the double bind of death and 
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survival. Derrida‟s “I want to kill myself” (CF 7) is the desire to mourn his own 
death and thereby survive it. This is the autoimmune desire for survival:  
 
On the one hand, to survive is to keep the memory of a past and thus resist 
forgetting. On the other hand, to survive is to live on in a future that 
separates itself from the past and opens it to being forgotten … No matter 
how much I try to protect the one I have been, I have to attack my own 
defences of the past, since the coming of the future opens my life to begin 
with.
42
 
 
Importantly, although Hägglund doesn‟t mention this, Derrida speaks in the same 
interview of the “dream of an absolute memory”, his “sigh[ing] after the keeping 
of everything” as his “very respiration” (PM 65). Derrida‟s very breath, his 
respiration, is autoimmune, parabatically stepping between life and death, a breath 
that undoes itself, a breath turn – Celan‟s Atemwende. 
Thus this chapter proposes that the laws of the interview – speed, 
simplification, system, intentionality – were, while not the sole contributor, an 
important factor in the change in style of Derrida‟s later work. The result was an 
autoimmune relation, an ironic contradiction that turned deconstruction in on itself, 
and imbued it with a certain closure and immunity. While autoimmunity may be 
self-deconstruction (R 90), the self-deconstruction of deconstruction turns the 
wheel back to metaphysics and immunity. 
 
Autoimmune (Auto)biographies  
 
Under the irony of the signature every text is an autobiographical text, a text on 
the self and a text on the other. The presentation of the self is a writing of the 
death of the self, a thanatography, as “the „I live‟ is guaranteed by a nominal 
contract which falls due only upon the death of the one who says „I live‟ in the 
present” (EO 10-11). That is, as the name is always the name of a dead person and 
the signature always the mark of the deceased, autobiography is always the work 
of a dead author, the presentation of the self that autoimmunely kills the self. The 
writing of a (soon-to-be) dead author is, however, doubly a thanatography in that 
it recounts “dead” events, events that never took place, that are not and were not. 
Derrida changes the strong, self-present, undivided autos of the autobiography to 
a thanatography, but also to a heterography – a writing of the other. The self 
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presents itself to itself, but the self that writes and the self that is written about, or 
as Derrida unveils in Memoirs of the Blind, the self that paints and the self that is 
painted, are not the same.
43
 There is a blind spot as one reflects, an invisible trait 
that cannot be captured as one looks at oneself looking. An Augenblick, a blinking 
of différance, “the law of the inter-view” (MB 55) – the blind view. The self-
portrait, like the autobiography, inhabits every text, but is never fully present, 
always a ruin and in ruins.  
The contamination of the real and the fictive causes de Man to refer to the 
autobiography as prosopopeia: “The dominant figure of the epitaphic or 
autobiographical discourse is, as we saw, the prosopopeia, the fiction of the voice-
from-beyond-the-grave” (AD 927).44 The author figures as a spectral presence 
within her own text, and the autobiographical becomes thanatographical as the 
self is split between an empirical self and a linguistic self. Language is figural, 
and always refers, not to the thing itself, but to a linguistic representation of the 
thing. Language always distances, and fictionalises. De Man concludes: 
 
Death is a displaced name for the linguistic predicament, and the 
restoration of mortality by autobiography (the prosopopeia of the voice 
and the name) deprives and disfigures to the precise extent that it restores. 
Autobiography veils a defacement of the mind of which it is itself the 
cause. (AD 930) 
 
Each writing is the writing of a dead self, dead because disfigured through 
language, dead because the time of that self is past. Autobiography is the writing 
of the dead, an ironic, autoimmune suicide through presentation in language. 
The autoimmune undoing of the self that takes place in the autobiography 
takes place through what Derrida refers to as transferential figures. 
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 And are different again to the self that reads or views.  
44
In Circumfession Derrida details the facial paralysis that he suffers from, what he calls a 
disfiguration, which 
 
reminds you that you do not inhabit your face because you have too many places, you 
take place in more places than you should, and transgression itself always violates a place, 
an uncrossable line, it seizes itself, punishes, paralyses immediately, topology here both 
being and not being a figure. (CF 24) 
 
This disfiguration calls to the de-facement of prosopopeia, as the voice from beyond the grave 
speaks for a multiplicity of selves, as the body of the subject is split between multiple bodies and 
multiple others, “real” and “fictive” transferential figures. In Memoires Derrida relates 
prosopopeia and parabasis. 
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The most private autobiography comes to terms with great transferential 
figures, who are themselves and themselves plus someone else (for 
example, Plato, Socrates, and a few others in The Post Card, Genet, Hegel, 
Saint Augustine, and many others in Glas and Circumfession, and so forth). 
In order to speak of the most intimate thing, for example one‟s “own” 
circumcision, one does better to be aware that an exegesis is in process, 
that you carry the detour, the contour, and the memory inscribed in the 
culture of your body, for example. (P 353) 
 
Every text is an anacoluthic or parabatic autobiography/heterography – an ironic, 
interrupted exegesis of the corpus of the other that is an ironic, interrupted 
exegesis of the corpus of the self. The story of the self does not recount the life of 
a single, unified self present to itself, but a self split by alterity, signed, in a 
moment of allography, by the other. Thus, under the irony of the signature, the 
overwriting of the self by the other is also an underwriting that ironically both 
secures and disturbs the self. The truth of life of the self becomes the (perjured) 
confession of a death given over to the other. In signing itself the self must wait 
for the countersignature of the other, for the other to read, repeat and step in a 
different direction. The countersignature of the other comes “to lead it [the text] 
off elsewhere, so running the risk of betraying it” (SI 69). Thus the (ironic) 
countersignature of the other, the change from autobiography to heterography, is 
an autoimmune act: “you have to give yourself over singularly to singularity, but 
singularity then does have to share itself out and so compromise itself, promise to 
compromise itself” (SI 69). Promise is a co-promising which is both a 
compromise and compromising. Each text, and each autobiography, is ironic and 
autoimmune, an auto-interpretation or self-critique that both turns every text into a 
writing of the self, and in that process undoes the self. The irony of the signature 
is a paraph of the autoimmune, the ironic signing that erases itself as it signs. It 
signs the ironic contamination of the self and the other, as each text is undersigned 
by the self, a signature that is already a signing of alterity.  
 An (ir)responsible, ironic autobiography is one which does not promise the 
representation of a self-present subject, but, is one which, as Joseph G. Kronick 
writes, is “a kind of shattering of the mirror in order to face the other to whom 
[the author] is responsible”.45 For Kronick “„Autobiography‟ is the name Derrida 
gives for this response or pledge to what remains outside [ontology and 
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 Joseph G. Kronick, “Philosophy as Autobiography: The Confessions of Jacques Derrida”, MLN 
115 (2000) 999. 
P a g e  | 238 
 
totalisation], an other that makes deconstruction, and other bodies of writing, 
possible”.46 A Derridean autobiography does not totalise, does not repeat or re-
present a life present to itself, but engages the other and self as other through 
parabatic interruption, an ironic exegesis of the hyphenation of the self and other. 
What, then, is a biography after Derrida, an inter-view through Derrida, and how 
do we address, as Naas puts it, “the extraordinary intersection of life and work 
that goes by the name of „Jacques Derrida‟”?47  
In an essay entitled “A Life in Philosophy” Bennington describes a 
biography as “committed to making sense of the life of its subject, of gathering the 
dispersed events of that life around an organising principle or guiding thread”.48 A 
philosopher is one who lives philosophically, and as such philosopher is an 
ontological category, a mode of being rather than occupation. But what truly gives 
a thinker the status of philosopher is not simply her work, but the way she lives 
her life, that is, anecdotal, banal details of everyday existence. Thus “philosophy 
cannot do without the ontological supplement documented in biography – and 
therefore cannot do without potential triviality”.49 The truths that philosophers 
present should be absolutely unconnected to their personal lives, and yet it is those 
personal lives that formed the people who discovered those systems and truths. 
Anecdotes about the way in which Kant or Spinoza or Wittgenstein lived prove 
their status as philosophers, and yet undermine philosophy with their triviality. 
However, in the case of Derrida, Bennington argues Derrida‟s work does not seek 
to end philosophy, and that he is therefore not a philosopher. As such a biography 
of Derrida would probably not conform to the typical model of a philosophy‟s 
biography, but would take the form of “a multiple, layered but non hierarchised, 
fractal biography which would escape the totalising and teleological 
commitments which inhabit the genre from the start”.50 
Two recent biographies of Derrida‟s life – Jason Powell‟s Jacques Derrida: 
A Biography and David Mikics‟ Who Was Jacques Derrida? An Intellectual 
Biography – occupy the troubled border between work and life that Derrida 
speaks of in “Otobiographies”. However, both absolutely fail to present the 
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paratactic, fragmentary, ironic biography which Bennington describes, bearing 
closer resemblance to psychobiographies which “claim that, by following 
empirical procedures of the psychologistic – at times even psychoanalystic – 
historicist, or sociologistic type, one can give an account of the genesis of the 
philosophical system” (EO 5). Both attempt make sense of the Thought, to the 
extent that what Powell terms a biography is in fact a bibliography, a listing, with 
précis and commentary, of his texts. Derrida‟s life is what he published, what he 
thought and how he engaged. Personal details are mentioned only insofar as they 
appear in texts like Circumfession or as they directly affected the content or theme 
of his works. As Powell writes, “The biography only comes from the texts, if the 
biography is to make sense of Derrida, as a writer”.51 While Powell acknowledges 
the contamination of author and work and life – “Autobiography cannot be written 
fully; it is just everywhere in life and texts, but nowhere in particular”52 – he is 
interested only in Derrida the writer. For him Derrida is deconstruction, and as 
such Derrida‟s biography is a bibliography of texts that reads not as a 
personal/public history, but a chronologically organised summary or introductory 
guide.  
David Mikics‟ text is a biography that sees the subject – Derrida and 
deconstruction – as immediately knowable and presentable: “I aim to explain his 
career”.53 Meaning for Mikics is attainable and univocal, and he is oddly and 
confusingly confident that “Derrida‟s resistance to thinking about the personal life 
cannot prevent biography … from coming back to haunt him”. 54  While he 
purportedly attempts to offer a measured assessment of Derrida‟s texts and 
political/public engagements, his reading of Derrida and of deconstruction is 
predominantly reductionist and generalising. His statements betray a tendency 
towards hasty (mis)reading and labelling, making sweeping proclamations such as: 
“Derrida‟s knowing scepticism relieves us of responsibility for our words and 
deeds: he reduces us to mere parts of the signifying machine”. 55  While both 
Powell and Mikics address Derrida through transferential figures – Derrida is 
understood through his engagement with Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Levinas, 
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Sartre etc. – Derrida‟s signature is wholly subsumed into the system. There is no 
human being, just a series of events and texts that led inexorably to deconstruction, 
and through which deconstruction can be systematised and comprehended.  
Catherine Malabou‟s collaboration with Derrida in Counterpath: 
Traveling with Jacques Derrida is a travelogue, a traversing of Derrida‟s life and 
texts, and as such is arguably a far more successful biography than Powell‟s or 
Mikics‟. Counterpath presents disordered chapters/fragments wherein Derrida‟s 
mother, his language and his facial paralysis are themes on an equal footing with 
arche-writing, violence, or messianicity. Punctuating Malabou‟s investigations 
into the events of Derrida‟s life, academic or personal, are postcards sent by 
Derrida to Malabou as he travels and reads drafts of her book. Malabou‟s text 
“travels with” Derrida, it steps with him through different cities, texts and events, 
mixing biographical detail with critical exposition. It is named a biography only in 
the Library of Congress cataloguing data, and is therefore properly and 
improperly a biographical work, recognising and not recognising itself as such. Its 
fragmentary approach, its non-totalising destinerrance, its unnamed irony, its 
maps and itineraries that point in different, impossible and unprogrammable 
directions, its mixture of the public and the private, and its stepping up, without 
differentiating, to Derrida‟s Thoughts and thoughts, makes it a biography of and 
after Derrida. A biography signed over and over again with the inter-view of 
autoimmune irony, parabatically and undecidably stepping between work on and 
of the other, and work on and of the self.  
The film Derrida is successful in a similar way. As the co-director Amy 
Ziering Kofman explains, “It was never of interest to me to make a film about 
„who Jacques Derrida is‟ and present a narrative of his life”.56 Derrida attempts to 
side-step the laws of the interview, to step away from univocal meaning, from “a 
conventional PBS or BBC type documentary narrative that biographically 
recount[s] facts about Derrida‟s life in a standard documentary fashion”.57 Instead, 
Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick create a work that is both public and private, 
academic and anecdotal. A biography on Derrida, inheriting from Derrida an 
approach to Derrida and to biography. Derrida moves slowly, containing 
meandering shots accompanied by Ziering Kofman‟s otherworldly quotations 
from Derrida‟s texts. It questions representation, and problematises the subject 
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and the means of the biography, knowing that, as Dick says, the work cannot 
present Jacques Derrida, at home, unplugged, but “creates a doppelganger of the 
subject”.58 Instead it presents a fragmented, fractal subject(ile), a lower  case “i”. 
This “i” is mirrored in the title of the volume of the screenplay: Derrida is written 
in large, while letters, with the exception of the “i”, which is in gold. The subject, 
always in lower case, is defused, off-centre, a subjectile, and yet always a focus, a 
draw, a distraction.
59
 It glitters, it is and is not gold. It is biography, and it is not.
60
 
It is a work under the irony of the signature. 
The biography that Bennington calls for, and that Malabou steps very 
close to, is a biography written like Circumfession; through a fragmented, non-
hierarchised form. The presentation of a life through fragments presents frozen 
moments of self, close-ups of a subject microscopically focused on cells of 
thought (fragments of skin) to the extent that the cells are no more than 
anonymous cells, cells unique and yet unrecognisable. The self is seen to be made 
up of “general” fragments, a subject comprising multiple parts shared by many. 
Circumfession is not “fiction”, nor “autobiography”, but an “interrupted 
autobiothanatoheterographical opus” (CF 40) whose ideal form of expression is 
the ironic, parabatic, paratactic fragment. It is a performance of the irony of the 
signature, a writing of the self, of the other, life and death. In the eponymously 
titled film Derrida speaks on the difficulty of presenting (autobiographical) stories: 
“Even when I confide things that are very secret, I don‟t confide them in mode of 
a story. At times, I provide certain signs, facts, dates, but otherwise, I don‟t write a 
narrative”. 61  Circumfession is a string of independent units, a radical, 
unsystematic performance of Schlegel‟s description of the memoir as a “system of 
fragments”. It is an ironic, parabatic (non)story. It is an interview and inter-view; 
it is the response to systematic, methodical demands and a vast overstepping of 
those demands. It is a performance of ironic engagement, of nonmethodical, 
nonthetic, ironic exposition. It is an anacoluthon, always ironically interrupted by 
the irony of the signature, always stepping over itself and signing in a different 
direction, promising and compromising.  
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Circumfession: A Parabatic AutoBioThanatoHeteroGraphical Opus 
 
Circumfession is a book within a book. Neither chapter, essay, rècit or section, it 
is a book which, with another book – Derridabase – comprises (the book entitled) 
Jacques Derrida.
62
 Together these separate and conjoined books form a book 
which is complete and incomplete, as the book – Derridabase – which describes 
“the general system” (JD 1) of Derrida‟s thought is parabatically undermined and 
undercut by the book – Circumfession – which, running along the bottom third of 
the page, demonstrates and performs the impossibility of describing and therefore 
closing Derrida‟s system. Derridabase consists of Derrida as read by Bennington, 
who attempted to systematically detail and delimit the logical categories of 
Derrida‟s thought without quotation or biographical detail. The systemisation of 
deconstruction will, however, make it predictable, and therefore rob it of a future, 
and so Derrida responded to Bennington‟s death sentence with Circumfession, a 
text which revealed this systematisation or programmability to be doomed to 
failure. Derrida destabilises his Thought with his thoughts, with fragments of his 
life, a proliferation of signatures, phrases masquerading as transcendental 
signifiers, ambiguously directed apostrophes, doubles and doubled discourses. 
Responding to Bennington‟s (and, through him, all other previous and future) 
attempts to systematise him, Derrida goes to war against this self/other, and 
presents, not a thetic undoing, not a propositional engagement, not a descriptive 
analysis of inaccuracies or exclusions, but a confessional work of exceptional 
singularity. For Kronick this unpredictability is the essence of an autobiography: 
“Autobiography, for Derrida, is the compulsion to respond to an other, dead or 
alive, who provokes in him something singular, a text of his own whose otherness 
surprised him because it cannot be foreseen from the texts it repeats but does not 
leave unchanged”.63 
In Circumfession Derrida presents a deconstructive text at its most 
unmethodical, where the subject is Derrida: Derrida through Bennington, Derrida 
through all his interviews, Derrida through his texts, Derrida through Derrida. In 
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the inverted inter-view – alternate-view – of Derridabase/Circumfession questions 
are asked through Bennington‟s formulated system. Derrida does not respond with 
further reductions or explanations, but with a performance of deconstruction that 
excessively overrides the constative form of Derridabase‟s implicit questioning. 
Derrida does not offer accessible answers, but writes against the containment of 
his work, producing a cutting that opens his texts to aporias, alterity and the 
impossible. Circumfession is a parabatic, paratactic autobiography, ironically 
stepping between life and death, the self and the other, the proper and the 
improper. It writes itself and erases itself, presents itself in autoimmunity. It is a 
confession cut short, a confession of and for alterity and the other, an 
(ir)responsible confession of produced truth, transferential figures, perjury and 
guilt.  
Writing – criticism – attempts to find a vein, a passageway to the centre, a 
vena cava as via cava. Bennington writes (on) Derrida in order to find a point of 
entry, a place that he can see and inhabit and thereby possess. But while 
Derridabase endeavours to go straight to the heart of the matter, Circumfession 
circumnavigates the circulatory system, exploring the web of connections and 
wandering on the periphery, taking the pulse of a “paragraph which never 
circumpletes itself” (CF 2). The term “circumfession” is itself a “word vein” (CF 
3), a linguistic point or place of passage that branches out in a web/maze of 
connections, that “makes come the chance of events on which no program, no 
logical or textual machine will ever close” (CF 3). It is a word from a circulatory 
system that moves towards a centre which is not the centre, and is therefore a 
circulatory asystem. Circumfession is the foreword/foreskin to Derridabase, 
appropriately written after the body of the text, which figures as a trace 
throughout Derridabase and shows it to be incomplete. It is a supplement, adding 
to a whole and revealing that whole to be a priori lacking.  
 
The Fragments of Autobiography 
 
Circumfession presents a “series of 59 widows or counterexamplarities of myself” 
(CF 48), “59 conjurations” (CF 51), “59 prayer bands” (CF 49), “59 … 
periphrases” (JD title page), “59 periods, 59 respirations, 59 commotions, 59 four-
stroke compulsions” (CF 25). The 59 fragments – one for each year of Derrida‟s 
life – present Derrida‟s circumnavigation through – a deliberately impossible 
P a g e  | 244 
 
route – his “interrupted autobiothanatoheterographical opus” (CF 40). In 
Circumfession we find “counterexemplarities” of Derrida, different windows into 
Derrida‟s life at different times, moments that died in the inspiration/respiration of 
occurring and leave behind widows to remember them.
64
 Each example is set 
against example, each fragment against fragment, each fragment against 
Derridabase: “I gather my spirits, for there are more than one of them sharing by 
[sic] body, only by multiplying in me the counterexamples and the countertruths 
that I am” (CF 48). The 59 different counterexamples of Derrida and of 
deconstruction present each time a fragment of deconstruction, a performance and 
an example, that will of necessity be ordered by the reader into a system, but a 
system that repeats and contradicts itself, and as such will always explode in 
overdetermination.  
While there is a certain linearity to Circumfession, albeit one repeatedly 
disrupted by movements into the past, this linearity is not progressive, as each 
fragmentary period operates as a full stop, complete and yet in an elliptical series: 
“this story doesn‟t look like anything, nothing has shifted since the first morning 
on the threshold of the garden” (CF 26). Fragment 5 does not logically follow on 
from fragment 4, and while the event of reading is naturally changed by the order 
in which the fragments are read, there is no logical sequentiality that would be 
disrupted were they reordered at random. A fragment is a single period (of 
ellipsis), an instant of production that produces and presents the author as she is 
and was at a specific and singular moment. Derrida emphases this by giving – 
most of – his 59 fragments a single full stop; each fragment comprises a single 
run-on sentence, clause after clause that ends, if it ends at all, only at the end of 
each fragment. Each fragment presents the immediacy of a single thought thrown 
out with the urgency of a single breath – 59 fragments as 59 ironic, autoimmune 
respirations, aspirations to keep and thereby undo, to present and therefore erase, 
to be the self and hence the other.
65
 As Derrida explains in “The Word Processor”, 
the end of each fragment/sentence was dictated by a computer programme, and so 
Derrida was obliged to stop writing when the programme decided that the 
                                                 
64
 In “Envois” Derrida describes Socrates as Plato‟s widow: “He is also, on his part, Plato‟s widow. 
Don‟t laugh, there are only widows” (E 172). The one who dies before is ironically, and 
aphoristically, also the one left behind. In the inter-view, in the window into the self the self is 
always a widow, looking through the window of memory to what went before, and what will 
outlast.  
65
 As noted earlier, Derrida describes the autoimmune desire to keep everything as his “very 
respiration” (PM 65).  
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fragment would be too long (PM 22). Hence the end of each fragment was 
unknown to Derrida, evoking the end that could come at any time.
66
 As the author 
in “Envois” is “afraid to die before finishing my sentence” (E 48), Derrida‟s fears 
that he might die before the end of a long sentence, and that his mother might die 
before he confessed for her, are repeated throughout the fragments.  
Fragments 7 and 18 end with a question mark that functions both as the 
mark of a rhetorical question which turns the fragment back in on itself, and as a 
mark that solicits an answer, that opens the fragment up to a dialogic structure. 
Fragment 34 ends with a dash and fragment 35 with ellipsis: the breath of the 
fragment runs out, and without the finality of the full stop the fragment continues 
indefinitely. Fragments 45, 54 and 55 end with an ellipsis of a slightly different 
sort, as the ellipsis figures within quotation marks. The fragments end in 
unfinished quotation; they end in a different voice that is cut short, signifying an 
excessive absence. The author hides behind – and is no more than – the voice of 
the other and yet this mask is insufficient to complete or represent the instant of 
the fragment, an instant split by multiple yet incomplete and absent voices. Too 
many people breathe together, and the fragment runs dry, yet so as to extend the 
fragment beyond itself and the “closure” of a full stop. 
The fragmentary mode that Derrida employs in Circumfession emphasises 
a mode of writing/thinking that conjoins exposition and the theory of that 
exposition. In fragment 12 he details his anger with Proust‟s comment, which 
reads “„A work in which there are theories is like an object on which one has left 
the price tag‟” (CF 12). Derrida sees this “decorum” as “vulgar” and “naïve”, 
stating that “I write with the price on” (CF 12), a (bar) code that is not perhaps 
visible to every reader, but which can be seen when one pays a price. Work and 
theory on the work, Derrida‟s writing has always retained a performative, 
fragmentary stepping in to itself.  
Fragments are traditionally the work of an instant, a flash of inspiration 
poured out on to the page. In Circumfession the instants of the fragments, each a 
single period, are instants that span a year, long single sentences that cover a 12 
month breath/breadth. The instant expands beyond itself, taking in other instants, 
and through influences, doublings and quotations, the instants of the other(s). The 
fragmentary structure of the divided instant is the structure of the testimonial or 
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 The average was, as Derrida explains, about 25 lines, so there was a certain predictability, but in 
a sense the knowledge of the approximate end makes the specific end even more abrupt. 
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confessional moment. A testimony – “always autobiographical” (DE 42) – is of 
the instant, outlining what was witnessed in a unique and particular moment by a 
unique and particular witness. However, testimony should recount a general event 
that any witness could recount, and the “facts” of the event should remain the 
same at each retelling, at each and every moment. Hence the singularity of the 
instant is divided by the necessity that it operate as a potentially universal 
experience – anyone there would have seen the same thing – and by the necessity 
that its “facts” remain constant. Testimony is always autoimmune, always 
attacking itself, its conditions of possibility also its conditions of impossibility.  
In the instant of the testimony, in the instant of autobiographical 
witnessing, a truth is produced which fragments the instant. Testimonies and 
confessions are both constative and performative, splitting the instant of 
attestation between a truth described and produced. In this fragmentary time the 
instant is divided and doubled, producing truths that from the moment of their 
inception have always been true and that render previous truths original perjuries. 
The presence and present that the confession and testimony requires is impossible, 
as the self describing the events is other to the self who witnessed them. The 
instant becomes laden and overdetermined with repetitions, doublings, counter-
signatures and counter-possibilities, with the death of the instant and of the 
subject. Thus the instant of the production of a truth is the instant of the 
destruction of another truth, fragmenting time and making writing the writing of 
autoimmune suicide and death. As Derrida writes in Demeure, it is here “that the 
possibility of fiction and lie, simulacrum and literature, that of the right to 
literature insinuates itself, at the very origin of truthful testimony, autobiography 
in good faith, sincere confession, as their essential compossibility” (DE 42). 
 
Autoimmune Thanatography 
 
In Learning to Live Finally Derrida describes the autoimmune, ironic 
contradictions that were his own conditions of possibility – life – and 
impossibility – death:  
 
I am at war with myself, it‟s true, you couldn‟t possibly know to what 
extent, beyond what you can guess, and I say contradictory things that are, 
we might say, in real tension; they are what construct me, make me live, 
and will make me die. (LL 47)  
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These contradictions stem from the moment he was inscribed into language – 
named – and into a specific religious, familial, cultural sphere – circumcised. 
Through irony the act of cutting made him whole, the act of exposure made him 
more modest: “„the circumcised Jew: more naked, perhaps, and therefore more 
modest, under the excess of clothes, cleaner, dirtier, where the foreskin no longer 
covers, protects itself the better for being more exposed, through interiority, 
pseudonym, irony, hypocrisy, detour and derelay‟” (CF 26). Circumcision in the 
Jewish faith takes place traditionally on the eighth day of a boy‟s life, an act that 
will remain outside the child‟s memory. In removing the foreskin circumcision 
marks the boy, signifying the Jewish faith. For Derrida the foreskin becomes the 
dot on the “i” that reveals the strong, capitalised subject – “I” – to always be in the 
lower case. The act of dotting the “i” should create a sovereign autos, but instead 
creates/reveals a weak, injured subjectile:  
 
„all the dots on the i‟s, … that‟s really what I was talking about, the point 
detached and retained at the same time, false, not false but simulated 
castration which does not lose what it plays to lose and transforms it into 
a pronounceable letter, i and not I. (CF 14)  
 
The ironic paradoxes of circumcision – detachment and retention – are 
“autoimmune ambivalences and antinomies” (R 72) that in seeking to empower 
weaken, in seeking to mark and place open the self to iterability and homelessness. 
Circumcision itself symbolises life and death – the act of cutting causes 
the boy to be born into the Jewish faith, but the blade against the skin, the removal 
of part of the body denotes death – a little death, an anacoluthic petite mort.67 A 
“circumfession”, as autobiography, written, as Blanchot writes, 
 
in order either to confess or to engage in self-analysis, or in order to 
expose oneself, like a work of art, to the gaze of all, is perhaps to seek to 
survive, but through a perpetual suicide – a death which is total inasmuch 
as fragmentary. (ED 64) 
 
To write is to cease to be, to no longer situate death in the future but in each 
instant, making each fragment a suicide. An autobiography is the death of the self 
in a fragmentary instant, the killing of the self to produce a new (multiple) self. 
                                                 
67
 Eros and Thanatos, ejaculation and severance. Circumcision is also (tropic) interruption: “the 
tropic of circumcision disposes cuts, caesuras, ciphered alliances, and wounded rings throughout 
the text” (SQ 54).  
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When Derrida offers the phrase “I want to kill myself” – read above through 
Hägglund and the autoimmune – as a phrase incessantly returned to throughout 
his life and work, he describes the fragmentary relations of the instant, and of the 
life/death of the fragment and writing of the self. “I want to kill myself”, he writes, 
“speaks less the desire to put an end to my life than a sort of compulsion to 
overtake each second, like one car overtaking another, doubling it rather, 
overprinting it with the negative of a photograph already taken with a „delay‟ 
mechanism” (CF 7). The compulsion to die is also a compulsion to live, to follow 
each dead breath with a new breath, each dead instant with a new instant that 
explodes in its iterable, fragmented divisibility, prefiguring every other (dead) 
instant. Hence “I posthume as I breathe” (CF 5); each fragment is a single breath 
taken from the grave, an impossible instant of life and death.  
Derrida doubly fears his mother‟s death – she who is already parabatically 
“surviving between life and death” (MB 39) – fearing that she will die and he will 
be left to mourn her, and fearing that he will die and she will not mourn him, as 
she cannot remember him. This double bind of survival is found in the ironic 
hyphenation of death and survival found in the fragment. Each fragment dies 
before each fragment, while also outlasting each fragment, and thereby provides 
both alleviation and aggravation to the fear(s) of continuance and cessation. By 
inscribing his and his mother‟s deaths into fragments both can survive each other, 
but both must also die first. Hence the autoimmune in the fragment. The promise 
of death and survival is doubled, as throughout “Aphorism Countertime” Derrida 
links the fragment to the pledge, the vow, the production of perjury and lie, the 
production of a double (un)bind.  
 The death that Derrida resists in Circumfession is not only the death of his 
mother, or the death that writing produces, but the death of himself in the face of 
the predictable and totalising system that Bennington creates. Unless Derrida can 
surprise Bennington and undermine the programming, he is without any future. G., 
as writer of the “absolute theologic program” (CF 28) and holder of absolute 
knowledge (savoir absolu (S.A.)) must be confessed to, not in order to present 
knowledge, but to produce it. Derrida confesses, and thus changes his life, 
produces a different truth, bears witness to what did not occur, recounts memories 
of “fictive” events. Circumfession writes to exist, writes to produce an 
unpredictable text and self, and so live, and yet is caught by the double bind of 
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writing – writing is always of death. As Blanchot writes, “to write is to accept that 
one has to die without making death present and without making oneself present 
to it” (ED 66). The autobiography, always caught by the irony of autoimmunity, is 
doubly caught in this instance. 
 
Autobiographical Doublings 
 
The totality of the fragmentary Circumfession is broken by excessive quotation, 
quotation from wholly other times and other people. The quotations from Saint 
Augustine – primarily his Confessions – are within and without the fragment, as 
they are quoted in Latin within the fragment but also translated – in full – on the 
edge. The impossibility of closure is heightened by the fact that the Latin 
quotation within the fragment is often just a few phrases from a passage, while the 
entirety of the passage is quoted on the border. The fragment is thus forced to 
contain more than it does contain, and the parabatic stepping into other works and 
fragments is emphasised. The reader who requires the translations of the Latin is 
forced each time to move in and out of the fragment, reading from the outside and 
reinserting the border of the text into the centre. Like an escarre (scab or bedsore) 
the Latin pushes itself outside, while the reader is obliged to invert the process and 
read through invagination. The quotations from Derrida‟s notebooks also figure as 
counterpoint or syncopated time, pushing the fragments into different time 
signatures. The supposedly self-present immediacy of the fragment is undone by 
the voices and times of multiple others, and thus each fragment is of the moment 
and of a wholly other moment, absolutely of a singular identity and absolutely of 
others.  
The proliferation of quotations marks, of other breaths in a single breath, 
repeated and refigured throughout the fragments calls to the irony of quotation. In 
quoting Augustine Derrida is ironically quoting himself, through the irony of 
quotation quoting a new use of an existing syntax, while also quoting Augustine. 
The trace of Augustine remains, multiplying the meanings of the passage as 
authorship becomes shared between Augustine and Derrida, and by the almost 
inaudible voices of those who used the phrase and words before. In requoting the 
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quotations
68
 the authorial signature becomes even more confused: Derrida quotes 
himself – for the “first” time – while also quoting himself and the previous 
fragment, while also quoting Augustine, while also quoting transgression and 
iterability. Quotation, even self-quotation, is never passive repetition, but a violent 
alteration: 
 
Above all do not believe that I am quoting any more than G., no, I am 
tearing off my skin, like I always do, I unmask and de-skin myself while 
savagely reading others like an angel, I dig down in myself to the blood, 
but in them, so as not to scare you, so as to indebt you toward them, not 
me. (CF 45) 
 
The shifts and changes within each fragment and within the relations 
between the fragments perform the anacoluthic functioning of parabatic irony. 
Circumfession abounds with changes of syntax, with clauses that leap from the 
run-on sentences as conceptual and grammatical wholes; the biblical overtones of 
“this is my corpus” (CF 5), for example, or the definitive statement 
“„Circumcision, that‟s all I‟ve ever talked about‟” (CF 14). The flowing rhythm of 
the sentences is sometimes cut by excessive punctuation that turns towards 
parataxis: “„I am, like, he who, returning, from a long voyage, out of everything‟” 
(CF 33), or welded together: “sucked up thrown out to the periphery of a sentence” 
(CF 42). When de Man writes on irony and parabasis in Schlegel he notes how a 
single passage has both a philosophical content and a sexual content; each phrase 
differs and defers between the manifest “academic” discussion and the latent 
sexualised discourse. In Circumfession Derrida inverts this order so that the 
“serious” philosophical system becomes the latent meaning, while the sexualised 
exposition – “[I am] „the only philosopher to my knowledge who, accepted – more 
or less – into the academic institution … will have dared describe his penis‟” (CF 
22) – is manifest. The religious act of circumcision, becomes (further) sexualised 
when Derrida mixes it with fellatio: “„autofellocircumcision‟” (CF 31). The layout 
of each page plays both with the concept of the dream-work, and with parabatic 
irony: Bennington‟s philosophical work on the top two-thirds of the page 
represents manifest content, while Derrida‟s fragments on the bottom third 
represent the traditionally repressed, sexualised content. The movement from 
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 Certain quotations from Saint Augustine are repeated throughout the fragments; for example, the 
passage from Augustine detailing how after his mother‟s death he wept for a little over an hour is 
repeated in fragments 9 and 49. 
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Derridabase to Circumfession presents a parabatic, anacoluthic surprise, as 
Derrida intended, a surprise which is figured and refigured throughout 
Circumfession.  
The anacoluthon of parabatic irony, the surprise which Derrida needed to 
generate, is the shock generated by the contamination of supposedly separate 
genres. The parabatic step between genres is found within the term itself in 
German: Gattung is both genre and gender/sex, and thus the “scientific” term for 
divisions contains a priori an illicit reference to sexual acts. The philosophical and 
the literary, the impersonal philosophical and the personal sexual, the general 
philosophical and the particular, idiomatic, autobiographical are supposedly 
separate, as represented by the divided page, but the clear mixing of genres within 
Circumfession embodies the covert contamination that occurs between 
Derridabase and Circumfession. And “Why”, asks Derrida elsewhere, “would it 
be illegitimate, forbidden … to cross several „genres‟, to write about sexuality at 
the same time as one writes about absolute knowledge?” (P 86) Why repress irony 
and the anacoluthon? 
 This should absolutely not imply that the sexualised content becomes a 
form of primary meaning, or that that latent content is somehow more “true”. It 
becomes impossible to distinguish fact from fiction in Circumfession; for Derrida 
an autobiography always contains “everything + n” (SI 35), the events of what did 
and did not happen. Hence in fragment 47 Derrida speaks of seeing blood on the 
back of a little girl following anal penetration, and follows it with a quotation 
from Augustine, which is translated as “Do I lie? Do I bring confusion by not 
distinguishing the clear knowledge of these things in the firmament of heaven 
from the bodily works?” (CF 47) Augustine‟s quotation itself contains a parabatic 
step between genres – “bodily works” – and Derrida‟s position becomes even 
harder to situate when he follows the quotation with “that means, follow carefully, 
that you never write like SA” (CF 47).  
Contradictions figure throughout Circumfession, but contradictions that 
are never wholly realised as such, as they figure in fragments which are too 
isolated to be wholly in opposition. In Circumfession Derrida‟s mother is thus 
both the woman who never cried – “the one who literally could not weep for him” 
(CF 10) – and who cried each time he left – “she who wept as much as Monica at 
each of my departures, from the first” (CF 34). Derrida is both “drunk with 
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uninterrupted enjoyment”, knowing no one “who has been happier than I, and 
luckier, euphoric”, and yet is also “the counterexample of myself … constantly 
sad, deprived, destitute, disappointed, impatient, jealous, desperate, negative and 
neurotic” [emphasis added] (CF 50). Circumfession is a collection of fragmentary 
memories and false names that create a multiple self with multiple histories that 
exist not in opposition but in syncopation, in spaces that are parallel and 
contaminated. Contradictions are not contradictions but different events that 
occurred to different versions of the self. Thus, G. is the name of the father 
(Geoffrey Bennington) who inherits from the son and the name of mother 
(Georgette Derrida) who no longer recognises her son: “it‟s as if for you I had 
changed my name without her knowing and my presence then finally becomes the 
absence it always was” (CF 35). Derrida‟s secret name, is Elie – Elijah – the name 
of circumcision, as Elijah is present/absent at every circumcision. A name that is 
there and not there, the name of one who is there and not there.
69
 This important 
secret name – “a whole other story, the one that Circumfession more or less turns 
around” (P 344) – is, however, one whose authenticity Derrida himself questions: 
“I don‟t know if it‟s true or if I reinvented it little by little, if I made it up, if I told 
myself a story in this regard, and in fact rather late, only in the last ten or fifteen 
years” (P 344).70 Memories change, names change, selves change. Circumfession 
is thus “Everybody‟s Autobiography” (CF 59) in which, for each “everybody”, “it 
only happens to me” (CF 58). 
The multiplicity of the self is linked to the fragment as genre of genres, 
and therefore as the genre that undoes genericity. The relation of each fragment to 
each other is, in a sense, always homosexual, it is always a relation of fragment to 
fragment, same to same, and yet the radical differences between, and within, each 
fragment, demonstrate an absolute heterosexuality, a relation of difference and 
alterity. Thus the homosexual love between Plato and Socrates in “Envois”, the 
description of Saint Augustine (SA) as a “little homosexual Jew” (CF 33), the 
“homosexual ventriloquy” (CF 31) at the heart of autobiographies, the love 
Derrida repeatedly declares for G. (referring to Bennington, but always 
                                                 
69
 The name “Elie” calls to “Eli”, a variant of the name of God, and to the high priest Eli that 
Derrida discusses in Memoirs of the Blind (MB 21). 
70
 Elijah figures in “Envois”, which was published eleven years before Jacques Derrida. The 
author calls his beloved from a red phone box, and as they speak the phone box is circled by a 
tramp he names Elijah. Thus a circumcision is performed – the tramp, named after the prophet 
symbolically present at circumcisions, circles the red booth and cuts off the conversation. 
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contaminated by the name of his mother, Georgette), can all be seen to represent 
relations between the same that is also other. Derrida is the double of his dead 
brother – conceived, he felt, to replace him, and thereby “excluded and favourite” 
(CF 52) – the double of his sister (whose initials are also J. D.), the double of 
Augustine and Rousseau – he stole grapes and figs, and compares his mother to 
Monica, Augustine‟s mother. The autos is also heteros; “„in Elie, everything 
would be said in the first person, I, I, I and from one sentence to the next, even 
within the same sentence, it would never be the same I” (CF 55). Derrida is 
ventriloquised by voices that are his and other, a heterosexual same in a 
homosexual other that produces multiple histories. As he writes in “Envois”, 
“steering wheels held with 4 hands, and pursuits and crossings and I pass you and 
you pass me [je te double et tu me doubles]” (E 200). I overtake you and I double 
you, in ironic contretemps.  
A number of different phrases and tropes are presented in Circumfession 
as codes or keys to Derrida and his work: “virus will have been the only object of 
my work” (CF 18), escarre is described as a “password” (CF 18), and  
 
„Circumcision, that‟s all I‟ve ever talked about, consider the discourse on 
the limit, margins, marks, marches, etc., the closure, the ring (alliance and 
gift), the sacrifice, the writing of the body, the pharmakos excluded or cut 
off, the cutting/sewing of Glas, the blow and the sewing back up‟. (CF 14) 
 
There is no single code to Derrida or his work, as both are multiple. A key to a 
whole system unlocks its method, but as deconstruction is not a method there can 
be no key. In giving a key Derrida gives a timed code, a code operative, perhaps, 
in a certain time and for a certain text, but without a universally applicable value. 
Each key is a true definition of and key to deconstruction and to Derrida, but is 
also perjury: “I lied to her [Derrida‟s mother] as I do to all of you” (CF 34). “I 
only know how to deceive, deceive myself, deceive you, and you and you again” 
(CF 20). Each phrase or term is offered up as a key that will unlock meaning, that 
will define and delimit Derrida and deconstruction. By offering multiple keys, 
Derrida presents fragments of a code, explanations that sum up and open a single 
window, but which close many others. As Derrida writes; there is no single “gift 
with which to sew up the chain of all my texts” (CF 26). Each fragment, each 
truth, each “I” has a different singularity and a different key that turns, that reveals, 
but never absolutely unlocks. Circumfession is an interrupted inter-view, an 
P a g e  | 254 
 
autoimmune exposure of the self, an ironic hyphenation of self and other, 
literature and philosophy, personal and public.  
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Conclusion: W(h)ither Deconstruction? 
 
 
Volume 32.1 (2010) of The Oxford Literary Review is dedicated to 
“Deconstruction, Environmentalism, and Climate Change”, focusing primarily on 
the absence of the carbon footprint within the deconstructive step. In “Some 
Climate Change Ironies”, Clark asks if Derrida‟s lack of engagement with climate 
change is indicative of an inability within deconstruction to address the 
incalculable effects of “a bounded space in which the consequence of actions may 
mutate to come back unexpectedly from the other side of the planet”.1 For Clark 
we face a situation in which seemingly trivial decisions “become significant or not 
depending on the contingency of how many others have done, are doing or will do 
them, anywhere on earth, implicating acts of seeming irrelevance in incalculable 
impacts”.2 In the face of climate change our modes of thinking are “inadequate or 
anachronistic”,3 incapable of addressing the enormity of “scale effects” in which a 
routine act is of negligible environmental impact when committed by a single 
individual but becomes catastrophic when committed by the entire population of a 
nation or continent. Deconstruction‟s focus on negotiation and decision-making is 
ineffectual when at issue “is not a lack of plausible measures that might reduce 
pollution in specific instances … but that the global scale of the issue, combined 
with scale effects and other uncertainties, derides the significance of any one 
measure at any one place or time”.4 
 Cohen concurs with deconstruction‟s inability to address the radical 
excesses of climate change, particularly at a time when deconstruction is 
stagnated by obsessive hagiographies and “anesthetized routines of mourning”.5 
Texts tend towards to the “exegetical normalisation of Derrida‟s writings to the 
point of recommending, as some legacy-keepers now do, the retirement of 
„deconstruction‟ with a full focus on „Derrida studies,‟ a Derrideanism without 
deconstruction that ennobles the proper name”.6 For Cohen the time of mourning 
is over, and it is necessary to step towards a “deconstruction without „Derrida‟, a 
                                                 
1
 Timothy Clark, “Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction, Environmental Politics and the 
Closure of Ecocriticism”, The Oxford Literary Review 32.1 (2010) 134. 
2
 Clark, “Climate” 136.  
3
 Clark, “Climate” 135. 
4
 Clark, “Climate” 137. 
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 Tom Cohen, “The Geomorphic Fold: Anapocalyptics, Changing Climes and „Late‟ 
Deconstruction”, The Oxford Literary Review 32.1 (2010) 82. 
6
 Cohen, “Geomorphic” 73. See chapter six. 
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deconstruction without „deconstruction‟”.7 He calls for the acknowledgment of the 
radical and fragmentary within deconstruction – calling, without naming it as such, 
for an acknowledgement of irony – attesting that if deconstruction recognised 
itself to be “the point of orientation toward a movement of ex-position that could 
not, finally, be delineated or given one name”8 then it would have to step away 
from its current, Derridean engagements and investments, and “be able to 
interrogate those vectors in Derrida‟s work that appear non-recuperable and, for 
that reason, would never have been quite mounted”.9 Deconstruction should be 
recognised as ironic and fragmentary, as a web of contradictory forces and 
weaknesses that should not be historically preserved, but utilised by being 
investigated, even attacked. It should be left to autoimmune suicide, and the ashes 
of what then survives made the resources for further engagements. For Cohen the 
climactic is “not deconstructible, not narrateable, implies „futures‟ more 
calculable than archival pasts, is not of the era of „literature‟ – or even containable 
within a designated tropology”. 10  If deconstruction can help us address 
contemporary problems of environmental catastrophes and focus on the future, it 
is most certainly not by being made sacrosanct. No noli me tangere for 
deconstruction. Then what? 
“As a deconstructive force, intellectually inspiring despite its horror, 
climate change still works to resist and open up the deep assumptions, pious 
enclosures and disciplinary parochialisms of current intellectual life, even as its 
pervasive irony mocks the destructive complacencies of consumer democracy”.11 
The pervasive irony that Clark outlines is effectively a structural irony, and it is 
perhaps through its excessive movement that deconstruction can be saved from a 
withering away. The steps and movements of parabatic and paratactic irony may 
provide a framework for making if not the conceptual then the ideological shift 
from a focus on discrete units and isolated choices to series of interconnected, 
mutually affective fragments. 
The problem of scale effects is a problem of radical disproportion and 
alterity, as events become explosive fragments in a global series of effects. Each 
act is not an act in isolation but an act of excessive hyphenation that interrupts the 
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insignificance of the act and ties it to every other event to create a chain of 
worldwide effects. As a fragment, each action is both a localised, private 
occurrence and a global, public event of (disastrous) magnitude, and is placed 
within a series of other fragments that intersect and interlock. Each fragment must 
be thought of in the plural and writ large, ironically interrupting itself with 
disproportionate import. A (simple) decision to buy a (fair trade) t-shirt is 
anacoluthically interrupted by discourses of farming practices, pay and work-hour 
regulations, and inefficient and polluting modes of transportation. Through a 
thinking of irony and the multiplicity of fragments the trauma of climate change, 
which “enact[s] or entail[s] the deconstruction of multiple frames of reference in 
multiple fields and modes of thought at the same time”, 12  can begin to be 
addressed, not through an applicable set of procedures for change – irony does not 
provide that – but through an important ideological shift.  
The use of irony in addressing environmental concerns is found in “The 
Post-ecologist Condition: Irony as Symptom and Cure”, where Bronislaw 
Szerszynski ostensibly presents irony as pharmakon; a disease endemic to modern 
society and its potential cure. Understanding irony as essentially grounded in 
intention or observation, Szerszynski calls “irony of comportment” the “radical 
disjuncture between outward behaviour and inward intentions”13 that epitomises 
the current crisis in political meaning. Irony is employed as a ruse and effect of 
power; its contradictions enable politicians to shape the world according to a 
personal, self-involved final vocabulary, and thereby retain power. However, 
Szerszynski notes that irony can also be used to “make visible such ruses of 
power … and draw attention to the situational ironies inherent within 
unsustainable and unjust cultural practices”.14 Such a use of irony endangers the 
ironist, however, as it may render her trapped in her own ironic distance – we‟re 
in very Kierkegaardian territory here – and so Szerszynski proposes an “irony as 
world relation” that posits an awareness of our interconnectedness.15 Hence an 
ironic ecology would involve an exploration of the mutual implication of nature 
and culture, and an awareness of the partiality and limitations of one‟s beliefs, 
while recognising the inevitability of failure and error, and at the same time the 
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need to act”.16 As valuable as this formula is, its grounding in postmodern irony, 
(cynical) distance and intentionality limits its effectiveness. Its recognition of a 
mode of “symphilosophic” human/nature interconnectedness is a step towards 
addressing the excesses of scale effects, but a step too short. Rather than a 
traditional understanding of irony, the dissymmetry of a fragmentary, structural 
irony is required. 
Thus structural irony is the acknowledgement of the non-public within the 
public, the momentous within the banal, the heterogeneous within the 
homogeneous, global within the local. While its implications may still present a 
certain subject-centred orientation on the mark, its parabatic step and paratactic 
(dis)order allows for a thinking of effects and implications beyond the immediate 
or apparent. Contaminated by the movement of irony, a deconstruction that is no 
longer (just) the work of Derrida but the revenant of an autoimmune suicide, may 
live on in the border lines of radical, fragmentary engagement.   
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Szerszynski 351. 
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Appendix i: “Fable” by Francis Ponge  
 
 
Fable 
 
Par le mot par commence donc ce texte 
Dont la première ligne dit la vérité, 
Mais ce tain sous l‟une et l‟autre, 
Peut-il être toléré? 
Cher lecteur déjà tu juges 
Là de nos difficultés… 
 
(APRÈS sept ans de malheurs 
Elle brisa son miroir) 
 
 
 
Fable 
 
With the word with begins then this text 
Of which the first line states the truth, 
But this tain under the one and the other 
Can it be tolerated? 
Dear reader already you judge 
There as to our difficulties… 
 
(AFTER seven years of misfortune 
She broke her mirror.) 
 
 
(Texts as presented in “Psyche: Inventions of the Other”) 
 
P a g e  | 260 
 
Appendix ii: “At This Very Moment” – final fragment 
 
~ VOICI EN CE MOMENT MÊME J‟ENROULE LE CORPS DE NOS VOIX 
ENTRELACÉES CONSONNES VOYELLES ACCENTS FAUTIFS DANS CE 
MANUSCRIT ~ IL ME FAUT POUR TOI LE METTRE EN TERRE ~ VIENS 
PENCHE-TOI NOS GESTES AURONT EU LA LENTEUR INCONSOLABLE QUI 
CONVIENT AU DON COMME S‟IL FALLAIT RETARDER L‟ÉCHÉANCE SANS 
FIN DUNE RÉPÉTITION ~ C‟EST NOTRE ENFANT MUET UNE FILLE PUET-
ÊTRE D‟UN INCESTE MORT-NÉE À L‟INCEST SAURA-T-ON JAMAIS PROMISE 
~ EN FAUTE DE SON CORPS ELLE SE SERA LASSIÉ DÉTRUIRE UN JOUR ET 
SANS RESTE IL FAUT L‟ESPÉRER IL FAUT SE GARDER MIEUX ~ PLUS ASSEZ 
DE DIFFÉRENCE LÀ ENTRE ELLES ENTRE L‟INHUMÉE OU LES CENDRES 
D‟UN BRÛLE-TOUT ~ MAINTENANT ICI MÊME LA CHOSE DE CETTE 
LITURGIE SE GARDE COMME UNE TRACE AUTREMENT DIT SE PERD AU-
DELÀ DU JEU ET DE LA DÉPENSE TOUT COMPTE POUR D‟AUTRES FAIT 
ELLE SE LAISSE DÉJÀ MANGER ~ PAR L‟AUTRE PAR TOI QUI ME L‟AURAS 
DONNÉE ~ TU SAVAIS DEPUIS TOUJOURS QU‟ELLE EST LE CORPS PROPRE 
DE LA FAUTE ELLE N‟AURA ÉTÉ APPELÉE DE SON NOM LISIBLE QUE PAR 
TOI EN CELA D‟ADVANCE DISPARUE ~ MAIS DANS LA CRYPTE SANS FOND 
L‟INDÉCHIFFRABLE DONNE ENCORE À LIRE POUR UN LAPS AU-DESSUS DE 
SON CORPS QUI LENTEMENT SE DÉCOMPOSE À L‟ANALYSE ~ IL NOUS FAUT 
UN NOVEAU CORPS AU AUTRE SAN PLUS JALOUSIE LE PLUS ANCIEN 
ENCORE À VENIR ~ ELLE NE PARLE PAS L‟INNOMMÉE OR TU L‟ENTENDS 
MIEUX QUE MOI AVANT MOI EN CE MOMENT MÊME OU POURTANT SUR 
L‟AUTRE CÔTÉ DE CET OUVRAGE MOMUMENTAL JE TISSE DE MA VOIX 
POUR M‟Y EFFACER CECI TIENS ME VOICI MANGE ~ APPROCHE-TOI ~ POUR 
LUI DONNER ~ BOIS 
 
 
~ HERE AT THIS VERY MOMENT I ROLL UP THE BODY OF OUR INTERLACED 
VOICES FAULTY CONSONANTS VOWELS ACCENTS IN THIS MANUSCRIPT ~ I 
MUST PUT IT IN THE EARTH FOR YOU ~ COME BEND DOWN OUR GESTURES 
WILL HAVE HAD THE INCONSOLABLE SLOWNESS SUITABLE TO THE GIFT 
AS IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO DELAY THE ENDLESS FALLING DUE OF A 
REPETITION ~ IT IS OUR MUTE INFANT A GIRL PERHAPS OF AN INCEST 
STILLBORN TO AN INCEST PROMISED ONE MAY NEVER KNOW ~ BY FAULT 
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OF HER BODY SHE WILL HAVE LET HERSELF BE DESTROYED ONE DAY AND 
WITHOUT REMAINDER ONE MUST HOPE ONE MUST KEEP HOPE FOR/FROM 
ONESELF EVEN THAT THUS SHE WILL GUARD HERSELF BETTER FROM 
ALWAYS MORE AND NO MORE JEALOUSY ~ NO LONGER ENOUGH 
DIFFERENCE THERE BETWEEN THEM BETWEEN THE FEMININE INHUMED 
OR THE ASHES OF A BURN-EVERYTHING ~ NOW HERE EVEN THE THING OF 
THIS LITURGY KEEPS ITSELF LIKE A TRACE OTHERWISE SAID LOSES 
ITSELF BEYOND PLAY AND EXPENDITURE ALL IN ALL AND ALL 
ACCOUNTING FOR OTHERS DONE ALREADY SHE LETS HERSELF BE EATEN 
~ BY THE OTHER BY YOU WHO WILL HAVE GIVEN HER TO ME ~ YOU 
ALWAYS KNEW THAT SHE IS THE PROPER BODY OF THE FAULT SHE WILL 
ONLY HAVE BEEN CALLED BY HER LEGIBLE NAME BY YOU AND IN THAT 
IN ADVANCE DISAPPEARED ~ BUT IN THE BOTTOMLESS CRYPT THE 
INDECIPHERABLE STILL GIVES ONE TO READ FOR A LAPSE ABOVE HER 
BODY THAT SLOWLY DECOMPOSES ON ANALYSIS ~ WE NEED A NEW BODY 
ANOTHER WITHOUT ANY MORE JEALOUSY THE MOST ANCIENT STILL TO 
COME ~ SHE DOES NOT SPEAK THE UNNAMED ONE YET YOU HEAR HER 
BETTER THAN ME AHEAD OF ME AT THIS VERY MOMENT WHERE 
NONETHELESS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS MONUMENTAL WORK I 
WEAVE WITH MY VOICE SO AS TO BE ERASED THERE THIS TAKE IT HERE I 
AM EAT ~ COME CLOSER ~ IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM/HER ~ DRINK 
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